Why Bother Considering Whether Government is Necessary?

 

Before my most recent trip to India I had to choose which of two recently purchased books I should take with me: Aeon Skoble’s Deleting the State, or Salvatore Babones’ Dharma Democracy. I chose Dharma Democracy (which I have since written about here) because I didn’t like the idea of trying to explain to an airport official that Deleting the State is a philosophical treatise rather than a manual for the violent overthrow of governments.

At that time, I would not have been able to point to pages 107-8 where Skoble argues explicitly against violent action to remove a government in any “nominally liberal democracy”. In the Afterword of the recently published second edition of his book, the author takes the opportunity to emphasize his opposition to violence by giving reasons for eschewing it and reiterating that deleting the state means “deleting the idea of the necessity of the state”.

The subtitle of the book is Requiem for an Illusion. The illusion Skoble refers to is the Hobbesian Fear that in the absence of a government “to keep them all in awe” people would find themselves at each others’ throats - in a war “of every man against every other man”.  I will discuss later the author’s reasons for considering the Hobbesian Fear an illusion.

Skoble regards the neo-Aristotelian conception of human flourishing provided by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl as providing the best defense of a theory of individual liberty. He notes, however, that in Norms of Liberty the Dougs leave open the question of whether a political/legal order defending individual rights necessitates the existence of a state. Skoble points out that the difference between a state and a political/legal order is not trivial.

What is the point of philosophical anarchism? 

In the Afterword Skoble writes:

“If deleting the state means deleting the generally held notion that we need to have a state, and the only way to do it is to make philosophical arguments, we’re in a lot of trouble. Philosophers have a poor track record of being persuasive to large majorities. So what, one might ask, is the point of philosophical anarchism?”

The author goes on to answer that question cogently. However, before considering his response, I want to present a contrary argument.

Is the existence of government an issue that should occupy the minds of those who believe that liberty supports human flourishing? As far as I know, there is no country in the world in which citizens are currently faced with a choice between having a minimal state or no state at all. In liberal democracies – the countries that currently enjoy the greatest personal and economic freedom – liberty is being threatened by political movements with authoritarian tendencies. Authoritarianism is presented in the wrapping of different varieties of collectivist idealism which offer citizens the opportunity to attribute personal and social problems to immigration, foreign competition, the greed of the wealthy, systemic discrimination, environmental degradation or anything else that appears to justify a larger role for government. Shouldn’t libertarians be focusing their attention on supporting the political/legal order – democracy, or representative government - that has been most successful in promoting personal and economic freedom?

Readers who doubt that the countries with greatest economic and personal freedom are liberal democracies should take a look at the graphs shown in an essay I wrote last year. There may be serious errors in common measures of personal freedom for some countries - as noted in my recent essay on Indian politics – but the weight of evidence suggests that representative government has hitherto been more successful in defending individual rights than any other contemporary form of politico/legal order that currently exists in the real world.

So, how do I justify spending time thinking about utopian concepts such as philosophical anarchism instead of spending all my efforts opposing the advances of authoritarianism?

The first defence that comes to mind is that I find it interesting to think about the question of whether government is necessary. I think that is sufficient justification for a human to spend some time thinking about any topic.

However, I have reasons to be particularly interested in the potential for utopian thinking to play a useful role in considering public policy issues. I have claimed in the past:

“We are more likely to improve opportunities for human flourishing if we approach public policy issues with a view to both (a) upholding ideals that ought to apply and (b) the real-world constraints that should not be overlooked.”

I made that comment in a short essay considering Chris Sciabarra’s discussion of the anti-utopianism in the methodology of Marx and Hayek in Marx, Hayek and Utopia.

Skoble argues that anarchist arguments can help people to think about the limits of state power. He suggests that they can be used to clarify that getting a different group of office-holders into power will not resolve problems that are attributable to institutional structures. He cites mass incarceration and business regulation that stifles innovation as examples. He sums up:

“To make the case against the state is to undermine the idea that coercion is necessary for social order or that it is beneficial to human society. It is to point the way toward the continual need to scale back the scope of state power. It is to affirm the priorities of liberty and its necessary connection to human flourishing, and to keep us mindful of the ways in which the state, and our often-unthinking obedience to it, hinders that flourishing.”

Allaying the Hobbesian Fear

Those who argue that a government is necessary to maintain social cooperation often refer to the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. Players can obtain a greater payoff if they both cooperate than if they both defect. However, each player has an incentive to defect in the hope of obtaining a greater payoff at the expense of the other player. On that basis, it is claimed that in the absence of a coercive intervention to enforce cooperation both players will end up defecting.

However, Skoble observes that defection is only the winning strategy in a one-shot game - social cooperation emerges spontaneously when the prisoner’s dilemma game is repeated over long periods. In support of this argument he refers to Robert Axelrod’s book The Evolution of Cooperation, which found that a tit-for-tat (reciprocation) strategy gave players higher payoffs than constant defection. The author notes that strategies that allow for the possibility that a defecting player may have made a mistake offer higher payoffs than tit-for-tat.

It may be worth adding that the utility maximizing assumptions of game theory tend to be less conducive to social cooperation than are real people engaged in trust games in a laboratory setting. As Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson noted in Humanomics, anonymously paired people are “predominantly caring other-regarding, independent actors in the personal social exchange context of trust games in the laboratory”.

Skoble makes the point that law ought to be construed as a natural consequence of attempts of people to live and work together rather than as something requiring a coercive monopoly power. Among other things, he notes that enforcement of property rights requires “a society that in fact recognizes the practicality of recognizing property rights” rather than a “monopolistic coercive authority”. In that context he discusses the history of spontaneous evolution of civil law conflict resolution drawing upon works by David Friedman and Murray Rothbard.

