Henry B. Veatch’s Neo-Aristotelian Defense of Reality, Reason, and Rights

 

This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

In an age of philosophical fragmentation, the voice of Henry B. Veatch stands as an indispensable corrective. Recognized as one of the leading neo-Aristotelian thinkers of the twentieth century, Veatch devoted his long and distinguished career to defending a vision of philosophy rooted in realism, teleology, and the conviction that ethics and politics must be grounded in the nature of things. His many articles and books represent a sustained and powerful argument against the dominant trends of modern and postmodern thought.

Veatch revised and reinterpreted Aristotle’s ethical framework at a time when utilitarianism, subjectivism, skepticism, existentialism, emotivism, and positivism dominated philosophical discourse. During that period, contemporary ethics had fragmented into relativism, nihilism, and reductionist theories that failed to account for the richness of moral experience. 

He disagreed with prevailing trends in modern philosophy such as the anti-foundationalism of postmodern thought, the persistence of Kantian and neo-Kantian ethical theory, nominalism, and the dominance of linguistic analysis. Veatch argues that contemporary moral philosophy often attempts to evade individual responsibility, either by reducing morality to subjective preferences or by attaching morality to social institutions via collectivist ethical theories.

This essay will explore Veatch's contributions to metaphysics, his account of human nature and teleology, his conception of practical wisdom (phronesis), his critique of Kantianism and postmodernism, and his defense of natural law and human rights. It will then examine his influence on contemporary philosophers Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, comparing and contrasting their views with Veatch's own.

Metaphysics and the Defense of Realism

At the heart of Veatch's philosophical project lies a commitment to metaphysical realism. This commitment is nowhere more evident than in Intentional Logic (1952), where Veatch argues that "logic necessarily presupposes a metaphysics". He insists that logic cannot be understood as a mere formal calculus or as a set of rules for manipulating symbols. Rather, logic must be grounded in the nature of things themselves—in the way the world actually is.

Veatch's realism is thoroughly Aristotelian. He maintains that the world consists of substances with natures or essences, and that our concepts and judgments are true insofar as they correspond to these real structures. The cognitive relation between knower and known is, in his view, a relation of identity—not in the sense that the knower becomes the object known, but in the sense that the mind grasps the essence of the thing. Predication, similarly, involves the relation of identity between the abstracted essence and the individuals that instantiate it.

This metaphysical realism has profound implications for every other area of philosophy. If there are real natures and essences, then there are real facts about what things are and what they are for. And if there are real facts about what things are for, then there are real standards of goodness and badness, right and wrong. Veatch's metaphysics thus provides the foundation for his entire ethical and political philosophy.

Veatch's realism also leads him to reject the nominalism that pervades much modern philosophy. He argues that the denial of universals and essences leads inevitably to skepticism and relativism. If there are no real natures, then there is no basis for making objective claims about what anything is or ought to be. The only alternative, he insists, is to recover the Aristotelian understanding of the world as a realm of intelligible structures that we can come to know through reason.

Human Nature and Teleology 

Veatch's account of human nature is inseparable from his teleological view of the world. For Aristotle, as for Veatch, every natural thing has a telos. Human beings are no exception. We are rational animals, and our distinctive end is to live in accordance with reason.

In Rational Man (1962), Veatch takes aim at the modern denial of teleology. Against this view, he argues that ethical knowledge is possible and that it is "grounded in human nature". Human beings have a nature, and that nature determines what is good for them.

Veatch's teleology is not, however, a simplistic or reductive one. He does not believe that human well-being is something simple or that the moral life consists merely in following rules or recipes. Rather, he presents a "pluralistic understanding of human well-being without lapsing into moral relativism". There are many goods that contribute to human flourishing, and they must be integrated and balanced in the course of a well-lived life.

 This pluralistic teleology is crucial for understanding Veatch's ethics. Unlike utilitarians, who reduce the good to pleasure or happiness, Veatch recognizes a diversity of goods—knowledge, friendship, virtue, excellence in various activities, and so on. Unlike Kantians, who separate the right from the good and insist on duty for duty's sake, he insists that moral obligations are ultimately grounded in what is good for human beings. The good is prior to the right--we have duties because there are things that are truly good for us and for others. 

Veatch explains that ethics must be grounded in metaphysics. He provides an objective foundation for morality rooted in human nature and the rational pursuit of human flourishing. His Aristotelian realism holds that all beings have a natural end (or telos) and that each individual is responsible for his own moral development. This responsibility is the foundational existential fact from which ethics begins. He defends a teleological account of morality in which good is determined by the fulfillment of one’s human nature. Unlike Ayn Rand, for Veatch, an individual’s obligation to act to fulfill his human nature does not depend upon a pre-moral “choice to live”.

Veatch challenges the naturalistic fallacy by addressing the fact-value distinction through which many philosophers contend that moral choices are merely expressions of subjective preferences rather than statements of fact. Calling the fact-value dichotomy untenable, he explains that human nature contains normative implications and that moral claims cannot be divorced from human nature. 

Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) and the Moral Life

 Rationality is the defining characteristic of humanity guiding individuals toward a flourishing life. A person’s nature as a rational being shapes his ethical obligations. Veatch recognizes that moral decision making is contextual and requires the exercise of reason in concrete situations.

 Central to Veatch’s ethics is phronesis (practical wisdom) which discerns the contextual, particular, and contingent circumstances to determine what is morally required at the time of action. Practical wisdom is concerned with applying general moral principles to particular circumstances. Viewing rationality as the sole arbiter of action, his ethics includes the ability to reason and act including the ability to discern and correct errors.

Veatch's conception of the moral life is centrally organized around the Aristotelian virtue of practical wisdom. For Veatch, the moral life is not merely one of following rules or recipes, nor is human well-being something simple. Rather, the moral life, which Veatch calls "rational or intelligent living," is "the life of practical wisdom where individual judgment of the particular and the contingent is paramount". 

This emphasis on practical wisdom reflects Veatch's conviction that ethics cannot be reduced to a set of general principles or algorithms. The situations we face in life are always particular and contingent, and they require the exercise of judgment—the ability to see what is called for in this situation, with these people, under these circumstances. Practical wisdom is the virtue that enables us to make these judgments well.

At the same time, practical wisdom is not a form of intuition or feeling. It is a form of reason—practical reason. The practically wise person does not feel his way through moral situations; he sees them clearly, understands what is at stake, and discerns what the relevant goods and virtues require. Practical wisdom is thus both intellectual and moral. It  involves knowledge of the good and the ability to apply that knowledge in concrete situations. 

Veatch's account of practical wisdom also has important implications for his view of moral education and character formation. Virtues are not innate. They must be acquired through practice and habituation. The moral life requires learning, discipline, and experience. But it is not merely an art, for it deals with what is truly good and bad for human beings, not merely with what is useful or pleasant.

Critique of Kantianism and neo-Kantianism 

Veatch was a critic of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy. In For an Ontology of Morals (1971) he critiques contemporary trends in ethical theory, "including the deontological tradition dating back to Kant". His fundamental objection to Kantianism is that it severs morality from any grounding in human nature and human goods.

Kantian ethics, in Veatch's view, makes the fundamental mistake of supposing "that moral imperatives can be derived independently of consideration of human ends". Kantian moral theories "generally argue that moral duties are duties to perform certain actions 'without' reference to any end to be achieved".

Veatch also objects to the Kantian separation of the phenomenal and noumenal realms, which he sees as a form of idealism that undermines realism. Kant's "transcendental turn" represents a fateful departure from the Aristotelian understanding of knowledge as the grasp of an independently existing reality. By restricting knowledge to the phenomenal realm and relegating things-in-themselves to the noumenal, Kant makes it impossible to know the real natures of things—including human nature. Without knowledge of human nature, there can be no objective ethics.

Veatch's critique extends to neo-Kantianism as well. He argues that "moral and ethical distinctions cannot be rightly or adequately understood if they are regarded simply as matters of linguistic use but are grounded in the very being and nature of things". The linguistic turn in philosophy is, in Veatch's view, merely another form of the Kantian error. It treats morality as a matter of language or convention rather than as a matter of objective truth about human flourishing.

Postmodernism and the Linguistic Turn 

Veatch was equally critical of postmodernism, which he saw as the culmination of the modern trajectory away from realism and toward various forms of skepticism, relativism, and constructivism. He opposed the "linguistic turn" in philosophy, which treats language as the primary or exclusive subject of philosophical inquiry.

Veatch's objections to postmodernism are rooted in his realism. If there are no real natures or essences—if everything is a social construction or a product of language—then there is no basis for objective knowledge or moral truth. Postmodernism leads inevitably to a kind of nihilism in which all claims are equally valid (or equally invalid) and there is no way to distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong. Against this, Veatch insists that "our rules of language are determined by real necessities in the world". Language is not a self-contained system that creates reality. It is a tool for referring to and describing a reality that exists independently of us.

Veatch's opposition to postmodernism is thus not merely a matter of intellectual preference. It is a matter of philosophical necessity. If we abandon realism, we abandon the possibility of philosophy itself as a quest for truth. If we abandon the possibility of truth, we abandon the possibility of any meaningful ethics or politics.

Human Rights and Natural Law

Veatch's most sustained treatment of political philosophy appears in Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? (1985). In this work, Veatch "finds the basis for human rights in natural law". He "builds his argument step by step, carefully laying the foundation for his central assertion that our basic rights are discoverable directly in the facts of nature".

His theory of natural rights is grounded in an account of human nature that recognizes the connection between moral duty and human flourishing. He sees these rights as derived from duties that a person owes to himself to flourish as an individual human being. Each of us is bound by nature to fulfill that obligation. A person’s duty to self-perfection creates the right not to have that pursuit interfered with. It follows that, if one expects to hold these rights, then he must accord them to all other persons, as well. These natural rights are conditioned by the reciprocal duties of other rational being. Because the rights are grounded in reality, their validity does not depend upon social agreement or legal codification. 

