Why were merchants attracted to Buddhism in ancient India?

 

My recent visit to India was motivated in part by a desire to visit some ancient Buddhist caves that were excavated with the help of donations from merchants at a time when India was at the centre of a globalized world. My interest was aroused by reading of William Dalrymple’s book, The Golden Road, during a previous visit to India.

My interest was heightened by further reading, including a book chapter by Osmund Bopearachchi entitled ‘Indian Ocean Trade through Buddhist Iconographies’. (Please see references at the end of this essay.)

Ajanta caves

One of the highlights of my trip was visiting the Ajanta caves, which were hewn out over the period from 200 BC to 650 AD. The Ajanta caves are shown in the photo at the top of this post.

Here is an extract from Dalrymple’s discussion of the murals in Ajanta caves:

“The murals indicate that, by the time of Ajanta, India was not some self-contained island of Indianness, but already a cosmopolitan and surprisingly urban society full of traders from all over the world; in many cases it was the traders themselves who actually paid for these murals, such as the rich merchant Ghanamadada who, according to an inscription, donated the funds for Cave 12. To some extent, the murals may also have reflected the merchants’ taste, which could explain the near absence of asceticism or even monasticism in the murals.”

Some of the photos I took of murals at Ajanta caves are shown below.

 

I invite readers who are interested in finding out more about other historical sites I visited in India and Sri Lanka to take a look at a series of posts on my Facebook timeline, beginning on 12 April 2026.

Why was Buddhism attractive to merchants?

Even after my visit to the Ajanta caves, I did not fully understand why merchants supported Buddhism in ancient India. I reasoned that the occupation of being a merchant would make a person disinclined to accept a religious doctrine which denies their own existence. Idle people may ponder their own existence, but merchants would be expected to be too busy pursuing their occupation. So, wouldn’t Buddhism’s “no self” doctrine be unpalatable to merchants?

My first step toward a better understanding of this question was to revisit the discussion of the “no self” doctrine in a book on Indian philosophy by Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri. The authors note that in proposing the “no self” idea the Buddha was signalling his disagreement with the Brahmanical tradition which made the self a central pre-occupation. They explain the role of “no self” in the context of the Buddha’s teaching that craving is the source of human suffering. He argued that you can avoid being attached to the things that falsely seem to benefit you if you give up on the idea that you have a self that can be benefited.

The authors note that in rejecting the idea of a centre of identity that underlies all awareness, there is still a lot of room for Buddhists to accept less metaphysically ambitious notions of the self. However, they add:

“Yet it seems clear that the Buddhists did want to critique and revise our everyday assumptions about the reality of persons, and other things.” (p. 53)

Buddhists believe that it is only by convention that we refer to a person as an entity. There is nothing to a person over and above a conglomeration of momentary bodily states, feelings and perceptions. The authors sum up:

“So here we have arrived at what may be the most notorious philosophical doctrine of Buddhism, that we are nothing more than flowing streams with no firm identity from time to time.” (p. 54)

That statement reminds me that Richard Campbell used the metaphor of flowing streams to make the point that it is possible to distinguish between the contents of one’s consciousness and one’s identity:

“The same river can flow through different places, and I remain the same person through the many phases of my life.” (Campbell, p. 292).

However, that is a digression. (I have previously discussed Richard Campbell’s views here and here.)

Although they argue that it is only by convention that we refer to a person as an entity, Buddhists have no problem in acknowledging that acceptance of such “conventional truth” is necessary for people to function in everyday life.

The Buddha believed strongly that actions have consequences – the causes that you create are reflected in your subsequent experiences. That view - and the Noble Eightfold Path more generally - seems to me to presuppose that, in the world as we experience it, individuals exist and make choices. It would not be possible to choose the right view; right intention; right speech; right action; right livelihood; right effort; right mindfulness; and right concentration if you did not have individual agency.

I have just remembered that in writing about individualism some years ago, I noted that the Buddha did not oppose self-love when given an opportunity to do so. Despite his belief in “no self”, he suggested that self-love provides a strong reason for individuals to refrain from hurting others.

It seems likely that many merchants would have been attracted to the precepts of the Noble Eightfold Path as providing a basis for ethical conduct. They would certainly have been inclined to view themselves as engaged in “right livelihood”, because they were earning a living in a way that benefits others as well as themselves.

Andy Rotman has noted that early Buddhist literature accords high regard to merchants. In one story, a merchant, Supriya, converts all of India to Buddhism by satisfying everyone's material needs and then establishing them on the tenfold path of virtuous actions. As well as presenting a merchant as a virtuous hero, the story seems to imply the existence of something like Maslow’s hierarchy of needs – people may find it easier to be virtuous if cravings associated with their physiological needs are satisfied.

The attitude of Brahminical Hinduism toward merchants also helps to explain why merchants were attracted to Buddhism. Kathleen Morrison notes:

“Buddhism … overcame many of the problems Brahminical Hinduism presented to merchants, including strict rules of commensality, limited avenues for social advancement, and a prohibition against overseas travel.”

Conclusion

Visits to ancient Buddhist caves during my recent trip to India were motivated by my interest in links between Buddhism and merchants engaged in international trade. Many of the murals in the Ajanta caves depict an environment full of beauty and the pleasures of youth rather than ascetic monasticism.

It isn’t difficult to understand why merchants might fund the creation of such works of art, but that doesn’t explain why they would be attracted in the first place to a religion advocating a “no self” doctrine. It is central to Buddhism that giving up on the idea of self enables people to liberate themselves from the craving that is the cause of suffering.

The important point is that Buddhists have no problem accepting that the existence of selves as a convention necessary to function in everyday life. Ethical behaviour is predicated on the idea that actions have consequences, which presupposes the existence of individuals who make choices.

It seems likely that merchants would have been attracted to the Noble Eightfold Path as offering support for ethical conduct. They had good reasons to think of themselves as engaged in “right livelihood”.

The high regard for merchants in Buddhist society is reflected in early Buddhist literature. By contrast, at that time Hinduism seems to have been much less supportive of the activities of merchants.  

