This is a
guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at
Wheeling University,
and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and
Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and
flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and
“Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other
publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the
list after the end of this essay.)
In an age of philosophical fragmentation,
the voice of Henry B. Veatch stands as an indispensable corrective. Recognized
as one of the leading neo-Aristotelian thinkers of the twentieth century,
Veatch devoted his long and distinguished career to defending a vision of
philosophy rooted in realism, teleology, and the conviction that ethics and
politics must be grounded in the nature of things. His many articles and books represent
a sustained and powerful argument against the dominant trends of modern and
postmodern thought.
Veatch revised and reinterpreted
Aristotle’s ethical framework at a time when utilitarianism, subjectivism,
skepticism, existentialism, emotivism, and positivism dominated philosophical
discourse. During that period, contemporary ethics had fragmented into
relativism, nihilism, and reductionist theories that failed to account for the
richness of moral experience.
He disagreed with prevailing trends
in modern philosophy such as the anti-foundationalism of postmodern thought,
the persistence of Kantian and neo-Kantian ethical theory, nominalism, and the
dominance of linguistic analysis. Veatch argues that contemporary moral
philosophy often attempts to evade individual responsibility, either by
reducing morality to subjective preferences or by attaching morality to social
institutions via collectivist ethical theories.
This essay will explore Veatch's
contributions to metaphysics, his account of human nature and teleology, his
conception of practical wisdom (phronesis),
his critique of Kantianism and postmodernism, and his defense of natural law
and human rights. It will then examine his influence on contemporary
philosophers Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, comparing and
contrasting their views with Veatch's own.
Metaphysics
and the Defense of Realism
At the heart of Veatch's
philosophical project lies a commitment to metaphysical realism. This
commitment is nowhere more evident than in Intentional
Logic (1952), where Veatch argues
that "logic necessarily presupposes a metaphysics". He insists that
logic cannot be understood as a mere formal calculus or as a set of rules for
manipulating symbols. Rather, logic must be grounded in the nature of things
themselves—in the way the world actually is.
Veatch's realism is thoroughly Aristotelian.
He maintains that the world consists of substances with natures or essences,
and that our concepts and judgments are true insofar as they correspond to
these real structures. The cognitive relation between knower and known is, in
his view, a relation of identity—not in the sense that the knower becomes the
object known, but in the sense that the mind grasps the essence of the thing.
Predication, similarly, involves the relation of identity between the
abstracted essence and the individuals that instantiate it.
This metaphysical realism has
profound implications for every other area of philosophy. If there are real
natures and essences, then there are real facts about what things are and what
they are for. And if there are real facts about what things are for, then there
are real standards of goodness and badness, right and wrong. Veatch's
metaphysics thus provides the foundation for his entire ethical and political
philosophy.
Veatch's realism also leads him to
reject the nominalism that pervades much modern philosophy. He argues that the
denial of universals and essences leads inevitably to skepticism and
relativism. If there are no real natures, then there is no basis for making
objective claims about what anything is or ought to be. The only alternative, he
insists, is to recover the Aristotelian understanding of the world as a realm
of intelligible structures that we can come to know through reason.
Human Nature
and Teleology
Veatch's account of human nature is
inseparable from his teleological view of the world. For Aristotle, as for
Veatch, every natural thing has a telos. Human
beings are no exception. We are rational animals, and our distinctive end is to
live in accordance with reason.
In
Rational
Man (1962
), Veatch takes aim
at the modern denial of teleology. Against this view, he argues that ethical
knowledge is possible and that it is "grounded in human nature".
Human beings have a nature, and that nature determines what is good for them.
Veatch's teleology is not, however,
a simplistic or reductive one. He does not believe that human well-being is
something simple or that the moral life consists merely in following rules or
recipes. Rather, he presents a "pluralistic understanding of human
well-being without lapsing into moral relativism". There are many goods
that contribute to human flourishing, and they must be integrated and balanced
in the course of a well-lived life.