Veatch's natural law theory is thoroughly Aristotelian. Just as every natural thing has a telos that determines what is good for it, so too human beings have a nature and a telos that determine what is good for them and what they have a right to. Rights are not arbitrary conventions or creations of the state; they are grounded in the very being and nature of human persons.

Veatch insists that "law must be based on ethics" and that "ethics in turn must be grounded in fact and therefore must have a basis in nature". This is a direct challenge to the positivist view that law is merely a matter of social convention or sovereign command. It is also a challenge to the view that rights are merely creations of the state—a view that leaves individuals vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority or the state.

Veatch's defense of natural law is also a defense of what Aristotle called "a natural justice"—a justice that is not merely conventional but is grounded in the nature of things. This natural justice provides a standard by which positive laws can be judged and, if necessary, resisted. It is the foundation of any genuine theory of human rights. 

Influence on Rasmussen and Den Uyl

Veatch's influence on contemporary philosophy has been considerable, particularly on the work of Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl. These two philosophers have acknowledged Veatch as a major influence on their thinking. Indeed, Rasmussen and Den Uyl's The Perfectionist Turn  (2016) opens with a quotation from Veatch's Rational Man: "In Aristotle's eyes, ethics does not begin with thinking of others; it begins with oneself".

Rasmussen and Den Uyl share with Veatch a commitment to Aristotelian realism, teleology, and natural law. They defend "a version of Aristotelian ethics" and argue that "the Aristotelian approach to ethics supports the natural rights which form the most secure basis for liberal principles". Like Veatch, they hold that "human flourishing is the ultimate moral standard".

Moreover, Rasmussen and Den Uyl have been instrumental in bringing Veatch's work to a new generation of readers. The Liberty Fund edition of Rational Man contains an introduction by  Rasmussen, and both philosophers have written appreciatively of Veatch's contributions. They have also described Veatch as seeing "human beings as part of a natural order that is not ultimately constructed by humans but is nonetheless knowable and open to human flourishing".

Points of Agreement

The agreement between Veatch and Rasmussen and Den Uyl is substantial. First, all three are committed to metaphysical realism—the view that there is a real world independent of our minds and that we can know it. Second, all three embrace teleology—the view that natural things, including human beings, have ends or purposes that determine what is good for them. Third, they all regard human nature as philosophically relevant, holding that moral obligations and rights are grounded in human nature and human flourishing. Fourth, all three are critical of Kantianism, which they see as separating morality from any grounding in human goods, and of postmodernism, which they see as leading to skepticism, subjectivism, and relativism. Fifth, all three emphasize the importance of rationality, practical wisdom, and practical agency in the moral life. Sixth, they all are defenders of individual liberty and human flourishing. Rasmussen and Den Uyl describe themselves as advocating individualistic perfectionism and Veatch's defense of natural rights provides a foundation for liberal principles. Indeed, Rasmussen and Den Uyl have argued that a realist turn—namely, one in which the natural order is the basis for individual rights—is needed to bring about a proper understanding and defense of liberty.

Points of Disagreement

Despite this deep agreement, there are also differences between Veatch and Rasmussen and Den Uyl. The most important disagreement concerns how natural rights are conceptualized and grounded.

Veatch holds that "natural rights are derived from duties one naturally owes to oneself". According to Veatch, each individual "has eudaimonic obligations of self-perfection to himself, and, in virtue of these obligations to self, all other persons are obligated not to prevent that person’s self-perfecting activity". In other words, rights are grounded in duties—specifically, the duty that each person owes to himself to pursue his own flourishing.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl, however, see flaws in Veatch's view. Their main criticism is that his argument cannot provide a person with any right protective of non-self-perfecting behavior. An individual will, at best, have rights vindicating his rightful (i.e., dutiful) actions. In other words, if rights are grounded in duties to oneself, then one has rights only insofar as one is fulfilling those duties. This would leave no room for rights that protect actions that are not directly aimed at self-perfection—including, perhaps, many of the ordinary activities of daily life.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl offer a different account of rights. For them, what a person owes himself for the sake of his own flourishing includes his support for and adherence to a system of rights universally protective of self-directedness. Rights are not derived from duties to oneself in a simple, linear way. Rather, the system of rights is a necessary condition for human flourishing. One has an obligation to support a system of rights because such a system is essential for flourishing—not because one has a direct duty to perform specific self-perfecting actions.

 Veatch viewed natural rights as a direct extension of natural law ethics. For Veatch, rights are normative claims derived from an individual's moral obligations to fulfill their natural end. The political order is tasked with fostering an environment where natural law and moral virtue can be pursued. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that Veatch’s direct derivation creates a structural tension when applied to a modern, pluralistic society containing diverse individual lives. They propose a fundamental distinction between normative ethics and metanormative principles. 

 Normative Ethics addresses the question, "How should I live a flourishing, virtuous life?" This is personal, highly individualized, and teleological).  Metanormative principles (rights) address the political/legal question, "How can diverse, individual moral agents coexist peacefully without compromising the self-directed nature of their respective pursuits of flourishing?" For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, natural rights) are not meant to compel personal virtue directly. Rather, rights are metanormative framework rules whose sole purpose is to protect the possibility of self-directed action for all individuals alike. Rights establish a political structure of non-interference.