The author devotes a chapter to providing an extended example of the potential for disaster relief to be provided via voluntary cooperation rather than a centralized political authority.

In his final chapter, Skoble discusses the question of whether disagreements between libertarian anarchists and minimal-state libertarians are radically incommensurable, or capable of being resolved by dialogue. He argues that there are “no fundamental premises or values that separate anarchists from libertarian minimum-statists” that would prevent the differences between them being resolved by dialogue. There is even potential for dialogue between libertarians and welfarist liberals. Political philosophy can explore relevant questions such as the circumstances, if any, under which the will of the majority should override individual liberty.

Additional considerations

One argument that is sometimes advanced in opposition to philosophical anarchism is that a written constitution helps to protect liberty. Perhaps that is true of the United States, but it is not difficult to find examples of countries where constitutional provisions have failed to protect liberty. The former Soviet Union comes to mind. There are also notable examples of countries which have maintained a relatively high degree of liberty without written constitutional protections. Britain comes to mind.  

Roderick Long has suggested that those who believe government is necessary are being misled by a metaphysically illusive picture of what constitutional restraints are and how they work:

“The metaphysical illusion I referred to is the habit of thinking of constitutional restraints (checks and balances, separation of powers, etc.) as though these structures existed in their own right, as external limitations on society as a whole. But in fact those structures exist only insofar as they are continually maintained in existence by human agents acting in certain systematic ways. A constitution is not some impersonal, miraculously self-enforcing robot. It’s an ongoing pattern of behavior, and it persists only so long as human agents continue to conform to that pattern in their actions.” (Long, 2008)

I have previously discussed similar views of the nature of constitutions by Sheldon Richman (here) and Douglass North (here).

A more difficult argument to contend with is that the free rider problem would prevent adequate provision of national defense. I think John Hasnas has advanced an appropriate response to that argument. He suggests that an inability to raise sufficient capital to engage in foreign military adventures or pre-emptive warfare without resort to coercion proves nothing about the potential for defense against outside aggression to be funded voluntarily.

Hasnas acknowledges that he doesn’t know whether sufficient funds could be raised by voluntary means to fund protection against outside aggression. He suggests:

“No one believes that we can transition from a world of states to anarchy instantaneously. No reasonable anarchist advocates the total dissolution of government tomorrow. Once we turn our attention to the question of how to move incrementally from government to anarchy, it becomes apparent that national defense would be one of the last governmental functions to be de-politicized.”

That seems to me to be a sensible position to adopt. It does not preclude the possibility that a society that moves incrementally to reduce coercion of some by others will one day end up not requiring coercion to ensure appropriate provision of any goods currently provided by governments.

Conclusion

This essay has been prompted by my reading of the Second edition of Aeon Skoble’s book, Deleting the State.

Early in the essay, I posed the question of whether the existence of government is an issue that should currently occupy the minds of libertarians in the light of current threats to liberty by political movements with authoritarian tendencies. Skoble provides an appropriate response in his defense of philosophical consideration of the possibility of anarchy. In particular, he suggests that such philosophical endeavours help libertarians to make the point that getting a different group of office holders into power will not resolve problems that are attributable to the existence and scope of state power.

A central concern of the book is to allay the Hobbesian Fear that people will be unable to obtain the benefits of social cooperation in the absence of a government to maintain order. In my view, Skoble provides strong arguments to allay that fear.

I endorse Skoble’s view that law ought to be construed as a natural consequence of attempts of people to live and work together, rather than as something requiring a coercive monopoly power. Constitutional restraints are not self-enforcing. It cannot be assumed that they would continue to offer protection of the rights of citizens if enforcement of them did not have broad community support.

The question of how national defense could be provided without coercive taxation is probably the most challenging obstacle to attempts by philosophical anarchists to persuade minarchists that anarchy is a viable option. In my view, it makes sense to acknowledge the difficulties that would be encountered at present in ensuring adequate voluntary provision of defense resources. That doesn’t mean, however, that it makes sense to assume that coercive taxation will always be required to fund defense. Libertarians who have the objective of reducing coercion “as much as possible in society”, should leave open the possibility that at some stage elimination of the state could become a viable option.  

References

Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, 1984).

Babones, Salvatore, Dharma Democracy: How India Built the Third World’s First Democracy (Connor Court Publishing, 2025).

Hasnas, John, Common Law Liberalism: A New Theory of the Libertarian Society (Oxford University Press, 2024).

Hayek, F. A. The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 1960).

Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). 

Long, R. T. “Market anarchism as constitutionalism”, in R. T. Long & T. R. Machan (Eds.), Anarchism/Minarchism: Is a government part of a free country? (Ashgate Publishing, 2008). pp. 133–154.

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew, Marx, Hayek and Utopia (State University of New York Press, 1995).

Skoble, Aeon J. Deleting the State: Requiem for an Illusion, Second edition (Independent Institute, 2026).

Smith, Vernon L., and Bart J. Wilson, Humanomics: Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations for the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Is Indian Democracy an Extraordinary Success Story?

Salvatore Babones puts the view that Indian democracy is an extraordinary success story in his book, Dharma Democracy: How India Built the Third World’s First Democracy, which was published last year.

Babones describes himself as “a skeptical quantitative and comparative sociologist who came to the subject with an interest in democracy not (initially at least) with any particular interest in India itself”

I read the book during my most recent visit to India. I came to it with a particular interest in India and a desire to understand whether that country is more appropriately viewed as the world's largest democracy, or as an elective autocracy in which personal freedom is severely restricted. Babones has persuaded me that the first view is closer to being correct.