Part V: What information constraints confront political entrepreneurs?

 This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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This essay considers the information constraints confronting central planners and those political entrepreneurs who have less ambitious aims to promote widely accepted economic and social objectives. It is appropriate to begin by considering the motives of political entrepreneurs.

Motives of political entrepreneurs

Many assumptions that economists make about motives of political entrepreneurs are clearly wrong. Political entrepreneurs cannot maximize social welfare functions, even when they seek to promote the well-being of citizens.  They rarely set out to maximize the number of votes they obtain, even though they seek to obtain sufficient votes to win elections. They don’t necessarily set out to maximize the perks of office, or to use their positions to maximize personal wealth, even though such behaviour is common when the institutional context is conducive to it. The claims that many politicians make to be motivated by concerns for the well-being of the population they represent are not always deceitful.

Bryan Caplan suggests that to get ahead in politics, “leaders need a blend of naïve populism and realistic cynicism.” One reason why many politicians have legal training is because “the electoral process selects people who are professionally trained to plead cases persuasively and sincerely regardless of their merits” (Caplan 2007, p.169).

The easiest way to give the appearance of sincerity is to believe in the merits of the case you are pleading. Leon Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory predicts that when people publicly advocate a position - especially if doing so requires effort or commitment - they tend to adjust their private attitudes to align with their advocacy to reduce internal psychological tension (Festinger, 1957).

Institutional context has important implications for the character of people who are attracted to a career in politics. Unscrupulous opportunists are likely to be attracted to political and bureaucratic positions in which they can obtain personal benefit by using discretionary powers corruptly. F. A. Hayek observed that “the worst get on top” in totalitarian systems because “while there is little that is likely to induce men who are good by our standards to aspire to leading positions in the totalitarian machine, and much to deter them, there will be special opportunities for the ruthless and unscrupulous” (Hayek 1994, pp.166-67).

However, an institutional context that is attractive to unscrupulous opportunists may also attract potential political entrepreneurs who see opportunities for institutional reform. More generally, reform-minded individuals may be motivated to enter politics when they perceive that current practices are resulting in adverse economic and social consequences.

Unfortunately, reform-minded political entrepreneurs are not a panacea. As discussed below, those who advocate further restrictions on individual liberty in their efforts to promote economic and social objectives may make matters worse. And, as discussed in subsequent essays, even when reform-minded political entrepreneurs who advocate greater economic and personal freedom succeed in attaining high office, they face substantial obstacles to achieving their institutional change objectives.

The perils of central planning

In a famous article, F. A. Hayek explained that the data a national planning agency would require to engage in rational economic planning exists only in a dispersed form in the separate minds of millions of people. Hayek observed that individuals possess unique knowledge of “the particular circumstances of time and place”, which they can use for their own benefit, and that of others, only if the decisions depending on it are left to them or made with their active cooperation (Hayek 1945, pp.521-2). Hayek suggested that we should look at the price system as a “mechanism for communicating information” because prices act to coordinate the separate actions of different people (Hayek 1945, p.526).

In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek noted:

“The question raised by economic planning is … not merely whether we shall be able to satisfy what we regard as our more or less important needs in the way we prefer. It is whether we shall be able to decide what is more, and what is less, important for us, or whether this is to be decided by the planner” (Hayek 1944, p.100).

In later writings, Hayek noted that as the adverse consequences of central planning became apparent, it came to have fewer defenders in the liberal democracies. However, arguments were still being advanced in favor of the state’s taking sole charge of providing various services that can be provided privately. He suggested that this also entailed the risk that people would be prevented from using their unique knowledge for their own benefit and would be denied the benefits of competitive experimentation:

“If, instead of administering limited resources under its control for a specific service, government uses its coercive powers to insure that men are given what some expert thinks they need; if people thus can no longer exercise any choice in some of the most important matters of their lives, such as health, employment, housing, and provision for old age, but must accept the decisions made for them by appointed authority on the basis of its evaluation of their need; if certain services become the exclusive domain of the state, and whole professions – be it medicine, education, or insurance - come to exist only as unitary bureaucratic hierarchies, it will no longer be competitive experimentation but solely the decisions of authority that will determine what men get” (Hayek 1960, p.261).  

In a book first published in 1985 Don Lavoie further explained the fundamental knowledge problem that political entrepreneurs are confronted with when they seek to plan economic activities. The most obvious implication is that it is impossible for markets to be replaced by comprehensive economic planning. However, more modest attempts to steer the market towards outcomes which planners consider to be desirable also obstruct the source of knowledge which is essential to rational decision-making (Lavoie 2016, p.56-7).

Lavoie points out that the only way we can know whether we are squandering resources by over- or under-investing in microprocessors or steel, for example, is via “the messages contained in the relative profitability of rival firms in these industries”. He adds:

“But this is precisely the information we garble when we channel money toward one or another of the contenders. Deprived of its elimination process, the market would no longer be able to serve its function as a method for discovering better and eliminating worse production techniques. Without the necessity of responding to consumers’ wants or needs, businesses would never withdraw from unprofitable avenues of production” (p.181).

Lavoie notes that advocates of industry policy disagree on the directions in which the market should be steered. For example, Felix Rohatyn wanted to funnel aid to sunset industries while Robert Reich wanted to funnel it to sunrise industries. He sums up:

“It is the main conclusion of the argument that I have called the knowledge problem … that there are no rational grounds on which Reich could ever convince Rohatyn or vice versa on such matters as are involved in economic change. As a result, such battles are sure to be fought with weapons other than carefully reasoned argument” (p. 200-201).

Lavoie notes that Rohatyn and Reich both argued that it is the responsibility of a strong leader to coordinate the actions of the rest of us (p.190). The coordination they had in mind seems to be more akin to the coordination that military leaders impose by giving orders to subordinates than the coordination among individuals that occurs voluntarily and spontaneously in a free market.

