How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins.

Ed is Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. He is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. My review of that trilogy is included among references listed among suggestions for further reading at the end of Ed’s essay.

Ed has numerous other publications, including an essay reviewing books by David L. Norton, which was published here in January and a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book “Total Freedom” published here in July. 

Ed Younkins writes:  

The pursuit of human flourishing—what Aristotle termed eudaimonia—stands as a central concern of both philosophical inquiry and economic science. At first glance, the Austrian economic tradition, with its emphasis on subjective value and methodological individualism, might appear incompatible with neo-Aristotelian philosophies like Ayn Rand's Objectivism and Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J.  Den Uyl's "individualistic perfectionism," which assert the objectivity of human values. Yet, upon deeper examination, these traditions reveal profound compatibilities and complementary insights that provide a more robust framework for understanding human freedom, social cooperation, and the conditions for prosperity. This synthesis offers a powerful intellectual foundation for what could be termed "flourishing individualism"—the view that individuals possess an objective nature whose perfection requires specific social, political, and economic conditions, most notably freedom.

The Austrian School of economics and the neo-Aristotelian philosophy of freedom and flourishing share profound philosophical and methodological affinities. Both frameworks emphasize individual agency, moral responsibility, and the dynamic process of human flourishing in a world of uncertainty and choice. Although Austrian economists such as Ludwig von Mises typically maintain that values are subjective, and neo-Aristotelians assert that values are objective in a moral sense, these positions are not incompatible when understood as operating on different levels of analysis: the praxeological versus the ethical. Both perspectives converge on the centrality of rational agency, the importance of practical wisdom, and the moral necessity of liberty for human flourishing. This essay explores these convergences, demonstrating that Austrian economics and the neo-Aristotelian ethical framework together form a mutually enriching paradigm of freedom and flourishing.

 The Foundations of Austrian Economics

Austrian economics emerged in the late nineteenth century with Carl Menger’s Principles of Economics (1871), which emphasized methodological individualism, subjectivism, and the causal-realistic method. Menger held that value originates in the human mind’s recognition of the usefulness of goods for achieving desired ends. Later thinkers such as Ludwig von Mises (1949), Friedrich Hayek (1948), and Israel Kirzner (1973) expanded this foundation, emphasizing purposive human action (praxeology), the coordinating role of the price system, and the discovery process of entrepreneurship. Mises’s Human Action presents economics as a deductive science grounded in the axiom that “man acts purposefully” (Mises 1949). Human action, for Mises, is always rational in the instrumental sense—it involves the use of means to achieve chosen ends under conditions of uncertainty.

Israel Kirzner added to this framework by introducing the concept of entrepreneurial alertness. Entrepreneurs notice opportunities for profit that others have overlooked, thereby correcting market errors and coordinating dispersed knowledge. Kirzner’s entrepreneur is a creative, forward-looking agent who exercises alertness, judgment, and initiative—traits that closely parallel the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom (Kirzner 1973). In both frameworks, knowledge, creativity, and prudence are essential for navigating the complexities of real-world decision-making.

Neo-Aristotelian and Objectivist Ethics of Flourishing

The neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Rasmussen and Den Uyl, articulated in Norms of Liberty (2005), The Perfectionist Turn (2016) and The Realist Turn (2020) seeks to develop a liberal political order grounded in the ethics of individual perfectionism. They argue that moral value is objective and grounded in human nature: flourishing (eudaimonia) is the natural end of human beings as rational and social agents. Moral principles are thus derived from the requirements of human flourishing, not from arbitrary preferences. Rand’s Objectivism similarly holds that reason is man’s means of survival, that values are objective, and that rational self-interest is the proper moral code (Rand 1964).

Rasmussen and Den Uyl distinguish between self-perfection—the moral ideal of living rationally and virtuously—and self-directedness, the political condition that makes self-perfection possible. Rights, in their account, protect the liberty necessary for individuals to pursue their own perfection in diverse ways. Their framework, like Rand’s, integrates metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics to yield a view of human beings as rational, volitional agents who must exercise practical reason to flourish.

 Subjective and Objective Value: Distinct Spheres of Analysis

One of the most frequently discussed issues in relating Austrian economics to neo-Aristotelian ethics concerns the apparent conflict between Misesian subjectivism and Aristotelian or Objectivist views about value. Mises maintains that “value is subjective,” meaning that economic value arises from individual preferences and choices; there are no objective economic values apart from subjective evaluations by acting persons. Rand and Rasmussen and Den Uyl, by contrast, hold that moral values are objective because they are grounded in the requirements of human life and flourishing. However, as Kathleen Touchstone (2015) and I (2011) have argued, these positions refer to different levels of analysis and are not contradictory.

This subjectivism is epistemological and economic, not moral. Mises did not claim that values are morally relative; rather, he argued that economics must remain value-free to maintain scientific rigor. Mises’s subjectivism pertains to the preferences individuals express in their actions, not to the truth or falsity of moral claims. Austrian economics thus provides a descriptive account of human behavior, focusing on how individuals allocate scarce resources to achieve their goals.

In the praxeological sense, subjectivity refers to the agent-relative nature of preference: each individual chooses based on his or her own hierarchy of ends. In the ethical sense, objectivity refers to the fact that some ends are objectively better than others for human flourishing. Austrian economists do not deny that there may be objective criteria for human well-being; rather, economics as a value-free science abstains from ethical judgments. Thus, Austrian subjectivism is methodological, not moral. Neo-Aristotelian philosophies,  in turn, concern moral evaluation, not economic explanation. The two frameworks, therefore, are compatible and complementary.

In contrast to the Austrian position, Rand's Objectivism maintains that values are objective, meaning they are "determined by the nature of reality, but to be discovered by man's mind."  Values are not created by whim or social convention but are discovered through rational inquiry into the requirements of human life. As Peikoff (1991) explains Rand's ethics, "the fundamental alternative at the base of value is life versus death. Since human beings do not survive automatically, but by the use of reason, the standard of value is not mere survival, but rational flourishing."  From this perspective, something is objectively valuable if it genuinely promotes human life and flourishing according to man's nature as a rational being.

Similarly, Rasmussen and Den Uyl's individualistic perfectionism, while acknowledging the diversity of flourishing paths, maintains that human flourishing serves as an objective standard for ethics. They define human flourishing as objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed, and social. A person's flourishing is desired because it is desirable and choice-worthy.  The objectivity resides in the factual requirements for human flourishing, while the specific instantiation varies according to individual circumstances, talents, and choices.

The resolution to this apparent contradiction lies in recognizing that these theories operate at different levels of analysis. The Austrian subjective theory of value explains how economic calculation and market prices emerge from individual preferences in the context of scarcity. The neo-Aristotelian objective theory of value explains how certain goods, virtues, and institutions reliably promote human flourishing given human nature. The neo-Aristotelian sense of value-objectivity complements the Austrian sense of value-subjectivity because personal flourishing on an objective level transcends subjective value preferences.