The structure of this essay is as follows. In the next section I discuss the graph presented above. I then draw upon Dharma Democracy to explain why Babones implies that the freedom data depicted in the graph understates personal freedom in India. The following sections outline why Babones views Indian democracy as a success story, his explanation for that success, and the reception his book has received in India. I present some personal views before concluding.

A Visual Starting Point: Emancipative Values and Personal Freedom

To frame the discussion, I use the chart above showing data from the World Values Survey and the Human Freedom Index. The horizontal axis presents Christian Welzel’s emancipative values index, a measure of cultural support for autonomy and expressive freedoms. The vertical axis shows personal freedom as assessed by the Fraser/Cato Human Freedom Index. I have previously explained the chart more fully on this blog, when using it to explore global patterns of authoritarianism associated with political entrepreneurship.

I am using the chart here to highlight how India appears to be situated within the broader global landscape. India appears in the middle of the distribution: less free than Western democracies but significantly freer than many culturally comparable societies. The chart suggests that the degree of personal freedom in India is much as might be expected for a country with India’s level of economic development and cultural values.

However, historical data suggests that personal freedom was much higher in India during the first decade of this century. It declined to its current level (around 6/10) from a rating substantially higher than might be expected based on emancipative (around 7/10). 

Possible errors in the measurement of personal freedom

Babones implies that the Fraser/Cato index understates the personal freedom that Indians experience. He argues that there is bias in all democracy and freedom indexes that use of subjective data from the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem). Apparently, nearly all of V-Dem’s survey indicators are coded by country experts, most of whom are academics residing in the country being studied. In the case of India, that methodology may introduce bias in recent freedom indicators because Narendra Modi and his BJP party are “widely reviled among social scientists both within India and in the West”.

This raises several issues. First, the Fraser/Cato index’s reliance on V-Dem seems to be modest. As far as I can see, only one item tends to depress India’s freedom score: that is V-Dem’s score for Media and expression under the heading “Expression and information”. On that item, V-Dem’s score is not far below the scores of Freedom House, BTI and CLD, which are also used in the Fraser/Cato index. It is possible, however, that data from Freedom House, BTI and CLD are subject to similar methodological biases as the data from V-Dem.

Second, India’s academics have some good reasons to criticize Modi’s human rights record. Nevertheless, in my view Babones’ allegation of bias carries weight because V-Dem gives Indian democracy a lower rating at present than in 1976 - during Indira Gandhi’s “Emergency” rule - when civil rights were suspended.

Third, some other freedom indexes provide a rosier picture of civil liberties in India than Fraser/Cato. For example, the Civil liberties rating for India incorporated in the Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is higher than for Armenia and Georgia – a ranking which is inconsistent with that shown in the above chart.

On balance, it seems to me that Babones has made a plausible case that democracy and personal freedom are in better shape in India than is often claimed by critics of the Modi government.

 India as an Extraordinary Democratic Success

Babones argues that “India’s democracy is in better shape than that of just about any other developing country”. His central claim is that India’s democracy is historically exceptional.

He emphasizes that India is the only large, poor, post‑colonial society to maintain continuous electoral democracy for more than seven decades. Unlike Western democracies, which evolved gradually over centuries, India launched universal suffrage at independence despite widespread illiteracy and immense cultural diversity. For Babones, this makes India not a fragile democracy but an extraordinary one - a global outlier whose success cannot be understood through Western liberal frameworks.

He grounds this argument in several propositions:

·        India conducts elections involving hundreds of millions of voters with consistently high turnout. Babones sees this as evidence of a deeply internalized democratic ethos.

·        India’s democratic resilience is rooted in its dharmic heritage, which emphasizes pluralism, decentralisation, and negotiated social order.

·        Most post‑colonial states experienced military coups and/or authoritarian consolidation. India did not.

·        India has vast civil society networks which have tended to inculcate a sense of national unity.

·        India’s electoral system has enabled historically disadvantaged communities to gain political voice – it is helping these communities to overcome social disadvantages.

Babones has included a chapter discussing the status of Muslims in India. In that context he suggests that nationhood is a work in progress. One interesting statistic he cites is that 99% of Indian Muslims report being “proud” to be Indian. He also makes the point that in a country that is 80% Hindu, “Muslims will never experience full social inclusion unless Hindus actively invite them into the national mainstream.”

Reception of “Dharma Democracy”

I asked Grok and CoPilot to provide summaries of the reception that the book has received in India.

Grok notes that as a relatively recent book from a smaller publisher, it hasn’t yet garnered widespread mainstream academic or Western critical reviews. However, the book has been well-received in circles aligned with its thesis. Reviewers highlight its challenge to global democracy indices, defense of India’s success via “dharma” and Hindu civil society, and data-driven rebuttals to criticisms of Modi-era democracy. One highly critical reviewer argues the book is misguided because it fails to address the Indian Constitution’s alleged anti-Hindu biases.

CoPilot offered similar comments, noting specifically that some critics are concerned that support for the Hindu civilization thesis tends to downplay pluralism and legitimize majoritarian narratives. Extending its analysis beyond formal reviews, it notes that much Indian academic discourse pushes back against the core thesis of the book. Many Indian scholars continue to view recent developments in India’s democracy as problematic. CoPilot sums up: “The book has not been dismissed; it’s being taken seriously in India, but primarily as a provocative intervention in an ongoing debate rather than a settled or widely accepted interpretation.”

Personal Perspectives

I cannot claim to have spent much time discussing politics during my three visits to India. Readers who are interested in my motives for visiting India can find relevant information here, here, here, here and here.

