Does Aristotle’s assertion that a viable political system requires a supportive culture still have relevance today?

 

Some readers may be wondering why anything written about culture and politics over 2000 years ago could possibly have contemporary relevance. Fred D. Miller J.R. makes a strong case that Aristotle’s views remain relevant in his recently published book, Aristotelian Statecraft. In particular, Miller demonstrates that we can still learn a lot from Aristotle about the relationships between moral character, culture and political systems.

In the first part of this essay I will draw upon Miller’s book, particularly Chapter 15, to explain the basis for Aristotle’s assertion that a viable political system requires a supportive culture. In the second part I will outline Miller’s observations about the contemporary relevance of the relationship between culture and political systems. In the third part I will reflect on implications of Miller’s work for the role political entrepreneurship in institutional change, drawing on my recent essays on that topic.

Aristotle’s thesis

At this point I should explain why I think Aristotle was intending to convey the idea that a viable political system requires a supportive culture in the sentence quoted in the epigraph (Pol. V.9.1310a). The quote appears in a context where Aristotle is writing about laws being democratic or oligarchic. Since he is also referring to a constitution as something that might be influenced by education of the young, it seems reasonable to infer that in this context he sees a constitution as being constituted mainly of mores (i.e. informal institutions).

Aristotle observes that the moral character of a polis reflects the moral character of its citizens. His thesis that a viable political system requires a supportive culture can be seen to stem from his moral psychology. The line of argument is summarized in the following points:

• Individuals develop character traits, including social virtues, through their voluntary habitual actions in social settings. Good character has two components: pursuit of virtuous ends; and practical wisdom to choose the best means to those ends.
• Justice and friendship are the most important social virtues. Justice aims at establishing some kind of equality among individuals whereby they all get what properly belongs to them and can cooperate for mutual advantage. Friendship goes beyond justice. Friends choose what is good for each other, and each believes their own good is chosen by the other. Friendship entails trust as well as respect.
• “When a number of individuals cooperate in an association over a period of time, their shared character traits and practical knowledge become an integral part of the culture of the association.” (p. 370)
• Political friendship – a situation where individuals regard fellow citizens as their friends - is closely related to consensus. It is typically found in a society where the rich and the poor (and others with divergent interests) agree about important issues and trust people in authority to act in the common interest.
• However, if people are not careful to treat each other justly, political friendship will be eroded, resulting in civil strife between parties with divergent interests. As the culture is corrupted “individuals will seek to aggrandize themselves at the public expense and the association will become unjust, unstable, and fragile”.

Miller concludes:

“The practical upshot of Aristotle’s thesis is that legislators and policy makers should be concerned about supporting and advancing culture by promoting education and the institutions and practices necessary for the formation of virtuous character traits.” (p. 371)

Miller’s observations about contemporary relevance

The point about emergence of civil strife among those with divergent interests seems to me to be relevant to explaining the link between interest group politics and growth of populism in Western democracies. I will return to that topic later.  

In discussing the contemporary relevance of Aristotle’s thesis, Miller focuses on the role of culture in the political transition of the countries that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s. Miller sets the scene for that discussion by noting that Alexis de Tocqueville advanced similar ideas to Aristotle in Democracy in America.

Tocqueville noted that democratic political institutions suited to common traits of Americans could not easily be transferred to Europe. He suggests that traits such as self-help, mutual beneficence, and active participation in voluntary associations made Americans more self-reliant and less dependent upon government support.

Miller also draws upon Douglas North’s views on the path-dependence of culture. He quotes a passage in which North cites examples of unsuccessful attempts to transplant to other countries the constitutions and laws of the United States and other successful Western countries. Those attempts failed because the formal institutions being transplanted were incompatible with the prevailing cultures of recipient countries.

Miller’s observations about the political transition following communist rule draw initially on the work of Svetozar Pejovich (“The Uneven Results of Institutional Change in Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of Culture”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 2006). Pejovich’s theoretical framework rests on the idea that the transactions costs of integrating new formal rules are higher when members of the community perceive the consequences of those rules to conflict with their prevailing culture. He applies that framework to discuss the great disparity in economic freedom among Central and Eastern European countries in 2004, advancing the hypothesis that countries with a stronger Western cultural influence have been more successful in making the transition than those with a tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christianity or Islam. Pejovich observes that culture in the less free and unfree groups has “a bias toward collectivism, egalitarianism, and shared values that predates communism”.

Miller expands Pejovich’s analysis to cover political and personal freedom and extends the period covered to 2002. Drawing upon a range of sources, he identifies three groups of countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for 2020-2022: consolidated democracies; consolidated semi-democracies; and hybrid regimes. The consolidated democracies are Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The consolidated semi-democracies are Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. The19 hybrid regimes include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia, and Hungary.

The author notes that most of the countries that got off to a good start after the fall of communism have continued their trajectories to consolidate democratic capitalism.  He adds: “A notable exception was Hungary, which was demoted to the hybrid zone after a conservative government adopted a new constitution.”

Miller notes that most countries in the hybrid group have made little progress to democratic capitalism. He then adds:

“On the other hand, it is noteworthy that none of these countries have reverted to outright authoritarianism. It is as if they have an inner tendency preventing them from rising above or falling below a certain level. Aristotle’s thesis suggests a plausible explanation of this phenomenon: the parameters of political change are determined to a significant extent by a country’s underlying culture.”

Implications for political entrepreneurship

Miller’s book contains a great deal of information about Aristotle’s view of statecraft which is highly relevant to consideration of political entrepreneurship. In this section of the essay, however, I want to focus on two of my essays discussing the roles of culture and political entrepreneurship as determinants of economic and personal freedom.

The first of these essays is entitled Part II: Can cultural values explain freedom levels? In that essay I observe the existence of a weak positive relationship between economic freedom and an index of facilitating values that I have developed and a strong positive relationship between Christian Welzel’s emancipative values index and personal freedom levels. This research is broadly supportive of the view that culture plays an important role as a determinant of formal institutional settings.

However, my main focus was on outlier countries, whose freedom levels could not be readily explained by culture. I suggested that outlier status can be attributed to the influence of political entrepreneurship. It is relatively easy to identify individual political entrepreneurs who have contributed to institutional outcomes in countries with economic and/or personal freedom ratings substantially lower than might be predicted by underlying cultural values. However, when governments have relatively high regard for individual liberty, political entrepreneurship tends to be more subtle, and less focused on individual national leaders.

Looking at the data base used in this analysis, 24 countries can be identified as belonging to the former Soviet bloc. Of those,10 have both economic and personal freedom levels within a range of plus or minus 1 unit of that predicted by underlying cultural values. Armenia is the only country in which both personal and economic freedom are greater the predicted level; Albania is the only other country where economic freedom is greater than the predicted level. Azerbaijan is the only country with both personal and economic freedom are less than the predicted level and is also the only country with economic freedom less than the predicted level. Apart from Armenia, the countries with personal freedom greater than the predicted level are Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia and Romania. Apart from Azerbaijan, the countries with personal freedom levels lower than the predicted level are Belarus, Russia and Tajikistan.

This analysis provides some support for the Aristotle/Miller thesis even though it suggests that political entrepreneurship can also play an important role in determining economic and personal freedom levels.