 Entrepreneurship, Practical Wisdom, and Eudaimonia

The Austrian entrepreneur and the Aristotelian practically wise person share deep conceptual similarities. Kirzner’s entrepreneur acts under uncertainty, perceives opportunities, and exercises judgment and creativity—traits essential to human flourishing. Likewise, Aristotelian phronesis involves rational deliberation about means and ends in the pursuit of eudaimonia. Both require sensitivity to context, adaptability, and the courage to act amidst uncertainty.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2005) describe flourishing as a self-directed activity of reason, while Kirzner (1973) and Mises (1949) describe the market process as an open-ended discovery procedure. Both perspectives view human action as purposive and guided by reason. The Austrian view of entrepreneurship provides a dynamic understanding of how individuals realize their plans within institutional frameworks, which aligns with the Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom as context-sensitive, agent-centered reasoning.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism builds on Aristotelian ethics to defend a liberal political order. They argue that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is agent-relative and pluralistic, requiring liberty for individuals to pursue their own good. Their philosophy emphasizes practical wisdom (phronesis), the capacity to deliberate well about how to live.

Rand’s rational egoism and Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s agent-relative flourishing both affirm the moral legitimacy of self-interest. Austrian economics shows how self-interest, when channeled through markets, leads to mutual benefit. As Kathleen Touchstone argues, “Practical reason can be aligned with self-interest in a way that promotes both personal and social good.” This alignment reinforces the idea that liberty is not only economically efficient but morally justifiable.

This aligns closely with Austrian economists’ view of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs exercise alertness and judgment in navigating uncertainty and making context-sensitive decisions. As Benjamin Powell and Rosolino Candela (2014) have shown, entrepreneurial action is a form of practical reasoning, akin to Aristotelian phronesis. Both traditions recognize that flourishing requires freedom, creativity, and contextual judgment.

In both frameworks, success depends on alertness to opportunity—economic or moral. The morally flourishing individual, like the entrepreneur, must remain open to new information, creatively respond to change, and act on rational insight. This parallel suggests that the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom and the Austrian idea of entrepreneurial alertness describe complementary dimensions of human rationality: moral and economic.

Both traditions recognize that practical wisdom and entrepreneurial judgment are necessary precisely because human beings face genuine uncertainty and operate with limited knowledge. The Austrian emphasis on the market as a discovery procedure for mobilizing dispersed knowledge complements the neo-Aristotelian recognition that human flourishing requires practical wisdom precisely because we cannot have algorithmic certainty about how to live well. As Kathleen Touchstone observes in her comparison of Rand and the Austrians, the recognition of death's inevitability plays a crucial role in establishing life as the ultimate value, highlighting the finitude that makes choice meaningful.  Our limited time and knowledge make both economic and ethical judgment necessary and meaningful.

Liberty as the Political Prerequisite for Flourishing

Both Austrian economists and neo-Aristotelians maintain that liberty is the indispensable precondition for human flourishing. For Mises and Hayek, economic freedom allows individuals to coordinate dispersed knowledge and discover better ways to achieve their goals. For Rand, Rasmussen, and Den Uyl, moral self-perfection requires the freedom to act on one’s rational judgment without coercion. The rule of law and private property thus provide the institutional context within which individuals can exercise moral and entrepreneurial agency.

Many economists have shown that economic liberty correlates strongly with prosperity and well-being, but beyond material benefits, liberty also enables moral growth, Freedom is valuable not only as a means but also as a necessary condition for self-responsibility and virtue. The Austrian and neo-Aristotelian perspectives converge in seeing liberty as both an epistemic and a moral requirement—a framework that respects the dignity of human choice and the moral significance of self-directedness.

The Austrian understanding of the market as a spontaneous order—an emergent pattern of cooperation that results from human action but not human design—provides an economic justification for the political framework defended by neo-Aristotelian philosophers. The result of these combined perspectives is a powerful moral and political framework that answers the challenge of modern pluralism without surrendering the objectivity of value. It is a theory that preserves the ethical centrality of virtue and the reality of human goods while insisting on the primacy of liberty and individual responsibility.

 Human Action, Rational Agency, and the Unity of Knowledge

Austrian economics and the neo-Aristotelian philosophy share a common anthropological foundation: human beings as rational, purposive agents. Mises’s praxeology and Aristotle’s practical philosophy both begin from the recognition that action is purposeful and intelligible. Barry Smith (1990) has argued that Mises’s praxeological categories correspond closely to Aristotelian metaphysical concepts: means, ends, causality, and teleology. This correspondence suggests that Austrian economics, though methodologically individualist, is compatible with a broader realist metaphysics of human nature.

Rand’s Objectivism likewise rests on a realist ontology and a teleological conception of life. Human reason is a means of survival, and moral virtue is the consistent choice to act in accordance with reason. Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2016) extend this insight by emphasizing that the moral self is a “self-perfecting agent” whose flourishing requires both internal rational order and external social liberty. The Austrian theory of the market as a spontaneous order complements this moral vision: both rely on the creative, adaptive rationality of individuals operating within an open-ended, complex world.

Self-Interest, Practical Reason, and Moral Responsibility

In both Austrian and neo-Aristotelian thought, self-interest is rational and morally legitimate. For Mises, self-interest is inherent in human action: individuals act to remove felt uneasiness and improve their conditions. For Rand, self-interest is the moral expression of the objective requirements of human life. Rasmussen and Den Uyl reinterpret self-interest in terms of self-perfection: the pursuit of moral virtue and excellence as expressions of one’s nature as a rational being.

Practical reason (phronesis) guides this pursuit by integrating knowledge, experience, and judgment in concrete circumstances. Similarly, the Austrian entrepreneur uses reason to identify and pursue profit opportunities, which represent the coordination of subjective values through voluntary exchange. This coordination process can be seen as a form of social learning in which individual discovery contributes to mutual benefit. Both frameworks thus ground moral and economic order in the creative, purposive activity of rational agents.

 Harmony Between Ethics and Economics

Austrian economics and neo-Aristotelian ethics are not separate silos but complementary aspects of a unified understanding of human life. Economic science explains how individuals interact within markets to achieve their diverse ends, while ethical philosophy clarifies which ends are worthy of pursuit. Together they yield a comprehensive view of the human person as a self-responsible, rational being whose flourishing depends on freedom, virtue, and creativity.

It could be argued that integrating these perspectives results in a “humanomics” of flourishing—a science of man that recognizes the inseparability of moral and economic dimensions of action. (Rasmussen 2024-25) Freedom provides the institutional framework; virtue provides the moral compass; entrepreneurship provides the practical engine of progress. Each reinforces the others in a mutually supportive system.

Conclusion: Toward a Paradigm of Freedom and Flourishing

The intellectual convergence between Austrian economics and neo-Aristotelian philosophy represents more than an academic curiosity. It offers a comprehensive framework for understanding human flourishing under conditions of freedom that integrates insights from ethics, economics, and political theory. Their complementarity arises from addressing different but interconnected aspects of the human condition: the Austrian tradition explaining how social cooperation emerges from individual choices under specific institutional arrangements, and the neo-Aristotelian tradition explaining what constitutes a well-lived life for the individual choosing agent.

Rand admired Mises and the Austrian school, praising their defense of capitalism and critique of central planning. She ranked Mises among history’s intellectual giants and featured favorable reviews of his works in her publications. However, she rejected Mises’s value subjectivism, insisting that values must be grounded in objective reality. For Rand, values are not arbitrary preferences but facts of reality that reflect the requirements of human life.

