Showing posts with label Ethics and moral instincts. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ethics and moral instincts. Show all posts

Saturday, December 13, 2025

Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?

 



This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including an essay reviewing books by David L. Norton, which was published here in January, a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book “Total Freedom” published  here in July, and an essay entitled, “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?”, published here in October.

I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to publish Ed’s latest essay at this time. I recently concluded a series of essays on political entrepreneurship by suggesting:

“If we want institutions that are more supportive of freedom and flourishing to become entrenched, we will need more supportive citizens engaged in discursive processes at all levels of society …”. 

It is difficult to have useful discourse with people expressing opposing views if we focus exclusively on categorizing their positions according to the political groupings or ideological tribes that seem to provide their talking points. It can be more interesting, and is sometimes more productive, to seek to understand the motivational systems, parenting models, and moral foundations underlying the positions they adopt.

Ed Younkins writes:

 The intense polarization characterizing contemporary political discourse has prompted several influential scholars to explore the deeper psychological and moral foundations underpinning our ideological divisions. Three particularly significant contributions to this understanding include Ronnie Janoff-Bulman's The Two Moralities: Conservatives, Liberals, and the Roots of Our Political Divide, George Lakoff's Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, and Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Each of these works approaches the political divide through different disciplinary lenses—social psychology, cognitive linguistics, and moral psychology respectively—yet arrives at a similar fundamental conclusion: that political differences reflect much deeper differences in moral intuitions and conceptual frameworks rather than merely calculated disagreements about specific policies. Together, these works provide complementary frameworks for understanding why political arguments often seem so intractable and why each side frequently views the other as not merely mistaken but morally deficient. This essay will first provide a short summary and review of each of these three influential works before exploring how libertarian thinking, particularly through the lens of neo-Aristotelian flourishing and the "Individualistic Perfectionism" of Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, might provide a compelling framework for appealing to both liberal and conservative moral concerns while protecting the space necessary for human flourishing.

 

The Two Moralities by Ronnie Janoff-Bulman


In her 2023 work The Two Moralities, social psychologist Ronnie Janoff-Bulman presents a framework for understanding political differences rooted in the most fundamental motivational distinction in psychology: approach and avoidance. She argues that these basic motivational systems give rise to two distinct moralities: a proscriptive morality that defends against negative outcomes and focuses on what we should not do, and a prescriptive morality that moves us toward positive outcomes and focuses on what we should do. The former can be viewed as a morality of justice that emphasizes rules, impartiality, law, order, universal principles, retributive justice, and equality of opportunity whereas the latter can be viewed as a morality of care that is rooted in empathy, connection, compassion, responsiveness, safety nets, and equality of outcomes.

At the individual and interpersonal levels, Janoff-Bulman notes that both liberals and conservatives value both moral dimensions—not harming others (proscriptive) and helping others (prescriptive). The critical divergence occurs at the collective level, where these moralities translate into distinct political worldviews. Conservatism is rooted in a proscriptive "Social Order" morality focused on protecting against threats—both external and internal—and maintaining societal stability. Liberalism, conversely, is founded on a prescriptive "Social Justice" morality focused on providing for the well-being of the nation's constituents.

The book also develops a distinction between moral mandates (absolutes rooted in moral identity) and moral preferences (values open to negotiation). She notes that moral mandates, typical of proscriptive morality, tend to produce rigid moral judgments, resistance to compromise, and belief that moral transgressors deserve blame or punishment. Prescriptive morality, however, tends to moralize less about violations and more about failures to promote positive ends.

This framework leads to predictable differences in policy preferences. Liberals, with their Social Justice morality, focus on the economic domain where resource distribution is managed, supporting regulation of markets, entitlements, and expenditures for health, education, and social safety nets. Conservatives, with their Social Order morality, focus primarily on the social domain (e.g., abortion and same-sex marriage), where traditional roles and strict norms are regarded as bulwarks against personal gratification believed to threaten societal stability. Importantly, each side favors limited government in precisely the domain where the other favors intervention—liberals support freedom in the social domain while conservatives support liberty in the economic domain.

 

Moral Politics by George Lakoff 


First published in 1996, cognitive linguist George Lakoff's Moral Politics introduces perhaps the most famous metaphorical framework for understanding political differences. Lakoff argues that people's political reasoning is determined to a large extent by unconscious metaphors, with the central metaphor being the nation as a family. According to Lakoff, the political views of Americans on both ends of the political spectrum derive from this foundational metaphor, but they are informed by two very different conceptual models of the ideal family.

The conservative worldview centers on what Lakoff terms the "strict father" model. This model emphasizes the traditional nuclear family with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set and enforce strict rules for children's behavior. In this worldview, self-discipline, self-reliance, personal responsibility, hard work, and respect for legitimate authority are crucial qualities children must learn, typically through a system of reward and punishment. This model assumes the world is dangerous and competitive, and that children need strict moral guidance to develop the discipline necessary to succeed. This worldview supports a strong military, low taxes, free markets, and strict law-and-order.

The liberal worldview centers on the "nurturant parent" model, which stresses empathy, nurturance, fair distribution, and restitution. The primal experience behind this model is one of being cared for and cared about, with children's obedience coming from love and respect for their parents rather than fear of punishment. This model views the world as potentially cooperative and believes children develop best through explanation and mutual understanding rather than strict punishment. This worldview stresses empathy, social responsibility, cooperation, equality of outcome, protection of the vulnerable, safety nets, environmental protection, government regulation, and progressive taxation. 