The second of my essays relevant to the role of culture and political entrepreneurship is entitled Part VI: What are the consequences of path dependence? In that essay I argue that the culture of preferment-seeking and plunder currently associated with interest group politics in Western liberal democracies took a long time to reach its current state, but it is now entrenched and will be difficult to overcome. The problem arises from path dependence. Changing the rules of the game to reduce the adverse impact of interest group politics poses a large challenge for reform-minded political entrepreneurs.

The development of my line of argument has features in common with the Aristotle/ Miller thesis outlined above. The most obvious common element is reference to Douglas North’s views on the path dependence of culture.

My line of argument also relies heavily on the views of James M Buchanan about social virtues. Those views have an Aristotelian flavour. Buchanan argues that two norms underpin liberal democracy: that a sufficient proportion of the population can make their own choices and prefer to be autonomous rather than dependent on others; and that a sufficient proportion of the population enter relationships with others based on reciprocity, fair dealing, and mutual respect. My attempt to link Buchanan’s views to Aristotle has led me to John Passmore’s book, The Perfectibility of Man (1970). Buchanan claims that book “remains the definitive work on the history of ideas” related to its title. From the little I have read of Passmore’s book, it is clear that he is influenced by Aristotle (but more critical of Aristotle’s views than I am).

I began my path dependence essay with famous quotes from Frédéric Bastiat about the state being the great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else; and the universal franchise as likely to result in universal plunder. It is now clear to me, however, that Bastiat’s comments should be viewed in the light of Tocqueville’s observation that democratic political institutions suited to common traits of Americans could not easily be transferred to Europe. In that light, at the time they were made Bastiat’s comments seem to have been more pertinent to continental Europe than to the Anglosphere. Over the last 150 years, democratic political institutions do seem to have had greater resilience in the Anglosphere than in other parts of the world.

However, in my view Aristotle’s warning that social trust will be eroded if people are not careful to treat each other justly has now also become highly pertinent to the Anglosphere. We are seeing increasing evidence that as the culture is corrupted “individuals will seek to aggrandize themselves at the public expense”. Our democratic political institutions now seem to be becoming increasingly “unjust, unstable, and fragile”.

Conclusion

 This essay was prompted by my reading of Chapter 15 of Fred Miller’s book, Aristotelian Statecraft. That chapter discusses how Aristotle’s observation that the moral character of a polis reflects the moral character of its citizens supports his view that a viable political system requires a supportive culture.

In that chapter, Miller also discusses the varied political transition of countries following the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s to illustrate that democratic capitalism is only viable if culture is supportive. He demonstrates that the countries that have been most successful in making the transition have had a history of relatively strong Western cultural influence. Cultural influences in many of the other countries seem to hold them back from either advancing strongly toward democratic capitalism or reverting to outright authoritarianism.

I also considered whether the Aristotle/Miller thesis is consistent with the conclusions of two essays in my series on political entrepreneurship. The findings of my essay on the extent to which cultural values explain freedom levels are broadly supportive of the role of cultural values, even though I emphasize that political entrepreneurship can also play an important role.

My essay on the consequences of path dependence offers strong support for the Aristotle/ Miller thesis in the context of considering the gradual erosion of social virtues in Western liberal democracies. I think we are now observing the consequences of failure to heed Aristotle’s warning that social trust will be eroded if people do not treat each other justly.

Can the rise of populism be explained as a reaction to the rule of experts?

 

In an essay written over 15 years ago I observed that we were beginning to see a populist reaction to the rule of experts in the United States and (to a lesser extent) in Australia. In more recent essays, however, I have tended to see populism as a manifestation of interest group politics. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, but it may be useful to consider how the rule of experts and populism are both entangled with interest group politics.

My 2010 essay

The essay was entitled: Does Australia also have a ruling class? It was prompted by an article by Angelo Codevilla which suggested that Democrat and Republican office-holders in recent governments in the United States had shown “a similar presumption to dominate and fewer differences in tastes, habits and opinions ... than between both and the rest of the community”. He claimed: “They think, look, and act like a class.”

Codevilla discussed several characteristics of this “ruling class”. For example, he suggested that they believe themselves to be “the best and brightest while the rest of Americans are retrograde, racist, and dysfunctional unless properly constrained”. They view the common people’s words as “like grunts, mere signs of pain, pleasure and frustration”.

I concluded that while Australia also had a self-appointed ruling class which could be identified with the public service and the political left, I didn’t think the conservative side of Australian politics was as closely identified with that ruling class as in the United States. That explains why populist politicians were not particularly popular in Australia at that time.

In retrospect, however, I think I also displayed some “ruling class” attitudes in my essay:

“In my view the words of non-experts on complex economic issues do have little more value than a grunt. Whether we are talking about economic policy, brain surgery or plumbing, I think it should be self-evident that the views of experts count for more than those of non-experts.”

I still think that the views of experts should count for more than those of non-experts, although these days I try to avoid being offensive. Apart from the tone of my comment, I should have made clear that there are reasons to doubt that some of those who claim economic expertise know what they are talking about. The claims that some economists make about the potential to regulate complex market systems to produce better outcomes deserve no more respect than the similar claims of non-experts.

In his book, Expert Failure, published in 2018, Roger Koppl brings an economic perspective to “the problem of experts”. I will briefly consider Koppl’s line of argument in the following section.

Expert Failure

Koppl acknowledges that we must rely on experts even though experts may not be completely reliable and trustworthy sources of the advice we require from them.

 He defines an “expert” as anyone paid to give an opinion. That definition leaves open the question of whether experts are reliable or unreliable.

 Koppl adopts the Hayekian view that knowledge is generally emergent from practice, often tacit, and embodied in our norms, habits, practices, and traditions. His comparative institutional approach leads to the conclusion that expert error and abuse are more likely when experts have monopoly power, and less likely in a “competitive” market for expert opinion.

I expect most economists would view that as commonsense, but it is far removed from standard practice in many fields which rely on expert knowledge. Based on his study of the use of expert witnesses in law, Koppl observes that it is common to encounter the view that it is scandalous for the opinions of men of science to be challenged, even by other scientists. It is often held that the knowledge of expert witnesses is or should be uniform, unambiguous and certain. Experts are often encouraged to come to a common understanding rather than to offer competing views.

Koppl observes that the division of knowledge makes it impossible for anyone to avoid a limited and partial perspective, which implies a parochial bias in our perceptions and judgments. That kind of bias cannot be eliminated by blinding protocols – such as the double-blind requirements used in testing of pharmaceuticals.  It can only be mitigated by multiplying the number of experts and putting them in positions of genuine rivalry.

The book contains an interesting discussion of epistemic systems design in an experimental economics laboratory. In that setting, the experimenter is in the god-like position of defining unambiguously what the truth is and examining how close experimental subjects come to it in different institutional settings. The knowledge gained of which institutional structures promote the discovery and elimination of error is relevant to the real world. Experimental systems design studies offer opportunities to test the role of network structure in producing reliable knowledge in scientific fields.

Koppl comments:

“Rather than attempting to instruct people in how to form true opinions, we might reform our social institutions in ways that tend to induce people to find and speak the truth.”