Another difference concerns the relationship between the universal and the individual. Rasmussen and Den Uyl claim that universal and individual orders are separate. While Veatch emphasized the universal aspects of human nature and human perfection, Rasmussen and Den Uyl introduce a radical emphasis on the individualized and agent-relative character of eudaimonia. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that while human nature provides universal forms of goodness (e.g., health, knowledge, friendship, virtue), actual human flourishing is always particular, individual, and context-dependent. What constitutes flourishing for a specific person depends on his unique talents, circumstances, choices, and personal history. Because flourishing is inherently self-directed and individualized, it cannot be standardized, centrally planned, or forced upon an individual by a political authority. Veatch, while recognizing individual responsibility, remained closer to classical and Thomistic traditions that emphasize a more uniform, shared human good realized within a cohesive moral community.

Conclusion

 Veatch stands as one of the most important neo-Aristotelian philosophers of the twentieth century. His defense of metaphysical realism, teleology, and natural law represents a powerful alternative to the dominant trends of modern and postmodern philosophy. His account of human nature and practical wisdom offers a rich and nuanced vision of the moral life, one that avoids both the abstractions of Kantianism and the relativism of postmodernism.

Veatch's influence on contemporary philosophers such as Rasmussen and Den Uyl is a testament to the enduring power of his ideas. While Rasmussen and Den Uyl share Veatch's commitment to Aristotelian realism, teleology, and natural law, they have developed his views in important ways—particularly in their account of the grounding of natural rights. Their disagreements with Veatch are not rejections of his project but rather refinements and developments of it. 

In an age of philosophical confusion and moral uncertainty, Veatch's voice remains as relevant as ever. His insistence that philosophy must be grounded in reality, that ethics must be grounded in human nature, and that rights must be grounded in natural law offers a path forward for those who refuse to accept the skeptical and relativistic conclusions of so much modern thought. As Veatch himself might have said, swimming against the current is never easy—but it is sometimes the only way to reach the truth.

---

References

 Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 1991. Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order. La Salle, IL: Open Court.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. Pennsylvania State University Press.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  2018. "Remembering an Aristotelian Radical: Henry Veatch and Rational Man." Law & Liberty, September 19.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 2020. The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Palgrave MacMillan.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1952. Intentional Logic: A Logic Based on Philosophical Realism. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. Rational Man 1962. A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1971. For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1985. Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1990 Swimming Against the Current in Contemporary Philosophy. Occasional Essays and Papers. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1978.  "Natural Law: Dead or Alive?" Literature of Liberty 1, no. 4 (October–December).

 Veatch, Henry B. 1954.  Realism and Nominalism Revisited. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

----------------------------“How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

---------------------------“How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 2, 2025.

----------------------------- “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

----------------------------- “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

----------------------------- “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

 ----------------------------- “Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. March 19, 2026.

----------------------------- “Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. June 4, 2026. 

----------------------------- “The Architecture of Freedom: Randy Barnett’s Natural Law Case for a Free Society” Freedom and Flourishing. June 26, 2026.

----------------------------- “Robust Political Economy and Neo-Aristotelianism: Complementary Visions of Freedom and Flourishing” Freedom and Flourishing. July 10, 2026.

------------------------------ “Is Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Consistent with Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 26, 2026.

Is Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Consistent with Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics?

 

This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling

University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

The first half of this essay was previously published in Le Québécois Libre on March 15, 2009. Ed and I agree that, since his essay was first published, Douglass Rasmussen and Douglass Den Uyl have improved upon Rand's approach. (Ed compared the work of Rasmussen and Den Uyl with that of Rand in an essay published by The Savvy Street on October 19, 2023.)

 

During the last fifty years or so, there has been a revival of scholarly interest in the virtues in general and in virtue ethics in particular. Many thinkers turned to a neo-­Aristotelian version of virtue ethics, but none had previously made a better or more consistent case than Rand (1957; 1964; 1967; [1966-67] 1990).¹ She explains that attaining moral perfection means achieving the highest level of human flourishing of which one is capable of reaching. Rand details how and why the consistent practice of seven virtues is essential for a person to attain his objective well-being (i.e., his flourishing).

For Rand, morality is a type of enlightened and rational self-in­terest—each individual's moral obligation is to attain his own moral well-being. She defines value as “that which one acts to gain and/or keep” (1964, 27). The purpose in pursuing values is the flourishing of one's own life. Values are thus at the root of morality. Proper moral norms are determined by human nature. Rand's ethical egoism sees naturalism as leading to facts that become the basis for objective judgments of value. An objective value is a feature of reality that is positively related to the flourishing of an individual human being. An objective value is relational and exists in a life-affirming relationship to a particular person.

Rand defends the principled pursuit of one's own flourishing. She explains that promoting one's own interest requires a person to consistently follow principles. A human being needs to understand, in the framework of principles, the cause and effect relationships between his actions and the achievement of his values. Moral principles are formulated through observation and induction regard­ing the effects of various forms of action on one's well-being. A man must identify and follow rational principles if he is to flourish.