Yet, as scholars like Robert Tarr have noted, this apparent conflict dissolves when we recognize that Mises and Rand operate at different levels of analysis. Mises’s subjectivism pertains to economic behavior, while Rand’s objectivism addresses moral philosophy. As Tarr puts it, “The Austrian and Objectivist views of value are not contradictory but complementary when properly contextualized.” Austrian economics describes how individuals act; Objectivism prescribes how they ought to act.

The resolution of the apparent conflict between subjective and objective value through different levels of analysis enriches both traditions, allowing economists to acknowledge the purpose-serving nature of market activity while enabling philosophers to recognize the institutional prerequisites for virtue. The connection between entrepreneurial judgment and practical wisdom highlights the moral dimension of economic creativity while acknowledging the cognitive demands of both economic and ethical excellence. The defense of political and economic freedom as essential for human flourishing provides a shared normative foundation for evaluating social institutions.

This synthesis finds eloquent expression in the work of scholars who explicitly aim to forge an understanding from various disciplines and to integrate them into consistent, coherent, and systematic whole. The goal is to have a paradigm in which the views of reality, human nature, knowledge, values, action, and society make up an integrated whole. This integrated perspective acknowledges what Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2016) identify as the "tethered character of political philosophy" to deeper metaphysical and ethical frameworks.

Perhaps most importantly, this integrated perspective reminds us that economics and philosophy ultimately serve the same end: understanding and promoting the conditions for human flourishing. The economic creativity unleashed by markets and the ethical excellence cultivated through virtue represent complementary aspects of what can be identified as flourishing and happiness in a free society.  By recognizing their compatibility and complementarity, we can move closer to an integrated understanding of human freedom that enables individuals to realize their highest potential through reason, practical wisdom, and voluntary cooperation.

The convergence of Austrian economics and neo-Aristotelian perfectionism reveals a coherent philosophical paradigm that integrates economics, ethics, and politics around the concept of rational human agency. Austrian economics contributes a dynamic, subjectivist understanding of market coordination and entrepreneurial discovery. Neo-Aristotelian and Objectivist ethics provide an objective, normative account of human flourishing and moral responsibility. Far from being incompatible, the subjective and objective dimensions of value illuminate different aspects of the same reality: human beings as valuers and choosers in a world of possibilities.

By recognizing their compatibility, scholars can move toward a richer, interdisciplinary synthesis—one that unites Misesian praxeology with Aristotelian virtue ethics, Kirznerian entrepreneurship with practical wisdom, and Randian self-interest with moral responsibility. This synthesis provides a powerful conceptual framework for understanding human life as a process of rational self-direction within a free society. It is, ultimately, a paradigm of freedom and flourishing.

 Recommended Reading

Bates, Winton. 2024. “The Vision of Ed Younkins’s Trilogy on Freedom and Flourishing” The Savvy Street.  (May 15).

Block, Walter. 2005. “Ayn Rand and Austrian Economists: Two Peas in a Pod” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol.6 No 2; 259-269.

Boettke, Peter J. 2019. “Mises, Rand, and the Twentieth Century” in Gregory Salmieri and Robert Mayhew, Foundations of a Free Society: Reflections on Ayn Rand’s Political Philosophy.  Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Candela, Rosolino A. 2018. “The Socialist Calculation Debate and its Normative Implications in Austrian Economics” The Next Generation: 29-44

Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Douglas B. Rasmussen. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Ebeling, Richard M. 2021. “The Case for Freedom in Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, and Ayn Rand”.  Future of Freedom (January).

Johnsson, Richard C. B..2005. “Subjectivism, Intrinsicism and Apriorism: Rand Among the Austrians”. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol.6 No.2: 317-335.

Kirzner, Israel M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Menger, Carl. 1871. Principles of Economics. Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller.

Mises, Ludwig von. 1949. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pauls, 2025. Theodore N. “What Do Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives tell us about Flourishing Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing (June 24).

Peikoff, Leonard. 1991. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York: Dutton

Powell, Benjamin and Rosolino Candela. 2014. “Markets as Processes of Moral Discovery” Studies in Emergent Order. Vol.7: 258-272.

Rand, Ayn. 1964. The Virtue of Selfishness. New York: Signet.

Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2024-25 “Homo Agens and Homo Moralis in Humanomics”. The Independent Review. (Winter).

Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Douglas J. Den Uyl. 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Douglas J. Den Uyl. 2020, The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism Palgrave Macmillan.

Smith, Barry. 1990. “Aristotle, Menger, Mises: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Economics.” History of Political Economy 22 (3): 683–706.

Tarr, Robert.” Economic Theory and the Conceptions of Value: Rand and the Austrians versus the Mainstream”. In Gregory Salmieri and Robert Mayhew, Foundations of a Free Society: Reflections on Ayn Rand’s Political Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 327-380.

Touchstone, Kathleen. 2015. “Rand and the Austrians: The Ultimate Value and the Non-interference Principle”. Libertarian Papers. 7 No.2, 169-204.

Touchstone, Kathleen. 2020.  Freedom, Eudaemonia, and Risk: An Inquiry into the Ethics of Risk-Taking.  Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Younkins, Edward W. 2005. ‘Menger, Mises, Rand, and Beyond” The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 6 no.2 Spring: 337-74.

Younkins, Edward W. 2011. Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

What does Gerald Gaus tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for political entrepreneurship?

 

This essay is the latest in a series that I have been writing about political entrepreneurship. It is the second that I have written on the implications of the knowledge problem for the plans of entrepreneurs who seek to improve economic and social outcomes. The first essay discussed Don Lavoie’s contribution to our understanding of the implications of the knowledge problem in that context.

The Complexities of the Open Society

This essay is based on my reading of Gerry Gaus’s final book, The Open Society and its Complexities. Gaus was a prolific author. This book, published in 2021, has been described by Chandran Kukathas as “his most ambitious work”. Gaus adopted an interdisciplinary approach to political philosophy and saw himself as being in “the truth business” rather than a proponent of any ideology. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the book that he valued the norms of liberty of the Open Society and detested authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

Like Don Lavoie, Gerry Gaus was strongly influenced by F. A. Hayek. In The Open Society, Gaus re-considers some of Hayek’s views in the light of developments over the last 20 years in theories of evolution and analyses of societies as complex systems. He focuses on the following three challenges based on his interpretation of Hayek’s views:

• First, do “our evolved moral sentiments constantly cause us to rebel against the Open Society and resort to a “tribal” moral outlook”?
• Second, given that “an evolved complex culture requires fidelity to … evolved norms, what type of justification” of the norms of the Open Society is open to us”?
• Third, has the Open Society “evolved beyond our governance”?

I will provide here just the briefest possible summary of Gaus’s responses to the first two questions.

First, humans “are certainly not inherently groupish creatures”. Humans are “fit for the Open Society”. However, they have not been optimized for it or any other social order, including tribal society.

Second, because the diversity of moral perspectives is fundamental to the moral life of the Open Society, the existence of increasingly diverse moral perspectives can enhance justification of the Open Society. The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality, entailing moral rules that lead toward extended cooperation rather than conflict and division. Public justifications of those moral rules must be as accommodating to diversity as possible. Effective governance requires widely justified norms and policies.