Lavoie argues that economic planning is inherently militaristic: “The practice of planning is nothing but the militarization of the economy”. In making that point he notes that the theory of economic planning was from its inception modeled after feudalistic and militaristic organizations (p. 230).

Some would argue that a degree of militarization is a price worth paying, or even desirable, to achieve a range of national objectives. Indeed, the conventional theory of democracy seems to entail top-down direction. Prior to elections, political leaders tell voters about their plans for education, health, social security etc. and are expected to implement those plans after they are elected. That view seems to imply the existence of some kind of necessary tension between democracy and markets. I will discuss that view later in this essay.

Knowledge required for governance

Gerry Gaus’s final book discusses, among other things, the question of whether the Open Society has evolved beyond “our” governance. Gaus seems to adopt F. A. Hayek’s view of the Open Society (or Great Society) as a society in which coercion of some by others has been reduced as far as possible and individuals are free to use their own knowledge for their own purposes.

Gaus alludes to the knowledge problem when he observes that “we seek to devise policies to improve” the functioning of the Open Society. However, “we do not have the knowledge and competency to do so, hence we are constantly disappointed by the last round of interventions and we blame the last government for its failures and broken promises” (Gaus 2021, p.13).

Gaus points out that when people do not endorse a policy imposed by planners, some tend to evade it. In commenting on the “passive population model”, he writes:

“Unfortunately, this view has been resurrected by those elites who continue to believe that the public is too ignorant to make its own decisions, and so should submit to “epistocracy,” or rule by those who know (aka, them). Not only, however, is such expertise essentially nonexistent in complex systems, but most actual agents in the Open Society are anything but passive materials to be guided by the elite: they are active, reflexive agents who make their own choices. When citizens do not endorse a policy, many will employ their resources to evade it” (Gaus 2021, p.244).

Gaus considers three levels of governance – macro, meso, and micro- and three dimensions of governance – goal directed, strategic, and rules-focused. A goal-directed governor identifies preferred states and seeks to move society toward them. A strategic governor seeks to solve strategic dilemmas to assist citizens to secure outcomes they all want. A rules-focused governor seeks to structure some of the rules of self-organization.

Gaus’s analysis leads to the following conclusions:

• There is little prospect for a governor to successfully pursue macro-level goals in a complex society. For example, efforts to promote development in particular societies are often unsuccessful because institutions cannot readily be transferred from on society to another.
• Attempts to structure the “rules of the game” at a macro level are more promising. In cooperation with the self-organized normative framework of society a governor may effectively shape the rules of self-organization e.g. via civil rights legislation.
• Goal pursuit at the meso level is a dubious enterprise. Pursuit of environmental, economic and welfare-targeted variables is a hit-and-miss affair because our social world is a complex system. It is not linear and determinate, as is often assumed. Successful goal pursuit in a complex world is usually a matter of “muddling through” (sometimes described as learning-based governance).
• Polycentric governance studies show that a focus on problem-solving tends to facilitate effective governance when publics share pressing strategic dilemmas.
• There may be grounds for more optimism about the prospect for micro governance than governance at other levels.

In writing about micro governance, Gaus makes a favourable reference to the work of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Gaus justifies his optimism about micro governance as follows:

 “When changes come up from the more micro levels, not only are they apt to garner the moral endorsement of actual citizens, but the Open Society will possess a diversity of normative networks. Because what works today may be dysfunctional tomorrow, a diversity of approaches is always critical. This itself upsets the moralist, who believes she speaks for the truth about justice, and sees most deviations from her plan as shades of immorality. But many of the diverse publics will not take up her solutions—many citizens will see different problems and possibilities, and their normative beliefs will lead them to different solutions” (Gaus 2021, p.240).

Can democracy be consistent with freedom?

Gaus and Lavoie offer similar views on the compatibility between democracy and freedom. Gaus suggests that “so far from being opposed or in tension, democracy and freedom need each other to thrive.” He suggests that a critical task of the democratic order is to ensure the equality and fairness on which large-scale human cooperation depends. However, unless it is “animated by a spirit of public justification, democracy itself becomes a mechanism by which some seek to impose their valued goals on others in the name of the people” (Gaus 2021, p. 245).

In his discussion of the view that there is some kind of necessary tension between democracy and free markets. Lavoie notes that we tend to think that “taking democracy too far undermines markets and that taking markets too far undermines democracy”. He attributes that view to “liberalism’s gradual drift into compromises with conservatism and socialism” (Lavoie 1993). He suggests that liberalism needs to reinterpret its notions of markets and democracy so that they are seen to be essentially complementary. Our economics needs to take account of the cultural underpinnings of markets and our politics “needs to move beyond the model of the exercise of some kind of unified, conscious democratic will and understand democratic processes as distributed throughout the political culture”. The force of public opinion is best perceived as the distributed influence of political discourses throughout society rather than as “a concentrated will”.

Lavoie argues that what we should mean by democracy is a distinctive kind of openness in society rather than a theory about how to elect the personnel of government:

“Democracy is not a quality of the conscious will of a representative organization that has been legitimated by the public, but a quality of the discursive process of the distributed wills of the public itself” (Lavoie 1993, p.111).

It seems to me that those who see merit in the view of democracy presented by Lavoie and Gaus have good reasons to be skeptical about the worth of top-down planning to achieve national objectives. Individuals have different priorities and objectives that deserve to be recognized. Top-down planning cannot give appropriate recognition to those individual differences. Moreover, given the peculiarities of the business of politics, as discussed in the preceding essay, well-meaning attempts to pursue economic and social objectives that are widely supported within communities are prone to diverted to serve narrow interest groups.

In the following essay I consider the consequences of institutional path dependence, first in slowing the emergence of interest group politics, and second in making it more difficult for reform-minded political entrepreneurs to restore freedom and enhance opportunities for human flourishing.

 

References

Caplan, Bryan., The Myth of the Rational Voter (Princeton University Press, 2007).

Festinger, Leon., A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford University Press, 1957).

Gaus, Gerald., The Open Society and its Complexities (Oxford University Press, 2021).