Lakoff uses these models to explain why certain political positions cluster together. For instance, he explains how conservatives can be "pro-life" when it comes to abortion yet support the death penalty—both positions reflect the strict father emphasis on reward and punishment for moral behavior. Similarly, he explains why liberals might support economic regulation but oppose social regulation, as this reflects the nurturant parent's emphasis on protection and care without authoritarian control.

An important aspect of Lakoff's analysis is his contention that conservatives have been more effective than liberals at understanding and leveraging these deep moral metaphors in political discourse. He notes that while he personally favors the nurturant parent model, recognizing the metaphorical nature of our political thinking is crucial for productive political dialogue.

 

The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt


Jonathan Haidt's 2012 work The Righteous Mind represents perhaps the most comprehensive empirical investigation into the moral foundations of political differences. Haidt's work is structured around three central principles: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second; (2) There's more to morality than harm and fairness; and (3) Morality binds and blinds. 

Haidt's first principle challenges the traditional view of human beings as rational actors who deliberate carefully about moral questions. Instead, he proposes the analogy of the rider (conscious reasoning) and the elephant (intuitive emotions), suggesting that moral reasoning is largely a post-hoc process used to justify intuitive moral judgments. This insight explains why simply presenting facts in political arguments rarely changes minds—the elephant of intuition largely determines where we end up, with the rider mainly serving as a public relations agent. 

Haidt's second principle introduces his influential Moral Foundations Theory, which initially identified five (later six) foundational, innate, and psychological moral systems that combine to form human moral matrices. These foundations are:

  • Care/harm: Sensitivity to suffering and need
  • Fairness/cheating: Concerns about unfair treatment and cheating
  • Loyalty/betrayal: Group cohesion and tribal identity.                                                       
  • Authority/subversion: Respect for hierarchy and tradition
  • Sanctity/degradation: Concepts of purity and the sacred
  • Liberty/oppression: Reactance to domination and tyranny (added later). 

Haidt's research indicates that political differences reflect different weightings of these moral foundations. Liberals tend to prioritize care, fairness, and liberty almost exclusively, while conservatives value all six foundations more evenly. This difference, Haidt argues, gives conservatives a rhetorical advantage because they can appeal to a broader range of moral intuitions.

Haidt's third principle—that "morality binds and blinds"—explains how moral matrices help form cohesive groups while simultaneously making it difficult to understand those outside our moral communities. This insight helps explain the intense polarization in contemporary politics—as moral groups form, they naturally create boundaries that heighten distinction from others.

A Libertarian Synthesis: Neo-Aristotelian Flourishing


Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen

The philosophical framework developed by Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen —termed Individualistic Perfectionism —provides a promising foundation for bridging the moral divide between liberal and conservative worldviews. This approach integrates Aristotelian ethical foundations with a political commitment to individual liberty, arguing that a society that protects individual rights through what they call "metanormative principles" creates the essential conditions for diverse forms of human flourishing to be pursued without social conflict.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl's central insight recognizes that human flourishing is individually realized yet socially contextual—that while we achieve our good through our own actions and choices, we do so within communities and relationships that provide the necessary context for that flourishing. This nuanced understanding respects the conservative emphasis on tradition, community, and moral order while simultaneously upholding the liberal commitment to personal autonomy, social progress, and individual rights. 

A libertarian framework grounded in neo-Aristotelian flourishing possesses unique potential to resonate with foundational moral concerns across the political spectrum. By examining this potential through the moral frameworks identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt, we can see how such an approach might bridge seemingly irreconcilable moral divides:

Addressing Both Approach and Avoidance Moralities: Janoff-Bulman's distinction between prescriptive and proscriptive moralities finds synthesis in the concept of individual flourishing. The protection of negative rights (the right not to be aggressed against) addresses the conservative proscriptive concern with protection from harm, while the positive pursuit of excellence through self-direction addresses the liberal prescriptive concern with providing for human well-being. A society that protects liberty creates the conditions for both freedom from interference and freedom to pursue excellence.

Transcending the Family Metaphor: Lakoff's strict father and nurturant parent models both find accommodation within a framework that allows different conceptions of the good to coexist. Rather than imposing a single vision of the good life (whether strict or nurturant), the libertarian framework provides the metanormative space for both approaches—and countless others—to be pursued without social conflict. This respects the conservative emphasis on parental authority in raising children according to their values while upholding the liberal commitment to diverse lifestyles and family structures.

Engaging Multiple Moral Foundations: Haidt's moral foundations theory reveals why libertarianism has struggled politically—by focusing predominantly on the liberty/oppression foundation—but also suggests its potential for broader appeal. A neo-Aristotelian libertarianism naturally engages:

(1) the care/harm foundation by minimizing state violence and allowing voluntary compassion flourish;

(2) the fairness/cheating foundation through consistent application of rules and opposition to cronyism;

(3) the loyalty/betrayal foundation by allowing authentic communities to form voluntarily;

(4) the authority/subversion foundation through respect for legitimate authority in appropriate spheres;

(5 the sanctity/degradation foundation by protecting the inviolability of the person; and

(6) the liberty/oppression foundation as its central political commitment.

A neo-Aristotelian libertarian framework provides a compelling account of moral development that incorporates insights from both traditional conservatism and progressivism. The concept of self-directedness—central to Rasmussen and Den Uyl's conception of flourishing—acknowledges the conservative insight that discipline and character are essential for human excellence while simultaneously affirming the liberal commitment to personal autonomy and self-determination. 

