Where did Carl Schmitt go wrong in his critique of democracy?

 

I first became aware of Carl Schmitt about 30 years ago while reading Friedrich Hayek’s book, Law, Legislation and Liberty. At that stage I was left with the impression that while Schmitt still had influence among German legal philosophers, his views were mainly interest to people wondering how a respected academic could become a Nazi. Over the last year or so, however, I seem to be coming across increasing references to the relevance to contemporary politics of Schmitt’s views about friend-enemy distinctions and the autonomy of the political.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides the following biographical information about Schmitt:

“Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) was a conservative German legal, constitutional, and political theorist. Schmitt is often considered to be one of the most important critics of liberalism, parliamentary democracy, and liberal cosmopolitanism. But the value and significance of Schmitt’s work is subject to controversy, mainly due to his intellectual support for and active involvement with National Socialism.”

My reading of the full entry about Schmitt in the Stanford Encyclopedia (written by Lars Vinx) reinforced the impression I previously had that Schmitt’s political philosophy is inherently authoritarian. However, the conclusion that Peter C. Caldwell reached in his literature review is ambivalent:

“What Schmitt’s real message is remains disputed. Fifty years after the first reflections on his work began to appear, his interpreters still battle over whether he was primarily a brilliant lawyer and theorist of constitutional democracy or a gravedigger of democracy and apologist for authoritarianism; an intellectual adventurer and opportunist or a serious analyst of modernity; a conservative trying to save what could be saved of the European heritage or an antisemite and Nazi.”

(‘Controversies over Carl Schmitt: A Review of Recent Literature’, The Journal of Modern History 77, June 2025)

The focus of this essay has been determined largely by a couple of books that I have read recently. I focus on three aspects of Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy. First, I consider Adrian Vermeule’s synthesis of Catholic integralism and Carl Schmitt’s view that politics is war. Second, I consider the link between entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political. Finally, I reconsider Friedrich Hayek’s view of Carl Schmitt’s legal philosophy.

Vermeule’s synthesis of integralism and Schmittian illiberalism

My initial source for the discussion of integralism was Kevin Vallier’s book, All the Kingdom’s of the World (2023). I recently reviewed Vallier's book in an essay entitled, ‘Are integralists opposed to natural rights?’, but neglected to mention Vermeule’s affinity with the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt.

Vallier refers to Vermeule’s article, The Ark of Tradition, which is a review of Schmitt’s book, Roman Catholicism and Political Form. Vermeule writes:

“My suggestion, which is consistent with Schmitt’s vision, but goes beyond what he articulates, is that the Church serves as a kind of ark, whose vocation is to preserve the living tradition of the Verbum Dei amidst the universal deluge of economic-technical decadence, and the eventual self-undermining of the regime.”

He goes on to quote Schmitt:

“Should economic thinking succeed in realizing its utopian goal and in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society, the Church would remain the only agency of political thinking and political form. Then the Church would have a stupendous monopoly: its hierarchy would be nearer the political domination of the world than in the Middle Ages.”

My understanding of what Schmitt meant by “an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society”, is a condition in which people would no longer be interested in drawing “friend-enemy distinctions”. Schmitt claimed that life in a completely de-politicized world would be shallow, insignificant, and meaningless.

Such views seem to me to be mistaken and to have potential to cause a great deal of unnecessary misery. In fields of human endeavour such as business and sport, friendly rivalry obviously helps to make life meaningful for many people. However, friendly rivalry does not require friend-enemy distinctions. Opportunities for human flourishing are enhanced in societies where individuals tend to seek mutual benefit from voluntary (and friendly) interactions with other people, rather than seeking to benefit from the friend-enemy distinctions associated with coercive political processes.  

Lars Vinx notes: 

“Some interpreters have explained Schmitt’s hostility towards liberal de-politicization as being grounded in the view that a willingness to distinguish between friend and enemy is a theological duty.”  

That made me wonder, very briefly, whether a theologian could argue that it is necessary for Christians to be able to distinguish between friend and enemy in order to follow Jesus’s exhortation to love one’s enemies. Before wasting too much time, however, I reminded myself of Erasmus’s message about refraining from wars over theology, which seems to me to remain as relevant today as at the time of the Protestant Reformation. (If further explanation is required, please read something I wrote about Erasmus a few years ago.)

Autonomy of the political

In my recent essay entitled “How does entangled political economy help us to understand political entrepreneurship?”, I drew heavily on Richard E. Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business,. However, that essay doesn’t discuss the link that Wagner draws between entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political.

The concept of autonomy of the political describes power relations and the behaviour of those who hold political power in society. The surface impression is that a small number of rulers dominate larger masses of citizens, but power is ever present in society and can be manifested in a variety of different ways. Wagner’s concept of entangled political economy “rests on the twin autonomies of the political and the economic in society, and the interaction between those autonomies being a source of turbulence within society.”   

Wagner writes:

“For Schmitt, the autonomy of the political rested on exceptional circumstances and the friend–enemy distinction. Exceptional circumstances mean that a rule of law cannot be articulated that will cover every possible point of decision that might arise. The presence of exceptions is a point where the autonomy of the political enters into society. The friend–enemy distinction is a feature of the crooked timber of humanity that surely intensifies with increases in societal complexity and the hierarchical ordering in terms of status that comes in the wake of growing complexity.”

Schmitt argued that even if constitutional arrangements are crafted to support private ordering of societal interaction, the autonomy of the political will assert itself in the guise of exceptional circumstances. As the scale of the polity expands, consensual action tends to give way to factional action, wherein some factions gain at the expense of others. For example, whereas application of general rules and principles might require a few pages of tax codes, factional action to achieve concessions generates thousands of pages of tax codes.

To consider Schmitt’s proposed remedies for factional politics, I have looked beyond the references to Schmitt in Wagner’s book. My main source is the Stanford Encyclopedia entry written by Lars Vinx.

Schmitt’s views about the problems of democracy and the need for strong political leadership are similar to those of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter (discussed in earlier essays, here and here). However, while Weber and Schumpeter defend liberty, Schmitt regards constitutionally guaranteed freedoms as concessions of the state to the individual.

Weber and Schumpeter emphasize the importance of constitutional procedures, but Schmitt’s view of constitutions seems ambivalent. Schmitt understands democracy as the self-rule of the people. He argues, however, that since the will of the people is not necessarily reflected in the majority view, representative government is not necessarily any more intimately connected with the principle of democracy than a dictatorship in the name of the people. 