However, when discussion has turned to politics, the people I met have tended to express views that either strongly oppose or strongly support prime minister Modi. There were exceptions, but the views seemed to be linked to education levels – those with a university degree tended to be critical of Modi’s human rights record, whereas those without a university education were highly supportive of his emphasis on nationalism and economic development.

One observation stands out: critics of Modi expressed their views to me openly and without hesitation. These were not whispered conversations but frank and confident exchanges, often in public settings. That willingness to criticise the government directly to a foreign visitor is not something one would expect in a society where personal freedom is severely restricted. This suggests that India’s public sphere retains a level of openness that complicates the more pessimistic narratives about democratic decline.

My own view of Modi has moderated over the years. When he was first elected, international reporting had me viewing him as a somewhat alarming Hindu nationalist, whose policies might cause disorder. Perhaps Modi has himself become more moderate as he has focused on achievement of Viksit Bharat, which translates as “Developed India”. The image he presents internationally is certainly that of an extraordinarily diplomatic leader who seeks mutually beneficial relations with nearly all other countries.

While reading Babones’ book I pondered whether a “dharma democracy” would differ substantially from one based on Western individualism. At a superficial level, a “dharma democracy” might be seen to place less emphasis on personal freedom because dharma is about “duty” or “right action” rather than individual rights. However, the Indian concept of dharma seems to me to be close to Aristotelian ideas of individual self-actualization in accordance with natural purpose (telos). Babones notes that the Indian philosopher, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975), suggested “every form of life, every group of men has its dharma, which is the law of its being”.

It seems to me that when Indians speak of duty to the nation what they have in mind might generally have more to do with doing the right thing - for example, adherence to societal norms that make democracy possible – because such behaviour is honorable and integral to self-realization, rather than an obligation that necessarily entails self-sacrifice.

 I am left wondering whether there is much difference in practice in the way Indian democracy is conducted by comparison with Western democracies. It seems possible that Indian democracy may be conducted with a little more regard to the norms of reciprocity, fair-dealing and mutual respect that restrain citizens from seeking to use the political process to exploit their compatriots.  

Conclusions

Salvatore Babones argues in Dharma Democracy that India is an extraordinary democratic outlier among post‑colonial societies. I think that line of argument holds up surprisingly well once one examines both the historical record and the limitations of the freedom indices that dominate international commentary. The evidence suggests that India’s personal freedoms, while imperfect, are not in the state of collapse that some critics claim.

The dharmic framing of democracy that Babones highlights offers a useful reminder that democratic resilience can emerge from cultural resources that differ from those of the West. India’s traditions of pluralism, decentralization, and negotiated social order have helped sustain a vast and diverse electorate through seven decades of elections. Whether or not one embraces the full “dharma democracy” thesis, it is clear that India’s democratic foundations run deeper than many external observers assume.

The reception of Dharma Democracy inside India reflects this complexity. Supporters see it as a welcome challenge to Western academic pessimism; critics worry that it risks legitimizing majoritarian narratives. Yet the very fact that the book has sparked open, vigorous debate is itself evidence of a public sphere that remains lively and accessible.

My own conversations in India reinforce that impression. Critics of the government spoke freely and confidently, even in public settings - something inconsistent with the idea of a society sliding into authoritarian silence. At the same time, the polarization of views, often along educational lines, reflects the tensions of a rapidly modernizing nation.

In the end, distinctive characteristics of India’s society have shaped its experience of democracy. Distinctive cultural values help to explain why Indian democracy has been surprisingly resilient. If the norms of reciprocity, restraint, and mutual respect that underpin democratic life continue to hold, India’s democracy may remain not only durable but an extraordinary success story. 

Why were merchants attracted to Buddhism in ancient India?

 

My recent visit to India was motivated in part by a desire to visit some ancient Buddhist caves that were excavated with the help of donations from merchants at a time when India was at the centre of a globalized world. My interest was aroused by reading of William Dalrymple’s book, The Golden Road, during a previous visit to India.

My interest was heightened by further reading, including a book chapter by Osmund Bopearachchi entitled ‘Indian Ocean Trade through Buddhist Iconographies’. (Please see references at the end of this essay.)

Ajanta caves

One of the highlights of my trip was visiting the Ajanta caves, which were hewn out over the period from 200 BC to 650 AD. The Ajanta caves are shown in the photo at the top of this post.

Here is an extract from Dalrymple’s discussion of the murals in Ajanta caves:

“The murals indicate that, by the time of Ajanta, India was not some self-contained island of Indianness, but already a cosmopolitan and surprisingly urban society full of traders from all over the world; in many cases it was the traders themselves who actually paid for these murals, such as the rich merchant Ghanamadada who, according to an inscription, donated the funds for Cave 12. To some extent, the murals may also have reflected the merchants’ taste, which could explain the near absence of asceticism or even monasticism in the murals.”

Some of the photos I took of murals at Ajanta caves are shown below.

 

I invite readers who are interested in finding out more about other historical sites I visited in India and Sri Lanka to take a look at a series of posts on my Facebook timeline, beginning on 12 April 2026.

Why was Buddhism attractive to merchants?

Even after my visit to the Ajanta caves, I did not fully understand why merchants supported Buddhism in ancient India. I reasoned that the occupation of being a merchant would make a person disinclined to accept a religious doctrine which denies their own existence. Idle people may ponder their own existence, but merchants would be expected to be too busy pursuing their occupation. So, wouldn’t Buddhism’s “no self” doctrine be unpalatable to merchants?

My first step toward a better understanding of this question was to revisit the discussion of the “no self” doctrine in a book on Indian philosophy by Peter Adamson and Jonardon Ganeri. The authors note that in proposing the “no self” idea the Buddha was signalling his disagreement with the Brahmanical tradition which made the self a central pre-occupation. They explain the role of “no self” in the context of the Buddha’s teaching that craving is the source of human suffering. He argued that you can avoid being attached to the things that falsely seem to benefit you if you give up on the idea that you have a self that can be benefited.