This approach recognizes that virtue cannot be coerced but must be chosen—that moral responsibility emerges from the opportunity to make genuine choices and experience their consequences. The conservative emphasis on moral order is respected not through state enforcement but through the recognition that certain virtues (honesty, integrity, courage, temperance) are naturally conducive to flourishing across most conceptions of the good life. Meanwhile, the liberal emphasis on social progress is honored through the understanding that different individuals and communities may discover different aspects of human excellence through experimentation and learning.

Contrary to the caricature of libertarianism as atomistic individualism, a neo-Aristotelian framework recognizes that human flourishing is inherently relational. Rasmussen and Den Uyl's work emphasizes that self-direction—the capacity to shape one's life according to one's values—necessarily occurs within social contexts and depends on relationships with others for its full actualization. 

This understanding allows a libertarian framework to honor the conservative emphasis on family, community, and tradition as essential contexts for moral development while simultaneously protecting the liberal commitment to diverse forms of relationship and association. By creating a framework of rights that allows multiple forms of community to flourish, this approach enables what Rasmussen and Den Uyl term "the possibility of diversity in human flourishing"—recognizing that different individuals may require different social contexts and relationships to achieve their particular forms of excellence.

A crucial psychological insight connecting moral foundations to political structures involves the relationship between threat sensitivity and political preferences. Research noted by Janoff-Bulman indicates that conservatives generally demonstrate higher sensitivity to threats—a finding consistent with their emphasis on social order and protection. A libertarian approach addresses this concern not through state control but through the protective functions of just institutions—what classical liberals called "the constitution of liberty." 

Similarly, the liberal emphasis on openness to experience and social progress finds expression in the innovative potential of free societies. A framework that protects individual liberty creates space for both the cautious and the bold, the traditional and the innovative, to coexist and learn from one another through voluntary exchange and cooperation rather than political imposition.

The bipolar frameworks explored by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt show why liberals and conservatives misunderstand each other. Yet Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism offers a framework that resonates with both moral cultures. Their neo-Aristotelian ethics argues that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is the proper moral standard: an objective but individualized ideal grounded in rational self-direction, virtue, and meaningful activity. 

Their key innovation is distinguishing personal moral norms (virtues) from political norms (rights). Rights are metanormative principles that secure the social space for individuals to pursue flourishing without coercion. Government’s purpose is not to impose virtue but to protect the conditions under which virtue can be chosen.

This appeals to liberals by protecting autonomy, diversity, and opportunities for self-development. It appeals to conservatives by emphasizing responsibility, character, and self-reliance. Both gain a coherent justification for a free society grounded in human nature and moral psychology.

A free (libertarian) society that protects rights is therefore the best context for human flourishing. It avoids paternalism, respects individuality, and encourages voluntary cooperation. It offers a unified moral language that transcends ideological tribes and affirms the dignity of rational, self-directing persons.

Neo-Aristotelian flourishing is social at its core: friendship, love, family, and associational ties are essential for living well, but these cannot be legislated from above. Voluntariness and consent ensure relationships are authentic, nurturing the liberal desire for care and the conservative requirement for loyalty and order.

Moreover, the psychological diversity identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt becomes an asset, not a threat, in a libertarian context—each person is free to pursue the forms of life and virtue most suited to their traits, goals, and allegiances.

Conclusion: Toward a Moral Politics of Liberty

The works of Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt collectively demonstrate that our political differences run deep—to the very foundations of how we conceptualize morality, family, and society. Yet within their frameworks we can also discern the possibility of a politics that honors the legitimate moral concerns of both left and right while transcending the limitations of each.

A libertarian approach grounded in neo-Aristotelian flourishing and informed by the Individualistic Perfectionism of Rasmussen and Den Uyl offers the promise of such a politics. By creating the metanormative conditions for diverse forms of human excellence to be pursued without social conflict, such a framework respects the conservative emphasis on moral order while upholding the liberal commitment to social progress. It acknowledges the importance of both reason and emotion in moral motivation, recognizes the social nature of human flourishing, and provides the institutional framework for both stability and innovation to coexist. Such an approach provides a common vocabulary for both sides to agree that a free society that protects the necessary moral space for self-directedness and self-determination is the best system for individuals to potentially fulfill their highest human potential.

Such an approach will not satisfy those who seek political victory for their particular moral vision. However, for those who seek a society in which different moral visions can coexist peacefully—where both the strict father and nurturant parent, both the social order and social justice advocate, can live according to their values without imposing them on others—it offers the most promising path forward. In recognizing that human flourishing is inherently pluralistic—that there are many forms of excellence and no single template for the good life—we can begin to build a politics that protects the space for that diversity rather than attempting to eliminate it through political power.

The promise of a free society is not that it will produce uniform agreement on moral questions, but that it will allow people with different moral intuitions to live together in peace, learning from one another through voluntary interaction rather than coercive imposition. In this respect, a thoughtfully articulated libertarianism may represent not just another political position, but the necessary framework for moving beyond our current political impasse toward a more inclusive and morally sophisticated politics.

Ultimately, society best enables flourishing not by dictating the good life but by protecting the conditions that make countless good lives possible. This vision honors the depth, dignity, and complexity of persons, uniting liberals’ and conservatives’ highest aspirations under the banner of freedom and flourishing.

Recommended Reading

 Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Rasmussen, Douglas B. (2016). The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh University Press.

Haidt, Jonathan. (2012).  The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by politics and Religion. Vintage.

Janoff-Bulman, Ronnie. (2023). The Two Moralities: Conservatives, Liberals, and the roots of the Political Divide.

Lakoff, George (1996 and 2002).  Moral Politics: How liberals and Conservatives Think.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Rasmussen, Douglas B.  and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2005). Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. Penn State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B.  and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2020). The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan.