Moral principles, as guides to life-promoting actions, are defined in relationship to the facts that makes them essential. For man to survive, he must discern the principles of action necessary to direct him in his relationships with other men and with nature. Man's need for these principles is his need for a code of morality. To flourish, a person must select proper principles and act in accordance with them. Human flourishing requires the identification and practice of a particular systematic code of morality. The traditional major virtues, as recast by Rand, provide the rational principles for this code of morality-virtues are manifestations of the rational long-range standards or principles that life as a human being requires.

Rand explains that a virtue is the act by which one gains and/ or keeps an objective value. From another perspective, character traits that objectively and rationally benefit their possessor are deemed to be virtues. The virtues are egoistic or partial to oneself, but not in any objectionable sense. A virtuous character is the result of appropriate actions and is contributive to further appropriate actions. 

The Objectivist Virtues

Rand explains throughout her writings that the rational pursuit of one's self-interest requires the consistent practice of seven principal virtues: rationality, honesty, independence, justice, integrity, produc­tiveness, and pride. Unfortunately, she did not produce a comprehen­sive, systematic, and detailed work with respect to the virtues. On the positive side, Tara Smith (2006) has endeavored to provide a detailed explanation of the virtues in the context of Rand's rational egoism.

Rationality, the primary virtue, involves full focus, commitment to reality, and the constant expansion of one's knowledge. Rationality is one's recognition and acknowledgment of reason as one's only source of knowledge, judge of values, and guide to action. Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses; it is man's fundamental means of survival and a practical instrument for gaining the values that further one's life. Rationality is concerned with the method by which an individual reaches his conclusions rather than being concerned with the particular conclusions that he comes to. Rationality is essential to the kind of practical actions required to attain human flourishing. It involves acceptance of the conditions necessary for man's flourishing. The virtue of rationality requires an individual to act on his rational conclusions.

Rationality requires the exercise of six additional derivative virtues that can be viewed as expressions of rationality (48-74). Honesty is the refusal to fake reality-it is the rejection of unreality and the recognition that the unreal can have no value. Misrepresenting reality does not change reality. Facts are independent of a person's beliefs. For honesty, a person must renounce misrepresentation, artifice, and evasion. He must also develop an active mind and act on his knowledge-an honest person seeks knowledge because he needs it to act properly. Honesty is practical. An individual must be truthful with himself, and not pretend that reality is something other than what it is. Self-deception is counter-productive. Dishonesty diverts an individual from identifying and seeking rational plans for gaining objective values. Dishonesty diminishes one's self-esteem and pride. It also changes facts and his own rationality into his enemies. Whereas an honest person depends on others' virtues, a dishonest person relies upon their vices.

Through dishonesty, a man makes himself dependent on others' standards, expectations, judgments, and ignorance. A liar depends upon others' naivete and he must strive to keep them unaware. In reality, an individual is apt to profit the most from others' rationality, knowledge, and virtues. Honesty, like all the virtues, is contextual and does not require one to tell the truth in all cases. It is permissible (and moral) to lie in order to protect a value that is being threatened. The use of force or fraud by an aggressor changes the conditions and the relationship between honesty and life. Lying is wrong when done in an attempt to gain a value (75-105).

An independent person establishes his primary orientation to reality rather than to other people. Accepting the primacy of existence, the independent person goes by his own judgment of reality. Independence requires a person's acceptance of the responsi­bility for making his own judgments, gaining knowledge through the use of his own mind, and surviving and flourishing by the efforts of his own mind. Thought is performed individually. Because reason is a characteristic of the individual human person, knowledge must be attained by the individual. Because thinking is a self-directed activity, the requirement of independence is implied in the requirement of rationality. Independence can be viewed as the method through which an individual comprehends ideas. It is essential to follow through by acting on his independent judgment.

It is permissible to learn from others provided that one thinks through and grasps the ideas for himself. A man can be independent while not being the creator or discoverer of new ideas. What is important is a person's own judgment. In our division of labor society, it is rational to make use of the knowledge of experts and people who are more experienced. However, it is essential not to accept unconditionally whatever the other person says merely because it is the judgment of another person. It is necessary not to substitute the judgments of others for one's own judgment. It is important to assess, to the best of one's ability, the ideas presented and the legitimacy of the expert's qualifications, education, and experience (106-34). 

Because other people are potential values or disvalues to an individual, it is essential to judge other individuals' character and conduct objectively and to act accordingly. The personal virtue of justice involves the application of rationality to the evaluation and treatment of other persons. These moral assessments and judgments require fidelity to reality and the use of one's reason rather than yielding to one's emotions.

It is essential to give each person that which he deserves. This idea reflects respect for causality-certain causes justify certain effects. This value-oriented perspective on justice recognizes that virtuous actions bring values into existence and that unprincipled or irrational actions damage or destroy values. It is rational to reward virtues with positive values and vices with punishments or negative values.