Hayek, F. A., The Road to Serfdom (University of Chicago Press, 1994).

Hayek, F.A., “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, The American Economic Review, XXXV, 4 (1945).

Hayek, F.A., The Constitution of Liberty (The University of Chicago Press, 1960).

Lavoie, Don., National Economic Planning: What Is Left? (Mercatus Center, 2016).

Lavoie, Don., “Democracy, Markets, and the Legal Order: Notes on the Nature of Politics in a Radically Liberal Society” in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Eds.) Liberalism and the Economic Order (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Part III: How is political entrepreneurship similar to economic entrepreneurship?

 This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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As noted in the Preface, Don Lavoie held that entrepreneurship fundamentally consists of interpreting and influencing culture. From Lavoie’s perspective, “entrepreneurial acts are the readings of, and contributions to, different conversations”. He explains further:

“Most acts of entrepreneurship are not like an isolated individual finding things on beaches; they require effort of the imagination, skillful judgements of future costs and revenue possibilities, and an ability to read the significance of complex social situations” (Lavoie 2015, p.63).

It seems to me that political entrepreneurs listen to the discourse of potential supporters about existing policies to discover what they will be likely to find attractive. They use that information to innovate by producing new products and selling them persuasively. The new products are policy proposals. Success is measured, in the first instance, by whether proposed policy proposals are implemented.

Political entrepreneurs respond to public discourse, using it as a basis for policy innovation. However, their ideological agendas may not reflect a society’s underlying cultural values. In democracies, individuals may challenge entrenched interests by creating and participating in new political movements; under authoritarian regimes, such innovation is suppressed.

As I see it, Lavoie’s suggestion that entrepreneurs play an interpretive role in complex systems is applicable to all kinds of entrepreneurship. And Roger Koppl is correct to argue that “entrepreneurs are not a class of people distinct from other persons.” As Koppl says: “Entrepreneurship is an aspect of all human action. Entrepreneurship is a human universal” (Koppl 2006, pp.1-2).

Koppl built on the views of Israel Kirzner to propose a post-Kirznerian theory of entrepreneurial behavior. He suggested that alertness, discovery, and innovation are the key concepts required to understand what entrepreneurs do and what entrepreneurs are. Alertness refers to recognition of opportunities to revise plans and habits. Discovery is finding a profit opportunity, or some other opportunity to achieve a better outcome. Innovation occurs when the entrepreneur acts on the discovery that he or she has made (Koppl 2006, pp.6-7).

It is possible to identify different kinds of entrepreneurship with major contributors to the study of entrepreneurship. While Kirzner recognized the importance of discovery and innovation, he emphasized alertness to profit opportunities (Kirzner 1979). Joseph Schumpeter viewed the entrepreneur as an innovator who does new things, or does things in new ways (Schumpeter 1947).

Some political scientists have suggested a role for political entrepreneurs akin to the role played by Schumpeter’s innovators in the field of economics. Catherine De Vries and Sara Hobolt suggest that competition between political parties in European countries is like competition in economic markets. Long-standing dominant players have been challenged by disruptive new players. The central objective for both challengers and incumbents is the control of government and the delivery of public policies. Political entrepreneurs play a key role because a party that engages in successful political policy innovation can enjoy an effective monopoly on an issue and reap the consequent electoral benefits (De Vries and Hobolt 2020).

De Vries and Hobolt were writing about multi-party systems in which several political parties are competing for power. However, a similar form of competition occurs when an innovator challenges established leadership factions within a major political party by offering a product that is more appealing to a group of party members.

It often makes sense to view political and economic activities as belonging to separate realms. That perspective is helpful in considering the interactions between politics and business. Nevertheless, Richard Wagner makes an important point when he suggests that politics should be viewed as a peculiar form of business because it has many characteristics in common with business. Both attract investors to provide capital, entail competition, offer sources of livelihood for people, and are supported by administrative educational organisations. And both involve entrepreneurship, (Wagner 2016, p.11).

The next essay focuses on the peculiarities of politics as a form of business and discusses the incentives that political entrepreneurs are faced with in their efforts to attain power and introduce policy innovations.

References

De Vries, C.E. and S.B. Hobolt, “Challenger Parties and Populism”, LSE Public Policy Review 1, no.1 (2020), pp. 1–8.

Kirzner, Israel, Perception, Opportunity, and Profit, Studies in the Theory of Entrepreneurship (University of Chicago Press, 1979).

Koppl, Roger, “Entrepreneurial Behavior as a Human Universal” in Entrepreneurship: The Engine of Growth, ed. Maria Minniti (Praeger, 2007).

Lavoie, Don, “The discovery and interpretation of profit opportunities: culture and the Kirznerian entrepreneur”, in Culture and Economic Action, edited by Laura E Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (Edward Elgar, 2015).

Schumpeter, Joseph, “The Creative Response in Economic History”, The Journal of Economic History VII, no. 2 (1947), pp. 149-159.

Wagner, Richard E., Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).

How is Maslow's hierarchy relevant to the needs of employees?

 

This is a guest essay by Ross Judd.

Ross has a Masters Degree in Communication Management, extensive training in NLP (Neuro Linguistic Programming), and works as a successful Business Consultant and Leadership Coach. He has decades of experience helping people connect more effectively through communication.

The essay was originally published as Chapter 3 of Ross’s book, “Cultural Insanity, and the roadmap to great organisational culture” That book was written to right the wrongs of the “culture change” approach and advocate the benefits of engaging people, and keeping the process as simple as possible.

Ross has also written another book:

“Listening, a guide to building deeper connections”. That book offers a practical guide about how to listen in the moments that really matter.

Ross enjoys the great outdoors between consulting assignments and writing his next book on Leadership.

Ross writes:

You are probably familiar with Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, as shown in the diagram. It demonstrates that we cannot satisfy psychological needs like ‘self-esteem’ or ‘belonging’ if our physical needs such as food, shelter, and safety have not been met.

This makes sense. It would be hard to talk to someone about self-fulfilment if they hadn’t eaten for two days.