Thursday, November 20, 2025

Part VIII: Summary and Conclusions

This is the final essay of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

——-

The purpose of this series of essays has been to explore the contribution that political entrepreneurship makes to human flourishing. A central issue is whether political entrepreneurship has a role to play in promoting a political and legal order more conducive to human flourishing.  

Each essay in this series has sought to address a question relevant to assessing the impact of political entrepreneurship on freedom and flourishing. The main points that emerge from each essay are as follows:

  1. This series of essays has focused on institutions related to liberty because those institutions are strongly linked to human flourishing. The links between freedom and flourishing are conceptual as well as empirical. Human flourishing is inherently individualized and self-directed. Liberty is necessary to enable individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others.
  2. At a national level, prevailing culture offers only a partial explanation of differences in economic and personal freedom levels. In several countries, political entrepreneurs and their ideologies have played an obvious historical role in bringing about economic and personal freedom levels that are substantially lower than predicted by underlying cultural values.
  3. Political entrepreneurship is similar in some ways to other forms of entrepreneurship. Don Lavoie’s suggestion that entrepreneurs play an interpretive role in complex systems is applicable to all kinds of entrepreneurship. Political entrepreneurs respond to public discourse by using it as a basis for policy innovation.
  4. Political entrepreneurship is largely about obtaining and using political power. Political entrepreneurs face incentives to exploit the misconceptions and irrational preferences of voters by making deals with narrow interest groups at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Innovators among them have incentives to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties don’t satisfy. However, political entrepreneurs who engage overtly in interest group politics are not always able to overcome opposition from other politicians who see benefits in seeking to serve broader community interests.
  5. Many political entrepreneurs are motivated by a desire to pursue economic, environmental and social objectives that are widely supported in the broader community. However, even modest attempts to steer the market system toward desired economic objectives often obstruct the price signals that convey information from consumers to producers about the most advantageous use of resources. Pursuit of social and environmental objectives is usually a matter of “muddling through” in the face of unintended consequences.
  6. Historically, the path-dependence of social norms has played an important role in slowing the emergence of interest group politics in the long-standing democracies. People were once more reluctant to become dependent upon government or to use the political system to obtain benefits at the expense of others than they are today. The erosion of those norms has led to increasing constraints on economic freedom, a decline in dynamism, and rapid growth in public debt. Path-dependence of social norms now poses a difficult challenge for political entrepreneurs seeking to promote policies that are more conducive to freedom and flourishing.
  7. The idea that autocrats have sometimes helped to promote greater economic freedom may not be entirely fanciful but empirical evidence certainly doesn’t support the idea that democracy, and the personal freedom associated with it, is incompatible with high levels of economic freedom. It is clear, nevertheless, that the long-standing democracies are experiencing difficulties in maintaining economic freedom in the face of interest group politics. Reform-minded political entrepreneurs in those countries have a great deal to learn from previous reform experiences. The problem of ensuring adoption of government policies that more consistently advance economic and personal freedom cannot be reduced to the question of how to elect better political entrepreneurs to national leadership positions. Institutional change is a complex process involving social movements, media organizations, and interactions between individual citizens, as well as local and national politics.

 In the preface I suggested that it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship at this time because there seems to be increasing support in liberal democracies for leaders who propose rule changes which are likely to have detrimental impacts on prospects for freedom and flourishing. In this series of essays, I have attempted to shed some light on the ways authoritarian leaders seek to appeal to the public but have not attempted to assess the gravity of current threats to liberty.

My concluding message for those who perceive that liberty is under threat is that they should emphasize the potential for positive relationships between democracy and human flourishing. Perhaps the most important thing I have learned in writing these essays is that my previous tendency toward cynicism about democracy was not entirely appropriate. If we want institutions that are more supportive of freedom and flourishing to become entrenched, we will need more supportive citizens engaged in discursive processes at all levels of society – that means more democracy, not less. 

Further Reading
Please see the following post which offers suggestions for further reading.

Part VI: What are the consequences of path dependence?

 This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

———

In 1848, Frédéric Bastiat famously wrote:

“The state is the great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else” (Bastiat 2012, p. 171).

 A couple of years later he noted that now participation in the making of law has become universal, “equilibrium is being sought in universal plunder” (Bastiat 2012, p.189).

He predicted social unrest: “people will be beating on the door of the legislative palace. The conflict will be no less bitter within it" (Bastiat 2012, p.194).

How can we explain why “universal plunder” has taken so long to become a major problem in the long-standing democracies? Part of the explanation lies in the existence of formal institutions that place constraints on legislatures. As noted in an earlier essay in this series, part of the explanation also lies in two-party systems of government in which power is usually exercised by encompassing interest groups which have an interest in promoting widespread opportunities for individuals to flourish.

However, the existence of formal rules and encompassing political parties doesn’t offer a complete explanation. What is it that has hitherto prevented governing parties from being displaced or taken over by political entrepreneurs seeking to modify the rules of the game to advantage favored interest groups?

I think the answer lies in the “path dependence” of social norms. Please recall at this point that (as noted in Part I) institutions include codes of conduct, norms of behavior, conventions, and customs as well as formal rules. As Douglass North explains:

“Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand today’s choices … without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions” (North 1990, p.100).

There was a time when social norms caused people in the long-established democracies to exercise greater restraint in using their democratic “rights” to obtain benefits for themselves at the expense of others. One reason was that inequality under a constitutional order in which the rules of the game were seen as fair didn’t generate tension but was seen as ipso facto also fair. Vincent Geloso and Alex Tabarrok note that James M. Buchanan held that view (Geloso and Tabarrok, 2025).