 Smith explains that a man should judge others objectively and treat them as they deserve because that is the best way to achieve his own personal flourishing. In fact, everyone is in a position to profit from actions that produce value and to be diminished by actions that harm or extirpate values. Injustice destroys the natural causal chain by rewarding corrupt conduct and punishing virtuous conduct. The Randian view is that both those who receive just treatment and the individual bestowing that treatment profit from that practice. It follows that one should support and endorse qualities in other people that benefit himself and dissuade those attributes that are damaging to oneself. It is necessary to judge, evaluate, and act properly toward other people in order to attain one's values and flourishing (135-75).

 Integrity is loyalty in action to rational principles and to one's convictions and values. There should be no breach or dichotomy between one's thought and moral principles and his actions. Integrity is fundamental to attaining one's values and flourishing. Integrity requires a policy and the conscientious consistent practice of life promoting principles. Smith explains that Rand condemns some, but not all, forms of compromise. There is a difference between a compromise of moral principle and a compromise of the details of a situation falling under a moral principle. It follows that when a person voluntarily negotiates toward a final agreed-upon price, he is not compromising the principle of free trade (176-97).

Productiveness, the process of creating material values, is necessary for human survival. Such values should be created rather than being confiscated. Productive work is the process through which man's mind maintains his life. It is through productive work that man's consciousness controls his existence; it involves the adjustment of nature to man's requirements and the translation of ideas into physical form. All productive work requires a combination of mental and physical exertion in varying proportions depending upon the particular kind of work. Values in reality are made possible by the existence of knowledge. Although the mental aspect is primary, this does not imply that there is some type of separation from the physical realm. The product of one's work must acquire physical existence outside of one's consciousness. Existential values are made possible through the application of a person's knowledge.

Productive work is necessary for a man both materially and spiritually; according to Rand, it is the central purpose of a person's life. Productivity depends upon one's rationality and sustains a man's self-esteem and sense of identity. Productive work can act as the integrating central element of a person's life. As such, it can be viewed as both an end and as a means (198-220). 

Pride (i.e., moral ambitiousness) is the commitment to attain one's own moral perfection. Pride demonstrates the exercise of the other six Randian virtues and involves one's dedication to achieving the highest or best character state of which he is capable of attaining. Like Aristotle, Rand views pride as the “crown of the virtues.” Smith explains that pride involves one's commitment to rationality in thought and action, the systematic pursuit of achievement, life­-advancing actions, and the continual strengthening of one's character. Pride leads a person to the self-esteem that is necessary for human life. Moral perfection is essential for one's personal flourishing (221-46).

Rand and Aristotle

 The similarities between Rand and Aristotle are substantial. Both hold that ethics is grounded in a conception of human nature and that the good life consists in the fulfillment of that nature. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue; for Rand, happiness is the state of consciousness that proceeds from the achievement of one’s values. Both identify reason as the distinctive human capacity and the foundation of virtue. For Aristotle, the rational part of the soul is what distinguishes humans from other animals; for Rand, “reason is man’s basic means of survival”. Both conceive of virtue as a kind of excellence in functioning—the excellent exercise of one’s human capacities. As Smith notes, humans’ ultimate goal is “not only to maintain our lives, but to live well, which means excellent functioning, both physical and psychological”. Both maintain that the virtues are interconnected and that full virtue requires possession of all of them.

Despite these deep affinities, important differences separate Rand from Aristotle. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the ultimate end, and virtues are traits that characteristically produce it. For Rand, “man’s life” qua rational being is the standard of value. This difference is subtle but significant: Rand’s standard is more explicitly biological and individualistic, whereas Aristotle’s is more social and contemplative. Aristotle’s ethics is thoroughly social; human beings are political animals who can only flourish in a polis. Rand’s ethics, by contrast, is radically individualistic. While she does not deny the value of social relationships, she insists that the individual’s own life is the ultimate standard and that others are to be valued only insofar as they are values to oneself. This is the most fundamental difference. Aristotle’s ethics is eudaimonist but not egoist in the strong sense; the good life involves friendship, justice, and contemplation of the divine. Rand’s ethics is unapologetically egoist: the moral purpose of life is one’s own happiness, and all virtues are justified by their service to self-interest. As Smith puts it, “egoistic rational principles ‘stem entirely from their practical service to self-interest’”. For Aristotle, happiness is an activity—the active exercise of virtue. For Rand, happiness is a consequence of virtuous action, a state of consciousness that results from the achievement of values. This difference has profound implications for the relationship between virtue and value, as we shall see.

Rand and Contemporary Virtue Ethics

 Rand’s ethics shares important features with contemporary virtue ethics, particularly in its emphasis on character, its rejection of act-centered moral theories, and its focus on human flourishing. Like contemporary virtue ethicists such as Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse,  Rand grounds ethics in a conception of natural human goodness and argues that virtue enable human flourishing. She shares with them a rejection of both consequentialist calculation and deontological rule-following in favor of a focus on the kind of person one should be and the kind of life one should live. However, Rand’s ethics differs from mainstream contemporary virtue ethics in several crucial respects. Contemporary virtue ethics is typically not egoist; it allows for genuine altruism and often emphasizes the social dimensions of virtue. Rand’s unapologetic ethical egoism sets her apart. As Smith observes, “contemporary virtue ethicists dance around the question of ethical egoism” precisely because egoism is “usually considered predatory, hedonistic, or subjectivist”. Contemporary virtue ethicists typically justify virtues by their contribution to eudaimonia, but they do not reduce virtue to self-interest. Rand, by contrast, explicitly justifies virtues by their service to self-interest: they are “the means by which one gains and/or keeps” values. Contemporary virtue ethics often includes virtues such as kindness, compassion, and generosity. Rand’s list is narrower and more focused on individual excellence. Rand’s metaethics is more foundationalist and more explicitly naturalistic than most contemporary virtue ethics. She seeks to derive moral norms from facts about human nature in a way that many contemporary virtue ethicists would find too ambitious.