However, at the end of the next chapter, after considering the problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion in government -  referred to as the rule of experts or the entangled deep state - the author suggests that the experimental approach of “piecemeal institutional reform (which is mostly borrowed from Vernon Smith) does not have an obvious application to the entangled deep state.”  He concludes:

“If my diagnosis of the deep state is at all correct, reform is urgently required. I freely confess, however, that I have no specific ideas on how we might attempt to roll back the deep state with a reasonable prospect of success.”

Nevertheless, Koppl offers useful insights into the nature of the problem arising from the rule of experts. His conclusion that the problem of experts “mostly boils down to the question of knowledge imposition” is highly relevant to consideration of institutional approaches to determination of public policies.

In the introductory chapter to his book Koppl explains that he values pluralistic democracy and is as much opposed to populism as to the rule of experts.  He argues for pluralism on the grounds that each of us has at best a partial view of the truth:

“In a pluralist democracy, competing partial perspectives on the truth have at least a chance to be heard and to influence political choices. Decisions in a political system – be it populist, elitist, or something else – that override or ignore plural perspectives will be based on knowledge that is at best limited, partial, biased.”

In the process of developing that view Koppl refers to an article by Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Accetti (“Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements?” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 20(2), 2015) which describes populism and technocracy as two organizing poles of politics which are both opposed to “party democracy”. I will now discuss that article because it raises the question in my mind of whether party democracy has more in common with interest group politics than with pluralism.

Party democracy, interest group politics and pluralism

 Bickerton and Accetti argue that whilst populism and technocracy are usually assumed to be opposed to each other, there is also an important element of complementarity between them. Both populism and technocracy are predicated on an implicit critique of party democracy. The authors suggest that “if we accept the idea that politics is increasingly structured in terms of this conflict between populism and technocracy, then we find that even the very possibility of articulating a defense of party democracy is excluded from the political spectrum”.

I have no difficulty agreeing with Bickerton and Accetti if they are just using different words to say that both populism and the rule of experts are opposed to pluralistic democracy. Technocracy seems to correspond closely with rule of experts, but “party democracy”, as the authors describe it, seems to me to corresponds more closely to interest group politics than to the role of encompassing political groups in a two-party pluralistic democracy.

The authors define party democracy as a political regime based on two key features: the mediation of political conflicts through the institution of political parties; and the idea that the specific conception of the common good that ought to prevail and therefore be translated into public policy is the one that is constructed through the democratic procedures of parliamentary deliberation and electoral competition. The role of political parties in “mediation of political conflicts” is the focus of my concern.

The authors suggest that an important function performed by political parties is that of “integrating a plurality of particular interests” and moulding them into “an overarching conception of the common good”. When political parties aim to do such things, it seems to me that they end up cobbling together coalitions of interest groups which seek to obtain benefits for themselves at the expense of others. That is essentially what interest group politics is about.

In my view, better outcomes are produced when political parties take on the role of encompassing political groups in two-party pluralistic democracies. In discussing the importance of encompassing political groups in a two-party system of government, Mancur Olson asserted that the leader of a party “whose clients comprise half or more of the society naturally is concerned about the efficiency and welfare of the society as a whole” because this affects the party’s electoral prospects.  (See further discussion and reference here.)

 As I have explained elsewhere (for example in a recent essay on the consequences of path dependence) the growth of interest group politics has tended to contract economic freedom, constrain economic growth and increase public debt levels. As a result, voters have tended to become increasingly disenchanted with conventional politics.

It seems to me that as party politics has increasingly focused on pandering to particular interest groups it has helped to bring about a situation where more people have become more willing to listen to populists who tell them that they are being disadvantaged by the policies of conventional political leaders. Unfortunately, most of those populist leaders advance policies that are likely to produce even worse economic and social outcomes.

The ubiquity of populism, rule of experts, and interest group politics

Looking at recent politics in the United Sates, it might seem appropriate to identify the Democratic Party with rule of experts and the Republican Party with populism. However, that assignment understates the extent of populism in the Democratic Party, which tends to seek popular support by attributing economic woes to the wealthy 1% of the population in much the same way as economic nationalists in the Republican Party attribute economic woes to import competition and immigration. It also understates the extent to which the current Administration relies on commercial expertise – dealmaking – in running the government. It seems that the rule of one group of experts has been replaced by rule of another group with different expertise. The problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion have changed their character but have not disappeared.

Roger Koppl’s reference to the “entangled deep state” reflects his awareness that the rule of experts is not immune to interest group politics. He notes that participants in the American deep state “have a variety of competing and parochial interests”. More generally, interest group politics is strongly associated with the entanglement of entrepreneurs and interests in private and public sectors.

Interest group politics seems to have attended to the pleas of increasingly narrow groups in recent years. As well as seeking support of broad economic groups such as unions, industry groups, and groups with differing social and environmental attitudes, political parties have increasingly sought the support of narrow interest groups by engaging in identity politics. The progressive side of politics has favoured groups that have previously been disadvantaged by ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation. The conservative side of politics has pushed back against what they label as wokeness, while seeking support from some groups, e.g. young men, who perceive themselves to be disadvantage by it.

Another interesting development in interest group politics in the United States is the emergence of an alliance between conservative populists and the high-tech community. It is not easy to comprehend how populists who claim to be concerned about economic and social impacts of competition from imports and immigration could be complacent about the economic and social impacts of AI. Action by the U.S. government to facilitate rapid development of AI has been accompanied by a change in the economic nationalist narrative away from its populist roots to emphasize the importance of retaining technological leadership in AI in the face of increasing competition from China.

The warning of President Eisenhower, quoted in the epigraph, might now be relevant for reasons that he could not have foreseen. Public policy is not only at risk of becoming the captive of a scientific-technological elite supported by the administrative state, it is also at risk of becoming the captive of a scientific-technological elite controlling the development of powerful AI models.

However, I don’t think we should assume that a future in which AI models will have an increasing influence on social and economic outcomes will necessarily be worse than a future in which the entangled deep state retains its current influence.  It is possible that rivalry between different AI models will ensure that their social and economic impacts are relatively benign and consistent with pluralistic democracy. Even now, greater use of truth-seeking bots has potential to lessen the problem of rational ignorance, and thus to reduce the susceptibility of voters to populists peddling false narratives.

Conclusions

The rise of populism in the Western liberal democracies can be explained to some degree as a reaction to the “ruling class” attitudes of experts within governments.  I have recently tended to see populism as a manifestation of interest group politics, but it is worth considering how the rule of experts and populism are entangled with interest group politics.

The essay has outlined the views presented by Roger Koppl in his book, Expert Failure. Koppl offers the useful insight that the main problem arising from the rule of experts is knowledge imposition. Expert error and abuse are more likely when experts have monopoly power and are less likely when experts are placed in positions of genuine rivalry. Koppl argues that pluralist democracy is superior to both the rule of experts and populism because it enables competing partial perspectives on the truth to have a chance to be heard.

I have also considered the view of Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Accetti that both populism and technocracy are predicated on an implicit critique of party democracy. I suggested that party democracy, as the authors described it, seemed to have more in common with interest group politics than with pluralistic democracy. In my view, interest group politics is largely to blame for the poor economic and social outcomes that have encouraged the growth of populism.

My main conclusion is that the rule of experts, populism, and interest group politics are currently ubiquitous on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics. Populism is certainly not confined to one side of politics and populist governments don’t eliminate problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion. In the U.S. a populist executive has continued to discourage rival views, while attempting to substitute expertise in commercial deal-making for expertise in statecraft.