The authors note that in rejecting the idea of a centre of identity that underlies all awareness, there is still a lot of room for Buddhists to accept less metaphysically ambitious notions of the self. However, they add:

“Yet it seems clear that the Buddhists did want to critique and revise our everyday assumptions about the reality of persons, and other things.” (p. 53)

Buddhists believe that it is only by convention that we refer to a person as an entity. There is nothing to a person over and above a conglomeration of momentary bodily states, feelings and perceptions. The authors sum up:

“So here we have arrived at what may be the most notorious philosophical doctrine of Buddhism, that we are nothing more than flowing streams with no firm identity from time to time.” (p. 54)

That statement reminds me that Richard Campbell used the metaphor of flowing streams to make the point that it is possible to distinguish between the contents of one’s consciousness and one’s identity:

“The same river can flow through different places, and I remain the same person through the many phases of my life.” (Campbell, p. 292).

However, that is a digression. (I have previously discussed Richard Campbell’s views here and here.)

Although they argue that it is only by convention that we refer to a person as an entity, Buddhists have no problem in acknowledging that acceptance of such “conventional truth” is necessary for people to function in everyday life.

The Buddha believed strongly that actions have consequences – the causes that you create are reflected in your subsequent experiences. That view - and the Noble Eightfold Path more generally - seems to me to presuppose that, in the world as we experience it, individuals exist and make choices. It would not be possible to choose the right view; right intention; right speech; right action; right livelihood; right effort; right mindfulness; and right concentration if you did not have individual agency.

I have just remembered that in writing about individualism some years ago, I noted that the Buddha did not oppose self-love when given an opportunity to do so. Despite his belief in “no self”, he suggested that self-love provides a strong reason for individuals to refrain from hurting others.

It seems likely that many merchants would have been attracted to the precepts of the Noble Eightfold Path as providing a basis for ethical conduct. They would certainly have been inclined to view themselves as engaged in “right livelihood”, because they were earning a living in a way that benefits others as well as themselves.

Andy Rotman has noted that early Buddhist literature accords high regard to merchants. In one story, a merchant, Supriya, converts all of India to Buddhism by satisfying everyone's material needs and then establishing them on the tenfold path of virtuous actions. As well as presenting a merchant as a virtuous hero, the story seems to imply the existence of something like Maslow’s hierarchy of needs – people may find it easier to be virtuous if cravings associated with their physiological needs are satisfied.

The attitude of Brahminical Hinduism toward merchants also helps to explain why merchants were attracted to Buddhism. Kathleen Morrison notes:

“Buddhism … overcame many of the problems Brahminical Hinduism presented to merchants, including strict rules of commensality, limited avenues for social advancement, and a prohibition against overseas travel.”

Conclusion

Visits to ancient Buddhist caves during my recent trip to India were motivated by my interest in links between Buddhism and merchants engaged in international trade. Many of the murals in the Ajanta caves depict an environment full of beauty and the pleasures of youth rather than ascetic monasticism.

It isn’t difficult to understand why merchants might fund the creation of such works of art, but that doesn’t explain why they would be attracted in the first place to a religion advocating a “no self” doctrine. It is central to Buddhism that giving up on the idea of self enables people to liberate themselves from the craving that is the cause of suffering.

The important point is that Buddhists have no problem accepting that the existence of selves as a convention necessary to function in everyday life. Ethical behaviour is predicated on the idea that actions have consequences, which presupposes the existence of individuals who make choices.

It seems likely that merchants would have been attracted to the Noble Eightfold Path as offering support for ethical conduct. They had good reasons to think of themselves as engaged in “right livelihood”.

The high regard for merchants in Buddhist society is reflected in early Buddhist literature. By contrast, at that time Hinduism seems to have been much less supportive of the activities of merchants.  

Does human perfectibility pose a problem?

 

This essay was prompted by my reading of John Passmore’s book, The Perfectibility of Man, which was first published in 1969. 

I read the book mainly because of James M. Buchanan’s suggestion that “it remains the most definitive work on the history of ideas” relating to the extent to which classical liberalism depends on some presumption that man is perfectible. Buchanan made that suggestion at the beginning of a chapter entitled “Classical liberalism and the perfectibility of man”, in his book Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative (2005). Buchanan argued that although classical liberalism does not depend on people being especially "good" in a conventional sense, there is nevertheless a presumption of human perfectibility in classical liberalism. He argued that classical liberalism requires that sufficient persons (i) prefer to govern themselves and not be dependent upon others; (ii) respect the person and property of others; (iii) eschew attempts to implement impractical visions of utopian perfectionism; and (iv) be willing to defend the political institutions of liberal society against its enemies.

I had another reason for reading The Perfectibility of Man. As an Australian interested in Aristotle’s view of human perfectibility, I felt that I should by now have read a book on this topic by a distinguished philosopher who was my compatriot.

The book was enjoyable to read and I learned a lot from it. However, I disagree with the author’s assessment of Aristotle’s application of teleology to individual flourishing. It seems to me that Passmore’s view that that “there is something more than a little strange” in “identifying perfection with the realization of potentialities” is not consistent with the view he expresses at the end of the book that humans “are capable of more than they have ever so far achieved”.

I will return to that point later in this essay. Meanwhile, I will briefly outline the scope and content of Passmore’s book.

Passmore’s history of ideas on perfectibility

Passmore discusses the long history of ideas about the perfectibility of humans from Ancient Greece and Rome to the 1960s. He discusses the differing views of Christians over the last 2000 years as well as views associated with the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the influence of social action, scientific progress and natural evolution.