 There are strong reasons to classify Rand as a virtue ethicist. Her ethics is “virtue-centered”; virtues are the central organizing concepts of her normative theory. She grounds ethics in a conception of human flourishing. She emphasizes character and the kind of person one should be. She rejects act-centered moral theories in favor of a focus on the agent. Moreover, Rand’s ethics shares the teleological structure of classical virtue ethics. Like Aristotle, she holds that ethics is about how one should live, and that the answer is determined by human nature. Like contemporary virtue ethicists, she argues that virtues enable human flourishing. However, there are also reasons to resist classifying Rand as a virtue ethicist in the strict sense. Her ethical egoism sets her apart from most virtue ethicists. Her explicit instrumentalism about virtue—the claim that virtue is the means to value—seems to conflict with the virtue ethicist’s claim that virtue is an intrinsic good.

 A defensible position is that Rand’s ethics is a distinctive form of virtue ethics—one that combines elements of eudaimonism and egoism, and in a unique synthesis. It is “virtue-centered” in its normative structure, but it is also egoist in its justification and teleological in its foundation. As Smith argues, Rand’s ethics is “a form of naturalistic eudaimonism, which shares some features with the Aristotelian virtue ethics of Hursthouse and Foot, but differs from them in its unapologetic ethical egoism”.

The Relationship Between Value and Virtue

 To understand the relationship between value and virtue in Rand’s ethics, we must begin with her definitions. Rand defines a value as “that which one acts to gain and/or keep” and a virtue as “the act by which one gains and/or keeps” a value. This definitional relationship is crucial: virtues are the means to values; values are the ends that virtues serve. A moral value is “an object (or thing) by means of which one promotes one’s life,” while a moral virtue is “an action (or choice) by means of which one does so”. Virtues “are the basic types of actions proper to the life of a rational being; thus, they are discovered and validated by reference to the nature and requirements of human life”.

 One interpretation of Rand’s ethics holds that virtues are merely instrumental to values. As Leonard Peikoff states, citing Rand, “morality is no more than a means to an end; it defines the causes we must enact if we are to attain a certain effect”. On this view, “virtue is (by definition) the means to value”. Virtue is “practical” in the sense that it “minimizes the risks inherent in life and maximizes the chance of success”. This interpretation treats virtue as purely instrumental to happiness—a necessary means but not itself an aspect of happiness. Virtue and happiness are conceptually independent; happiness is the end, and virtue is merely the means. However, this instrumental interpretation may be incomplete. Another interpretation is that virtue can be partly constitutive of happiness—both a means to happiness and partly an end in itself. On this view, “virtue is partly constitutive of happiness, such that happiness is partly defined in terms of virtue”.

 The most adequate interpretation may be that Randian virtues are both instrumental and constitutive. They are instrumental in that they are the means by which one gains and keeps values. They are constitutive in that the exercise of virtue is itself a form of value—a manifestation of the excellent functioning that constitutes human flourishing. This view avoids the false dichotomy between virtue as merely instrumental and virtue as wholly an end in itself. It allows us to say that virtues are means to the ultimate value of life while also recognizing that virtuous activity is itself part of the good life.

 Why Action Is Primary in Virtue

 For Rand, virtue is primarily a matter of action. She defines virtue as “the act by which one gains and/or keeps” a value. This definition is not accidental; it reflects a fundamental philosophical commitment. Virtues are not primarily dispositions or traits; they are actions—or, more precisely, patterns of action.

This action-primacy follows from Rand’s metaphysics and epistemology. Since values are things one acts to gain and keep, and virtues are the actions by which one does so, virtue is inherently action-oriented. One cannot be virtuous merely by having good intentions or admirable sentiments; one must act virtuously. 

The primacy of action in Rand’s virtue ethics has been recognized by scholars. Tara Smith has written on “The primacy of action in virtue,” arguing that virtues are fundamentally about what one does. This emphasis on action distinguishes Rand’s virtue ethics from more dispositional accounts that treat virtues primarily as character traits.

 The primacy of action reflects the practical orientation of Objectivist ethics. Morality is not a theoretical exercise but a practical science—a guide to living. As Rand puts it, the purpose of morality is to guide individuals to the achievement of their happiness. This purpose is achieved through action, not merely through contemplation or good intentions.