Knowledge required for governance

In this essay I focus on the Gaus’s view of the knowledge problem in his discussion of the question of whether the Open Society has evolved beyond “our” governance. He alludes to the knowledge problem when he observes that “we seek to devise policies to improve” the functioning of the Open Society. However, “we do not have the knowledge and competency to do so, hence we are constantly disappointed by the last round of interventions and we blame the last government for its failures and broken promises” (p. 13).

The passage quoted in the epigraph is from page 244, a point in the book where Gaus was summing up his argument. After noting that the passive population model often supposed that people would act against their own judgments, Gaus adds:

“Unfortunately, this view has been resurrected by those elites who continue to believe that the public is too ignorant to make its own decisions, and so should submit to “epistocracy,” or rule by those who know (aka, them). Not only, however, is such expertise essentially nonexistent in complex systems, but most actual agents in the Open Society are anything but passive materials to be guided by the elite: they are active, reflexive agents who make their own choices. When citizens do not endorse a policy, many will employ their resources to evade it.”

In considering whether the Open Society has evolved beyond our governance, Gaus introduces the concept of “self-governance”.  Self-governance is not the same as spontaneous self-organization, although Gaus suggests that the two concepts are not necessarily incompatible.

Self-governance requires that there be a “controller” who collects information at the system level and then uses that information to fuel a decision procedure that plays a role in guiding the systems behaviour.

Gaus refers to those aspiring to be controllers as governors. The roles that governors seek to perform may include the functions of political entrepreneurs. As I have discussed elsewhere, that function includes listening to the discourse of potential customers (supporters) to sense what they are likely to find attractive, and on that basis producing new products (policy proposals) and selling them persuasively.

Gaus considers three levels of governance – macro, meso, and micro- and three dimensions of governance – goal directed, strategic, and rules-focused. A goal-directed governor identifies preferred states and seeks to move society toward them. A strategic governor seeks to solve strategic dilemmas to assist citizens to secure outcomes they all want. A rules-focused governor seeks to structure some of the rules of self-organization.

Gaus’s analysis leads to the following conclusions:

• There is little prospect for a governor to successfully pursue macro-level goals in a complex society. For example, efforts to promote development in particular societies are often unsuccessful because institutions cannot readily be transferred from on society to another.
• Attempts to structure the “rules of the game” at a macro level are more promising. In cooperation with the self-organized normative framework of society a governor may effectively shape the rules of self-organization e.g. via civil rights legislation.
• Goal pursuit at the meso level is a dubious enterprise. Pursuit of environmental, economic and welfare-targeted variables is a hit-and-miss affair because our social world is a complex system. It is not linear and determinate, as is often assumed. Successful goal pursuit in a complex world is usually a matter of “muddling through” (sometimes described as learning-based governance).
• Polycentric governance studies show that a focus on problem-solving tends to facilitate effective governance when publics share pressing strategic dilemmas.
• There may be grounds for more optimism about the prospect for micro governance than governance at other levels.

In writing about micro governance, Gaus makes a favourable reference to the work of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Gaus justifies his optimism about micro governance as follows:

 “When changes come up from the more micro levels, not only are they apt to garner the moral endorsement of actual citizens, but the Open Society will possess a diversity of normative networks. Because what works today may be dysfunctional tomorrow, a diversity of approaches is always critical. This itself upsets the moralist, who believes she speaks for the truth about justice, and sees most deviations from her plan as shades of immorality. But many of the diverse publics will not take up her solutions—many citizens will see different problems and possibilities, and their normative beliefs will lead them to different solutions. (p. 240)

Summing up

In The Open Society and its Complexities, Gerry Gaus provided insights about the circumstances in which political entrepreneurs may be successful in pursuing goals.

Gaus was highly critical of the passive population model which assumes that people will follow policies dictated by governments rather than acting as self-governing agents. Such considerations made him highly skeptical about pursuit of goals at a macro level in a complex society.

He viewed pursuit of environmental, economic and welfare goals as problematic but acknowledged that some success may be achieved by “muddling through” i.e. adjusting policies in response to outcomes.

He was more optimistic about cooperative efforts to modify the “rules of the game” in which self-organization occurs. He also acknowledged that a focus on problem-solving tends to facilitate effective governance when people are confronted by pressing strategic dilemmas.

Gaus seems to have been most optimistic about micro-level governance that is able to garner the endorsement of “actual citizens”.

Why did Aristotle view leisure as a fundamental aspect of a well-lived life?

 

Leah Goldrick answers the question posed above in this guest essay. The essay was first published on Common Sense Ethics, Leah’s excellent blog.

Leah writes:

I've just finished reading Aristotle's Way: How Ancient Wisdom Can Change Your Life, by classicist Edith Hall. It's a great book that I would recommend for my readers, as Hall capitalizes on popular interest in ancient philosophy and substantive self-help. Aristotle addresses the issue of how to live a good life in his Politics, and Nicomachean Ethics, written in the fourth century BC. In Aristotle's Way, Hall codifies Aristotle's most important ideas on how we should live, addressing topics such as happiness, love, communication, and mortality, among others. 

Chapter Seven of Aristotle’s Way is all about Aristotle’s philosophy of leisure, which I think is one of the most interesting chapters, and that's what I'll be writing about in this post. If you want to read a review of the entire book, I recommend this one by Donald Robertson, since I'm focusing on only a part of it here. 

​Aristotle’s philosophy of leisure is tied to his broader understanding of human flourishing. Aristotle thought that most people tend to misuse leisure time if they haven’t learned how to spend it meaningfully, preferring instead to spend their non-working hours on trivial pleasures and amusements. However, learning to use leisure time for growth oriented pursuits can greatly improve our lives. Let's examine that idea in depth in the next sections.  
​

What is Aristotelian Leisure?

​Aristotelian leisure encompasses not just what we might think of as recreational activities today like hobbies and sports, but rather, everything broadly we do outside of work. This includes relaxation after work, eating and fulfilling other bodily functions, and amusements to avoid boredom. It also includes forming relationships with others, enjoying the arts, spending time on exercise and intellectual contemplation, crafts, civic association, and other beneficial and meaningful activities. For Aristotle, leisure isn’t simply about taking breaks or escaping from work; it's a fundamental aspect of a well-lived life.

At the core of Aristotle’s ethics is the concept of eudaimonia, translated as "flourishing" or "well-being." The ultimate human goal is living in accordance with reason and achieving a life of virtue. To reach eudaimonia, one must engage in activities that are fulfilling, meaningful, and promote personal growth. Leisure, in this context, is not a passive activity but is deeply connected to the active cultivation of one's intellect and virtues. In the Nichmeachean Ethics (Book X, 1176b) Aristotle writes: “To be always seeking after amusement is a sign of levity and not of a serious purpose.”

In today’s world, where leisure is often viewed as idle entertainment or seen merely as a break from work, the concept of Aristotelian leisure offers a richer and more profound understanding of what we should be doing with our time; leisure involves reflection, growth, and the pursuit of intellectual and moral development, not just passive distraction. Aristotle argues that leisure is the time in which we can engage in these activities, which allow us to connect to the highest aspects of our human nature. This could include philosophical conversation, artistic creation, or scientific inquiry. These activities are seen as valuable in themselves—not just as means to an end.