Schmitt denies the possibility of changing the fundamental nature of an established constitution via use of rules contained within it. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility of suspending a constitution through a sovereign decision on the exception. He also acknowledges that a people, in a renewed exercise of their constituent power, might legitimately choose a non-liberal and non-parliamentarian form of democracy. 

Friedrich Hayek’s view

Hayek held similar views to Schmitt concerning the ability of the majority in a representative assembly with unlimited powers “to confine its activities to aims which all members of the majority desire, or even approve of”. The majority can only be kept together by “paying off each of the special groups by which it is composed”. (LLL, V3, 138)

In a footnote to that passage, Hayek suggested that in the 1920s “the weakness of the government of an omnipotent democracy was very clearly seen by the extraordinary German student of politics, Carl Schmitt.” However, Hayek added that “Schmitt regularly came down on what to me appears both morally and intellectually the wrong side.” (LLL, V3, 194-5)

The passage quoted in the epigraph at the top of this essay appears in Volume 1 of Law, Legislation and Liberty (p 71). It is immediately followed by the assertion that “long before Hitler came to power” Carl Schmitt “devoted all his formidable intellectual energies to a fight against liberalism in all its forms”. (Hayek’s perception that Schmitt was so clearly opposed to all forms of liberalism has been disputed. Some of Schmitt’s writings apparently give the impression that he was trying to save Europe’s liberal heritage.)

Later in the same paragraph, Hayek explains that Schmitt’s final formulation of his central belief about the law entailed “concrete order formation”. Schmitt posits that law is fundamentally a form of political and social organisation grounded in a community’s values, and that the state is the embodiment of the community’s legal order. Hayek argues that under that view of law, individuals are “made to serve concrete purposes”.

Hayek contrasts Schmitt’s view of law with his own view that law consists of “abstract rules which make possible the formation of a spontaneous order by the free action of individuals through limiting the range of their actions.”

While Schmitt saw the state as giving expression to the values of the dominant community group, Hayek saw law as consisting of rules of just conduct that have evolved to protect individual liberty.

Conclusions

Carl Schmitt is remembered as a prominent German legal and political theorist who became a Nazi. However, Schmitt’s political affiliations have not prevented frequent reference being made to views about friend-enemy distinctions and the autonomy of the political in contemporary discussions about political institutions.

This essay has focused on three aspects of Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy: Adrian Vermeule’s synthesis of Catholic integralism and Carl Schmitt’s view that politics is war; the link between Richard Wagner’s concept of entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political; and Friedrich Hayek’s view of Carl Schmitt’s legal philosophy.

Schmitt argued that if economic liberalism succeeded in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of society – a condition where people were no longer interested in making friend-enemy distinctions – the Catholic church would be able to dominate the world. He reasoned that that this religious organisation would dominate in those circumstances because it would be the only agency still engaged in political thinking. I am puzzled as to why he thought a religious organisation would be last to abandon the habit of making friend-enemy distinctions. It seems to me that criminal organisations would be likely to pose a greater obstacle to establishing an unpolitical utopia because friend-enemy distinctions are more intrinsic to their activities.

Schmitt presented a valid argument that constitutional arrangements crafted to support private ordering are prone to corruption by interest group politics. The autonomy of the political exerts itself as some groups argue for exceptions to general rules to obtain benefits at the expense of others.

Other political theorists have proposed stronger executive government as a remedy for problems that interest groups pose for the functioning of liberal democracies. However, Schmitt proposed more extreme remedies. For example, he suggested that under exceptional circumstances a government could make a “sovereign decision” to suspend a constitution.

Friedrich Hayek acknowledged that Schmitt had clearly seen the weakness of omnipotent democracy in the 1920s, but suggested that he “regularly came down on the wrong side” in proposing remedies.

Hayek argued that under Schmitt’s final formulation of his beliefs about the law, individuals are made to serve concrete purposes determined by the state. By contrast, Hayek viewed law in terms of abstract rules of just conduct that have evolved to protect individual liberty.

In my view Schmitt went wrong in his critique of democracy by seeking authoritarian remedies rather than changes in the rules of the game to address the specific problems that he identified.

What role does political entrepreneurship play in institutional change?

 

One of the reasons I quoted that passage by Douglass North is because it mentions political entrepreneurship. I went looking for a quote from North in Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance because I was particularly impressed by that book when I first read it about 30 years ago. (The quoted sentence appears on page 87.)

As defined by North, institutions are “the rules of the game of society” that shape human interaction. He argued that formal institutions—such as constitutions, laws, and regulations—make up only a small proportion of the sum of constraints that shape choices. Informal constraints include codes of conduct, norms of behavior, conventions, and customs. They may be internalized in personal values, rather than imposed by others.

North acknowledged that political entrepreneurship plays a role in institutional change. He doesn’t have much to say about political entrepreneurship, but his analysis implies that political entrepreneurs may play an important role in reducing transactions costs associated with institutional change.

Path dependence and institutional stickiness

The transactions costs of institutional change are high because of the path dependence of institutions. As institutions evolve, ideologies tend to evolve to support them. Organizations and interest groups that have grown up under existing institutions often have a stake in maintaining them.  

The most important point I had remembered from reading Institutions … is that countries with similar formal institutions – constitutions, property rights etc. – can have vastly different economic performance outcomes if informal institutions (cultural settings) are different. Governments and international agencies that have sought to transplant formal institutions to foreign countries have been slow to recognize that point.

The implications of path dependence have been further explored by Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne, and Peter Leeson in “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics”, Chapter 6 in Culture of Economic Action, ed. Laura E. Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (2015).  The authors contend that the ability of a new institutional arrangement to take hold when it has been transplanted depends on that institutions status in relations to indigenous agents in the previous time period. They suggest that institutional transplants are unlikely to stick if they are inconsistent with indigenously introduced endogenous institutions.

The analytical framework used by Boettke et al is also relevant to considering the challenges faced by endogenous political entrepreneurs in bringing about institutional change.

Entrepreneurship (political and economic)

As discussed recently on this blog, political entrepreneurship has characteristics that differ from economic entrepreneurship. I suggested that it might be reasonable to assume that political entrepreneurs are motivated largely by the satisfaction they obtain from constructing ideological narratives and selling them, and from exercising the political power required to implement policies.