The following paragraph, referring to the views of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), summarizes the themes of the book:

“To an extraordinary degree, then, Teilhard built into a single system almost all the main forms of perfectibilism which we have so far distinguished from one another. He was a mystic: perfection consists in union with God. He was a Christian: perfection depends on Christ’s working in man through evolution. He was a metaphysician: perfection consists in the development to its final form of that consciousness     which is present, according to Teilhard, even in elementary electrons. He believed in perfection through science: scientific research is, in his eyes, the prototype of “working with God.” He believed in perfection through social change: men are to be perfected through their participation in a society infused with love. He believed that Christianity shows us in what perfection consists: the New Testament, and especially Paul, reveal to us the nature of that final unity in which evolution must finally come to rest; the Incarnation, the sacrifice of the Mass, symbolize the unity of the material and the spiritual. He believed that science can demonstrate that humanity is moving towards such a perfection. He was Pelagian in his constant emphasis on human effort; he was anti-Pelagian in so far as he argued that God’s grace is essential if mankind is to achieve its final perfection. If Teilhard had not existed, it would almost have been necessary to invent him, in order to weave together our diverse themes.”

Towards the end of the book, it becomes obvious that Passmore is particularly concerned about the tyrannical outcomes of government attempts to implement utopian ideas relating to human perfectibility.

I will now turn to the point on which I disagree with Passmore.

Aristotle’s teleology

Passmore notes that, according to Aristotle, “potential is incomplete, formless, imperfect”. That implies “the actual is ‘perfect,’ then, in so far as it is the realization of, or the giving form to, a potentiality”. He then comments:

“But there is something more than a little strange in thus identifying perfection with the realization of potentialities. Suppose a man is potentially a liar. When he actualizes that potentiality, has he thereby perfected himself? At this point, it is important to recall that the general concept of perfection does not have written into it any suggestion of moral excellence. A man can be a perfect scoundrel or a perfect idiot just as he can be a perfect saint; he can commit a perfect crime, be a perfect forger, or have a “perfectly rotten time of it.” But, as we have already pointed out, when we speak of “perfectibility,” as distinct from perfection simpliciter, the situation is different; to assert that man is perfectible is to assert that he can become, in some sense taken to be absolute, a better person. To the extent to which an analysis of perfection is directed towards helping us to answer the question whether human beings are, or are not, perfectible, it must not allow the response: “they are perfectible all right: there are plenty of men who are potential villains and who actualize that potentiality perfectly.” (p.14)

It seems to me that Aristotle’s perception of individual human perfectibility does have a suggestion of moral excellence written into it. As Passmore acknowledges, Aristotle saw the good for man, as “an activity of soul in accordance with goodness”. In that context he notes that Aristotle argues that the human good consists in a life of contemplation.

However, Aristotle suggests in Book I of the Ethics that the good of man consists in our living in accordance with practical wisdom. In his book Rational Man - in which the passage quoted in the epigraph appears - Henry Veatch comes out strongly in support of the latter view.

Veatch explains that from an Aristotelian viewpoint, a person who is honest, courageous or temperate “will not be one who has merely been conditioned to follow unthinkingly certain approved patterns of behavior. He will be one who has learned to let his choices and preferences be determined by such knowledge and understanding as he may have, rather than to proceed simply from chance feelings and impulses of the moment or from long established but mechanical habits of response.” (p. 74-5)  

In his Preface to the 2003 edition of Rational Man, Douglas Rasmussen makes the point that “when Veatch spoke of how to “perfect” oneself, he did not mean that one should become Godlike, immune to degeneration, or incapable of harm. Rather it is to fulfil those potentialities and capacities that makes one fully human.”

Passmore’s bottom line

Passmore concludes that “perfectibilism is dehumanizing”:

“To achieve perfection in any of its classical senses, as so many perfectibilists have admitted, it would first be necessary to cease to be human, to become godlike, to rise above the human condition.”

However, the concept of perfectibility endorsed by Neo-Aristotelians such as Veatch and Rasmussen certainly doesn’t require humans to become godlike.

And Passmore’s final paragraph suggests to me that there is little difference between his views on perfectibility and those of the Neo-Aristotelians mentioned above:

“In spite of these reflections, which might lead us to reject perfectibilism in any of its forms, it is very hard to shake off the feeling that man is capable of becoming something much superior to what he now is. This feeling, if it is interpreted in the manner of the more commonsensical Enlighteners, is not in itself irrational. There is certainly no guarantee that men will ever be any better than they now are; their future is not, as it were, underwritten by Nature. Nor is there any device, whether skilful government, or education, which is certain to ensure the improvement of man’s condition. To that extent the hopes of the developmentalists or the governmentalists or the educators must certainly be abandoned. There is not the slightest ground for believing, either, with the anarchist, that if only the State could be destroyed and men could start afresh, all would be well. But we know from our own experience, as teachers or parents, that individual human beings can come to be better than they once were, given care, and that wholly to despair of a child or a pupil is to abdicate what is one’s proper responsibility. We know, too, that in the past men have made advances, in science, in art, in affection. Men, almost certainly, are capable of more than they have ever so far achieved. But what they achieve, or so I have suggested, will be a consequence of their remaining anxious, passionate, discontented human beings.” (p. 258)

Conclusion

This essay was prompted by my reading of John Passmore’s book, The Perfectibility of Man.

Passmore makes a strong case that government attempts to implement utopian ideas about human perfectibility result in tyrannical outcomes.

In my view, he also offers a persuasive argument that perfectibilism is dehumanizing when it is approached from the perspective of attempting to rise above the human condition - to become godlike.