In essence, Aristotle’s view of leisure encourages us to think of it as time for self-improvement, exploration, and the cultivation of virtues, rather than merely a time to "rest" from work. Aristotle also believes that leisure is essential for cultivating friendships, which are vital for living a good life. In a sense, leisure time allows for the development of meaningful relationships, as people have time to engage in shared activities that promote mutual flourishing.

Work, Leisure and the Good Life

Aristotle obviously acknowledged that work and productive labor are necessary for survival, and most people in the ancient world that Aristotle inhabited worked tremendously hard. Aristotle also thinks that work can be virtuous if done with the right intentions.

Still, work is secondary to leisure in the Aristotelian sense. Moreover, work should not dominate a person’s life to the point where there is no room for leisure, because without leisure, a person is unable to engage in the activities that lead to personal fulfillment and virtue. Thinking about leisure this way can be a helpful antidote to the burnout many experience in the modern, work-centered culture.

From an Aristotelian perspective, you need not be defined by your job or career, but rather by what you choose to do with your non-working hours. This is good news for several reasons. First, the reality is that only a minority of people are lucky enough to be able to make a living doing what they love. Most of us will have work to get by, but it’s leisure that is truly important for a good life. So, it doesn’t matter if you aren’t totally satisfied with your career.

Best of all, even if you work a lot, you likely have more leisure time available to you than the average person in Aristotle's day. In ancient Greece, everything, even basic chores, had to be done by hand. By contrast, most people in the developed world today enjoy access to modern appliances and conveniences which free up more of our time for meaningful leisure.  

To wrap up the post here, Aristotle thought that how we spend our non-working hours defines who we are, the kind of life we will have, and the type of society we build. From this perspective, our leisure choices are more significant than we may realize. Spending our leisure time meaningfully helps us make sense of the world, experience growth, and contribute to something larger than ourselves. 

If you'd like to learn more about Aristotle's ideas on how to live well, I highly recommend reading Aristotle's Way.  

How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?

 

This guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins is a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book “Total Freedom”, which was published 25 years ago. The epigraph is from page 354 of that book.

Ed Younkins is Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. He is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. Ed has numerous other publications, including an essay reviewing books by David L. Norton, which was published here in January.    

 Ed Younkins’s review was previously published in 2001 in “Le Québécois Libre”. 

There are two reasons why it is appropriate for it to be re-published now.

First,“Total Freedom” deserves more attention, and the 25^th anniversary of its publication is a particularly appropriate time for that to occur.

Second, in the light of declining economic and personal freedom in many parts of the world, the defense of liberty has become more urgent than it was 25 years ago. Ian Vásquez and his colleagues responsible for measurement of human freedom for Cato and the Fraser Institute have noted that on a world-wide basis, and using a population weighted comparison, a high point for freedom occurred in 2005–2007, followed by a steady decline through 2019, and a precipitous descent in 2020 through 2021 associated with government responses to the Covid virus (“The Human Freedom Index 2024, pp. 21-25). The latest data suggest although some recovery has occurred since, human freedom remains lower than in the year 2000.

Younkins ended his review by noting that he was “looking forward to seeing what Sciabarra will offer us next that will contribute toward the development of a comprehensive defense of freedom.” Chris Sciabarra has continued to make important contributions in this field even though illness has somewhat constrained his efforts.

Here is Ed Younkins’s review of:

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew, Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism (Pennsylvania State University Press: 2000).

In Total Freedom, Chris Matthew Sciabarra offers a provocative, scholarly, and original work in social theory for the analysis of society and human liberty. The author aims to reclaim the dialectical method, the art of context keeping, in the name of liberty and from the authoritarian left in order to make it the foundation for a radical (i.e., one that goes to the root) defense of libertarianism.

The necessity of context

Sciabarra is convinced that a successful libertarian project must stress the necessity of context – the totality of systemic and dynamic connections among social problems. More specifically, the libertarian ideal cannot be isolated from the context upon which it depends and freedom cannot be defended successfully when separated from its broader requisite conditions. The author proposes in Total Freedom a metatheoretical foundation upon which to construct a comprehensive libertarian social theory. Rather than making a convincing argument for liberty, he offers a means for structuring the methodology of social inquiry. The book is about how a context-sensitive methodology can be used to defend freedom. In order to think about freedom, people need to grasp the totality of its prerequisites and implications. Emphasizing the indivisible unity of theory and practice, Sciabarra says that any effort to understand or change society requires an analysis of its many related aspects.  

Sciabarra explains that dialectics emphasizes the centrality of context in the intertemporal analysis of systems. It is a thinking style that stresses the contextual analysis of systems across time. Dialectics may be viewed as a method of analysis, a mode of inquiry, or a type of meta-methodological orientation or set of assumptions about how we approach the object of our study. Dialectics is an approach to thinking that attempts to grasp the full context of a philosophy or social problem. Dialectical thinking endeavors to understand the whole through differential vantage points and levels of generality and by a systemic and dynamic extension of analytical units. 

The author emphasizes that dialectical thinking necessitates that we do not engage in context dropping, but instead make every possible effort to see interconnections between seemingly disparate branches of knowledge. Such an approach compels scholars to investigate empirically the potential connections between various spheres in an effort to attain integrated knowledge of the full context. Since people are not omniscient, understanding a complex world thoroughly requires an on-going investigation of its many interrelated facets from shifting vantage points. 

Down to earth dialectics

As a methodological orientation, dialectics has been employed in the analysis of systems of argumentation, philosophy, ethics, linguistics, history, culture, psychology, social theory, political economy, etc. One of Sciabarra's goals is to capture the essence of the many dialectical approaches that have appeared throughout intellectual history. He argues that in its origins dialectics is not an especially Hegelian or Marxian tradition, but rather in its inception it is firmly Aristotelian. 

Sciabarra explains that, although the pre-Socratics and Plato were the earliest practitioners of dialectics, it was Aristotle, the true father (or fountainhead) of dialectical inquiry, who first articulated its theoretical principles and techniques. Plato had connected dialectics to an idealist ontology that entailed the search for comprehensive transcendent truth. Plato's unrealistic epistemological standard was for human beings to somehow attain a synoptic perspective on the whole society. 

Aristotle brought the dialectic down to earth by severing its principles from their Platonic-idealist formulation. The Aristotelian idea of dialectics eliminates cosmology from philosophy and relies on a minimalist metaphysics that states that existence is what it is, that consciousness is our means for understanding it, and that everything that exists is part of one reality. The history of dialectics is filled with battles between the synoptic Platonic idealist conception and the contextual Aristotelian realist understanding. As a dialectical reality, Sciabarra tells us that we should rightfully criticize those who form dialectical abstractions with no regard for their relationship to the facts of reality. 

Sciabarra explains that Aristotle advocates shifting our viewpoints on any object of study in order to illuminate different aspects of it. In this way, Aristotle keeps the Platonic predilection for organic unity, but acknowledges the central importance of context. Aristotle's principles of inquiry call for us to constantly shift our perspective on any object of study. Each point of view provides a different context of meaning. It is by piecing together the various perspectives that a person can gain a comprehensive understanding of the full context of the object. 

