Gaus begins the book with three questions inspired by Hayek: Are human beings psychologically and morally suited to the Open Society? Is the Open Society too complex to be morally justified? Is the Open Society too complex to be governed? The structure of the book follows those questions through three major parts: the evolution of a normative species; diversity and self-organized complexity; and the complexities of self-governance. Gaus’s project is therefore both philosophical and interdisciplinary. He draws upon moral philosophy, evolutionary theory, economics, political science, social psychology, complexity theory, and the study of institutions.
Although, in his book, Gaus provides an explanation of the
emergence and maintenance of cooperative social arrangements, an important
philosophical question remains: How
should we evaluate the moral principles that have evolved, and what justifies
the rights and institutions that make an open society desirable? An
explanation of how moral dispositions and cooperative practices emerged does
not, by itself, establish that those dispositions or practices are morally
justified.
Toward the end of this essay, I explain how Douglas B. Rasmussen
and Douglas J. Den Uyl’s theory of individualistic
perfectionism, particularly their account of individual rights as
metanormative principles, offers a complementary and underpinning philosophical
foundation. They argue that a
neo-Aristotelian understanding of human flourishing supports a political order
that protects individual liberty without requiring everyone to pursue the same
conception of the good life.
The Evolution of Human Moral
Behavior
The first part of the book explores the
evolution of human moral behavior. Gaus rejects a simple picture of human
beings as either selfish maximizers or altruistic cooperators. Instead, human
beings are highly social creatures possessing capacities for reciprocity,
cooperation, punishment, norm enforcement, moral learning, and cultural
adaptation. This evolutionary perspective matters because the Open Society is
not merely a political invention imposed upon human beings. It emerges from
capacities that human beings have developed over long periods of social
interaction. The implication is significant: liberal society must be understood
as a dynamic social order whose functioning depends upon actual human
capacities for cooperation and norm-following.
Gaus cites formal models and empirical evidence to show that the Open Society is grounded on the moral foundations of human cooperation originating in our distant evolutionary past, but has built upon them a complex and diverse society that requires rethinking both the nature of moral justification and the meaning of democratic self-governance. Instead of providing a traditional argument for the Open Society, Gaus offers an evolutionary account showing that the Open Society has advantages over alternative arrangements that will cause it to prevail. The features of the Open Society that foster cultural evolution have to do with diversity and complexity.
Diversity and Complexity
The second major theme is diversity. Gaus’s Open Society is much
more diverse than the relatively homogeneous liberal societies often imagined
by classical liberal theory. Individuals possess different values, preferences,
identities, projects, moral perspectives, and notions of the good.
This second part takes up Hayek’s
second thesis—that the Open Society is too complex for the practice of moral
justification. Gaus endorses Hayek’s criticism of social contract theory,
proposing instead a self-organization model of moral justification. According
to this model, moral justification is not a matter of deriving principles from
a hypothetical contract or a single collective choice, but rather emerges from
socially interdependent decisions. Publicly justified rules aid self-governance
through a process of continuous contestation and mutual adjustment.
Diversity can generate additional
diversity. Gaus describes this as autocatalytic
diversity. Interactions among different individuals and groups can
create new choices, institutions, occupations, lifestyles, associations, and
forms of cooperation. Diversity therefore becomes a source of further
complexity.
Freedom does not simply permit people to
choose among an existing menu of alternatives. Their interactions can generate
new alternatives. The social order is consequently not merely a system in
equilibrium. It is evolutionary and generative. Gaus’s central concept is self-organization. A complex social
order does not require a central designer. Individuals respond to one another,
learn, imitate, compete, cooperate, and adjust. Order emerges from these
interactions.
This is closely related to the Hayekian
concept of spontaneous order, but Gaus develops the idea in a more systematic
and contemporary framework. The Open Society is a complex adaptive system in
which individual actions can generate patterns that no individual actor
planned.
Public
Justification and Polycentric Governance
Importantly, Gaus does not conclude that
because an order is spontaneous it is beyond evaluation or governance. The third
part of his book explores how self-governance can operate within complex
systems.
Gaus’s account of public justification is also
important. In a diverse society, people will not share a comprehensive
conception of the good. Therefore, political legitimacy cannot depend upon
everyone sharing the same moral or religious worldview. Instead, social rules
must be justifiable to people with diverse normative perspectives. Gaus’s
approach attempts to explain how shared rules can emerge without requiring a
centralized agreement on ultimate values. His self-organization model suggests
that free and equal individuals can sometimes converge on common rules even
when they value those rules for different reasons.
This is an important development within
liberal public reason theory because it shifts attention away from designing an
ideal social contract and toward understanding how actual processes of
argument, adaptation, coordination, and institutional evolution can generate
publicly acceptable norms. Gaus’s libertarian neutralism embraces perspectival
diversity and interspectival justice which involves rational bargains and
compromises.
System-wide order self-organizes
from the bottom up rather than being commanded from above.