Buchanan also identified two norms which underpin liberal democracy: that a sufficient proportion of the population can make their own choices and prefer to be autonomous rather than dependent on others; and that a sufficient proportion of the population enter relationships with others based on reciprocity, fair dealing, and mutual respect. (Buchanan 2005, p. 26).

Buchanan asserted:

“Generalized or widespread failure of persons to adhere to these norms, along with widespread recognition that others also disregard the standards, will insure that the liberal order itself must fail, quite independently from any institutional safeguards” (Buchanan 2005, p.28).

The autonomy norm has eroded as more people have become heavily dependent on government for retirement incomes and for services such as health and education. Business and community organisations have also become increasingly willing to forgo their autonomy to pursue social and environmental objectives favored by whatever government happens to be in power and to obtain a more favourable regulatory environment for their activities.

The norm of reciprocity has also eroded considerably in recent decades. Political parties increasingly base their appeal to voters on the supposed benefits a policy might deliver to groups with specific demographic characteristics, rather than pursuing broad community interests. When voters see others declaring their support for political parties which promise additional spending or regulation to benefit specific groups, they are likely to be less inhibited in behaving similarly. As more voters engage in the struggle to obtain benefits, political parties have a greater incentive to compete for the support of narrow interest groups, rather than seeking to appeal to the broader interests of voters in their roles as taxpayers and consumers.

Increasing entanglement of government, industry and community organisations has been associated with inter-related problems of increasing constraints on economic freedom, changes in business culture leading to a decline in dynamism, and rapid growth in public debt levels. Economic freedom levels in countries such as France, Britain and USA are now substantially lower than they were at the turn of the century. Much of this slippage occurred prior to restrictions on freedom imposed during the coronavirus epidemic (Fraser Institute data). Edmund Phelps has noted a decline in economic dynamism associated with corporatism (Phelps 2013, pp. 159-69). Growth of public debt is a predictable consequence of the triadic political relationships discussed earlier. To avoid disappointing current generations by constraining government spending or raising taxes, governments tend to increase public debt, thus transferring the burden to future generations.

My consideration of these matters has led me to expect fiscal crises to become more common in the liberal democracies in the years ahead and that this will lead to consideration of rule changes to raise productivity growth and require governments to live within their means (Bates 2021, pp.117-18).

However, changing the rules of the game to reduce the adverse impact of interest group politics poses a large challenge for reform-minded political entrepreneurs. The problem arises from path dependency. The culture of preferment-seeking and plunder associated with interest group politics took a long time to reach its current state, but it is now entrenched and will be difficult to overcome.

North recognized the role that political entrepreneurs play in institutional change (North 1990, pp. 86-87, 103-4). His analysis implies that their role is to reduce transactions costs associated with institutional change. (North 1990, p.138). The transactions costs of institutional change are high because of the path dependence of institutions. As institutions evolve, ideologies tend to evolve to support them. Organizations and interest groups that have grown up under existing institutions often have a stake in maintaining them (North 1990, pp.91,99). 

In his Nobel lecture, North emphasized that because of path dependence, a change in formal rules may not change economic performance in the manner expected:

“It is the admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement characteristics that shapes economic performance. While the rules may be changed overnight, the informal norms usually change only gradually. Since it is the norms that provide “legitimacy” to a set of rules, revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its supporters desire and performance will be different than anticipated. And economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have very different performance characteristics than the first economy because of different informal norms and enforcement.” (North 1993).

The implications of path dependence have been further explored by Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne, and Peter Leeson. These authors contend that the ability of a new institutional arrangement to take hold when it has been transplanted depends on that institution’s status in relations to indigenous agents in the previous time period. They suggest that institutional transplants are unlikely to stick if they are inconsistent with indigenously introduced endogenous institutions (Boettke et al. 2015).

The analytical framework used by Boettke et al. suggests that endogenous political entrepreneurs might be more successful than international agencies in bringing about institutional change. Boettke and Coyne have noted elsewhere that political entrepreneurship entails alertness to the potential for new forms of governance to overcome political and bureaucratic constraints (Boettke and Coyne 2007, pp.130-31).

That raises the question, considered in the following essay, of what other qualities reform-minded political entrepreneurs might require to bring about desirable institutional change.

References

Bastiat, Frédéric, “The Law,” “The State,” and Other Political Writings 1843-1850, ed. Jacques de Guenin (Liberty Fund, 2012).

Bates, Winton, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing (Hamilton Books, 2021).

Boettke, Peter J., Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson, “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics”, Chapter 6 in Culture of Economic Action, ed. Laura E. Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (Edward Elgar, 2015).  

Boettke, Peter J. and Christopher J. Coyne, “Entrepreneurial Behavior and Institutions” in Entrepreneurship: The Engine of Growth, ed. Maria Minniti (Praeger, 2007).

Buchanan, James M. Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative, The normative vision of classical liberalism (Edward Elgar, 2005).

Geloso, Vincent and Alex Tabarrok. “Two Peas in a Pod: Democracy and Capitalism”, in Scott C. Miller and Sidney M. Milkis (eds.) Can Democracy and Capitalism be Reconciled (Oxford University Press, 2025).

North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

North, Douglass C., ‘Economic Performance through Time,’ Nobel Prize Lecture (December 9, 1993) https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1993/north/lecture/

Phelps, Edmund. Mass Flourishing: How grassroots innovation created jobs, challenge and change (Princeton University Press, 2013).