Like Aristotle, the Medieval Scholastics applied dialectical principles to the argumentative arts. Sciabarra observes that they brought dialectics to the consideration of Biblical texts and thus began the centuries-long journey toward the secularization of the human mind because they were brave enough to subject the scriptures to analysis, something that was disapproved of for centuries before.  

Sciabarra argues that Hegel's conception of the dialectic harks back to the Ancient Greek ideal of organic unity and to the Platonic penchant for the divine. In turn, Marx anchored dialectics to investigations of the real world. However, Marx's vision presumed god-like planning and control of many nuances, tacit practices, and unintended consequences of social action. He also presumed a total grasp of history and often attempted to study the present as if from an imagined future. When Marxists suggest that history can lead to a victory over human ignorance, they are implying privileged access to total knowledge of future social conditions. This is inherently utopian and undialectical since it is unbounded by the context that exists and is based on a « synoptic delusion, » a belief that one can live in a world in which every action produces consistent and predictable outcomes.

The art of context keeping

 If dialectics is the art of context keeping, then historical materialism proposes a theory of history that places the theoretician outside the context of the human condition. The problem occurs when Marx steps into the future to evaluate the present. He assumes the information needed by future planners will be available despite the fact that these planners will have destroyed the context (i.e., the price system), which permits such information to be generated and socially traded. By holding this incorrect assumption, Marx is placing himself outside the historical process that he analyzes. Sciabarra observes that it is as though Marx is permitting himself privileged access to information about a future that is ontologically and epistemologically impossible. Such a Utopian way of viewing the world is essentially an a-contextual, a-historical search for human ideals with no understanding of the limits or nature of reason. It is as if people can step outside the bounds of culture and society to re-create the world. 

Sciabarra goes on to explore the manifestations of dialectics among those from the liberal tradition including Herbert Spencer, Carl Menger, Mises, Hayek, Rand, and especially Murray Rothbard. The author's goal here is to show how classical liberal and modern libertarian approaches embody conflicting orientations. He also describes how these thinkers have been richer, more complex, and more context-sensitive than their critics have been willing to acknowledge. Total Freedom documents how a contextual-dialectical approach informed many of the classical liberal, and libertarian thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries. 

A large portion of the second half of Sciabarra's work involves a comprehensive case study of the writings of Murray Rothbard, one of the major libertarian thinkers of the 20th century. Sciabarra attempts to identify the dialectical and undialectical aspects of Rothbard's wide-ranging anarcho-capitalist analytical model. Rothbard's work is used to expose and analyze the dialectical strengths and nondialectical weaknesses that are typical in modern libertarian social theory. 

Sciabarra observes that Rothbard, for most of his life, believed that libertarianism did not require a theory of culture. Rothbard appeared to think that his axiom of non-aggression could resolve social and political problems by itself. Like many other libertarians, he simply dropped the larger context which freedom requires in order to flourish and stressed libertarian goals without considering the problem of meeting them. He insisted that libertarianism was a political philosophy that could accommodate any culture. For example, Rothbard believed that men could simply use their reason to develop a permanently fixed Libertarian Law Code in accordance with anarcho-capitalist principles.  

Sciabarra questions the efficacy of such an imposition because it does not take into account the philosophical, cultural, and historical context upon which libertarian principles depend. The acceptance of a Libertarian Law Code in the real world would require a deeper understanding of personal and cultural factors. Rothbard had abstracted a single principle of non-aggression and created a dualistic tension between theory and reality by declaring that state institutions are at odds with human nature. This led Rothbard to universalize the market as a means of destroying the state.  

Sciabarra points out that later Rothbard realized that proponents of a free society needed a fully articulated theory of culture, since some cultures foster, while others threaten, a free society. Rothbard's later greater dialectical sensibility is exhibited in his theory of structural crisis which was simultaneously historical, political, economic, and sociological and in the foundations of his non-Marxist theory of class struggle. 

In need of an effective strategy

Toward the end of his book, Sciabarra briefly surveys the growing dialectical trend among libertarians such as Peter Boettke, Douglas Den Uyl, Don Lavoie, Douglas Rasmussen, Mario Rizzo, and others. Sciabarra is convinced that libertarianism as a social theory is valuable and offers a valid perspective on the nature of the crisis in modern society and that voluntary social relations, with all their preconditions and effects, are morally and consequentially preferable to the status quo and to statism in all its varieties. However, he does not believe that libertarian theorists have presented the best formulations and arguments in the context of social conditions that exist. Freedom cannot be defended successfully when severed from its broader requisite conditions. Libertarians must pay greater attention to the broader context within which their goals and values can be realized.

Sciabarra's message is that libertarians need an effective strategy that recognizes the dynamic interrelationships between the personal, political, historical, psychological, ethical, cultural, economic, etc., if they are to be successful in their quest for a free society. He explains that attempts to define and defend a non-aggression axiom in the absence of a broader philosophical and cultural context are doomed to fail. Libertarians must pay greater attention to the broader context within which their goals and values can be realized. The battle against statism is simultaneously structural (political and economic), cultural (with implications for education, race, sex, language, and art) and personal (with connections to individuals' tacit moral beliefs, and psycho-epistemological processes).

The author wants people to understand both the necessity for objective conceptual foundations for a free society and the need for cultural pre-requisites in the battle for the free society. The fight for freedom is multidimensional and takes place on a variety of levels with each level influencing and having reciprocal effects on the other levels. Dialectics require that people take into account and pay attention to all the levels and structures that a politics of freedom depends upon. Sciabarra contends that it is possible to look at society from different angles and on different levels of analytical generality in order to obtain an enriched portrait of its total form. Change must occur on many different levels and cannot be dictated from the realm of politics – it must filter through all the various levels.

The goals of Total Freedom are to defend the need for a dialectical libertarianism that synthesizes multiple disciplines and to reclaim dialectics as a viable methodology for libertarian social theory. The author accomplishes this in his well-documented, innovative, and academic treatise. He offers libertarianism as a valid and valuable perspective that is preferable to the status quo and to statism in all its varieties. However, Sciabarra stops short of developing his own substantive dialectical libertarian social theory. 

His work is primarily methodological and only articulates the view that a dialectical libertarianism is essential to the future of both dialectics and libertarianism. He has taken the first step by offering a metatheoretical structure for social inquiry, rather than a comprehensive argument for liberty. Sciabarra cautions that much work needs to be done to test the validity of various libertarian theories. I am looking forward to seeing what Sciabarra will offer us next that will contribute toward the development of a comprehensive defense of freedom.

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in an essay that Chris M. Sciabarra recently published to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the first two books in his "Dialectics and Liberty Trilogy": "Marx, Hayek, and Utopia" and "Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical," and the twenty-fifth anniversary of "Total Freedom." This "Trilogy Anniversary" essay can be found on both Notablog and Medium:

https://notablog.net/2025/06/09/a-trilogy-anniversary/

https://medium.com/@cm.../a-trilogy-anniversary-6265b10c1258

What do Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives tell us about Flourishing Individualism?

 

This is a guest essay by Dr Theodore N. (Ted) Pauls.