Nevertheless, there are similarities between political and economic entrepreneurship that become apparent when economic entrepreneurship is considered in a cultural context. In his article, “The discovery and interpretation of profit opportunities and the Kirznerian entrepreneur”, reproduced as Chapter 3 of Culture and Economic Action (cited above), Don Lavoie writes:

“Entrepreneurship necessarily takes place within culture, it is utterly shaped by culture, and it fundamentally consists in interpreting and influencing culture.” (p. 50)

He suggests:

“entrepreneurship is the achievement not so much of the isolated maverick who finds objective profits others overlooked as of the culturally embedded participant who picks up the gist of a conversation.” (p. 51)

Later, he observes:

“Most acts of entrepreneurship are not like an isolated individual finding things on beaches; they require effort of the imagination, skillful judgements of future costs and revenue possibilities, and an ability to read the significance of complex social situations.”

In the following chapter of Culture and Economic Action, Virgil Henry Storr and Arielle John suggest that rather than viewing Lavoie’s contribution as a critique of Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship it is more appropriate to view it as a suggestion as to how that theory may be fruitfully amended. The amendments suggested by Lavoie seem to me to make the role of the economic entrepreneur seem similar in some respects to the role of a political entrepreneur.

Max Weber’s understanding of political entrepreneurship

Douglass North seems to have given minimal acknowledgement of Max Weber’s work as a social theorist, even though there was considerable overlap in their areas of interest.  Francesca Trivellato has noted that in one publication North does refer to Weber as a scholar of “the role of belief and values in shaping change”. Weber is, of course, most often remembered for his theory of the Protestant ethic but he also made other important contributions.

Weber’s writings on charismatic and demagogic leadership shed some light on the nature of political entrepreneurship in democracies. The following points summarize an article by Xavier Márquez, entitled “Max Weber, demagogy and charismatic representation”, published in the European Journal of Political Theory (2024).

• Weber argued that effective leaders must be able to fight for ‘causes’ beyond the narrow immediate interests of economic groups or party organisations and thus to struggle against the impersonal forces of bureaucratization (the subsumption of politics under bureaucratic and technical imperatives). Effective leaders must therefore have a charismatic form of authority – the only form of authority capable of overcoming the constraints of organisation, legality and tradition.
• The need to appeal to mass publics in modern democratizing societies selects for leaders who have a talent for mobilising large groups of people through rhetorical means. In the context of mass politics, charismatic authority manifests as demagogy. Weber thinks of the masses as unorganized and irrational and argues that even ‘democratically’ elected leadership is a form of ‘dictatorship which rests on the exploitation of the emotionality of the masses.
• Weber's praise for charismatic and demagogic leadership is tempered by the worry that political leaders must also be responsible. This is so in a twofold sense: objectively, a political system must be able to hold leaders accountable for their actions; and subjectively, leaders must display an ethics of responsibility, and thus be able to ‘take responsibility’ for their actions.
• Elections formalize the recognition of charisma. If charismatic leaders capable of mobilizing and representing broad masses will tend to arise in any case, it is better if the recognition of their charisma is subject to periodic formal tests rather than informal, extra-legal events.
• Charismatic authority in the broadest sense tends to appear in moments of deep, even existential crisis, where the charismatic leader performs a ‘miracle’ for a group that feels otherwise impotent and deeply threatened, and can sustain itself only when the leader can provide such ‘miracles.
• The charismatic demagogue produces a wondrous or miraculous representation of the people as a charismatic community but also a ‘wondrous’ representation of himself.
• Weber argues that charismatic leaders must provide evidence of benefiting their charismatic community if they are to retain their authority. The implicit ‘bargain’ between leaders and followers that exists even in cases of strong charismatic authority allows us to speak of a degree of accountability and influence.
• Instead of distinguishing between the ‘mere’ demagogue and its antithesis, the statesman, in terms of whether or not they deceive the demos or act for the common good, Weber stresses the ethical distinction between the politician who is responsible for their cause, and thus capable of intentionally and rationally directing state power towards its achievement (in what is, strictly speaking, a value–rational way), and the politician who is not.
• Lack of objectivity (wishful thinking, extreme overconfidence, ignoring inconvenient information) in assessing a situation leads to irresponsible political action, insofar as it leads to a misunderstanding of the means necessary to achieve particular ends and the physical, social and political constraints on the use of such means. All leaders are susceptible to these vices, but the situation of the charismatic demagogue, surrounded by adoring followers and capable of summoning the adulation of crowds, makes these vices extremely common occupational hazards.
• Weber hoped that training in committee or party work would hone the political judgement of leaders so that they would be more likely to see the consequences of their decisions and to take responsibility for them. 

Márquez argues that Weber's conception of charismatic authority allows some demagogues to play a genuinely democratic role in modern societies when viewed through contemporary theories of representation. He suggests that a Weberian analysis of democracy points to the need for strong accountability mechanisms and for institutions that socialize potential leaders into productive habits of adversarial conduct and responsibility, while preventing easy ‘buck passing’.

Márquez observes that although Weber provides a stronger sense of democratic possibility than did Joseph Schumpeter, he is very much the ancestor of the ‘minimalist’ model of democracy that Schumpeter first articulated explicitly in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. (I wrote about Schumpeter’s model of democracy here in 2012.)

Directions of future research

This essay is the second in a series in which I am attempting to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship. The first essay can be found here.

My next step is to read Robert Faulkner’s book, The Case for Greatness (2007). I am wondering whether the ancients thought it was possible for a charismatic demagog to also be a "great-souled" leader who is keen to promote liberty and opportunities for individuals to flourish. 

After that, I will consider how the concept of political entrepreneurship fits in with modern public choice literature.

Summary and Conclusions

This essay briefly considers the context in which political entrepreneurship is most relevant, some similarities between economic and political entrepreneurship, and the role of charismatic and demagogic leadership in political entrepreneurship within democracies.

The essay begins by considering the role that Douglas North saw for political entrepreneurship in bringing about institutional change – i.e. change in the rules of the game of society. Political entrepreneurship is required to overcome high transactions costs of change that arise from the path dependent nature of institutions. Building on the concept of path dependency, Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson developed an analytical framework to consider the consequences of institutional stickiness for foreigners engaged in institution building exercises that seek to transplant institutions from one country to another. That framework is also relevant to considering the challenges faced by political entrepreneurs seeking to bring about institutional reforms in their own countries.