What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing?

 

Preface to a Series of Essays

“Entrepreneurship necessarily takes place within culture, it is utterly shaped by culture, and it fundamentally consists in interpreting and influencing culture.”

-        Don Lavoie (Lavoie 2015, p. 50)

A few months ago, a kind person told me that “Freedom and Flourishing” had become more than just a blog. With that thought in mind, I have decided to try something new. I am proposing to present here a series of linked essays that can be read in much the same way as a journal article. Readers who wish to do so will be able to start at this Preface and read all the way through to the end, or alternatively, just read the essays that are of most interest to them. There will be links at the end of each essay to help readers to find their way to the next one and links at the beginning of each essay to help readers to find their way back to this Preface.

Some readers may notice that some of the material presented here has been published previously on this blog. The views presented in this series of essays have been more carefully considered but are still subject to revision.

As always, I welcome comments from readers.

———

Some readers will come to this series with the prior belief that political entrepreneurship has a negative impact on freedom and flourishing. Those of us who believe that people tend to flourish most fully when governments refrain from interfering with their lives may hold that belief. We certainly have good reasons to be skeptical about the impact of political entrepreneurs on human flourishing.

Nevertheless, if we are serious about promoting libertarian ideals, we cannot avoid considering the possibility that political entrepreneurship might have a role to play in getting us from where we are now - or where we seem to be heading - to a political and legal order that is more conducive to human flourishing.

In my view, it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship at this time because many voters in liberal democracies seem to have become increasingly dissatisfied with conventional centre-left and centre-right political leaders. Unfortunately, there seems to be increasing support in liberal democracies for leaders who propose rule changes which are likely to have detrimental impacts on prospects for freedom and flourishing. That support seems evident on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics.

In that context, it is particularly important to understand the contribution that political entrepreneurship has made to the problems that voters perceive, and the likely consequences of the alternative approaches to political entrepreneurship that are currently on offer.

The analytical approach adopted here has been influenced by entangled political economy as explained by Richard E. Wagner. According to that approach, both “polity and economy are arenas of practical action that operate in similar but not identical fashion” (Wagner 2016, p. 64).

Wagner’s approach recognizes the importance of individual action:

“The framework of entangled political economy accommodates recognition that societies change only through individual action inside those societies, and with those actions spreading within the society according to the receptivity of other members of that society to those changes” (Wagner 2016, p. 138).

As Chris Matthew Sciabarra has suggested, to understand institutional change we need to recognize interactions between personal, cultural and structural (political-economic) considerations. Sciabarra has discussed the nature of those interactions using a Tri-Level Model which builds on Ayn Rand’s conceptual framework (Sciabarra 2000, pp. 379-83). He emphasizes that although the personal, the cultural, and the structural can be analyzed separately, they can never be “reified as wholes unto themselves” (Sciabarra 2000, pp. 379-80).

I believe that the concept of political entrepreneurship is necessary to an understanding of institutional change for much the same reason that the concept of economic entrepreneurship is necessary to an understanding of technological change. The focus of the series is on how political entrepreneurship shapes the formal rules that govern economic and personal freedom across jurisdictions.

These essays draw heavily upon the insights of Don Lavoie in considering the nature of political entrepreneurship. In the passage quoted in the epigraph, Lavoie was writing about economic entrepreneurship. He argued that the “seeing of profit opportunities is a matter of cultural interpretation” (Lavoie 2015, p. 51). However, the idea that entrepreneurship consists in “interpreting and influencing culture” seems particularly relevant to political entrepreneurship.

What Lavoie means by culture is “the language in which past events are interpreted, future circumstances are anticipated, and plans of action are formulated.” (Lavoie 2015, p. 49).

He explains that he views culture as a discourse. In that context: “entrepreneurship is the achievement not so much of the isolated maverick who finds objective profits others overlooked as of the culturally embedded participant who picks up the gist of a conversation” (Lavoie 2015, p. 51).

Essays in this series will discuss the implications of significant differences that exist between political and economic entrepreneurship. In politics, voter choices are weakly linked to individual outcomes, decision-making often involves triadic relationships, and political marketing allows greater scope for deception. Moreover, political deal-making lacks a clear success metric comparable to profit in markets, and institutional incentives may attract opportunists rather than principled leaders.

I acknowledge, however, that many political entrepreneurs are motivated by a desire to achieve economic and social objectives that are widely supported in the communities they live in. They are confronted by information constraints. It is often impossible for a central authority to possess and process all the knowledge needed to achieve social and economic objectives without producing adverse, unintended consequences. As new policy initiatives are implemented to reduce those adverse consequences, economic freedom is often further reduced, and adverse economic and social impacts tend to multiply.

Political leaders seeking to restore economic freedom face challenges including entrenched interests and institutional path dependence. Changing formal rules is insufficient without corresponding changes in norms and incentives. I maintain that institutional reform is not solely about electing better leaders at a national level.

In advocating that the social sciences should pay more attention to the role of political entrepreneurship, I am certainly not attempting to promote a “great man theory” of institutional change. Political entrepreneurs rarely act alone, and their influence is constrained by a range of factors that are present to varying degrees in the societies in which they function.

Crucially, libertarian political entrepreneurs are unlikely to have a lasting impact on freedom and flourishing if their influence is confined to national politics. A national leader may play a pivotal role in sweeping away accumulated regulation but a culture supporting liberty and individual flourishing cannot be established and maintained unless many individuals undertake frequent acts of political entrepreneurship in their day-to-day interactions with others.