The emergence of an alliance between the current U.S. Administration and the high-tech community poses a risk that public policy may become captive to a scientific-technological elite controlling the development of powerful AI models.  We should not assume, however, that a future in which AI models have an increasing influence on social and economic outcomes will necessarily be worse than one in which the entangled deep state retains its current influence. Rivalry between AI models may even have potential to produce better outcomes.

What was wrong with the Washington Consensus?

 

Just as I was reading the final chapters of William Easterly’s book, Violent Saviours: The West, the Rest, and Capitalism Without Consent, the United States government abducted the president of Venezuela to stand trial on drug charges in New York. I was pleased to see Nicolás Maduro facing justice, even if for the wrong reasons, but at the time of writing it remains to be seen whether the U.S. actions will advance the economic and personal freedom of Venezuelans.

 In the light of recent developments, Easterly’s conclusion seem to me to be excessively optimistic. He states:

“Adam Smith’s prophesied movement of “nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another” had been partially fulfilled. The relation of the West to the Rest, previously based on coercion, was now based mainly on consent.”

Under the presidency of Donald Trump, the U.S. seems to me to be behaving like a colonial power. President Trump makes no secret of the fact that he is more interested in control of additional territory, oil, and other resources than in promoting respect for human rights, free trade, and the liberal international order.

Apologists for President Trump can claim, with some justification, that big powers have always swung their weight around in their own interests despite their rhetoric supporting the liberal international order. Nevertheless, public support for international norms of behaviour has hitherto signaled a willingness to be held to account publicly for breach of those norms.

 Easterly qualifies his statement that the relation of the West and the Rest is now based mainly on consent:

“The trend toward freedom is neither inexorable nor irreversible. As of this writing, new threats to freedom have emerged with proposed increases in US tariffs and possible restrictions on foreign students. It’s a little premature to declare the attainment of a liberal paradise.”

With the benefit of observation of recent events, however, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the world is currently moving rapidly away from the ideal of relations between nations being based on consent rather than coercion. It is possible, nevertheless, that oppressed people in some countries will manage to achieve more economic and personal freedom over the next few years. The best we can hope for is that before too long Washington will once again embrace the ideal that relations between nations should be based on consent rather than coercion.

Before I discuss Easterly’s view of the Washington Consensus, I will briefly outline what Violent Saviours is about.

The West’s conflicted view of the Rest

Violent Saviours offers a historical account of the conflict between the duelling visions that have influenced the conduct of Western nations toward the rest of the world since the 17^th and 18^th centuries. On the one hand, there are the liberal ideas of consent, self-determination, and equality that make possible positive-sum gains from commerce between groups and individuals. On the other hand, there are the opposing illiberal ideas of coercion, paternalism and racism that yielded a negative sum world of conquest.

Adam Smith was a leading advocate of liberal ideas and a critic of many aspects of colonialism. However, some well-intentioned Enlightenment philosophers (e.g. Condorcet) offered support for the “Development Right of Conquest”. Condorcet sought to justify conquest as offering the hope of eventually “civilizing” the locals.

Over the period from 1776 to 1865, the liberals were mainly on the losing side. They were unable to prevent the West’s adoption of illiberal policies such as colonial conquest and population removal (in countries such as the U.S, and Australia). However, liberals had some victories during that period; most notably, they were able to bring about abolition of the slave trade and of slavery in the United States.

Easterly suggests that over the period from 1865 to 1945 most economists abandoned liberal morality: “Commerce expands but without moral constraints on plunder”. The regression of freedom culminated in World War II, during which liberalism had to fight for its survival.

The period since 1945 has seen the partial victory of liberal ideas with the end of colonialism and a surge in commerce which has partially restored agency to people in the former colonies. Easterly notes that some economists – notably Milton Friedman, P. T. Bauer, and Amartya Sen – revived the idea of individual freedom as “an end in itself”.

It is possible to quibble with some aspects of that account, but I think the important point to focus on is the current state of the conflict between the duelling visions. Easterly writes:

“Yet the legacy of the past is still here. While obviously not equating modern development efforts with slavery, genocide, and colonialism, the question remains of what violations of consent today in the name of progress should be out of bounds.”

That provides the context in which I would like to consider the Washington Consensus.

 The Washington Consensus

The Washington Consensus was the term John Williamson, an economist, invented in 1989 to describe the set of policy reforms that the US Treasury, the World Bank and the IMF believed would be good for Latin American countries. The ten propositions of the Washington Consensus combined fiscal discipline with selective deregulation. They were broadly pro-market but did not entail a vastly diminished role for government. As an advocate of a greater measure of economic freedom than required by the ten points in the Washington Consensus, I recall being bemused to see opponents equate it with “neoliberalism” and “market fundamentalism”. John Williamson had a different reaction. As he discussed in the paper from which I obtained the epigraph, he was concerned that the term was often being used to refer to a more radical pro-market view than he had intended.

The policy ideas in the Washington Consensus were certainly applicable beyond Latin American countries and were not confined to economists in Washington DC. Those ideas were widely accepted by economists with expertise in economic policy in many different countries. I think they are still widely accepted by economists today.

As I was reading Easterly’s discussion of the Washington Consensus, the thought crossed my mind that the era in which it held sway was actually the high point in economic development policy as advocated by the World Bank. The Washington consensus seemed to show more recognition of the importance of economic freedom than subsequent policy approaches emerging from Washington.

One of the problems that Easterly mentions is that many observers thought that pro-market reforms were only desirable if they produced immediate economic gains. The reforms led to anti-globalization protests because they didn’t have an immediate positive impact on economic growth and were often associated with worsening of poverty. As time went on, however, “there was more evidence of growth turnarounds and poverty reduction correlated with movements away from extreme state control”.

As I was reading this, I tried to recollect what I had written in the 1990s about the adjustment process following an expansion of economic freedom. I wrote about some aspects of that question in an article entitled “The New Zealand Model of Economic Reform: A Review” (published in: Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997), ANU Press). My work suggested that the lack of clear evidence of economic benefits in some countries that had undertaken economic reforms in the 1980s could be attributed partly to the time required for new policy directions to become embedded and for adjustment to occur: 

“Profound changes in behaviour, including changes in the willingness of individuals to learn new skills and business practices, are required as people respond to the incentives that policy reforms provide.  It takes time even for the most innovative firms and individuals to accept that new market incentives are likely to be sustained and to develop and implement new strategies.  Widespread adoption requires sufficient time for these new strategies to become demonstrably successful.”

I am pleased that I wrote that even though I missed an important point that Easterly makes. He suggests that the emphasis “on material results alone – on both sides of the debate – neglected Sen’s and others’ arguments for freedom as an end in itself”.

I don’t see freedom as an “end in itself” – freedom is necessary because human flourishing is an individualized and self-directed process. What I think Easterly means is that institutional freedom would be no less desirable if individuals chose to use it ways that made no contribution to economic growth e.g. by increasing the amount of time they spent on leisure activities.

Easterly also suggests that the manner in which foreign governments were encouraged to adopt Washington Consensus polices was problematic:

“Low and middle-income countries could get badly needed loans from the World Bank and IMF only if they agreed to reforms decreed by Bank and Fund staff. The fatal combination of foreign advisors with some coercion would keep discrediting promarket recommendations made by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1990s, especially for Africa, Latin America, and Russia.”