The essay then turns to consideration of the relevance to political entrepreneurship of Don Lavoie’s view of economic entrepreneurship. Lavoie suggests that entrepreneurship takes place within culture and is concerned with interpreting and influencing culture. He makes the role of the economic entrepreneur seem similar in some respects to that of the political entrepreneur.

The other major topic considered in the essay is the contribution that Max Weber makes to our understanding of political entrepreneurship through his writings on charismatic and demagogic leadership. Weber makes the case that charismatic and demagogic leadership may be required to overcome the impersonal forces of bureaucratization within democracies. He also sheds light on the circumstances in which demagogic leadership can be consistent with democracy.

North and Weber both add to our understanding of the role of the political entrepreneur in overcoming obstacles to institutional change. However, the fundamental question that both leave aside is how to ensure that institutional change enhances liberty and opportunities for individuals to flourish.  

Can the concept of political entrepreneurship help us to understand authoritarianism?

 

In this essay I discuss the relevance of the concept of political entrepreneurship to an understanding of political outcomes that have substantially affected personal and economic freedom in different countries. The essay has a particular focus on authoritarianism. My understanding of that concept is based on  the view of Hans Eysenck that people who have an authoritarian personality are attracted to the possibility of oppressing others. People who have authoritarian values see such oppression as justified. Authoritarian governments oppress people by restricting their personal and economic freedom to a greater extent than other governments.

The essay focuses on political outcomes which seem incongruent with underlying cultural values in a range of countries. It suggests that political entrepreneurship has influenced the ideologies currently reflected in personal and economic freedom in those countries. It also considers the current role of political entrepreneurship in harnessing cultural and economic grievances to pursue a range of different ends in the liberal democracies.

The essay draws on some of my previous research on the extent to which cultural values can explain authoritarianism and on the influence of cultural backlash and economic grievances on political outcomes in liberal democracies. That research is summarized prior to considering the nature and relevance of political entrepreneurship.

Can cultural values explain authoritarianism?

My answer to that question is that cultural values do not fully explain authoritarianism – the ideologies of some governments are at variance with cultural values. The best way to explain how I came to that conclusion is by referring readers to the accompanying graph which shows levels of economic freedom and personal freedom for 85 countries. Please note that the personal freedom scale on the vertical axis is in reverse order with highest levels of personal freedom at the bottom. (The graph has previously been published in an article in The Savvy Street in 2023.)

Please focus on the labelling of data points. I have attached country labels only to those data points where freedom ratings are substantially different from predicted levels based on indexes of emancipative and facilitating values which were constructed using World Values Survey data. The methodology for constructing these indexes is explained in the Savvy Street article and on this blog (here and here).

The colour of the labelled points depends on whether freedom is greater than or less than predicted—green if greater than predicted, red if less than predicted. The size of the labelled points is larger if both personal and economic freedom are greater than or less than predicted.

It is clear from the graph that freedom ratings of most of the countries with low personal and economic freedom are substantially lower than predicted by corresponding emancipative and facilitating values. The countries in which both personal and economic freedom is less than predicted include China, Iran and Venezuela. It seems obvious that suppression of liberty in those countries is a product of the ideologies of the governments concerned rather than the cultural values of the peoples.  

The graph also shows that a substantial number of countries with relatively high personal and economic freedom are performing better in that regard than can readily be explained on the basis of prevailing values. Most of the countries concerned are not the high-income countries of North America, Western Europe, Oceania, and East Asia that come to mind when one thinks of countries with relatively high levels of economic and personal freedom.

The existence of countries in which freedom levels are substantially greater than predicted by facilitating and emancipative values suggests that government support for economic and personal freedom may precede or accompany the evolution of facilitating and emancipative values. The transition to high levels of economic freedom often takes place over an extended period. As market-friendly economic reforms promote the growth of economic opportunities, this could be expected to lead to the gradual evolution of facilitating values supporting higher levels of economic freedom. The growth of economic opportunities could be expected to encourage people to place higher value on personal autonomy and to become more trusting of others.

Milton Friedman observed that economic freedom “promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other” (Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 1982, 9). As economic development proceeds, the evolution of emancipative values provides additional support for personal freedom.

The correlation between economic and personal freedom is strikingly evident in the graph. There are not many countries with relatively high personal freedom and low economic freedom, or vice versa. Argentina—which stands out as the only country having high personal freedom despite low economic freedom—helps illustrate why that is so. In the published article, I suggested:

“In Argentina, the decline in economic freedom over the last 20 years has been accompanied by worsening economic prospects, which seem likely to lead, before long, to an economic and political crisis. Hopefully, the political response to the crisis will be to restore greater economic freedom and make personal freedom more secure, rather than to restrict personal freedom to suppress criticism of government policies.”

A few months after that comment was published, Javier Milei was elected president of Argentina and has successfully introduced policy reforms to expand economic freedom. (Unfortunately, I cannot claim that my essay was influential in bringing that about.)

Cultural and economic grievances as explanators of political change

In the preceding essay on this blog I discuss the question: “Is cultural backlash a major determinant of political outcomes in the liberal democracies?” My intial focus was on the view which Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart presented in their book, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism (2019),  that the spread of post-materialist values has induced a cultural backlash among cultural conservatives. They suggested on that basis that the combination of authoritarianism and populist rhetoric is a threat to liberal democracy.

In my view, Norris and Inglehart were mistaken in attributing cultural backlash to the spread of post-materialist values. I argued that it would be more correct to attribute cultural backlash to the illiberalism of progressives who have been advocating what Yascha Mounk has described as the identity synthesis (see: The Identity Trap, 2023). The identity synthesis has provoked a backlash because it rejects neutral rules like equal opportunity and free speech in favour of action to promote the interests of particular groups that have suffered from discrimination in the past.

Some recent research by John Burn-Murdoch, published in the Financial Times ‘Why the Maga mindset is different’, March 7, 2025) has suggested that over the last 20 years the values held by people who identify with the right wing of U.S. politics has moved closer to the values of people in Turkey, Russia and China than to people who identify with the right wing of politics in Europe. It remains to be seen what impact, if any, this apparent retreat from classical liberal values will have on the institutions of liberal democracy in the United States. 

Norris and Inglehart acknowledge that economic grievances also play an important role in encouraging people to support policy remedies proposed by populists. In that context, I have referred to some research published in an essay on this blog that has highlighted the adverse impact that slower economic growth can have on life satisfaction, particularly of young people. I suspect that the longer-term slowdown in economic growth in the liberal democracies might be more important in generating support for populist policies than are grievances that can be related directly to the impact of import competition or immigration.