The structure of the series is as follows:

Part I provides a brief discussion of the links between freedom and flourishing to explain my reasons for focusing on institutions relating to economic and personal freedom. It also explains the meaning of institutions, institutional change, and political entrepreneurship.

Part II considers the extent to which differences in economic and personal freedom in different countries can be attributed to differences in underlying cultural values. It concludes that prevailing culture at a national level offers only a partial explanation of differences in economic and personal freedom levels. There is much left to be explained by other factors, particularly the influence of political entrepreneurship on the ideologies adopted by governments.

Part III discusses similarities between political and economic entrepreneurship.

Part IV discusses the incentives that political entrepreneurs are faced with in the context of the characteristics of politics that make it a peculiar business.  

Part V discusses the motives of political entrepreneurs and the impact of information constraints on pursuit of economic and social objectives.

Part VI considers the consequences of institutional path dependence, first in slowing the emergence of interest group politics and associated detrimental impacts on economic dynamism, and second in making it more difficult for reform-minded political entrepreneurs to restore economic freedom.

Part VII considers whether heroic political entrepreneurship has potential to promote freedom and flourishing. It urges that political entrepreneurship be perceived more broadly than in terms of government leadership.

Part VIII summarizes the series and concludes.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Chris Matthew Sciabarra for helpful comments on earlier drafts of some of the material presented in this series. The usual caveat applies. Please do not assume that Chris endorses the views presented here.

References

Lavoie, Don, “The discovery and interpretation of profit opportunities: culture and the Kirznerian entrepreneur”, in Culture and Economic Action, edited by Laura E Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (Edward Elgar, 2015).

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew, Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism (Pennsylvania State University Press: 2000).

Wagner, Richard E., Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).

Friday, October 31, 2025

How can the study of human nature help us to reach normative conclusions in political philosophy?

When I read the sentence quoted in the epigraph above, the thought crossed my mind that Aristotle would have agreed with it. Aristotle based his philosophy on his observation of human nature. The reason why Aristotle came to mind will become apparent as you read the essay.


The quoted sentence written by Gerry Gaus is from the Preface of The Open Society and its Complexities (p.x). I have previously written about this book in an essay entitled: What does Gerry Gaus tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for political entrepreneurship?



I have three objectives in writing this essay:

  • The first is to outline Gaus’s discussion of the social evolution of human nature and how that provides a basis for his normative conclusions about the desirability of an Open Society.
  • The second is to consider what we need to know about human nature to reach normative conclusions about the desirability of an Open Society.
  • The third is to consider whether Gaus’s approach helps us to defend the intuition that natural rights exist.

The evolution of human nature  

Gaus argues that human nature has been shaped by evolution, including cultural evolution. Humans are a norm-guided species. Social norms are predominantly a cultural phenomenon – a product of cultural evolution. The norms associated with different types of social order differentially encourage some aspects of human nature while discouraging others. Gaus suggests that “the truly outstanding feature of our evolved moral psychology is our ability to follow a wide variety of sharing and fairness norms in different circumstances and cultures”. (p.86)

Gaus suggests that the common view that publicly justified moral rules are a modern Western invention fails to appreciate that public justification has been a fundamental feature of moral life from the beginning:

“From the very beginning, human morality has relied on public justification: the rules of the group must be such that the members’ personal normative convictions and interests align with them.” (p.50)

Gaus is critical of the “tribal collectivist” view that humans “are simply, at bottom, natural egalitarian collectivists”. He begins his evolutionary story with conjectures about the complex social life of ancestral Pan – the posited common ancestor of humans, chimps and bonobos. Concern for personal autonomy may have its roots in a social life where individuals displayed a keen sense of self-interest in competition for alpha status, and in rebelling to avoid dominance.

Gaus acknowledges that Late Pleistocene (LPA) hunter-gather societies engaged in egalitarian meat-sharing. That was a means of reducing the variance in food intake, but it also reflects successful efforts by subordinates to control would-be bullies and upstarts. Under that interpretation, the egalitarian ethos of LPA societies was not inherently collectivist. LPA societies “appear characterized by a near-obsession with resisting the authority of would-be dominators”. LPA societies also exerted immense social pressure against innovators who sought to introduce new techniques to improve their own lot. This may have been an effective way to protect distributive shares.

People in LPA societies had a strong ethic of reciprocation – they engaged in the conditional cooperation that enables markets to function. Social support was more readily available to those who had a reputation for being willing to assist others.

Social norms developed in LPA societies as some moral rules became internalized because large majorities developed an emotional attachment to them and willingly complied with them. The exercise of self-control in conforming to social rules was a highly prized virtue in many small hunter groups.

About 17,000 years ago, there was a rise in inequality brought about by the development of forager clans, leading to creation of hierarchical states. The state’s organization gave it a decisive military advantage over more egalitarian groups. Grain-based monoculture may be the creation of hierarchical states rather than a cause of it.

Gaus presumably adopts F. A. Hayek’s view of the Open Society (or Great Society) as a society in which coercion of some by others has been reduced as far as possible and individuals are free to use their own knowledge for their own purposes. He argues that the morality of the Open Society scales up the norms of reciprocity and fairness while incorporating the ancient concern with autonomy and personal freedom: “the core rights of person and property become universal”. (p.133)

The recent emergence of WEIRD morality (the morality of Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democracies) may have occurred as a consequence of teachings of the Catholic Church opposed to incest, which was once defined so broadly that it led to the breakup of kin- and clan-based morality. Gaus notes Jonathan Haidt’s data (The Righteous Mind, 2012) indicating that the moral reasoning of WEIRD populations is largely focused on individuals and centres on the dimensions of liberty-oppression, care-harm, and fairness-cheating.  In contrast, most other moral systems, including those of conservatives in WEIRD societies give greater emphasis to loyalty-betrayal, authority-subversion, and sanctity-degradation.