A few pages on, however, the author notes that “the association of liberal reforms with a Washington-imposed Consensus did not turn out to be fatal”. He follows that observation with a long list of “homegrown reformers” who have pursued pro-market reforms. (I have reproduced the list here.)

Unfortunately, Easterly’s list of reformers does not include Javier Milei, president of Argentina. It was probably compiled too soon for that to be possible.

Now that I have mentioned Javier Milei it is worth noting that the U.S. government offered a $20 billion bailout for Argentina prior to the country’s recent legislative elections. The offer was apparently made with strings attached — namely, that the funds would be available only if Milei’s party won the election.

It seems to me that if the U.S. president were to promote a general policy of assisting those low-income countries whose political leaders enthusiastically expand economic and personal freedom, he might be worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize.   

Conclusion

William Easterly’s book, Violent Saviours, offers an insightful account of the conflict between liberal and coercive views of economic development since the 17^th and 18^th centuries. He suggests that the legacy of the past is still with us because development economists and policy makers are still confronted by the question of what violations of consent should be out of bounds.

That provided the context in which I considered Easterly’s views of what was wrong with the Washinton Consensus – the moderately pro-market economic policies advocated by the U.S. Treasury, the World Bank, and the IMF during the 1990s. Easterly is clearly sympathetic to espousal of pro-market policies. However, he makes a strong case that such policies should be advocated to promote economic freedom rather than to promote “material results alone”.

The view that Easterly presents is consistent with the idea that liberty is desirable because it provides opportunities for individuals to flourish in the manner they choose.

Part VIII: Summary and Conclusions

This is the final essay of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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The purpose of this series of essays has been to explore the contribution that political entrepreneurship makes to human flourishing. A central issue is whether political entrepreneurship has a role to play in promoting a political and legal order more conducive to human flourishing.  

Each essay in this series has sought to address a question relevant to assessing the impact of political entrepreneurship on freedom and flourishing. The main points that emerge from each essay are as follows:

1. This series of essays has focused on institutions related to liberty because those institutions are strongly linked to human flourishing. The links between freedom and flourishing are conceptual as well as empirical. Human flourishing is inherently individualized and self-directed. Liberty is necessary to enable individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others.
2. At a national level, prevailing culture offers only a partial explanation of differences in economic and personal freedom levels. In several countries, political entrepreneurs and their ideologies have played an obvious historical role in bringing about economic and personal freedom levels that are substantially lower than predicted by underlying cultural values.
3. Political entrepreneurship is similar in some ways to other forms of entrepreneurship. Don Lavoie’s suggestion that entrepreneurs play an interpretive role in complex systems is applicable to all kinds of entrepreneurship. Political entrepreneurs respond to public discourse by using it as a basis for policy innovation.
4. Political entrepreneurship is largely about obtaining and using political power. Political entrepreneurs face incentives to exploit the misconceptions and irrational preferences of voters by making deals with narrow interest groups at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Innovators among them have incentives to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties don’t satisfy. However, political entrepreneurs who engage overtly in interest group politics are not always able to overcome opposition from other politicians who see benefits in seeking to serve broader community interests.
5. Many political entrepreneurs are motivated by a desire to pursue economic, environmental and social objectives that are widely supported in the broader community. However, even modest attempts to steer the market system toward desired economic objectives often obstruct the price signals that convey information from consumers to producers about the most advantageous use of resources. Pursuit of social and environmental objectives is usually a matter of “muddling through” in the face of unintended consequences.
6. Historically, the path-dependence of social norms has played an important role in slowing the emergence of interest group politics in the long-standing democracies. People were once more reluctant to become dependent upon government or to use the political system to obtain benefits at the expense of others than they are today. The erosion of those norms has led to increasing constraints on economic freedom, a decline in dynamism, and rapid growth in public debt. Path-dependence of social norms now poses a difficult challenge for political entrepreneurs seeking to promote policies that are more conducive to freedom and flourishing.
7. The idea that autocrats have sometimes helped to promote greater economic freedom may not be entirely fanciful but empirical evidence certainly doesn’t support the idea that democracy, and the personal freedom associated with it, is incompatible with high levels of economic freedom. It is clear, nevertheless, that the long-standing democracies are experiencing difficulties in maintaining economic freedom in the face of interest group politics. Reform-minded political entrepreneurs in those countries have a great deal to learn from previous reform experiences. The problem of ensuring adoption of government policies that more consistently advance economic and personal freedom cannot be reduced to the question of how to elect better political entrepreneurs to national leadership positions. Institutional change is a complex process involving social movements, media organizations, and interactions between individual citizens, as well as local and national politics.

 In the preface I suggested that it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship at this time because there seems to be increasing support in liberal democracies for leaders who propose rule changes which are likely to have detrimental impacts on prospects for freedom and flourishing. In this series of essays, I have attempted to shed some light on the ways authoritarian leaders seek to appeal to the public but have not attempted to assess the gravity of current threats to liberty.

My concluding message for those who perceive that liberty is under threat is that they should emphasize the potential for positive relationships between democracy and human flourishing. Perhaps the most important thing I have learned in writing these essays is that my previous tendency toward cynicism about democracy was not entirely appropriate. If we want institutions that are more supportive of freedom and flourishing to become entrenched, we will need more supportive citizens engaged in discursive processes at all levels of society – that means more democracy, not less. 

Further Reading

Please see the following post which offers suggestions for further reading.

Part V: What information constraints confront political entrepreneurs?

 This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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This essay considers the information constraints confronting central planners and those political entrepreneurs who have less ambitious aims to promote widely accepted economic and social objectives. It is appropriate to begin by considering the motives of political entrepreneurs.

Motives of political entrepreneurs

Many assumptions that economists make about motives of political entrepreneurs are clearly wrong. Political entrepreneurs cannot maximize social welfare functions, even when they seek to promote the well-being of citizens.  They rarely set out to maximize the number of votes they obtain, even though they seek to obtain sufficient votes to win elections. They don’t necessarily set out to maximize the perks of office, or to use their positions to maximize personal wealth, even though such behaviour is common when the institutional context is conducive to it. The claims that many politicians make to be motivated by concerns for the well-being of the population they represent are not always deceitful.

Bryan Caplan suggests that to get ahead in politics, “leaders need a blend of naïve populism and realistic cynicism.” One reason why many politicians have legal training is because “the electoral process selects people who are professionally trained to plead cases persuasively and sincerely regardless of their merits” (Caplan 2007, p.169).

The easiest way to give the appearance of sincerity is to believe in the merits of the case you are pleading. Leon Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory predicts that when people publicly advocate a position - especially if doing so requires effort or commitment - they tend to adjust their private attitudes to align with their advocacy to reduce internal psychological tension (Festinger, 1957).

Institutional context has important implications for the character of people who are attracted to a career in politics. Unscrupulous opportunists are likely to be attracted to political and bureaucratic positions in which they can obtain personal benefit by using discretionary powers corruptly. F. A. Hayek observed that “the worst get on top” in totalitarian systems because “while there is little that is likely to induce men who are good by our standards to aspire to leading positions in the totalitarian machine, and much to deter them, there will be special opportunities for the ruthless and unscrupulous” (Hayek 1994, pp.166-67).