Ted Pauls holds a Doctorate in Higher Education Administration and serves as a Professor of Business at Bethany College (Bethany, West Virginia). He has 32 years of college teaching experience including Bethany, Wheeling Jesuit University, and West Liberty University. He also currently serves as the President of the Brooke County Board of Education. Prior to entering academe, Ted served as a Marketing Director for a privately held corporation and as a stockbroker.

In my view, the topic of Ted’s essay is highly relevant to people who live in the liberal democracies. I often hear people claim that the priority given to personal freedom in those societies has caused them to become excessively individualistic. How can defenders of individual liberty respond to those who claim that excessive individualism has contributed to narcissistic behaviour, social isolation, and mental illness? We can’t deny that many individuals lack integrity in their dealings with others. We can’t deny that many individuals live lonely lives, lacking positive relationships with others. We can’t deny that many individuals seek to escape from reality and that some of them end up delusional.

However, we can explain that it is wrong to jump to the conclusion that the solution to those problems lies in further restricting opportunities for individual self-direction. We can explain that humans cannot fully flourish unless they have opportunities to exercise the practical wisdom and integrity required to direct their own lives in accordance with goals they choose and values they endorse. And we can also explain that the kind of individualism that we endorse is the flourishing individualism that Ted Pauls writes about in the following essay.

Ted writes:

 Flourishing individualism is a philosophical vision that places the rational, morally responsible individual at the center of ethics, politics, and human life. It is an ideal that affirms the dignity of the person, the objectivity of value, and the necessity of freedom—not merely as a constraint on power, but as the essential condition for human excellence. This article develops a theory of flourishing individualism by integrating key insights from three related and foundational works:

• Leonard Peikoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (1991),
• Edward W. Younkins’s Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism (2011), and
• Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen’s The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics (2016).

Each of these works contributes to a shared theme: the defense of individual flourishing as the core moral aim and the view that political society exists to enable, not direct, that flourishing. Peikoff articulates Ayn Rand’s Objectivist ethics and politics as a fully integrated philosophical system grounded in reason, egoism, and laissez-faire capitalism. Younkins seeks to synthesize Aristotelian virtue ethics, Austrian economics, and Objectivist principles to argue that human happiness and social cooperation are best achieved in a free society. Den Uyl and Rasmussen develop a metanormative liberalism in which the moral diversity of flourishing individuals is protected by political principles that are themselves ethically grounded but non-perfectionist in character.

The result of their combined perspectives is a powerful moral and political framework that answers the challenge of modern pluralism without surrendering the objectivity of value. It is a theory that preserves the ethical centrality of virtue and the reality of human goods while insisting on the primacy of liberty and individual responsibility. This article unfolds this framework in five parts: (1) the moral foundations of individual flourishing, (2) the structure of virtue and self-perfection, (3) the social context of flourishing, (4) the political principles that protect freedom, and (5) the philosophical implications of flourishing individualism for contemporary thought.

The Moral Foundations of Flourishing

At the heart of flourishing individualism is the idea that human life has an objective standard of value and that each individual must discover and pursue their own good through rational action. This view stands in opposition to both subjectivist relativism and collectivist moralities that subordinate the individual to external purposes.

Peikoff Explains Rand on Reason and on Life as the Standard of Value

Leonard Peikoff, in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand presents a moral framework that begins with the facts of human nature. This book is the first comprehensive statement of Rand’s philosophy. Peikoff discusses Rand’s views on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics. Rand’s philosophy asserts that existence exists independently of consciousness, that reason is the primary means of understanding the world and one’s place in it, and that individuals should act in pursuit of their own self-interest. Ayn Rand’s ethics, as he explains, holds that value is that which one acts to gain or keep, and that the fundamental alternative at the base of value is life versus death. Since human beings do not survive automatically, but by the use of reason, the standard of value is not mere survival, but rational flourishing—living as the kind of being one is.

This leads to a morality of rational egoism. The purpose of morality is not to sacrifice the self for others, nor others for the self, but to guide each individual in achieving their own happiness through the use of reason. Moral principles are principles of self-perfection, of the kind of character and action required to live a fully human life.

Objectivist ethics is thus neither altruistic nor hedonistic. It affirms the individual as an end in himself and views the pursuit of one’s own rational interests as both morally right and practically necessary. It calls for independence, integrity, productivity, and pride—virtues that are both personally fulfilling and socially beneficial.

Rand’s Objectivism holds that an individual’s choice to live is required for ethical obligations to exist. On the other hand, Younkins, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen all maintain that there is an ethical obligation to choose life because life is one’s natural end and good and therefore choiceworthy.

Younkins on Flourishing and Human Nature

Edward W. Younkins, in Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society, expands on this foundation by situating it within the broader tradition of Aristotelian eudaimonism. He argues that human beings have a nature with specific potentials and that morality consists in actualizing these potentials over the course of a lifetime. Flourishing (or eudaimonia) is an activity of the soul in accordance with reason and virtue.

Younkins draws on Aristotle, Rand, contemporary neo-Aristotelian philosophers, Austrian economists, and others to argue that flourishing is not reducible to pleasure, wealth, or external success. It is a state of integrated self-realization involving rationality, moral character, purposeful work, and meaningful relationships. It requires that individuals make choices consistent with their nature and long-term well-being.

Crucially, flourishing cannot be given or imposed—it must be chosen and achieved. This emphasis on agency echoes Objectivism’s moral individualism while adding a richer account of the variety and depth of human goods. The good life is not a fixed pattern but a dynamic process of self-perfection.

He also explains that Objectivist claims of value objectivity and claims of Austrian economists are compatible because that involve different levels of analysis. Rand’s sense of value-objectivity complements the Austrian sense of value-subjectivity because personal flourishing on an objective level transcends subjective value preferences.

Younkins’s book presents the essentials of a potential paradigm or conceptual framework for individual human flourishing in a free society. It is an attempt to forge an understanding from various disciplines and to integrate them into consistent, coherent, and systematic whole. His goal is to have a paradigm in which the views of reality, human nature, knowledge, values, action, and society make up an integrated whole. He recognizes that his potential framework will grow and evolve as scholars engage and extend its ideas.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen on Individualistic Perfectionism

Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen, in ThePerfectionist Turn, argue that ethical theory must return to a teleological and perfectionist framework that recognizes the centrality of human flourishing. Against dominant trends in analytic philosophy that treat ethics as a matter of rules, duties, or utility, they insist that the good life is the ultimate standard of evaluation.

Their contribution lies in developing a concept of “individualistic perfectionism”: the view that the good is self-perfection, but that this perfection takes diverse forms based on individual contexts, capacities, and choices. Flourishing is not a single ideal life but a framework in which many legitimate variations of the good life are possible.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen define human flourishing as objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed, and social. A person’s flourishing is desired because it is desirable and choice-worthy.

This view preserves the objectivity of morality while respecting the uniqueness of persons. It sees ethics as aspirational, not prohibitive—as a guide to excellence rather than a list of constraints. And it affirms the value of individual agency, creativity, and responsibility in moral development.

 Den Uyl and Rasmussen defend a template of responsibility, rather than a template of respect, as a framework within which to based one’s self-perfection. This agent-centered template recognizes the existential condition that each responsible and choosing individual must make a life for himself. Under this template self-direction and integrity are central to morality because personal responsibility for one’s life is primary.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen explain that political philosophy is unavoidably tethered to deeper, more foundational. and comprehensive perspectives and frameworks regarding reality, human nature, and ethics, Championing the tethered character of political philosophy, Den Uyl  and Rasmussen advocate individualistic perfectionism and the template of responsibility for a person’s self-perfection.