This pluralistic teleology is
crucial for understanding Veatch's ethics. Unlike utilitarians, who reduce the
good to pleasure or happiness, Veatch recognizes a diversity of
goods—knowledge, friendship, virtue, excellence in various activities, and so
on. Unlike Kantians, who separate the right from the good and insist on duty
for duty's sake, he insists that moral obligations are ultimately grounded in
what is good for human beings. The good is prior to the right--we have duties
because there are things that are truly good for us and for others.
Veatch explains that ethics must be
grounded in metaphysics. He provides an objective foundation for morality rooted
in human nature and the rational pursuit of human flourishing. His Aristotelian
realism holds that all beings have a natural end (or telos) and that each individual is responsible for his own moral
development. This responsibility is the foundational existential fact from
which ethics begins. He defends a teleological account of morality in which
good is determined by the fulfillment of one’s human nature. Unlike Ayn Rand,
for Veatch, an individual’s obligation to act to fulfill his human nature does
not depend upon a pre-moral “choice to live”.
Veatch challenges the naturalistic
fallacy by addressing the fact-value distinction through which many
philosophers contend that moral choices are merely expressions of subjective
preferences rather than statements of fact. Calling the fact-value dichotomy
untenable, he explains that human nature contains normative implications and
that moral claims cannot be divorced from human nature.
Practical
Wisdom (Phronesis) and the Moral Life
Rationality is the defining
characteristic of humanity guiding individuals toward a flourishing life. A
person’s nature as a rational being shapes his ethical obligations. Veatch
recognizes that moral decision making is contextual and requires the exercise
of reason in concrete situations.
Central to Veatch’s ethics is phronesis (practical wisdom) which
discerns the contextual, particular, and contingent circumstances to determine
what is morally required at the time of action. Practical wisdom is concerned
with applying general moral principles to particular circumstances. Viewing
rationality as the sole arbiter of action, his ethics includes the ability to
reason and act including the ability to discern and correct errors.
Veatch's conception of the moral
life is centrally organized around the Aristotelian virtue of practical wisdom.
For Veatch, the moral life is not merely one of following rules or recipes, nor
is human well-being something simple. Rather, the moral life, which Veatch
calls "rational or intelligent living," is "the life of
practical wisdom where individual judgment of the particular and the contingent
is paramount".
This emphasis on practical wisdom
reflects Veatch's conviction that ethics cannot be reduced to a set of general
principles or algorithms. The situations we face in life are always particular
and contingent, and they require the exercise of judgment—the ability to see
what is called for in this situation, with these people, under these
circumstances. Practical wisdom is the virtue that enables us to make these
judgments well.
At the same time, practical wisdom
is not a form of intuition or feeling. It is a form of reason—practical reason.
The practically wise person does not feel his way through moral situations; he
sees them clearly, understands what is at stake, and discerns what the relevant
goods and virtues require. Practical wisdom is thus both intellectual and moral.
It involves knowledge of the good and
the ability to apply that knowledge in concrete situations.
Veatch's account of practical wisdom
also has important implications for his view of moral education and character
formation. Virtues are not innate. They must be acquired through practice and
habituation. The moral life requires learning, discipline, and experience. But
it is not merely an art, for it deals with what is truly good and bad for human
beings, not merely with what is useful or pleasant.
Critique of
Kantianism and neo-Kantianism
Veatch was a critic of Kantian and neo-Kantian
philosophy. In For an Ontology of Morals
(1971) he critiques contemporary trends in ethical theory, "including the
deontological tradition dating back to Kant". His fundamental objection to
Kantianism is that it severs morality from any grounding in human nature and
human goods.
Kantian ethics, in Veatch's view,
makes the fundamental mistake of supposing "that moral imperatives can be
derived independently of consideration of human ends". Kantian moral
theories "generally argue that moral duties are duties to perform certain
actions 'without' reference to any end to be achieved".
Veatch also objects to the Kantian
separation of the phenomenal and noumenal realms, which he sees as a form of
idealism that undermines realism. Kant's "transcendental turn"
represents a fateful departure from the Aristotelian understanding of knowledge
as the grasp of an independently existing reality. By restricting knowledge to
the phenomenal realm and relegating things-in-themselves to the noumenal, Kant
makes it impossible to know the real natures of things—including human nature. Without
knowledge of human nature, there can be no objective ethics.