However, an institutional context that is attractive to unscrupulous opportunists may also attract potential political entrepreneurs who see opportunities for institutional reform. More generally, reform-minded individuals may be motivated to enter politics when they perceive that current practices are resulting in adverse economic and social consequences.

Unfortunately, reform-minded political entrepreneurs are not a panacea. As discussed below, those who advocate further restrictions on individual liberty in their efforts to promote economic and social objectives may make matters worse. And, as discussed in subsequent essays, even when reform-minded political entrepreneurs who advocate greater economic and personal freedom succeed in attaining high office, they face substantial obstacles to achieving their institutional change objectives.

The perils of central planning

In a famous article, F. A. Hayek explained that the data a national planning agency would require to engage in rational economic planning exists only in a dispersed form in the separate minds of millions of people. Hayek observed that individuals possess unique knowledge of “the particular circumstances of time and place”, which they can use for their own benefit, and that of others, only if the decisions depending on it are left to them or made with their active cooperation (Hayek 1945, pp.521-2). Hayek suggested that we should look at the price system as a “mechanism for communicating information” because prices act to coordinate the separate actions of different people (Hayek 1945, p.526).

In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek noted:

“The question raised by economic planning is … not merely whether we shall be able to satisfy what we regard as our more or less important needs in the way we prefer. It is whether we shall be able to decide what is more, and what is less, important for us, or whether this is to be decided by the planner” (Hayek 1944, p.100).

In later writings, Hayek noted that as the adverse consequences of central planning became apparent, it came to have fewer defenders in the liberal democracies. However, arguments were still being advanced in favor of the state’s taking sole charge of providing various services that can be provided privately. He suggested that this also entailed the risk that people would be prevented from using their unique knowledge for their own benefit and would be denied the benefits of competitive experimentation:

“If, instead of administering limited resources under its control for a specific service, government uses its coercive powers to insure that men are given what some expert thinks they need; if people thus can no longer exercise any choice in some of the most important matters of their lives, such as health, employment, housing, and provision for old age, but must accept the decisions made for them by appointed authority on the basis of its evaluation of their need; if certain services become the exclusive domain of the state, and whole professions – be it medicine, education, or insurance - come to exist only as unitary bureaucratic hierarchies, it will no longer be competitive experimentation but solely the decisions of authority that will determine what men get” (Hayek 1960, p.261).  

In a book first published in 1985 Don Lavoie further explained the fundamental knowledge problem that political entrepreneurs are confronted with when they seek to plan economic activities. The most obvious implication is that it is impossible for markets to be replaced by comprehensive economic planning. However, more modest attempts to steer the market towards outcomes which planners consider to be desirable also obstruct the source of knowledge which is essential to rational decision-making (Lavoie 2016, p.56-7).

Lavoie points out that the only way we can know whether we are squandering resources by over- or under-investing in microprocessors or steel, for example, is via “the messages contained in the relative profitability of rival firms in these industries”. He adds:

“But this is precisely the information we garble when we channel money toward one or another of the contenders. Deprived of its elimination process, the market would no longer be able to serve its function as a method for discovering better and eliminating worse production techniques. Without the necessity of responding to consumers’ wants or needs, businesses would never withdraw from unprofitable avenues of production” (p.181).

Lavoie notes that advocates of industry policy disagree on the directions in which the market should be steered. For example, Felix Rohatyn wanted to funnel aid to sunset industries while Robert Reich wanted to funnel it to sunrise industries. He sums up:

“It is the main conclusion of the argument that I have called the knowledge problem … that there are no rational grounds on which Reich could ever convince Rohatyn or vice versa on such matters as are involved in economic change. As a result, such battles are sure to be fought with weapons other than carefully reasoned argument” (p. 200-201).

Lavoie notes that Rohatyn and Reich both argued that it is the responsibility of a strong leader to coordinate the actions of the rest of us (p.190). The coordination they had in mind seems to be more akin to the coordination that military leaders impose by giving orders to subordinates than the coordination among individuals that occurs voluntarily and spontaneously in a free market.

Lavoie argues that economic planning is inherently militaristic: “The practice of planning is nothing but the militarization of the economy”. In making that point he notes that the theory of economic planning was from its inception modeled after feudalistic and militaristic organizations (p. 230).

Some would argue that a degree of militarization is a price worth paying, or even desirable, to achieve a range of national objectives. Indeed, the conventional theory of democracy seems to entail top-down direction. Prior to elections, political leaders tell voters about their plans for education, health, social security etc. and are expected to implement those plans after they are elected. That view seems to imply the existence of some kind of necessary tension between democracy and markets. I will discuss that view later in this essay.

Knowledge required for governance

Gerry Gaus’s final book discusses, among other things, the question of whether the Open Society has evolved beyond “our” governance. Gaus seems to adopt F. A. Hayek’s view of the Open Society (or Great Society) as a society in which coercion of some by others has been reduced as far as possible and individuals are free to use their own knowledge for their own purposes.

Gaus alludes to the knowledge problem when he observes that “we seek to devise policies to improve” the functioning of the Open Society. However, “we do not have the knowledge and competency to do so, hence we are constantly disappointed by the last round of interventions and we blame the last government for its failures and broken promises” (Gaus 2021, p.13).

Gaus points out that when people do not endorse a policy imposed by planners, some tend to evade it. In commenting on the “passive population model”, he writes:

“Unfortunately, this view has been resurrected by those elites who continue to believe that the public is too ignorant to make its own decisions, and so should submit to “epistocracy,” or rule by those who know (aka, them). Not only, however, is such expertise essentially nonexistent in complex systems, but most actual agents in the Open Society are anything but passive materials to be guided by the elite: they are active, reflexive agents who make their own choices. When citizens do not endorse a policy, many will employ their resources to evade it” (Gaus 2021, p.244).

Gaus considers three levels of governance – macro, meso, and micro- and three dimensions of governance – goal directed, strategic, and rules-focused. A goal-directed governor identifies preferred states and seeks to move society toward them. A strategic governor seeks to solve strategic dilemmas to assist citizens to secure outcomes they all want. A rules-focused governor seeks to structure some of the rules of self-organization.

Gaus’s analysis leads to the following conclusions:

• There is little prospect for a governor to successfully pursue macro-level goals in a complex society. For example, efforts to promote development in particular societies are often unsuccessful because institutions cannot readily be transferred from on society to another.
• Attempts to structure the “rules of the game” at a macro level are more promising. In cooperation with the self-organized normative framework of society a governor may effectively shape the rules of self-organization e.g. via civil rights legislation.
• Goal pursuit at the meso level is a dubious enterprise. Pursuit of environmental, economic and welfare-targeted variables is a hit-and-miss affair because our social world is a complex system. It is not linear and determinate, as is often assumed. Successful goal pursuit in a complex world is usually a matter of “muddling through” (sometimes described as learning-based governance).
• Polycentric governance studies show that a focus on problem-solving tends to facilitate effective governance when publics share pressing strategic dilemmas.
• There may be grounds for more optimism about the prospect for micro governance than governance at other levels.