 The emphasis on action also reflects Rand’s view of human nature. Human beings are not born with fixed characters; they create their characters through their choices and actions. As Rand famously said, “Man is a being of self-made soul”. Character is not given; it is achieved through the consistent practice of virtue.

 Despite the primacy of action, the Objectivist virtues do have a dispositional dimension. A virtue is not just an isolated action but a pattern of acting. It is a characteristic way of responding to situations, a settled disposition to act in certain ways. This dispositional dimension is evident in Rand’s descriptions of the virtues. Honesty is not just telling the truth on a particular occasion but a commitment to refusing to fake reality. Justice is not just one fair judgment but a settled disposition to judge people objectively. Integrity is not just one act of loyalty to principle but a steadfast commitment to one’s convictions.

 However, Rand’s conception of character differs from the Aristotelian conception in important respects. For Aristotle, character is a stable disposition that is acquired through habituation; for Rand, character is something one chooses and achieves through the consistent exercise of one’s rational judgment. Rand rejects the notion that one is born with character or that character is simply a product of social conditioning. Instead, “through one’s choices and actions one acquires one’s character traits and habits”. Character is not a given but an achievement—the result of countless choices to act in accordance with reason or in defiance of it.

 The most adequate view is that Objectivist virtues are both actions and states of character—or rather, that they are states of character consisting in patterns of action. A virtue is a settled disposition to act in certain ways, but that disposition is realized in and through action. There is no virtue apart from virtuous action; there is no character apart from the choices that constitute it. This integration of action and character reflects Rand’s broader philosophical commitments. Since existence is primary and consciousness is relational, character is not a separate entity but a pattern of behavior. The virtuous person is not someone who has virtue as a possession but someone who acts virtuously consistently. As Rand might put it, virtue is not a state one is in but a way one lives.

Conclusion

 Ayn Rand’s Objectivist virtue ethics presents a distinctive synthesis of Aristotelian eudaimonism, rational egoism, and action-centered morality. Her ethics shares with Aristotle a teleological naturalism, a conception of virtue as excellence in functioning, and the primacy of reason. Yet it departs from Aristotle in its radical individualism, its unapologetic ethical egoism, and its more explicit instrumentalism about the relationship between virtue and value.

 The relationship between virtue and value in Rand’s ethics is complex. While virtues are instrumentally related to values—they are the means by which one gains and keeps values—they may also be constitutively related to the ultimate value of happiness. Virtuous activity is not merely a means to happiness but is itself an expression of the excellent functioning that constitutes human flourishing.

 Rand can legitimately be classified as a virtue ethicist, though of a distinctive kind. Her ethics is virtue-centered in its normative structure, eudaimonist in its teleology, and egoist in its justification. The primacy of action in her virtue ethics reflects her practical orientation and her view that character is achieved through choice and action. The Objectivist virtues can be viewed as states of character, but only insofar as character is understood as a pattern of action rather than a static possession.

 Ultimately, Rand’s virtue ethics offers a challenging and coherent vision of the moral life—one that insists on the primacy of the individual, the centrality of reason, and the practical nature of virtue. Whether one accepts or rejects her conclusions, her contribution to the virtue ethics tradition deserves serious philosophical engagement.

Notes

 

The first half of this essay was previously published in Le Québécois Libre on March 15, 2009.

¹ For rival explanations of virtue ethics, see Annas 1998; Crisp and Slote 1997; Darwall 2002; Foot 1978; 2001; Gaut 1997; Hunt 1997; Hursthouse 1999; Korsgaard 1996; MacIntyre 1997; McDowell 1978; Slote 1992; 1995; Swanton 1995; Wallace 1978; and Zagzebski 1996. 

References 

Annas, Julia. 1998. Virtue and eudaimonism. Social Philosophy and Policy 15, no. 1 (Winter): 37-55.

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958. Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy 33: 1-19.

Crisp, R. and M. Slore, eds. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Darwall, Stephen L., ed. 2002. Virtue Ethics. Boston: Blackwell Publishing Limited.

Foot, Philippa. 1978. Virtues and Vices. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gaut, Berys. 1998. The structure of practical reason. In Ethics and Practical Reason, edited by Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 161-88.

Gotthelf, A. and Lennox, J. G. (eds. 2010). Metaethics, Egoism, and Virtue: Studies in Ayn Rand’s Normative Theory, University of Pittsbirg Press.

Hunt, Lester H. 1997. Character and Culture. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1997. The nature of the virtues. In Virtue Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp and Michael Slate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 118-40.

McDowell,John. 1978. Virtue and reason. Monist 62: 331-50.

Peikoff, Leonard. 1991. Objectivism; The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Dutton.

Rand, Ayn. 1957. Atlas Shrugged. New York: Random House.

———. 1964. The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: New American Library.

———. [1966-67] 1990. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Expanded second edition. Edited by Harry Binswanger and Leonard Peikoff. New York: Meridian.

———. 1967. Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. New York: New American Library.

Slote, Michael. 1992. From Morality to Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.

 ———. 1995. From Morality to Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Tara. 2006. Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Swanton, C. 1995. Profiles of the Virtues. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76: 47-72.

Wallace, James D. 1978. Virtues and Vices. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

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