However, we live in a world where the policies that political leaders sell to voters depend on how voters perceive reality. Those perceptions are not always accurate. Some opinion leaders on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics attempt to sell voters a distorted view of reality. As I wrote that I was reminded of a comment I made in my review of Michèle Lamont’s book, Seeing Others, 2023. I suggested:

“On the question of factual accuracy, Lamont’s narrative, which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry with the wealthy one percent, seems to me to be just as questionable as Donald Trump’s narrative which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry about globalization and immigration. Neither of those narratives promotes an accurate understanding of economic reality.”

The concept of political entrepreneurship

Catherine De Vries and Sara Hobolt have suggested that competition between political parties in European countries is like competition in economic markets. In both contexts long-standing dominant players (firms or parties) may be challenged by disruptive new players. The central objective for both challengers and incumbents is the control of government and the delivery of public policies. Political entrepreneurs play a key role because a party that engages in successful political policy innovation can enjoy an effective monopoly on an issue and reap the consequent electoral benefits. (De Vries CE, Hobolt SB. Challenger Parties and Populism. LSE Public Policy Review. 2020; 1(1): 3, pp. 1–8. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31389/lseppr.3)

De Vries and Hobolt were writing about multi-party systems in which several political parties are competing for power. However, a similar form of competition occurs when an innovative political entrepreneur within a major political party challenges established leadership factions by offering a product that is more appealing to supporters of the party.

Valentina Ausserladscheider has contributed to an understanding of political entrepreneurism by providing a framework to consider reasons for the political success of Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, during the 1990s. Haider’s winning formula was based on a policy mix of authoritarian and and neoliberal policies, which was particularly successful during a time of economic turmoil and uncertainty. (See Chapter 9 of Culture, sociality, and morality : new applications of mainline political economy edited by Paul Dragos Aligica, Ginny Seung Choi, and Virgil Henry Storr, 2021).

Ausserladscheider emphasizes that the strategies of political entrepreneurs are not determined solely by voters’ ideological positions. Successful political entrepreneurs don’t offer the same policies as their competitors. They advance their political ambitions by focusing on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties do not satisfy, and on winning support by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas. For example, the entrepreneurial strategy of far-right parties is their “nationalist and nativist core ideology”, leading to policies such as immigration restrictions that are claimed to solve a range of problems.

As illustrated by the example of Jörg Haider, the strategies that political entrepreneurs follow to attract support can result in political programs that offer a mix of libertarian and authoritarian policies.

The influence of political entrepreneurs

From a cursory inspection of the accompanying graph, people who have rudimentary knowledge of global politics would have no difficulty identifying political entrepreneurs who have historically been major players determining outcomes in many jurisdictions where economic and personal freedom seems substantially at variance with underlying cultural values. There are good reasons for that. Media coverage tends to focus on political leaders, the challenges they face and the policies they adopt.

The role of political entrepreneurship is not always obvious in liberal democracies where the institutions of representative government have been respected for many decades. However, it doesn’t make sense to assume that changes in public opinion will be automatically reflected in public policy even in countries with representative government. In general, the responses of political markets to new information (e.g. poll data about shifts in public opinion on particular issues) depend to a much larger extent on decisions by big players than do responses to new information in financial and commodity markets.

A better understanding of the reasons why political entrepreneurs behave as they do might help us to assess whether current political developments are likely to expand or constrain economic and personal freedom. Those outcomes depend on both the motivations of the individuals concerned and on the social and economic context in which they operate.

Like other humans, political entrepreneurs are motivated by a range of factors. It is usually unrealistic to assume that they are motivated solely by a desire to maximize social welfare (whatever that means), to maximize the number of votes they obtain, to maximize personal wealth, or to obtain the perks of the office. Given the nature of their occupation, however, it seems reasonable to assume that political entrepreneurs obtain more satisfaction than most other people from constructing ideological narratives and selling them, and from exercising the political power required to implement policies.

In some instances, ideological predilections may play a dominant role. For example, while social and economic context helps to explain why revolutions occurred in China and Iran in the 20^th century, the repression of individual liberty following those revolutions stemmed directly from the ideologies of revolutionary leaders - Mao Zedong in China and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.

Similarly, while the economic problems confronting the United States and Britain during the 1980s provided contexts in which substantial changes in the direction of economic and social policies could be contemplated, the responses of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher owe much to their respective commitments to economic freedom. The reforms currently being pursued by Javier Milei in Argentina seem to be similarly motivated.

Looking around the world, a range of different ideological predilections seem to be playing a role in policies advocated by political entrepreneurs. For example, we see ideological considerations playing a role among those seeking opportunities to expand the welfare state, to redistribute wealth, to promote “equity” for community groups which have suffered from discrimination in the past, to save the environment from CO2 emissions, to pursue international humanitarian goals, or to pursue nationalist goals by restricting immigration, raising trade barriers, and withdrawing from international organisations. Some of those policies have potential to impinge adversely on economic and personal freedom.

As we have seen earlier, even if political entrepreneurs are motivated mainly by a desire to exercise political power, the innovative aspect of their role requires them to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties (or factions) do not satisfy. They seek to attract support from people who are discontented with current economic and social outcomes by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas. Their success in attracting a loyal support base of customers who are willing to help them to sell their narrative depends to a large extent on the strength of competition from politicians selling different narratives, and on the extent of resistance by journalists and members of the public who consider their narratives to be incorrect or that their policy proposals are unworkable, unconstitutional, unethical, or otherwise unhelpful.

In my opinion, the ability of some political entrepreneurs (from both conservative and progressive sides of politics) to persuade large numbers of people to accept false narratives is posing an increasing threat to liberty in the liberal democracies. False narratives pose a threat to liberty because they often provide a basis for false beliefs that problems can be solved by restricting personal and economic freedom. For example, the personal freedom of people who refused vaccinations for Covid was restricted inappropriately in many countries because of false narratives that unvaccinated people were likely to spread infection. And economic freedom is currently being restricted in some countries through imposition of higher import barriers on the basis of false narratives about the impact of free trade.

A few decades ago, people seemed to have been more willing to put their trust in political commentators who took pride in remaining politically independent and well-informed. Those commentators were able to expose false narratives to a greater extent than now occurs, and thus to limit the influence of political entrepreneurs who base their policies on falsehoods.