Consequently, ideal political
theories (such as Rawlsian egalitarianism or strict libertarian utopianism)
fail because they assume a static, predictable social model. They demand a
level of institutional knowledge that no central authority or philosopher can
possess. Crucially, Gaus argues that moral diversity is not a problem to be
eliminated, but an engine of social discovery and resilience. Gaus describes
diversity in the Open Society as autocatalytic. Free societies grant
individuals room to experiment with diverse ways of living and thinking. This
diversity drives innovation, specialization, and economic complexity. Increased
complexity expands the range of possible social roles and moral perspectives,
which in turn generates even greater diversity.
Instead of searching for a single,
ideal standard of justice, Gaus argues that the Open Society relies on
flexible, self-organizing moral rules that allow diverse agents to live
together productively despite moral disagreements. Polycentric governance and
decentralized rule-evolution allow society to adapt dynamically to unforeseen
challenges.
His discussion draws upon the insights associated with Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School. Polycentric institutions can emerge from self-organized networks and can provide mechanisms for solving collective action problems without requiring comprehensive central planning. Thus, Gaus’s liberalism is not simply about limiting government. It is about understanding the architecture of a complex social order in which governance itself can be decentralized.
According to Gaus, the Open Society
is characterized by three key features: autocatalytic diversity, unbounded
technological innovation, and individual autonomy. These features make the Open
Society a complex adaptive system that is difficult to control from the top or
center but is resilient and adaptive from the bottom up. Gaus argues that the
freedoms of our highly networked society are difficult to extinguish and that
its ideals can be vindicated via grassroots exploration and consent. This is a
cautiously optimistic argument about the long-term prospects for the Open
Society, grounded in an evolutionary analysis of morality as a complex adaptive
system.
Gaus’s approach is distinctively interdisciplinary, drawing on evolutionary analysis, primatology, anthropology, moral psychology, analyses of complex systems, experimental economics, and studies of norms. This methodological breadth reflects his pivotal role in the re-founding of “moral science” as an explicit form of social inquiry and his championing of philosophy, politics, and economics as a way of injecting empirical and strategic insights into traditional philosophical debates. His detached attitude toward morality, assessing it as an admirable but pragmatic mechanism, contrasts with the more prescriptive tone of much contemporary political philosophy.
Underpinning and Strengthening Gausian Complexity with neo-Aristotelian Perfectionism
While Gaus’s analysis of social
complexity is well done, an exclusively evolutionary defense of liberalism
faces weaknesses. Evolutionary processes can sometimes select for illiberal,
tribal, or authoritarian social structures if those structures offer short-term
survival advantages. If moral rules are merely evolved social conventions, it
becomes difficult to explain why an open society is good, rather than merely
complex and adaptive.
Evolutionary
persistence does not establish moral validity. A disposition may have
contributed to the survival or reproductive success of a group without being
ethically defensible. Favoritism toward one’s own group, for example, may have
supported cooperation among insiders while encouraging hostility toward
outsiders. Likewise, an institution may endure because it benefits powerful
participants rather than because it respects the rights and flourishing of
everyone subject to it.
Spontaneous order should not be treated as automatically just. Self-organizing processes can generate beneficial arrangements, but they can also operate within institutions that permit coercion, exploitation, or rights violations. The fact that a social pattern emerges spontaneously does not establish that it is morally legitimate.
Gaus’s dependence on formal empirical models, game theory, empirical evidence, evolutionary adaptation, and the social sciences displays his tendency to disregard or underrate traditional normative political philosophy. He appears to reject the traditional goal of political philosophy which is to determine or identify the best political order. An evolutionary theorist, like Gaus, should at some point judge what has evolved.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl supply the
necessary normative foundation. They remind us that social systems ultimately
exist for the sake of real human beings striving to live meaningful,
perfectible lives. Grounding the defense of the free society in human
self-direction ensures that classical liberalism remains anchored in a firm
defense of individual rights, preventing it from being reduced to pure
pragmatic functionalism.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl provide the missing normative anchor through their distinction between normative and metanormative principles. Normative principles guide individual moral conduct—they tell us how we ought to live. Metanormative principles, by contrast, regulate the conditions under which normative conduct could take place. Individual rights are metanormative principles: they establish the political and legal framework within which each person can pursue his or her own conception of the good life without being coerced by others. The linchpin of their argument is self-direction. Human flourishing is an objective, individualized, agent-relative achievement that each person must attain through his or her own practical reasoning and choice. Self-direction is both a necessary condition for, and an operating condition of, the pursuit and achievement of human flourishing. Because flourishing requires self-direction, and self-direction is thwarted by coercion, individuals possess natural rights to the conditions of their flourishing—rights that are grounded not in convention or utility but in the very nature of human beings as rational agents.
The complementarity between these approaches is structural. Gaus’s evolutionary-epistemic framework explains how the Open Society emerges, functions, and remains fragile. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s neo-Aristotelian perfectionism explains why it is worth defending and what its moral limits are. Spontaneous orders—markets, evolved legal rules, decentralized coordination—create conditions of prosperity and peace that no central planner could replicate. The spontaneous order of the market does not guarantee that anyone will flourish. It merely creates the space within which flourishing is possible. This is exactly what metanormative rights do. They do not guarantee success or even provide the conditions that make such action possible. The spontaneous order of general rules and the teleological structure of human action are not opposed but mutually supporting. The evolved rules of a free society create the conditions under which individual practical wisdom can operate effectively, while the metanormative framework of rights protects the sphere within which that wisdom is exercised.