Ross Judd’s Hierarchy of Employee Needs

Maslow’s concept can be translated to organisational culture, and helps us understand what employees need so they can help create a great organisational culture.  

Security needs   

The most basic needs Maslow identified were physiological, meaning the things we need to survive, like food, water, and shelter.

In terms of organisational culture, the survival requirements are salary and job security. If they are threatened we feel like our survival is threatened. It’s not a logical or rational response; clearly someone wouldn’t die if they lost their job. It’s a neurological response based on deep instincts. We will still go to work if these things are threatened, but we won’t be able to think as clearly, or make good decisions.

As an example, think about what happened during the COVID Pandemic. People were worried about losing their jobs and felt like their survival was threatened. As a result they started making irrational decisions – like hoarding toilet paper.

You will find it very difficult to talk to people about culture if they are worried they will lose their job and not be able to pay their mortgage, buy groceries, and satisfy their ‘survival’ needs. And yet, how many companies have enacted redundancies and then immediately imposed a ‘culture change’ program? Are they really expecting people to contribute positively to the business’s culture when they are wondering if there will be another round of redundancies and if they will still have a job in a month?

And what happens if a leader behaves in a way that causes people to feel their job is threatened?

People need to feel secure; if they don’t, everything else is hard work.

Safety needs

The next level is safety. In organisations, this is physical and psychological safety.

People will not participate in improving the culture if they feel their safety is threatened, meaning they feel like they are working in unsafe conditions or there will be repercussions if they speak up.

Leaders need to create a safe place to work if they want to build a culture where people demand and expect the right behaviours from each other.

Psychological needs: belonging and self-esteem

The next two levels are psychological, and won’t be achieved if people feel like their security or safety is threatened.

People need to belong to something worthwhile or meaningful. In organisations, this is experienced as loyalty to the company, a sense of belonging to a team, project, site or company, and feeling that work has meaning.

People will be loyal to a company if they feel secure and safe, but feelings of self-esteem will be enhanced by engaging them in a conversation about the purpose of the company and the culture needed to deliver that purpose.

Any time you connect people with a purpose, you are creating a deeper meaning for their work and they will feel a strong sense of belonging and self-esteem.

Self-fulfilment needs: self-actualisation

The final level is self-actualisation. This is a state in which people relax and perform to their full potential. They are often more creative, innovative and successful.

Maslow’s Hierarchy makes it clear this is only possible when people feel secure, safe, and part of a team that is doing something meaningful.

That makes sense. It’s hard to achieve your full potential if you are worried about things like putting food on the table, repercussions if you speak up, or whether you are accepted by your leader and team.

A strong culture is the essential ingredient that helps people achieve their full potential. People are more creative when they feel the team will accept and explore their crazy ideas, or when they feel like they are doing something meaningful. If people feel threatened they withdraw and will only do what they are told.

Leadership Principles

This hierarchy establishes a set of principles that leaders need to understand and follow to build a positive culture in their organisation:

1.     People need to feel secure.

2.     People need to feel safe to speak up. 

3.     You need to build healthy relationships that create a sense of belonging.

4.     People need to have a sense of purpose and feel their work is meaningful.

5.     Then you will find it much easier to engage people in creating a culture that will help them achieve their full potential.  

 

How does Entangled Political Economy help us to understand political entrepreneurship?

 

After I finished reading Richard E. Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, the thought crossed my mind that I should encourage people to read what I was about to write about it before reading the other essays I have recently written about political entrepreneurship. The titles of the other essays are:

Can the concept of political entrepreneurship help us to understand authoritarianism?

What role does political entrepreneurship play in institutional change?

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good?

I have been writing essays about political entrepreneurship to improve my understanding of the topic. In the process I have felt like that a blind man trying to build up a picture of an elephant in his mind by approaching it from different angles. After I finish writing this essay, I might be able to turn my mind to considering how best to present my understanding of the concept and its relevance to liberty and human flourishing.

Entangled Political Economy

The full title of Richard E. Wagner’s book is Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).  

Wagner refers to the ancient Indian parable of the blind men and the elephant in suggesting that political economy is best approached from the standpoint of plausible reasoning rather than demonstrative reasoning.

Plausible reasoning starts from the standpoint that the object of inquiry cannot be known in full detail to the inquirer.

By contrast, demonstrative reasoning begins with a set of assumptions about human behavior, and then analyses the implications of those assumptions. The conventional welfare economics approach to the role of government - with its assumption that government acts like an omniscient and benevolent dictator attempting to maximize the well-being of citizens by correcting externalities and providing public goods – provides a relevant example of demonstrative reasoning.

The analytical framework of Entangled Political Economy recognises that both “polity and economy are areas of practical action that operate in similar but not identical fashion.”

The author suggests that human nature has “a bi-polarity about it that generates both polity and economy.” The political side of human nature entails recognition that we are social creatures who live in close proximity and engage in cooperation and conflict. The economic side entails recognition that we need “to make a livelihood” and desire “to be self-directed as against being conscripts in someone’s army”.

I am not persuaded that “bi-polarity” is the best way to capture the idea that humans are “political animals” whose interactions with other members of the species are not always motivated by personal benefit. It seems to me that human nature inclines individuals to seek to flourish by making wise and well-informed choices about all aspects of their lives that they are able to influence, including their interactions with others. 

However, as public choice theorists have noted, most people lack sufficient motivation to allocate the time and effort required to make well-informed choices in relation to national politics because their individual choices are unlikely to have much impact on national outcomes. Wagner’s view of entangled political economy draws on that public choice literature.

I certainly agree that political economy should focus on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. As Wagner notes, that perspective has important implications for social change:

“The framework of entangled political economy accommodates recognition that societies change only through individual action inside those societies, and with those actions spreading within the society according to the receptivity of other members of that society to those changes.”