In recent years, however, mainstream media has become increasingly polarized. The rise of social media seems to have aggravated the problem. Many exchanges of views about political issues on social media consist largely of recitations of false narratives promulgated by political leaders.

Some commentators who are independent and well-informed can still be found in both mainstream and social media, but prevailing cultures may need to give greater respect to the search for truth before those people will have sufficient influence to discourage political entrepreneurs from promoting false narratives.

Conclusions

Authoritarian and libertarian political outcomes don’t just appear out of nowhere. Underlying cultural values that have evolved over long periods of time go some of the way toward explaining levels of economic and personal freedom in different countries. However, political entrepreneurship also plays an important role.

The role of political entrepreneurs is most apparent in those countries where underlying cultural values are less supportive of economic and personal freedom. Political entrepreneurs have played an important role in some of those countries in promoting either more or less freedom than would be expected on the basis of underlying cultural values.

The role of political entrepreneurship has been more constrained in those liberal democracies where the institutions of representative government have been respected for many decades.

However, the ability of some political entrepreneurs (from both conservative and progressive sides of politics) to persuade large numbers of people to accept false narratives is posing an increasing threat to personal and economic freedom in the liberal democracies. Polarization of the media means that such claims are now less subject to independent scrutiny than they were a few decades ago.

Recent political developments are raising the question of whether cultural change in some liberal democracies has emboldened some political entrepreneurs to challenge conventions regarding government respect for judicial rulings on the legality of their activities. Governments that do not perceive themselves to be bound by judicial interpretation of laws and constitutions are unlikely to have much regard for individual liberty. Any government which claims that its actions are beyond legal challenge because they reflect the general will of the people is showing obvious signs of authoritarianism.

Addendum

Chris M Sciabarra has given me permission to publish the following comment, which he has provided by email:

"I just read the essay and enjoyed it; I'll have to give a bit more thought to it. You make some very good, persuasive points, though there are some claims that I need to process a bit more. I think the whole concept of political entrepreneurship has some weight here. I wonder how, for example, it might mesh not only with public choice thinking, but also with Hayek's insights about how the 'worst get on top' when political power becomes the only power worth having. If that's the case, then political entrepreneurship in a populist age morphs into a kind of political con game that attacks the very roots of liberal democracy---something you acknowledge in your conclusions.

One of the issues that concerns me is that while there was a backlash against the "identity synthesis" of illiberal progressives, I don't think that was the key factor that influenced the outcome of the election. Incumbent parties lost all around the world, whether they were perceived as 'right'- or 'left'-leaning. In the US, of course, Trump won over Harris. In the UK, the Conservative Party was defeated. The Liberal Democrats lost in Japan, while in France, a coalition of left-wing and centrist parties gained ground. And so forth. I think that inflation, stagnant wages, housing affordability, etc. led most incumbents to defeat because whoever is in power is the party that takes the blame for the conditions on the ground. 

That said, I also think that the "identity synthesis" on the illiberal left has only been replaced by a different kind of "identity synthesis" on the illiberal right, given the right's embrace of nationalism and, in many cases, a virulent form of nativism, riding on profound anti-immigrant fervor. Not to mention the illiberal right's obsession with scapegoating the smallest of minorities---like transgender-identifying people, who make up about 0.6% of the population. This is as much of an illiberal right-wing play on identity politics as anything we've seen on the left." 

Chris has now posted a more extensive review on Notablog . 

Notablog is also worth visiting for other reasons - including the opportunity to take a break from worrying about authoritarianism to listen to the "Song of the Day". 

An interesting diagram

I think the following diagram captures very well the illiberal cultures on the authoritarian socialist and authoritarian nationalist sides of politics, and the overlap between them.

Stephen Hicks posted the diagram on X and asked if anyone could tell him where it came from so that that he could give credit. I would also like to give credit to the person responsible for constructing this.

 

Is Alexander Hamilton's ideal of a modern commercial republic still relevant today?

 

Alexander Hamilton was one of the Founding Fathers of the United States. He served as secretary to the Treasury from 1789 to 1795 during the presidency of George Washington.

I knew little about Alexander Hamilton’s contribution to American economic policy before reading Samuel Gregg’s book, The Next American Economy: Nation, State, and Markets in an Uncertain World, 2022. Gregg suggests that America faces a choice between a form of state capitalism – top-down interventionism focused on achieving political objectives such as greater economic security for specific groups and “national security” – and a free market economy. He argues that in making the case for free markets it is helpful to take another look at the ideal of a modern commercial republic as espoused by Alexander Hamilton.

Centralization of powers

Prior to reading Gregg’s book, I knew that Hamilton had argued successfully for greater centralization of government powers than prevailed in the original confederation. On that basis, I had entertained the idea that he might possibly have been responsible for much that is wrong with the U.S. today.

Gregg presents a more positive view of Hamilton’s contribution. He suggests that integration of the states into a more unified commercial republic made it easier for Hamilton to apply principles of free trade among the states and between the U.S. and other countries.

Gregg’s line of reasoning poses a challenge both to libertarian globalists, who see national governments as the source of barriers to the functioning of free markets, and to economic nationalists who want governments to prevent foreign economic competition because they see it as a threat to national sovereignty. He challenges libertarian globalists by suggesting that “failure by the government to smooth the economic ups and downs which are part of life in a market economy risks opening the door to political movements that have no particular regard for human freedom”. He challenges economic nationalists by suggesting that tariffs and other measures that protect of American industry from foreign competition are harmful to Americans.

 It isn’t necessary for libertarian globalists, like myself, to abandon utopian thinking in order to see merit in effective unilateral action by national governments to promote free trade. At a national level, the case for free trade rests on it providing individual citizens and their descendants with the prospect of better opportunities than would otherwise be available to them.

To eliminate the excesses of statism, it is necessary for political leaders to exercise statecraft (or what Adam Smith and David Hume referred to as “the science of the legislator”). As Gregg puts it Smith and Hume recognized that:

 “the knowledge furnished by … integration of moral, political, and economic inquiry needed to be brought to bear upon society by statesmen and governments in the interests of its improvement”.

Gregg notes that although Edmund Burke’s involvement in economic policy was “attuned to political realities” he leaned strongly towards promoting greater commercial freedom within Britain’s empire and between Britain and other nations.