In writing about micro governance, Gaus makes a favourable reference to the work of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Gaus justifies his optimism about micro governance as follows:

 “When changes come up from the more micro levels, not only are they apt to garner the moral endorsement of actual citizens, but the Open Society will possess a diversity of normative networks. Because what works today may be dysfunctional tomorrow, a diversity of approaches is always critical. This itself upsets the moralist, who believes she speaks for the truth about justice, and sees most deviations from her plan as shades of immorality. But many of the diverse publics will not take up her solutions—many citizens will see different problems and possibilities, and their normative beliefs will lead them to different solutions” (Gaus 2021, p.240).

Can democracy be consistent with freedom?

Gaus and Lavoie offer similar views on the compatibility between democracy and freedom. Gaus suggests that “so far from being opposed or in tension, democracy and freedom need each other to thrive.” He suggests that a critical task of the democratic order is to ensure the equality and fairness on which large-scale human cooperation depends. However, unless it is “animated by a spirit of public justification, democracy itself becomes a mechanism by which some seek to impose their valued goals on others in the name of the people” (Gaus 2021, p. 245).

In his discussion of the view that there is some kind of necessary tension between democracy and free markets. Lavoie notes that we tend to think that “taking democracy too far undermines markets and that taking markets too far undermines democracy”. He attributes that view to “liberalism’s gradual drift into compromises with conservatism and socialism” (Lavoie 1993). He suggests that liberalism needs to reinterpret its notions of markets and democracy so that they are seen to be essentially complementary. Our economics needs to take account of the cultural underpinnings of markets and our politics “needs to move beyond the model of the exercise of some kind of unified, conscious democratic will and understand democratic processes as distributed throughout the political culture”. The force of public opinion is best perceived as the distributed influence of political discourses throughout society rather than as “a concentrated will”.

Lavoie argues that what we should mean by democracy is a distinctive kind of openness in society rather than a theory about how to elect the personnel of government:

“Democracy is not a quality of the conscious will of a representative organization that has been legitimated by the public, but a quality of the discursive process of the distributed wills of the public itself” (Lavoie 1993, p.111).

It seems to me that those who see merit in the view of democracy presented by Lavoie and Gaus have good reasons to be skeptical about the worth of top-down planning to achieve national objectives. Individuals have different priorities and objectives that deserve to be recognized. Top-down planning cannot give appropriate recognition to those individual differences. Moreover, given the peculiarities of the business of politics, as discussed in the preceding essay, well-meaning attempts to pursue economic and social objectives that are widely supported within communities are prone to diverted to serve narrow interest groups.

In the following essay I consider the consequences of institutional path dependence, first in slowing the emergence of interest group politics, and second in making it more difficult for reform-minded political entrepreneurs to restore freedom and enhance opportunities for human flourishing.

 

References

Caplan, Bryan., The Myth of the Rational Voter (Princeton University Press, 2007).

Festinger, Leon., A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford University Press, 1957).

Gaus, Gerald., The Open Society and its Complexities (Oxford University Press, 2021).

Hayek, F. A., The Road to Serfdom (University of Chicago Press, 1994).

Hayek, F.A., “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, The American Economic Review, XXXV, 4 (1945).

Hayek, F.A., The Constitution of Liberty (The University of Chicago Press, 1960).

Lavoie, Don., National Economic Planning: What Is Left? (Mercatus Center, 2016).

Lavoie, Don., “Democracy, Markets, and the Legal Order: Notes on the Nature of Politics in a Radically Liberal Society” in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Eds.) Liberalism and the Economic Order (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Part IV: What incentives are political entrepreneurs faced with?

This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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The most obvious difference between economic and political entrepreneurship is that the former is largely about creating wealth and the latter is largely about obtaining political power. It is possible, of course, for individuals to seek political power to enhance their own wealth or that of a nation, but I will leave to the following essay a discussion of the differing motives that political entrepreneurs may have for obtaining power.

This essay focuses on the choices that political entrepreneurs are faced with in considering how to obtain power, given the peculiarities of politics as a form of business. I will briefly outline the nature of these peculiarities before considering the incentives they create for political entrepreneurship.

Peculiarities of political activities

The most important peculiarities of political activities arise from differences between voting and other choices, differences between triadic and dyadic relationships, and differences in deal-making in public and private sectors.

Differences between voting and other choices

It has often been observed that when people vote they have less incentive to make well-informed choices than in the other decisions that they make. Joseph Schumpeter argued that a typical citizen who makes rational decisions in daily life at home and in business “drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field” (Schumpeter 2011, pp.261-62). He argued that citizens are prone to “irrational prejudice and impulse” in political matters and that this makes them particularly vulnerable to influence by interest groups (Schumpeter 2011, pp.262-64). As I have noted elsewhere, Schumpeter developed those views before the public choice literature enabled concepts such as rational ignorance and rational irrationality to be explored more fully (Bates 2021, pp.114-116). 

Bryan Caplan points out that for an individual voter, the cost of clinging to irrational political beliefs is negligible because there is a miniscule probability that one vote will be decisive in changing the result of an election. Caplan suggests that although citizens often talk about voting options as if they were ordering dinner from a menu, their actions tell a different tale: “They expect to be served the same meal no matter what they order” (Caplan 2007, p. 132). Few individuals take the trouble to assess relevant evidence before they form strong opinions on political issues. They have no incentive to do so. If they cling to irrational beliefs about items on a dinner menu they may experience adverse consequences because of their choices, but when they vote there is no direct connection between the individual elector’s choice and the outcome obtained.

The absence of a direct connection between individual choice and outcome, Richard Wagner argues, is the reason sentiment tends to play a larger role, relative to reason, in political competition (Wagner 2016, p.158). He notes Vilfredo Pareto’s view that ideological articulation can even induce people to support measures that they might have opposed in a market setting. Voters generally embrace policies that enable them to feel good about themselves (Wagner 2016, p.198).

Caplan has assembled evidence that widely held beliefs among the public show a systematic anti-market and anti-foreign bias (Caplan 2007, pp. 30-39, 146).

Competition for leadership

Joseph Schumpeter viewed democracy, as actually practiced, as a competition for leadership. He ended up defining democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 2011, p.269). That view of democracy has become increasingly relevant as party leaders have come to dominate legislatures, and decisions are increasingly made by executive order and other forms of regulation that are primarily under executive control.

Triadic versus dyadic relationships

Wagner argues that the main difference between political entrepreneurship and market entrepreneurship has to do with the difference between dyadic and triadic relationships. Dyadic relationships involve two people; triadic relationships involve three. Wagner observes that market relationships can be reduced mostly to a set of dyadic relationships where both parties benefit. Political catallactics “typically requires a set of triadic relationships” where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support. (Wagner 2016, p. 122).

Use of the word “typically” is appropriate in the context of government activities but is less appropriate in a broader context, if political catallactics encompasses voluntary activity that doesn’t involve government. For example, whenever a group of people band together to buy a service that is of mutual benefit, it seems to me that they are engaging in a dyadic political activity.

It also seems inappropriate to label much of the political entrepreneurship that occurs at the local government level as triadic. The group of people who are using the service in that context may not differ much from the group who are paying for it. As discussed by Paul Aligica and Peter Boettke, in a context where people can exercise both voice and exit, “public” entrepreneurship can lead not only to better services at lower cost but also new and better forms of organization (Aligica and Boettke 2009, p.48).