Although Entangled Political Economy is based on a description of different kinds of interactions among individuals in the real world, it represents a departure from the way many economists have previously thought about the interaction between politics and economics. Wagner reminds readers that it has been customary to “envision a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas what is denoted as economy.” He points out that discussion is usually in terms of “additive political economy” in which polity and economy are denoted as independent entities and polity intervenes in economy to correct “market failure”. He argues:

“The Progressivist vision of political presence and dominance throughout society is abetted by the vision of additive political economy because that vision provides rationalization for unlimited political action.”

Political entrepreneurship

 Wagner argues that it makes sense to view politics as a peculiar form of business because it has many characteristics in common with business. Both are sources of livelihood for people, entail competition, and are supported by administrative educational organisations. Both must attract investors to provide capital. Both involve entrepreneurship.

The main difference between political entrepreneurship and market entrepreneurship arises because of the difference between dyadic and triadic relationships. Dyadic relationships involve two people; triadic relationships involve three. Wagner observes that market relationships can be reduced mostly to a set of dyadic relationships where both parties benefit. Political relationships typically require a set of triadic relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

Wagner explains:

“Within the triadic relationships associated with electoral competition … a political entrepreneur can construct a supporting coalition by crafting a transactional structure that entails gainers and losers, while at the same time generating a supporting ideological cover that softens and conceals the redistributive character of the transaction.”

The difference between market and political competition has implications for the qualities required for successful entrepreneurship in different contexts. Wagner suggests that while puffery is an understandable part of market competition, “electoral competition is mostly about puffery”. Systemic lying is a feature of political competition. Sentiment tends to play a larger role, relative to reason, in political competition because of the absence of a direct connection between the individual elector’s choice and the outcome obtained. Voting is like ordering a meal at a restaurant and being served the same meal as everyone else, irrespective of what you ordered. Wagner notes Vilfredo Pareto’s view that ideological articulation can induce people to support measures that they might have opposed in a market setting. Voters generally embrace policies that enable them to feel good about themselves.

Wagner argues that little substantive work is accomplished through elections and political campaigns. The substantive work of policy choice takes place “outside electoral politics and entails the interactive elements necessary for constructing and maintaining deals.” He suggests a parliamentary assembly can be viewed as an “investment bank” because it is “a hub for making deals” involving selection and funding of projects. In that context:

“Entrepreneurs are thus competing among themselves to seize the future. Successful entrepreneurship offers both fame and fortune.”

In reading Wagner’s account of political entrepreneurship, it occurred to me that the significance of electoral competition in the United States is greater than he portrays it to be. That perception is based partly on my (somewhat cursory) observation of the presidential election in 2024 and the performance of the Trump administration in its first 100 days in office.

The 2024 U.S. election and its aftermath may be atypical, but similar political entrepreneurship has been on display in some European elections.  As discussed in a previous essay, political entrepreneurs tend to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas. They seek to attract support from people who are discontented with current economic and social outcomes by emphasizing alleged problem-solving capacities of their ideas. Their success in attracting a loyal support base of customers who are willing to help them to sell their narrative depends to a large extent on the strength of competition from politicians selling different narratives, and on the extent of resistance by journalists and members of the public who consider their narratives to be incorrect, or that their policy proposals are unworkable, unconstitutional, unethical, or otherwise unhelpful.

I also observed that the discussion of entangled political economy in Politics as a Peculiar Business seemed more relevant to countries with parliamentary systems of government than to those with presidential systems, where much business seems to be done via “executive orders”. However, that is not intended as criticism. It may reflect the greater role of “executive orders” in the U.S. in the years since the book was published.

How can entanglement be contained?

One of Wagner’s aims in writing the book was “to explain how an entangled political economy can generate its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control”. He refers to the credit market as providing an example of how this occurs. Private ordering of credit markets is vulnerable to entanglement for two reasons. On the demand side are market participants who are dissatisfied with how they fare in privately ordered credit markets. On the supply side are “political figures who want to catapult themselves from background to foreground in the cosmic drama that is human society”.

Another example relates to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which provides for just compensation when the government takes private property for public use. However, Wagner observes that “history over the past century or so has increasingly run in the direction of governments taking property for what are private uses and paying only partial or token compensation”. A clear constitutional provision is not necessarily “sufficiently strong to deter rapacious interest groups from using government as an instrument of predation”.

Wagner refers to Vincent Ostrom’s observation that government involves a Faustian bargain: “instruments of evil – power over other people – are to be employed because of the good they might do, recognizing that evil might also result.” 

How can we minimize the potential for evil to result? Wagner suggests that the alternatives are “parchment” and “guns”.

“Parchment” refers to constitutional rules. Constitutional rules may remain effective if supported by public morality – sufficient numbers of people being willing to refrain from use of the powers of the state to enrich themselves at the expense of others. This approach relies on education and related processes to cultivate virtue and wisdom.

“Guns” refers to an approach that looks primarily to “a kind of opposition of interests to limit government predation”. Wagner suggests that “guns” may complement “parchment”. He writes:

“The basic principle behind this approach is for governmental action to require some concurrence among different participants with opposed interests.”

Wagner suggests that when it becomes habitual for people to use politics in a predatory manner that may “promote alternative beliefs as to what comprises just conduct”. He concludes that “parchment and guns … would seem to be nonseparable ingredients of constitutional order in the final analysis.”

Wagner tells us that his reference to guns is metaphorical, so what he has in mind may not necessarily be violent. For example, those who believe themselves to be victims of predation have an incentive to form associations to protect their interests in the courts and may be able to exert countervailing power the political arena.

While I believe that entangled political economy offers important insights about interactions between participants in politics and markets, I would have liked the author to explore more fully the macroeconomic consequences of increasing entanglement. Perhaps that would have led to a more optimistic conclusion.

In Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing I suggested that although most liberal democracies are heading for major economic crises in the years ahead there are reasons to be optimistic “that governments will eventually introduce institutional reforms to enable the drivers of progress to restore growth of opportunities.” (See Chapter 6, particularly p. 120)

My optimism presupposes the emergence of political entrepreneurs who understand the nature of the problems that need to be addressed and can marshal the political support required to carry out appropriate institutional reforms to correct those problems.