America’s Founding Fathers, including Alexander Hamilton, were also influenced by Adam Smith and David Hume.

Hamilton’s vision of a commercial republic

Samuel Gregg explains how Hamilton advanced his vision of a commercial republic in his contributions to the Federalist Papers and in his role as secretary to the Treasury. Hamilton’s vision of a modern civilized nation combined republican government and a private enterprise economy, with merchants subject to the discipline of competitive markets. He hints that character traits that make for commercial success – industry, innovation, economy, self-restraint, honesty, prudence – are also republican virtues.

Hamilton argued for free trade between the states and for revenue tariffs only on international trade. He suggested that tariffs “force industry out of its more natural channels into others in which it flows with less advantage”. He maintained that trade policy should be driven by national interest and was adamantly opposed to use of trade sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy.

What next?

Samuel Gregg ends his book by acknowledging that he doesn’t know whether there is a real possibility that an American commercial republic could emerge to shape America’s future. He hopes that it could on the basis that he can “see no reason why America cannot embrace the habits, incentives, and disciplines associated with markets while also grounding them in the language, norms, and virtues of the American experiment”.

Since 2022, when Gregg’s book was published, it has become clearer that the U.S. is likely to continue, for a few more years at least, down the path towards greater international trade protectionism.  The choice that the two major political parties are offering voters in the 2024 presidential election certainly does not include a candidate offering an alternative to higher trade barriers.

Unfortunately, the adverse impacts of increased trade protectionism in the U.S. cannot be guaranteed to result in a strong impetus for policy reversal. The U.S. economy is sufficiently large and diverse that increased barriers to international trade are likely to have relatively minor adverse impacts by comparison with those that would occur in most other countries if they followed similar policies.

It looks to me as though trade liberalisation is unlikely to occur in the U.S. until influential politicians come to see merit, from a foreign policy perspective, in supporting multilateral efforts to encourage trade among countries that have more than minimal regard for free market principles.

Meanwhile, Samuel Gregg’s book will hopefully be widely read in other countries where some current political leaders may be more receptive to Alexander Hamilton’s vision of a commercial republic based on free market principles.

Conclusion

Samuel Gregg’s book, The Next American Economy, urges Americans to adopt the ideal of a modern commercial republic, as originally espoused by Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton argued for the U.S. to adopt, unilaterally, the principle of free international trade on the grounds that this would serve the economic interests of Americans and promote republican virtues.

Unfortunately, American political leaders do not currently seem to be in the mood to re-endorse Hamilton’s vision of a modern commercial republic.

Hopefully, Gregg’s book will be widely read in other countries where some political leaders may be receptive to messages about the contemporary relevance of the role that free market polices played at an early stage in the economic and social development of the United States.

Addendum

A year has passed since I suggested: "The U.S. economy is sufficiently large and diverse that increased barriers to international trade are likely to have relatively minor adverse impacts ...". A year ago, I had no idea that the 2nd Trump administration would generate so much uncertainty about future tariff levels, or that it would raise tariffs to such an extent that it might start a trade war. 

I expect that the tariffs imposed by the 2nd Trump administration will have substantial adverse impacts on the U.S. economy, particularly during the next couple of years while the economy is adjusting to these new price distortions. The price increases resulting from the tariffs is likely to generate expectations of higher inflation that the Fed will presumably try to contain via tighter monetary policy. That would be likely to result in a recession even without taking account of the impact of foreign retaliation on U.S. exports. 

It now does seem possible that the Trump tariffs might have a sufficiently large adverse impact on the U.S. economy to generate political pressure for some kind of policy reversal.

What makes a narrative good?

 

I asked myself the question posed above as I was reading Michèle Lamont’s book, Seeing Others, How to Redefine Worth in a Divided World. The passage quoted below seems central to Michèle Lamont’s book:

“The hegemony of the American dream manifests in the emphasis Americans put on neoliberal virtues of material success, self-reliance, individualism, entrepreneurialism, and competitiveness. These criteria of worth have gained more and more influence as “models of ideal selves,” and encourage many to internalize blame for the increasing precarity of their lives. This model can also lead people to seek out a scapegoat group to blame.” (p 31)

Those sentences seem to suggest that neoliberalism encourages people to either internalize blame for misfortune or to seek scapegoat groups to blame.

Internalizing blame

The author doesn’t explain why she believes neoliberalism can cause people to “internalize blame for the increasing precarity of their lives”, but she lists several references in the notes section which may support her claims. The one which seems likely to be most relevant is an article by Glen Adams, Sara Estrada-Villalta, Daniel Sullivan, and Hazel Rose Markus entitled ‘The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of Psychology’, Journal of Social Issues 75 (1), 2019.

Adams et al use the term ‘neoliberalism’ to refer to an economic and political movement that came to prominence in the late 1970s, advocating “deregulation of markets and free movement of capital with an emphasis on fluidity and globalization”. Such usage of ‘neoliberalism’ to refer to advocacy of free markets is now common, even though the term was once generally understood to refer to advocacy of left-leaning policies, e.g. a ‘social market economy’, rather than free markets. Like most advocates of free markets, I would prefer to be referred to as a classical liberal or libertarian, but I can usually assume that I am among good company when I am labelled as a neoliberal.

The authors argue that neoliberalism encourages “an entrepreneurial approach to self as an ongoing development project, an imperative for individual growth and personal fulfillment, and an emphasis on affect regulation”. I don’t object to that characterisation. It describes some aspects of the approach to human flourishing in Part III my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing.

However, the authors suggest that neoliberalism also supports psychological “responsibilization” - an ugly word for an ugly concept. The claim they make is that neoliberals advocate that individuals should not only accept personal responsibility for problems which it may be possible to ameliorate through behaviour change (such as obesity and substance abuse) but also to accept responsibility for misfortune more generally.

Neoliberals argue that free markets tend to reward individual effort, but that doesn’t mean that they believe that economic misfortune is always attributable to lack of individual effort. In fact, one of the characteristics of neoliberalism is recognition that social problems of poverty, unemployment etc. are often attributable to foolish government economic policies that are opposed to economic freedom.