Veatch's critique extends to neo-Kantianism
as well. He argues that "moral and ethical distinctions cannot be rightly
or adequately understood if they are regarded simply as matters of linguistic
use but are grounded in the very being and nature of things". The
linguistic turn in philosophy is, in Veatch's view, merely another form of the
Kantian error. It treats morality as a matter of language or convention rather
than as a matter of objective truth about human flourishing.
Postmodernism
and the Linguistic Turn
Veatch was equally critical of
postmodernism, which he saw as the culmination of the modern trajectory away
from realism and toward various forms of skepticism, relativism, and
constructivism. He opposed the "linguistic turn" in philosophy, which
treats language as the primary or exclusive subject of philosophical inquiry.
Veatch's objections to postmodernism
are rooted in his realism. If there are no real natures or essences—if
everything is a social construction or a product of language—then there is no
basis for objective knowledge or moral truth. Postmodernism leads inevitably to
a kind of nihilism in which all claims are equally valid (or equally invalid)
and there is no way to distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong. Against
this, Veatch insists that "our rules of language are determined by real
necessities in the world". Language is not a self-contained system that
creates reality. It is a tool for referring to and describing a reality that
exists independently of us.
Veatch's opposition to postmodernism
is thus not merely a matter of intellectual preference. It is a matter of
philosophical necessity. If we abandon realism, we abandon the possibility of
philosophy itself as a quest for truth. If we abandon the possibility of truth,
we abandon the possibility of any meaningful ethics or politics.
Human Rights
and Natural Law
Veatch's most sustained treatment of
political philosophy appears in Human
Rights: Fact or Fancy? (1985). In this work, Veatch "finds the basis
for human rights in natural law". He "builds his argument step by
step, carefully laying the foundation for his central assertion that our basic
rights are discoverable directly in the facts of nature".
His theory of natural rights is
grounded in an account of human nature that recognizes the connection between
moral duty and human flourishing. He sees these rights as derived from duties
that a person owes to himself to flourish as an individual human being. Each of
us is bound by nature to fulfill that obligation. A person’s duty to
self-perfection creates the right not to have that pursuit interfered with. It
follows that, if one expects to hold these rights, then he must accord them to
all other persons, as well. These natural rights are conditioned by the
reciprocal duties of other rational being. Because the rights are grounded in
reality, their validity does not depend upon social agreement or legal
codification.
Veatch's natural law theory is
thoroughly Aristotelian. Just as every natural thing has a telos that determines what is good for it, so too human beings have
a nature and a telos that determine
what is good for them and what they have a right to. Rights are not arbitrary
conventions or creations of the state; they are grounded in the very being and
nature of human persons.
Veatch insists that "law must
be based on ethics" and that "ethics in turn must be grounded in fact
and therefore must have a basis in nature". This is a direct challenge to
the positivist view that law is merely a matter of social convention or
sovereign command. It is also a challenge to the view that rights are merely
creations of the state—a view that leaves individuals vulnerable to the tyranny
of the majority or the state.
Veatch's defense of natural law is
also a defense of what Aristotle called "a natural justice"—a justice
that is not merely conventional but is grounded in the nature of things. This
natural justice provides a standard by which positive laws can be judged and,
if necessary, resisted. It is the foundation of any genuine theory of human
rights.
Influence on
Rasmussen and Den Uyl
Veatch's influence on contemporary
philosophy has been considerable, particularly on the work of Douglas B.
Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl. These two philosophers have acknowledged
Veatch as a major influence on their thinking. Indeed, Rasmussen and Den Uyl's The Perfectionist Turn (2016) opens with a quotation from Veatch's Rational Man: "In Aristotle's eyes,
ethics does not begin with thinking of others; it begins with oneself".
Rasmussen and Den Uyl share with
Veatch a commitment to Aristotelian realism, teleology, and natural law. They
defend "a version of Aristotelian ethics" and argue that "the
Aristotelian approach to ethics supports the natural rights which form the most
secure basis for liberal principles". Like Veatch, they hold that
"human flourishing is the ultimate moral standard".