Yet, the two approaches also differ
in important respects. Gaus’s framework is fundamentally procedural and social.
Moral justification emerges from the self-organization of diverse agents
converging on shared rules. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s framework is teleological
and individualistic. Rights are grounded in the nature of human flourishing as
an objective good that each person must achieve in his or her own way. Gaus is
more optimistic than Hayek about the capacity of evolved moral psychology to
sustain the Open Society. Rasmussen and Den Uyl are more confident that a
robust ethical foundation can be articulated without imposing a particular
conception of the good on others. Gaus’s account risks leaving the Open Society
normatively underdetermined and vulnerable to the objection that if some other
arrangement produced more prosperity or coordination, it would be justified.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s account supplies a non-consequentialist ground: the
right to self-direction is justified because self-direction is a necessary
condition for human flourishing, and human flourishing is the ultimate standard
of value.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s metanormative framework provides the normative foundation that Gaus’s evolutionary account presupposes but cannot itself generate. Gaus shows that the Open Society is grounded on evolved moral foundations. Rasmussen and Den Uyl show why those foundations are not merely contingent facts but expressions of a deeper teleological structure. The Open Society is an emergent order that creates the conditions for human flourishing, and human flourishing is the ultimate end that justifies and limits political power. Liberty and flourishing are not opposed but interdependent. Liberty is the political condition for flourishing, and flourishing is the moral purpose of liberty.
In an age of polarization and
skepticism about liberal institutions, this synthesis offers a defense of
freedom that is both empirically grounded and ethically robust. Gaus’s
evolutionary-epistemic framework explains the fragility and complexity of the Open
Society; Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s neo-Aristotelian perfectionism explains why it
deserves our understanding and our defense. Together, they articulate a vision
of a free society that emerges spontaneously yet serves the ultimate end of
human flourishing.
Conclusion
The relationship between Gerald Gaus’s The
Open Society and Its Complexities and Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Norms of
Liberty and The Perfectionist
Turn illustrates the potential value of integrating evolutionary
social science with neo-Aristotelian political philosophy. Gaus demonstrates
how evolved moral capacities, cultural development, and self-organized
complexity can help sustain an open society characterized by cooperation and
diversity. Rasmussen and Den Uyl provide a complementary and underpinning
ethical foundation by explaining why individual rights should protect the
conditions necessary for self-directed human flourishing.
The resulting synthesis recognizes that
an open society requires both an understanding of how cooperative social order
develops and a defensible account of the principles that should govern it.
Evolutionary success alone cannot determine moral legitimacy, while abstract
principles alone cannot explain the full complexity of social life.
Individualistic perfectionism supplies a philosophical standard for evaluating the moral and political institutions that evolutionary processes produce. Metanormative rights protect the freedom necessary for individuals to pursue diverse forms of flourishing, while the insights of spontaneous-order theory help explain how those individuals can cooperate peacefully without a centrally imposed plan.
References
Bates, Winton. 2025. “How Can the Study of Human Nature Help Us Reach Normative Conclusions in Political Philosophy”. Freedom and Flourishing (Oct. 31).
Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Gaus, Gerald. 2011. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of
Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Gaus, Gerald. 2016. The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gaus, Gerald. 2021. The Open Society and Its Complexities. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hayek, Friedrich A., 1960. The Constitution of Liberty.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1973. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1: Rules and Order*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Popper, Karl R. 1945. The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:
Younkins,
Edward W. “What Contribution did David L.
Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and
Flourishing. January 18, 2025.
----------------------------“How can dialectics help us to defend
liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.
---------------------------“How can Austrian Economics be
reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 2, 2025.
----------------------------- “Can Polarized Moral Politics be
Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.
----------------------------- “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing.
January 22, 2026.
----------------------------- “Is
Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.
----------------------------- “Are Spontaneous Order and
neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing.
March 19, 2026.
----------------------------- “Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and
Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing.
June 4, 2026.
----------------------------- “The Architecture of Freedom: Randy
Barnett’s Natural Law Case for a Free Society” Freedom and Flourishing. June 26, 2026.
----------------------------- “Robust Political Economy and
Neo-Aristotelianism: Complementary Visions of Freedom and Flourishing” Freedom and Flourishing. July 10, 2026.
------------------------------ “Is Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Consistent with Aristotle’s
Virtue Ethics?”
Freedom and
Flourishing. July 26,
2026.
-------------------------------"Henry
B. Veatch’s Neo-Aristotelian Defense of Reality, Reason, and Rights”
Freedom and Flourishing. August 30, 2026.
-------------------------------- "Behavioral Economics and Human Flourishing: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective” Freedom and Flourishing. October 4, 2026.
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