I don’t know any neoliberal who would suggest that individuals should “internalize blame” for any disruption of their lives associated with innovation and competition. Neoliberals are more likely to suggest that people who lose jobs or other remuneration because of the disruptive impact of innovation and competition should view such setbacks as beyond their control. The potential for such setbacks is a price that previous generations have willingly paid to enable to enable their descendants to enjoy the benefits of economic growth. Deirdre McCloskey – a prominent classical liberal – has coined the term, ‘bourgeois deal’, to refer to the willingness of people to accept the potential for their lives to be disrupted by innovation and competition in exchange for ongoing expansion of economic opportunities. (See Bourgeois Equality.)

I doubt that many psychologists would suggest that their clients should “internalize” blame for all the bad things that happen to them. When psychologists suggest that individuals should take responsibility for their lives, I am sure that the vast majority would mean that individuals should focus on taking personal responsibility for problems that are within their locus of control.

Who is responsible for the scapegoat narrative?

It took me some time to work out why Michèle Lamont believes that neoliberalism encourages people to seek out scapegoat groups to blame for misfortune. Her reasoning evidently has more to do with her belief that Donald Trump is a neoliberal than with the beliefs of neoliberals.

On the page following the passage quoted above, Lamont writes: 

“From Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump, neoliberalism has come to be understood as a precondition for a successful society”.

I believe that free markets help societies to become and remain successful, but it is hard to understand how anyone could perceive Donald Trump to be an advocate of that view. While in office, Trump administered the final blow to the “neoliberal consensus” on international trade that characterised the post-Cold War period, and he currently favors further restrictions on international trade and international movement of labor.  

Lamont’s claim that neoliberalism encourages people to seek out scapegoat groups to blame seems to rest on the behavior of Donald Trump. She observes that in 2015 former president Trump advanced a false narrative in which immigrants from Mexico were rapists and drug dealers. (pp 51-2). During the 2016 campaign Trump appealed to “America’s forgotten workers” by recognizing their plight and “by blaming globalization and immigration for it”. (p 70)

Lamont also suggests that Trump provided “an empowering narrative” for the working class “who are often perceived as “the losers of the system”. (p 165). Early in the book, she notes:

“Instead of depicting ‘everyday Americans’ as ‘deplorables’, as Hillary Clinton was perceived to do in the 2016 presidential campaign, her opponent Donald Trump affirmed their worth in his various electoral speeches, explaining their loss of social status as a result of globalization and immigration.” (p 8)

Lamont’s narrative

The title of Lamont’s book, “seeing others”, refers to “acknowledging people’s existence and positive worth, actively making them visible and valued, reducing their marginalization, and openly integrating them into a group”. (p 6) She suggests that having one’s sense of worth affirmed “is a universal need that is central to our identity as human beings and our quality of life”. (p 7) She urges that we “bridge boundaries with those who are different” via “ordinary universalism”, or “emphasizing similarities over differences”. (p 144)

I don’t object to those sentiments, and I doubt whether many other neoliberals would either. It is certainly appropriate to recognize that ordinary universalism can be “a vital counterweight” to “Nationalist populism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia” which “are on the rise in many countries”. (p 146) As an advocate of ordinary universalism, however, I think it is unfortunate that the author was not sufficiently “inclusive” to recognize that anti-Semitism also belongs on that list.  

I also object to the idea that “individualist approaches” to improving wellbeing “may harm more than they help, since they pull people’s attention away from more meaningful efforts”. (p 48) The author seems to be suggesting that excessive attention is given to approaches that help individuals to improve their assessments of their own worth. Instead, she urges:

“We need to ask ourselves hard questions about how we decide who matters and what we can do to create a more inclusive society.”

It seems to me that people who are lacking in regard for their own worth are unlikely to make a positive contribution to ensuring that the worth of others is appropriately recognized.

Much of the book is devoted to a discussion of how it is possible to change hearts and minds in order to reduce stigmatization of marginalized groups, and thus build a more inclusive society. That discussion is largely beyond the scope of this essay.

In Chapter 7, however, the author discusses the result of a survey of the attitudes of Gen Z students (aged 18 to 23). She seems a little perplexed that Gen Z tend to “embrace some neoliberal ideals – hard work and success” but is pleased that they “combine personal professional aspirations with the promotion of collective well-being”.

The author claims that apart from “the wealthiest of the wealthy” every other group “finds itself reeling from an onslaught of difficulties, disappointments, and anxieties, grasping for dignity and stability”. (p 47) That is implausible and seems at odds with her message about destigmatization of marginalized groups. However, it fits well with another theme of Lamont’s narrative.   

As already mentioned, Lamont suggests that Trump provided “an empowering narrative” for the working class. She suggests that the Democratic party should counter that with “messages of solidarity and dignity”:

“Redirecting working class anger toward the one percent is more likely to sustain fruitful alliances than driving wedges between diverse categories of workers who have so much in common.” (p 159)

Is Lamont’s narrative good?

It seems to me that appropriate criteria to consider whether a narrative is good include whether it encourages ethical behaviour and whether it is factually accurate.

Regarding ethical behaviour, Michèle Lamont seems to be seeking to “mobilize” good narratives when she suggests:

“We engineer our world together by mobilizing narratives that expand recognition of who is worthy.”

Leaving aside engineering, the message she is attempting to convey seems to be that narratives have a role in reinforcing the ethical intuition that we should respect other humans and behave with integrity toward them, irrespective of gender, sexual preference, race, nationality, religion, wealth, social status, political affiliations etc. I am not entirely convinced that she would include ideological opponents among those who are “worthy”, but she does acknowledge that “it is worth trying to understand even people we may strongly disagree with”. (p 159).   

On the question of factual accuracy, Lamont’s narrative, which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry with the wealthy one percent, seems to me to be just as questionable as Donald Trump’s narrative which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry about globalization and immigration. Neither of those narratives promotes an accurate understanding of economic reality.  

Conclusion

In this essay I have examined Michèle Lamont’s narrative that neoliberalism encourages people to either internalize blame for misfortune or to seek scapegoat groups to blame. My conclusion is that her claim that neoliberalism encourages people to internalize blame is baseless. Her claim about seeking to blame scapegoat groups seems to be based on the false belief that Donald Trump is a neoliberal.

Good narratives should encourage ethical behaviour and be factually accurate. One of Lamont’s objectives in this book seems to be to “mobilize” good narratives that reinforce the ethical intuition that we should behave with integrity toward all other humans. However, the factual accuracy of her narrative that workers have reason to be angry with the wealthy one percent is highly questionable. If accepted by governments that approach would encourage unethical redistributions of incomes and further dampen incentives that are essential to the ongoing growth of widespread economic opportunities.