Conclusions

The discussion of entangled political economy in Richard Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, is helpful to an understanding of the context in which political entrepreneurship occurs in the liberal democracies.

Entangled political economy focuses on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. It emphasizes that societal change occurs only through individual actions. Entangled political economy represents a departure from the view of those economists (and governments) who have envisioned a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas an economy.  

Wagner argues that politics has many characteristics in common with private business, but it is characterized by triadic relationships rather than dyadic relationships. Market relationships can be reduced mainly to sets of relationships between two people, both of whom benefit. Politics typically requires sets of relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

The author suggests that the main work of political entrepreneurs – interactions to construct deals - takes place outside electoral politics. He suggests that parliaments can be viewed as kinds of investment banks because they are hubs for making deals involving selection and funding of projects.

In my view the significance of electoral politics and deal-making by executive arms of governments is greater than Wagner portrays it to be. However, my view has been strongly influenced by events since 2016, when his book was published.

Wagner argues that entangled political economy generates its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control. He is pessimistic about the prospect for entanglement to be contained via constitutional rules and moral conduct. He suggests that habitual use of politics in a predatory manner promotes an alternative view of what constitutes just conduct.

In my view, Wagner might have come to a more optimistic conclusion if he had more fully explored the macro-economic consequences of increasing use of the powers of the state for predatory purposes. Economic crises may eventually bring about appropriate institutional reforms if political entrepreneurs emerge who can marshal the political support required to implement them.  

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.

What role does political entrepreneurship play in institutional change?

 

One of the reasons I quoted that passage by Douglass North is because it mentions political entrepreneurship. I went looking for a quote from North in Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance because I was particularly impressed by that book when I first read it about 30 years ago. (The quoted sentence appears on page 87.)

As defined by North, institutions are “the rules of the game of society” that shape human interaction. He argued that formal institutions—such as constitutions, laws, and regulations—make up only a small proportion of the sum of constraints that shape choices. Informal constraints include codes of conduct, norms of behavior, conventions, and customs. They may be internalized in personal values, rather than imposed by others.

North acknowledged that political entrepreneurship plays a role in institutional change. He doesn’t have much to say about political entrepreneurship, but his analysis implies that political entrepreneurs may play an important role in reducing transactions costs associated with institutional change.

Path dependence and institutional stickiness

The transactions costs of institutional change are high because of the path dependence of institutions. As institutions evolve, ideologies tend to evolve to support them. Organizations and interest groups that have grown up under existing institutions often have a stake in maintaining them.  

The most important point I had remembered from reading Institutions … is that countries with similar formal institutions – constitutions, property rights etc. – can have vastly different economic performance outcomes if informal institutions (cultural settings) are different. Governments and international agencies that have sought to transplant formal institutions to foreign countries have been slow to recognize that point.

The implications of path dependence have been further explored by Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne, and Peter Leeson in “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics”, Chapter 6 in Culture of Economic Action, ed. Laura E. Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (2015).  The authors contend that the ability of a new institutional arrangement to take hold when it has been transplanted depends on that institutions status in relations to indigenous agents in the previous time period. They suggest that institutional transplants are unlikely to stick if they are inconsistent with indigenously introduced endogenous institutions.

The analytical framework used by Boettke et al is also relevant to considering the challenges faced by endogenous political entrepreneurs in bringing about institutional change.

Entrepreneurship (political and economic)

As discussed recently on this blog, political entrepreneurship has characteristics that differ from economic entrepreneurship. I suggested that it might be reasonable to assume that political entrepreneurs are motivated largely by the satisfaction they obtain from constructing ideological narratives and selling them, and from exercising the political power required to implement policies.

Nevertheless, there are similarities between political and economic entrepreneurship that become apparent when economic entrepreneurship is considered in a cultural context. In his article, “The discovery and interpretation of profit opportunities and the Kirznerian entrepreneur”, reproduced as Chapter 3 of Culture and Economic Action (cited above), Don Lavoie writes:

“Entrepreneurship necessarily takes place within culture, it is utterly shaped by culture, and it fundamentally consists in interpreting and influencing culture.” (p. 50)

He suggests:

“entrepreneurship is the achievement not so much of the isolated maverick who finds objective profits others overlooked as of the culturally embedded participant who picks up the gist of a conversation.” (p. 51)

Later, he observes:

“Most acts of entrepreneurship are not like an isolated individual finding things on beaches; they require effort of the imagination, skillful judgements of future costs and revenue possibilities, and an ability to read the significance of complex social situations.”

In the following chapter of Culture and Economic Action, Virgil Henry Storr and Arielle John suggest that rather than viewing Lavoie’s contribution as a critique of Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship it is more appropriate to view it as a suggestion as to how that theory may be fruitfully amended. The amendments suggested by Lavoie seem to me to make the role of the economic entrepreneur seem similar in some respects to the role of a political entrepreneur.

Max Weber’s understanding of political entrepreneurship

Douglass North seems to have given minimal acknowledgement of Max Weber’s work as a social theorist, even though there was considerable overlap in their areas of interest.  Francesca Trivellato has noted that in one publication North does refer to Weber as a scholar of “the role of belief and values in shaping change”. Weber is, of course, most often remembered for his theory of the Protestant ethic but he also made other important contributions.

Weber’s writings on charismatic and demagogic leadership shed some light on the nature of political entrepreneurship in democracies. The following points summarize an article by Xavier Márquez, entitled “Max Weber, demagogy and charismatic representation”, published in the European Journal of Political Theory (2024).