However, I disagree with Passmore’s view of Aristotle’s application of teleology to individual flourishing. Passmore suggests that because the general concept of perfection does not have written into it any suggestion of moral excellence, it is possible for some people to actualize their potential perfectly by becoming villains. My response is that Aristotle’s understanding of human perfectibility does have a suggestion of moral excellence written into it. In support, I also refer to Henry Veatch’s view of the link between virtuous behaviour and the exercise of practical wisdom.

Nevertheless, after considering Passmore’s bottom line about the possibility for greater human achievement, I conclude that his view that perfectibilism is dehumanizing does not necessarily apply to Neo-Aristotelian perfectibilists. It certainly doesn’t apply to those of us who maintain that seeking to perfect oneself is about becoming “fully human”, rather than godlike.

Does Aristotle’s assertion that a viable political system requires a supportive culture still have relevance today?

 

Some readers may be wondering why anything written about culture and politics over 2000 years ago could possibly have contemporary relevance. Fred D. Miller J.R. makes a strong case that Aristotle’s views remain relevant in his recently published book, Aristotelian Statecraft. In particular, Miller demonstrates that we can still learn a lot from Aristotle about the relationships between moral character, culture and political systems.

In the first part of this essay I will draw upon Miller’s book, particularly Chapter 15, to explain the basis for Aristotle’s assertion that a viable political system requires a supportive culture. In the second part I will outline Miller’s observations about the contemporary relevance of the relationship between culture and political systems. In the third part I will reflect on implications of Miller’s work for the role political entrepreneurship in institutional change, drawing on my recent essays on that topic.

Aristotle’s thesis

At this point I should explain why I think Aristotle was intending to convey the idea that a viable political system requires a supportive culture in the sentence quoted in the epigraph (Pol. V.9.1310a). The quote appears in a context where Aristotle is writing about laws being democratic or oligarchic. Since he is also referring to a constitution as something that might be influenced by education of the young, it seems reasonable to infer that in this context he sees a constitution as being constituted mainly of mores (i.e. informal institutions).

Aristotle observes that the moral character of a polis reflects the moral character of its citizens. His thesis that a viable political system requires a supportive culture can be seen to stem from his moral psychology. The line of argument is summarized in the following points:

• Individuals develop character traits, including social virtues, through their voluntary habitual actions in social settings. Good character has two components: pursuit of virtuous ends; and practical wisdom to choose the best means to those ends.
• Justice and friendship are the most important social virtues. Justice aims at establishing some kind of equality among individuals whereby they all get what properly belongs to them and can cooperate for mutual advantage. Friendship goes beyond justice. Friends choose what is good for each other, and each believes their own good is chosen by the other. Friendship entails trust as well as respect.
• “When a number of individuals cooperate in an association over a period of time, their shared character traits and practical knowledge become an integral part of the culture of the association.” (p. 370)
• Political friendship – a situation where individuals regard fellow citizens as their friends - is closely related to consensus. It is typically found in a society where the rich and the poor (and others with divergent interests) agree about important issues and trust people in authority to act in the common interest.
• However, if people are not careful to treat each other justly, political friendship will be eroded, resulting in civil strife between parties with divergent interests. As the culture is corrupted “individuals will seek to aggrandize themselves at the public expense and the association will become unjust, unstable, and fragile”.

Miller concludes:

“The practical upshot of Aristotle’s thesis is that legislators and policy makers should be concerned about supporting and advancing culture by promoting education and the institutions and practices necessary for the formation of virtuous character traits.” (p. 371)

Miller’s observations about contemporary relevance

The point about emergence of civil strife among those with divergent interests seems to me to be relevant to explaining the link between interest group politics and growth of populism in Western democracies. I will return to that topic later.  

In discussing the contemporary relevance of Aristotle’s thesis, Miller focuses on the role of culture in the political transition of the countries that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s. Miller sets the scene for that discussion by noting that Alexis de Tocqueville advanced similar ideas to Aristotle in Democracy in America.

Tocqueville noted that democratic political institutions suited to common traits of Americans could not easily be transferred to Europe. He suggests that traits such as self-help, mutual beneficence, and active participation in voluntary associations made Americans more self-reliant and less dependent upon government support.

Miller also draws upon Douglas North’s views on the path-dependence of culture. He quotes a passage in which North cites examples of unsuccessful attempts to transplant to other countries the constitutions and laws of the United States and other successful Western countries. Those attempts failed because the formal institutions being transplanted were incompatible with the prevailing cultures of recipient countries.

Miller’s observations about the political transition following communist rule draw initially on the work of Svetozar Pejovich (“The Uneven Results of Institutional Change in Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of Culture”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 2006). Pejovich’s theoretical framework rests on the idea that the transactions costs of integrating new formal rules are higher when members of the community perceive the consequences of those rules to conflict with their prevailing culture. He applies that framework to discuss the great disparity in economic freedom among Central and Eastern European countries in 2004, advancing the hypothesis that countries with a stronger Western cultural influence have been more successful in making the transition than those with a tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christianity or Islam. Pejovich observes that culture in the less free and unfree groups has “a bias toward collectivism, egalitarianism, and shared values that predates communism”.

Miller expands Pejovich’s analysis to cover political and personal freedom and extends the period covered to 2002. Drawing upon a range of sources, he identifies three groups of countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for 2020-2022: consolidated democracies; consolidated semi-democracies; and hybrid regimes. The consolidated democracies are Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The consolidated semi-democracies are Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. The19 hybrid regimes include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia, and Hungary.

The author notes that most of the countries that got off to a good start after the fall of communism have continued their trajectories to consolidate democratic capitalism.  He adds: “A notable exception was Hungary, which was demoted to the hybrid zone after a conservative government adopted a new constitution.”