Moreover, Rasmussen and Den Uyl have
been instrumental in bringing Veatch's work to a new generation of readers. The
Liberty Fund edition of Rational Man
contains an introduction by Rasmussen,
and both philosophers have written appreciatively of Veatch's contributions.
They have also described Veatch as seeing "human beings as part of a
natural order that is not ultimately constructed by humans but is nonetheless
knowable and open to human flourishing".
Points of
Agreement
The agreement between Veatch and
Rasmussen and Den Uyl is substantial. First, all three are committed to
metaphysical realism—the view that there is a real world independent of our
minds and that we can know it. Second, all three embrace teleology—the view
that natural things, including human beings, have ends or purposes that
determine what is good for them. Third, they all regard human nature as
philosophically relevant, holding that moral obligations and rights are
grounded in human nature and human flourishing. Fourth, all three are critical
of Kantianism, which they see as separating morality from any grounding in
human goods, and of postmodernism, which they see as leading to skepticism,
subjectivism, and relativism. Fifth, all three emphasize the importance of rationality,
practical wisdom, and practical agency in the moral life. Sixth, they all are
defenders of individual liberty and human flourishing. Rasmussen and Den Uyl
describe themselves as advocating individualistic perfectionism and Veatch's
defense of natural rights provides a foundation for liberal principles. Indeed,
Rasmussen and Den Uyl have argued that a realist turn—namely, one in which the
natural order is the basis for individual rights—is needed to bring about a
proper understanding and defense of liberty.
Points of
Disagreement
Despite this deep agreement, there
are also differences between Veatch and Rasmussen and Den Uyl. The most
important disagreement concerns how natural rights are conceptualized and
grounded.
Veatch holds that "natural
rights are derived from duties one naturally owes to oneself". According
to Veatch, each individual "has eudaimonic obligations of self-perfection
to himself, and, in virtue of these obligations to self, all other persons are
obligated not to prevent that person’s self-perfecting activity". In other
words, rights are grounded in duties—specifically, the duty that each person
owes to himself to pursue his own flourishing.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl, however, see
flaws in Veatch's view. Their main criticism is that his argument cannot
provide a person with any right protective of non-self-perfecting behavior. An
individual will, at best, have rights vindicating his rightful (i.e., dutiful) actions.
In other words, if rights are grounded in duties to oneself, then one has
rights only insofar as one is fulfilling those duties. This would leave no room
for rights that protect actions that are not directly aimed at
self-perfection—including, perhaps, many of the ordinary activities of daily
life.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl offer a
different account of rights. For them, what a person owes himself for the sake
of his own flourishing includes his support for and adherence to a system of
rights universally protective of self-directedness. Rights are not derived from
duties to oneself in a simple, linear way. Rather, the system of rights is a
necessary condition for human flourishing. One has an obligation to support a
system of rights because such a system is essential for flourishing—not because
one has a direct duty to perform specific self-perfecting actions.
Veatch viewed natural rights as a direct
extension of natural law ethics. For Veatch, rights are normative claims
derived from an individual's moral obligations to fulfill their natural end.
The political order is tasked with fostering an environment where natural law
and moral virtue can be pursued. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that Veatch’s
direct derivation creates a structural tension when applied to a modern,
pluralistic society containing diverse individual lives. They propose a
fundamental distinction between normative ethics and metanormative principles.
Normative Ethics addresses the
question, "How should I live a flourishing, virtuous life?" This is
personal, highly individualized, and teleological). Metanormative principles (rights) address the
political/legal question, "How can diverse, individual moral agents
coexist peacefully without compromising the self-directed nature of their
respective pursuits of flourishing?" For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, natural
rights) are not meant to compel personal virtue directly. Rather, rights are
metanormative framework rules whose sole purpose is to protect the possibility
of self-directed action for all individuals alike. Rights establish a political
structure of non-interference.