Wagner illustrates the nature of triadic relationships by reference to decisions that are made about which roads to repair and which channels to dredge when roads and harbours are publicly owned. In that situation a triadic relationship is involved because the agencies responsible for road repair and dredging do not receive revenues directly from sales to the public. Those who benefit from the activities concerned have an incentive to undertake costly action, e.g., making donations to political parties to improve their positions in the queues (Wagner 2016,pp. 214-30).

Making deals

Wagner argues that little substantive work is accomplished through elections and political campaigns. He observes that while puffery is an understandable part of market competition, “electoral competition is mostly about puffery” (Wagner 2016, p.197).

The substantive work of policy choice takes place “outside electoral politics and entails the interactive elements necessary for constructing and maintaining deals” (Wagner 2016, p.198). He suggests a parliamentary assembly can be viewed as an “investment bank” because it is “a hub for making deals” involving selection and funding of projects (Wagner 2016, p.232). Wagner observes:

“Entrepreneurs are thus competing among themselves to seize the future. Successful entrepreneurship offers both fame and fortune” (Wagner 2016, p.279).

One important difference between the deal-making of political entrepreneurs and economic entrepreneurs is that the success of the latter can be measured by profit, which is usually a reliable indicator that the product meets consumers’ expectations. There is no similar indicator to enable political entrepreneurs to be held to account for the failure of policies to meet their purported objectives, let alone for any broader negative impacts on opportunities for human flourishing.

 Implications for entrepreneurial choices

Power-seeking political entrepreneurs have an obvious incentive to pander to the misconceptions and irrational preferences of voters by offering populist policies that are more closely aligned to those preferences. In my opinion, the response of some political entrepreneurs (from both conservative and progressive sides of politics) to reinforce false narratives is posing an increasing threat to economic freedom and prosperity in democracies. For example, a myth about the “hollowing out of American manufacturing” is currently supporting restrictions on economic freedom in the United States through imposition of higher import barriers. Phil Gramm and Donald Boudreaux have thoroughly debunked that false narrative (Gramm and Boudreaux 2025, pp.81-117).

There is also an incentive for political entrepreneurs to advance policies which increase the extent to which economic activity becomes subject to triadic relationships. The aim of such policies is to deliver benefits to politically powerful interest groups at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.

Observations about the prevalence of triadic relationships in politics bring to mind the definition of democracy as “two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch” (sometimes attributed to Benjamin Franklin without any supporting citation).

It is sometimes possible for political entrepreneurs to take advantage of triadic relationships and the willingness of voters to cling to irrational beliefs to pursue objectives that voters would not otherwise support. Wagner provides an outline of the process in his description of electoral competition:

“Within the triadic relationships associated with electoral competition … a political entrepreneur can construct a supporting coalition by crafting a transactional structure that entails gainers and losers, while at the same time generating a supporting ideological cover that softens and conceals the redistributive character of the transaction” (Wagner 2016, p.196).

The conceptual framework developed by Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik illustrates how such deceptive conduct can occur. Within that framework, political entrepreneurs discover identity and policy ‘memes’ (narratives, cues, framing) that shift beliefs about how the world works or a person’s beliefs about their identity and interests. Worldview politics and identity politics can complement and reinforce each other. In some instances, political entrepreneurs may induce a lobby group to push a particular policy because it has shaped their understanding of where their interests lie, rather than because the group has a vested interest in that policy (Mukand and Rodrik 2018).

The framework developed by Valentina Ausserladscheider also emphasizes that the strategies of political entrepreneurs are not determined solely by voters’ ideological positions. Innovative political entrepreneurs don’t offer the same policies as their competitors. They advance their political ambitions by focusing on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties do not satisfy, and on winning support by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas. For example, the entrepreneurial strategy of “far-right parties” is linked to their “nationalist and nativist core ideology”, leading to policies such as immigration restrictions that are claimed to solve a range of problems. (Ausserladscheider 2022).

Ausserladscheider uses that framework to consider reasons for the political success of Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, during the 1990s. Haider’s approach, based on a mix of authoritarian policies and policies to promote greater economic freedom, was particularly successful during a time of economic turmoil and uncertainty.

Political entrepreneurs seeking fame and fortune seem to be particularly attracted to deal making which expands public funding and regulation of infrastructure provision. The lack of clear measures of success in deal making in the political arena also makes also makes it easier for shysters and purveyors of inferior products to operate successfully in that arena.

This discussion of the incentives of political entrepreneurs to exploit voter misconceptions, promote triadic relationships, engage in deceptive conduct and participate in uneconomic deal making might cause some readers to wonder why democratic political systems have been as resilient as they have been. How is it that economic and political catastrophes have so far been largely averted in liberal democracies, given that political entrepreneurs have obvious incentives to engage in behaviour that could be expected to “kill the goose that lays the golden eggs”?

An obvious answer to that question is that political entrepreneurs often meet resistance when they seek to exploit the peculiarities of politics discussed above. Caplan has noted that established political leaders and parties have an incentive to think twice before caving in to popular misconceptions about the desirability of policies such as tariff protection because this poses the risk that they may become scapegoats for poor economic performance (Caplan 2007, pp.159-60). When voters have faith in political leaders, that allows leaders who are somewhat well-intentioned and less irrational some slack to circumvent their supporter’s misconceptions (Caplan 2007, p.181).

Mancur Olson provided an explanation by reference to the importance of encompassing political groups in a two-party system of government. He asserts that the leader of a party “whose clients comprise half or more of the society naturally is concerned about the efficiency and welfare of the society as a whole, particularly in comparison with lobbies for special-interest groups and congressmen accountable only to small districts” (Olson 1982, p.51). Party leaders certainly have an incentive to constrain deal-making that they consider is likely to have adverse impacts the party’s electoral prospects.

The next essay in this series, focuses on political entrepreneurship that occurs in liberal democracies in pursuit of economic and social objectives that have broad community support. It suggests that information constraints pose a challenge to successful pursuit of such objectives.

The adverse economic consequences of political entrepreneurship that seeks to exploit the peculiarities of politics as a form of business can also lead eventually to emergence of political entrepreneurs who propose reforms which aim to restore free markets. The scope for that to happen is explored in later essays in this series.

References

Aligica, Paul Dragos and Peter J. Boettke, Challenging Institutional Analysis and Development: The Bloomington School (Routledge, 2009).

Ausserladscheider, Valentina, “The Haider Phenomenon and the Rise of Austrian Neoliberalism,” in Culture, Sociality, and Morality : New Applications of Mainline Political Economy edited by Paul Dragos Aligica, Ginny Seung Choi, and Virgil Henry Storr (Rowman & Littlefield, 2022).

Bates, Winton, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing (Hamilton Books, 2021).

Caplan, Bryan. The Myth of the Rational Voter (Princeton University Press, 2007).

Gramm, Phil, and Donald J. Boudreaux, The Triumph of Economic Freedom: Debunking the Seven Great Myths of American Capitalism (Rowman & Littlefield, 2025).

Mukand, Sharun and Dani Rodrik, “The Political Economy of Ideas: On Ideas Versus Interests in Policymaking” NBER Working Paper No. 24467 (2018).

Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale University Press: 1982).

Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Second Edition (Martino Publishing, 2011).

Wagner, Richard E., Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).