Miller notes that most countries in the hybrid group have made little progress to democratic capitalism. He then adds:

“On the other hand, it is noteworthy that none of these countries have reverted to outright authoritarianism. It is as if they have an inner tendency preventing them from rising above or falling below a certain level. Aristotle’s thesis suggests a plausible explanation of this phenomenon: the parameters of political change are determined to a significant extent by a country’s underlying culture.”

Implications for political entrepreneurship

Miller’s book contains a great deal of information about Aristotle’s view of statecraft which is highly relevant to consideration of political entrepreneurship. In this section of the essay, however, I want to focus on two of my essays discussing the roles of culture and political entrepreneurship as determinants of economic and personal freedom.

The first of these essays is entitled Part II: Can cultural values explain freedom levels? In that essay I observe the existence of a weak positive relationship between economic freedom and an index of facilitating values that I have developed and a strong positive relationship between Christian Welzel’s emancipative values index and personal freedom levels. This research is broadly supportive of the view that culture plays an important role as a determinant of formal institutional settings.

However, my main focus was on outlier countries, whose freedom levels could not be readily explained by culture. I suggested that outlier status can be attributed to the influence of political entrepreneurship. It is relatively easy to identify individual political entrepreneurs who have contributed to institutional outcomes in countries with economic and/or personal freedom ratings substantially lower than might be predicted by underlying cultural values. However, when governments have relatively high regard for individual liberty, political entrepreneurship tends to be more subtle, and less focused on individual national leaders.

Looking at the data base used in this analysis, 24 countries can be identified as belonging to the former Soviet bloc. Of those,10 have both economic and personal freedom levels within a range of plus or minus 1 unit of that predicted by underlying cultural values. Armenia is the only country in which both personal and economic freedom are greater the predicted level; Albania is the only other country where economic freedom is greater than the predicted level. Azerbaijan is the only country with both personal and economic freedom are less than the predicted level and is also the only country with economic freedom less than the predicted level. Apart from Armenia, the countries with personal freedom greater than the predicted level are Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia and Romania. Apart from Azerbaijan, the countries with personal freedom levels lower than the predicted level are Belarus, Russia and Tajikistan.

This analysis provides some support for the Aristotle/Miller thesis even though it suggests that political entrepreneurship can also play an important role in determining economic and personal freedom levels.

The second of my essays relevant to the role of culture and political entrepreneurship is entitled Part VI: What are the consequences of path dependence? In that essay I argue that the culture of preferment-seeking and plunder currently associated with interest group politics in Western liberal democracies took a long time to reach its current state, but it is now entrenched and will be difficult to overcome. The problem arises from path dependence. Changing the rules of the game to reduce the adverse impact of interest group politics poses a large challenge for reform-minded political entrepreneurs.

The development of my line of argument has features in common with the Aristotle/ Miller thesis outlined above. The most obvious common element is reference to Douglas North’s views on the path dependence of culture.

My line of argument also relies heavily on the views of James M Buchanan about social virtues. Those views have an Aristotelian flavour. Buchanan argues that two norms underpin liberal democracy: that a sufficient proportion of the population can make their own choices and prefer to be autonomous rather than dependent on others; and that a sufficient proportion of the population enter relationships with others based on reciprocity, fair dealing, and mutual respect. My attempt to link Buchanan’s views to Aristotle has led me to John Passmore’s book, The Perfectibility of Man (1970). Buchanan claims that book “remains the definitive work on the history of ideas” related to its title. From the little I have read of Passmore’s book, it is clear that he is influenced by Aristotle (but more critical of Aristotle’s views than I am).

I began my path dependence essay with famous quotes from Frédéric Bastiat about the state being the great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else; and the universal franchise as likely to result in universal plunder. It is now clear to me, however, that Bastiat’s comments should be viewed in the light of Tocqueville’s observation that democratic political institutions suited to common traits of Americans could not easily be transferred to Europe. In that light, at the time they were made Bastiat’s comments seem to have been more pertinent to continental Europe than to the Anglosphere. Over the last 150 years, democratic political institutions do seem to have had greater resilience in the Anglosphere than in other parts of the world.

However, in my view Aristotle’s warning that social trust will be eroded if people are not careful to treat each other justly has now also become highly pertinent to the Anglosphere. We are seeing increasing evidence that as the culture is corrupted “individuals will seek to aggrandize themselves at the public expense”. Our democratic political institutions now seem to be becoming increasingly “unjust, unstable, and fragile”.

Conclusion

 This essay was prompted by my reading of Chapter 15 of Fred Miller’s book, Aristotelian Statecraft. That chapter discusses how Aristotle’s observation that the moral character of a polis reflects the moral character of its citizens supports his view that a viable political system requires a supportive culture.

In that chapter, Miller also discusses the varied political transition of countries following the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s to illustrate that democratic capitalism is only viable if culture is supportive. He demonstrates that the countries that have been most successful in making the transition have had a history of relatively strong Western cultural influence. Cultural influences in many of the other countries seem to hold them back from either advancing strongly toward democratic capitalism or reverting to outright authoritarianism.

I also considered whether the Aristotle/Miller thesis is consistent with the conclusions of two essays in my series on political entrepreneurship. The findings of my essay on the extent to which cultural values explain freedom levels are broadly supportive of the role of cultural values, even though I emphasize that political entrepreneurship can also play an important role.

My essay on the consequences of path dependence offers strong support for the Aristotle/ Miller thesis in the context of considering the gradual erosion of social virtues in Western liberal democracies. I think we are now observing the consequences of failure to heed Aristotle’s warning that social trust will be eroded if people do not treat each other justly.