• Weber argued that effective leaders must be able to fight for ‘causes’ beyond the narrow immediate interests of economic groups or party organisations and thus to struggle against the impersonal forces of bureaucratization (the subsumption of politics under bureaucratic and technical imperatives). Effective leaders must therefore have a charismatic form of authority – the only form of authority capable of overcoming the constraints of organisation, legality and tradition.
• The need to appeal to mass publics in modern democratizing societies selects for leaders who have a talent for mobilising large groups of people through rhetorical means. In the context of mass politics, charismatic authority manifests as demagogy. Weber thinks of the masses as unorganized and irrational and argues that even ‘democratically’ elected leadership is a form of ‘dictatorship which rests on the exploitation of the emotionality of the masses.
• Weber's praise for charismatic and demagogic leadership is tempered by the worry that political leaders must also be responsible. This is so in a twofold sense: objectively, a political system must be able to hold leaders accountable for their actions; and subjectively, leaders must display an ethics of responsibility, and thus be able to ‘take responsibility’ for their actions.
• Elections formalize the recognition of charisma. If charismatic leaders capable of mobilizing and representing broad masses will tend to arise in any case, it is better if the recognition of their charisma is subject to periodic formal tests rather than informal, extra-legal events.
• Charismatic authority in the broadest sense tends to appear in moments of deep, even existential crisis, where the charismatic leader performs a ‘miracle’ for a group that feels otherwise impotent and deeply threatened, and can sustain itself only when the leader can provide such ‘miracles.
• The charismatic demagogue produces a wondrous or miraculous representation of the people as a charismatic community but also a ‘wondrous’ representation of himself.
• Weber argues that charismatic leaders must provide evidence of benefiting their charismatic community if they are to retain their authority. The implicit ‘bargain’ between leaders and followers that exists even in cases of strong charismatic authority allows us to speak of a degree of accountability and influence.
• Instead of distinguishing between the ‘mere’ demagogue and its antithesis, the statesman, in terms of whether or not they deceive the demos or act for the common good, Weber stresses the ethical distinction between the politician who is responsible for their cause, and thus capable of intentionally and rationally directing state power towards its achievement (in what is, strictly speaking, a value–rational way), and the politician who is not.
• Lack of objectivity (wishful thinking, extreme overconfidence, ignoring inconvenient information) in assessing a situation leads to irresponsible political action, insofar as it leads to a misunderstanding of the means necessary to achieve particular ends and the physical, social and political constraints on the use of such means. All leaders are susceptible to these vices, but the situation of the charismatic demagogue, surrounded by adoring followers and capable of summoning the adulation of crowds, makes these vices extremely common occupational hazards.
• Weber hoped that training in committee or party work would hone the political judgement of leaders so that they would be more likely to see the consequences of their decisions and to take responsibility for them. 

Márquez argues that Weber's conception of charismatic authority allows some demagogues to play a genuinely democratic role in modern societies when viewed through contemporary theories of representation. He suggests that a Weberian analysis of democracy points to the need for strong accountability mechanisms and for institutions that socialize potential leaders into productive habits of adversarial conduct and responsibility, while preventing easy ‘buck passing’.

Márquez observes that although Weber provides a stronger sense of democratic possibility than did Joseph Schumpeter, he is very much the ancestor of the ‘minimalist’ model of democracy that Schumpeter first articulated explicitly in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. (I wrote about Schumpeter’s model of democracy here in 2012.)

Directions of future research

This essay is the second in a series in which I am attempting to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship. The first essay can be found here.

My next step is to read Robert Faulkner’s book, The Case for Greatness (2007). I am wondering whether the ancients thought it was possible for a charismatic demagog to also be a "great-souled" leader who is keen to promote liberty and opportunities for individuals to flourish. 

After that, I will consider how the concept of political entrepreneurship fits in with modern public choice literature.

Summary and Conclusions

This essay briefly considers the context in which political entrepreneurship is most relevant, some similarities between economic and political entrepreneurship, and the role of charismatic and demagogic leadership in political entrepreneurship within democracies.

The essay begins by considering the role that Douglas North saw for political entrepreneurship in bringing about institutional change – i.e. change in the rules of the game of society. Political entrepreneurship is required to overcome high transactions costs of change that arise from the path dependent nature of institutions. Building on the concept of path dependency, Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson developed an analytical framework to consider the consequences of institutional stickiness for foreigners engaged in institution building exercises that seek to transplant institutions from one country to another. That framework is also relevant to considering the challenges faced by political entrepreneurs seeking to bring about institutional reforms in their own countries.

The essay then turns to consideration of the relevance to political entrepreneurship of Don Lavoie’s view of economic entrepreneurship. Lavoie suggests that entrepreneurship takes place within culture and is concerned with interpreting and influencing culture. He makes the role of the economic entrepreneur seem similar in some respects to that of the political entrepreneur.

The other major topic considered in the essay is the contribution that Max Weber makes to our understanding of political entrepreneurship through his writings on charismatic and demagogic leadership. Weber makes the case that charismatic and demagogic leadership may be required to overcome the impersonal forces of bureaucratization within democracies. He also sheds light on the circumstances in which demagogic leadership can be consistent with democracy.

North and Weber both add to our understanding of the role of the political entrepreneur in overcoming obstacles to institutional change. However, the fundamental question that both leave aside is how to ensure that institutional change enhances liberty and opportunities for individuals to flourish. 

 

Addendum

Do ideas play a larger role than interests in bringing about institutional change, or is the opposite true? Prominent economists have been associated with opposing views on this question. Keynes and Hayek emphasized the role of ideas; Stigler and Becker emphasized the role of vested interests.

Perhaps the respective influence of ideas and interests depends on the narratives constructed by political entrepreneurs. The role of political entrepreneurs in constructing narratives has been discussed briefly in an earlier essay.

Some recent research suggests that political entrepreneurs discover “memes” (narratives, cues, frames) that invoke voters’ identity concerns (interests) or shift their ideas about how the world works. (Ash E, Mukand SW, Rodrik D, Economic Interests, Worldviews, and Identities: Theory and Evidence on Ideational Politics , Research Paper, May 2024). The authors identify a potential complementarity between worldview politics and identity politics and illustrate how they may reinforce each other. The authors develop a model which predicts that adverse economic shocks will lead to a greater incidence of ideational politics in affected regions. The results of empirical work using televised political ads seem to be consistent with their model predictions.

Further Note

Readers may also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.