Another difference concerns the
relationship between the universal and the individual. Rasmussen and Den Uyl
claim that universal and individual orders are separate. While Veatch
emphasized the universal aspects of human nature and human perfection,
Rasmussen and Den Uyl introduce a radical emphasis on the individualized and
agent-relative character of eudaimonia.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that while human nature provides universal forms of
goodness (e.g., health, knowledge, friendship, virtue), actual human
flourishing is always particular, individual, and context-dependent. What
constitutes flourishing for a specific person depends on his unique talents,
circumstances, choices, and personal history. Because flourishing is inherently
self-directed and individualized, it cannot be standardized, centrally planned,
or forced upon an individual by a political authority. Veatch, while recognizing
individual responsibility, remained closer to classical and Thomistic
traditions that emphasize a more uniform, shared human good realized within a
cohesive moral community.
Conclusion
Veatch stands as one of the most important
neo-Aristotelian philosophers of the twentieth century. His defense of
metaphysical realism, teleology, and natural law represents a powerful
alternative to the dominant trends of modern and postmodern philosophy. His
account of human nature and practical wisdom offers a rich and nuanced vision
of the moral life, one that avoids both the abstractions of Kantianism and the
relativism of postmodernism.
Veatch's influence on contemporary
philosophers such as Rasmussen and Den Uyl is a testament to the enduring power
of his ideas. While Rasmussen and Den Uyl share Veatch's commitment to
Aristotelian realism, teleology, and natural law, they have developed his views
in important ways—particularly in their account of the grounding of natural
rights. Their disagreements with Veatch are not rejections of his project but
rather refinements and developments of it.
In an age of philosophical confusion
and moral uncertainty, Veatch's voice remains as relevant as ever. His
insistence that philosophy must be grounded in reality, that ethics must be
grounded in human nature, and that rights must be grounded in natural law
offers a path forward for those who refuse to accept the skeptical and
relativistic conclusions of so much modern thought. As Veatch himself might
have said, swimming against the current is never easy—but it is sometimes the
only way to reach the truth.
---
References
Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Rasmussen,
Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn:
From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl,
Douglas J. 1991. Liberty and Nature: An
Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl,
Douglas J. 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics.
Pennsylvania State University Press.
Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl,
Douglas J. 2018. "Remembering an
Aristotelian Radical: Henry Veatch and Rational Man." Law & Liberty, September 19.
Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl,
Douglas J. 2020. The Realist Turn:
Repositioning Liberalism. Palgrave MacMillan.
Veatch, Henry B. 1952. Intentional Logic: A Logic Based on
Philosophical Realism. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Veatch, Henry B. Rational Man 1962. A Modern
Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press.
Veatch, Henry B. 1971. For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of
Contemporary Ethical Theory. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Veatch, Henry B. 1985. Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Veatch, Henry B. 1990 Swimming Against the Current in Contemporary
Philosophy. Occasional Essays and
Papers. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.
Veatch, Henry B. 1978. "Natural Law: Dead or Alive?" Literature of Liberty 1, no. 4
(October–December).
Veatch, Henry B. 1954. Realism
and Nominalism Revisited. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Other essays
by Ed Younkins on this site:
Younkins, Edward W. “What Contribution did David L.
Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and
Flourishing. January 18, 2025.
----------------------------“How can dialectics help us to defend
liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.
---------------------------“How can Austrian Economics be
reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 2, 2025.
-----------------------------
“Can Polarized Moral Politics be
Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.
-----------------------------
“Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing.
January 22, 2026.
----------------------------- “Is
Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.
----------------------------- “Are Spontaneous Order and
neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing.
March 19, 2026.
----------------------------- “Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and
Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing.
June 4, 2026.
----------------------------- “The Architecture of Freedom: Randy
Barnett’s Natural Law Case for a Free Society” Freedom and Flourishing. June 26, 2026.
----------------------------- “Robust Political Economy and
Neo-Aristotelianism: Complementary Visions of Freedom and Flourishing” Freedom and Flourishing. July 10, 2026.
------------------------------ “Is Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Consistent with Aristotle’s
Virtue Ethics?” Freedom
and Flourishing. July 26, 2026.