The Virtues of Flourishing: Self-Perfection in Practice

Flourishing individualism depends not only on abstract principles but on the cultivation of character. Virtue is the bridge between human nature and human flourishing: it is the habitual excellence of the soul in action.

All of these thinkers agree that virtues are not mere social conventions or rules of obedience but rational habits that support an individual’s life and happiness. While they differ in terminology and emphasis, they converge on a core set of traits that enable a flourishing life.

Objectivist Virtue Theory

Peikoff identifies seven cardinal virtues in Ayn Rand’s ethics: rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride. Each of these is a rational requirement of life, rooted in the objective needs of human survival and flourishing.

• Rationality is the primary virtue: it is the commitment to reason as one’s only source of knowledge and guide to action.
• Independence follows from rationality: it is the reliance on one’s own judgment rather than on the beliefs or authority of others.
• Integrity is fidelity to one’s rational principles.
• Honesty is the refusal to fake reality.
• Justice is the principle of judging others objectively and giving them what they deserve.
• Productiveness is the creation of material values.
• Pride is moral ambitiousness—a commitment to achieving one’s moral worth.

These virtues are not sacrifices but achievements. They are the means by which an individual shapes a life worth living.

Younkins on Integrated Living

Younkins expands this list by emphasizing the integration of mind, body, and character. He argues that flourishing involves not just isolated traits but the harmonious development of the whole person. This includes intellectual virtues like wisdom and understanding, moral virtues like courage and benevolence, and practical virtues like industry and perseverance.

He also stresses the importance of purposeful work and the creation of value. Echoing Rand and the Austrians, Younkins sees economic activity not as a separate sphere but as an expression of human creativity and agency. Work is not a mere means to leisure; it is part of the good life.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen on the Diversity of Excellence

Den Uyl and Rasmussen agree that virtue is central but emphasize that virtue must be contextualized. Because flourishing is individualized, the specific content of virtue can vary with personal identity, role, and situation. What prudence or courage demands may differ between a soldier, a scholar, and an entrepreneur.

They resist reducing virtue to rule-following or to a fixed ideal life. Instead, they see it as a dynamic and developmental concept: excellence in the use of practical reason to navigate the world in pursuit of self-perfection. This view aligns with Aristotle’s emphasis on phronesis (practical wisdom) as the master virtue guiding others.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen add practical wisdom (prudence) to the Objectivist list of virtues. They explain that reason is a self-directing activity and that practical wisdom is the excellent use of practical reason and the central integrating virtue of a flourishing life.

The Social Context of Flourishing

Flourishing is personal, but it is not solitary. Human beings are social by nature, and many goods—friendship, love, trade, knowledge—require the presence of others. The moral vision of flourishing individualism recognizes this fact without collapsing the individual into the collective.

The Role of Trade and Civil Society

Peikoff emphasizes that trade—both economic and spiritual—is the proper mode of human interaction. In a society of rational individuals, people deal with one another by mutual consent for mutual benefit. Force, fraud, and parasitism are morally and practically incompatible with a flourishing life.

Younkins adds that civil society—the network of voluntary institutions, markets, and communities—is the natural habitat for human flourishing. Drawing on Austrian economics, he shows how spontaneous order arises from the free choices of individuals pursuing their own goals. Markets are not chaotic or amoral but forms of cooperation that reflect human values.

Younkins explains that an entrepreneur attains wealth and his other objectives by providing people with goods and services that further flourishing on earth. He views entrepreneurs as specialists in prudence—the virtue of applying one’s talents to the goal of living well. In turn, Den Uyl and Rasmussen see a parallel between entrepreneurship and moral conduct. They discuss the creativity of human beings both in producing wealth and in building moral character, two enterprises that require alertness, insight, and evaluation and are parts of a flourishing life. They explain that both ethical wealth and economic wealth are a function of one’s actions taken to produce a good life.

Virtue and Community

While the state must not impose virtue, communities and relationships play an essential role in cultivating it. Younkins, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen all stress the importance of cultural norms, moral education, and social practices that support character development. Families, friendships, institutions of learning, and the arts all contribute to the conditions of flourishing.

But these institutions must be voluntary and diverse. The ethical pluralism of flourishing individualism requires a social order that permits experimentation, innovation, and personal growth.

Political Philosophy and the Framework for Flourishing

Ethics identifies the good life for the individual; political philosophy identifies the kind of social order that makes the pursuit of that life possible.

Peikoff, Rand, and Objectivism: Rights as Moral Principles

Peikoff and Rand emphasize that because human beings survive by reason, and because reason is a volitional faculty, freedom is the political condition required for moral agency. Rights are objective principles that protect the individual’s freedom to act.

The proper political system, therefore, is laissez-faire capitalism: a system that protects rights and bans the initiation of force. It is not morally neutral but grounded in the recognition that each individual has a moral right to live for their own sake.

Younkins: Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Civil Society

Younkins explains that the natural negative right to liberty is concerned with regulating conditions for human flourishing They are not directly concerned with promoting the attainment of flourishing. He agrees with Den Uyl and Rasmussen’s long held view that rights are metanormative principles that protect self-directedness, a universal requirement to all manifestations of human flourishing.

He also demonstrates that political freedom enables the emergence of complex, adaptive systems—markets, associations, cultural norms—that support flourishing. He draws on Austrian insights to argue that no central planner can substitute for the decentralized knowledge and creativity of individuals.

This view also entails limits on political authority. The state must be constrained by rule of law and dedicated to protecting liberty—not managing outcomes or mandating virtues.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen: The Metanormative Structure of Liberalism

Unlike Rand, Den Uyl and Rasmussen (as well as Younkins) distinguish between normative and metanormative principles. Ethics is normative: it guides individuals in living well. Politics is metanormative: it defines the conditions under which individuals can peacefully pursue diverse goods.

This leads to a perfectionist yet non-perfectionist liberalism: one that values flourishing and virtues but refrains from legislating them. The liberal order is justified not by neutrality but by its compatibility with ethical pluralism and moral agency.

Philosophical Implications and the Future of Flourishing Individualism

Flourishing individualism reconciles objectivity with freedom, pluralism with virtue, and individuality with community.

It offers:

• Objectivity without authoritarianism: Morality is real, but political authority is limited.
• Pluralism without relativism: There are many good lives, but not all lives are equally good.
• Agency in a world of systems: Individuals are not products of structures but shapers of their own destiny.
• A humanistic ideal: The individual is not a cog in the machine but a creator of values.

In a time of cultural fragmentation and political overreach, this philosophy offers a bold and humane alternative. It calls on us to build a society that respects liberty, cultivates virtue, and honors the rationality and free will of each person.

Together, these books by Peikoff, Younkins, and Den Uyl and Rasmussen provide essential  ideas for a robust framework for understanding flourishing individualism—a life of rational self-interest, virtue, and freedom.

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References

Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Douglas B. Rasmussen. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

Peikoff, Leonard. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York: Dutton, 1991.

Younkins, Edward W. Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2011.