Gaus suggests:

“Extending core morality beyond kin-based networks may have been the critical development of WEIRD morality, but WEIRD morality too manifests a push toward expansion of the impartial network and pulling back by kin and ethnic markers and the power of social proximity. Human social life is defined by this constant tension between the push to wider moral relations and the pulling back of familiarity and social proximity. To describe human morality as either tribalistic or an ever-expanding circle is evocative but fundamentally distorting.” (p. 90)

Gaus goes on to suggest that although cultural evolution does not render humans unfit for the Open Society, they may well be unfit for Millean liberalism (and by implication, WEIRD morality). He argues that Millean progressivism “is a recipe for drastically reducing social learning (aka imitation), throwing us back on our cognitive capacities. That, however, is in turn a recipe for undermining ultra-social cooperation, and would probably make any significant system of social rules dysfunctional”. (p.102)

The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality, entailing moral rules that lead toward extended cooperation rather than conflict and division. Diversity of moral perspectives is fundamental to the moral life of the Open Society. Thus, the existence of increasingly diverse moral perspectives can enhance justification of the Open Society and public justifications of those moral rules must be as accommodating to diversity as possible. (pp. 164-167)

Gaus concludes:

 “a variety of different moral perspectives can, counterintuitively, enhance the ability of a society to secure public justification of shared moral rules. Each has his own opinion of the point and value of these rules, yet each can particulate in, and indeed enhance a social process that can generate a self-organized social morality.” (p. 167)

That description of an important characteristic of an Open Society seems to be as close as Gaus comes to reaching a normative conclusion about the desirability of an Open Society.

What do we need to know about human nature to reach normative conclusions supporting an Open Society?

I don’t think we need an evolutionary account of the shaping of human nature to reach normative conclusions supporting an Open Society. Gerry Gaus could have argued that humans have a variety of different moral perspectives by merely referring to evidence such as that presented by Jonathan Haidt. He didn’t need his interesting account of the evolution of human nature to make the point that moral rules can only secure “public justification” if they are as accommodating to diversity as possible.

That is not intended as a criticism. Gaus made clear that his primary intention in providing the evolutionary account was to counter the view (attributed to Hayek among others) that our evolved moral sentiments constantly cause us to rebel against the Open Society and resort to a “tribal” moral outlook.

Gaus’s discussion of the evolution of moral norms helped him to focus on some aspects of human nature that are relevant to assessment of politico-legal orders. However, it seems to me that Gaus overlooked other relevant aspects of human nature such as the importance to individual flourishing of the exercise of practical wisdom and self-direction. The relevance of those aspects might have been given more prominence if Gaus had considered some studies with an individualistic focus on virtues and values.

The study by Martin Seligman and Christopher Petersen of virtues that are ubiquitous and valued in every culture is relevant in this context. By reading the basic writings of all the major religious and philosophical traditions, the researchers found that six virtues were endorsed by “almost every single one” of these traditions: wisdom and knowledge, courage, love and humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. That list incorporates the ancient cardinal virtues of practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice and the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. Seligman and Petersen identified 24 character strengths that they viewed as the routes by which the virtues can be achieved. One aim of the study was to assist people to identify their own character strengths. The study recognizes that individuals who have different character strengths have potential to flourish in different ways. (The study is described in Martin Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 2012, pp. 125-161.)

Another relevant approach is Shalom Schwartz’s theory of basic values. The findings of his surveys suggest that the value priorities in 82 countries exhibit a similar hierarchical order, despite substantial differences in the value priorities of individuals within those countries. The 10 basic values identified in that study were self-direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, security, power, achievement, hedonism, and stimulation. (See: Schwatz, S.H., 2012, ‘An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values’, Online Readings in Psychology and Culture.)

There are no doubt other empirical studies that identify the importance of practical wisdom and self-direction to individual flourishing.

However, as Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl (often referred to as the Dougs) have pointed out, “the character of human flourishing is not discovered solely by a scientific study of human nature. Considerations of the requirements and conditions for human volition and action, cultural and social practices, and commonsense observations are part of the process”. The Dougs add: “The point of entry for such reflection most often occurs when we examine our lives as a whole and wonder what they are for”. (Norms of Liberty, 2005, p.116).

The Dougs present a Neo-Aristotelian account of human flourishing in which the human good is explained to be objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed and social. After providing that explanation, the authors conclude:

“Regardless of whether or not the forgoing outline of human flourishing meshes with Aristotle’s, it clear that human flourishing is, for our theory of individualistic perfectionism, something plural and complex, not monistic and simple. As we have noted, this view of human flourishing amounts to a version of moral pluralism because there are many goods that help to define human flourishing. Further, there is no single good or virtue that dominates all others and reduces them to mere instrumental values.” (p.143)

The Dougs do not refrain from declaring that human flourishing is good. Flourishing occurs when individuals actualize their natural potential to be good humans. (p.122)

The Dougs note that the individualized and agent-relative character of human flourishing poses the problem of how it can be possible for individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others. They explain that recognition of individual rights solves that problem because it enables individuals to flourish in different ways provided that they do not interfere with the rights of others. (pp. 76-96)

I hope that this brief outline of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl’s discussion of human flourishing provides sufficient evidence that their normative conclusions in political philosophy are based on their study of human nature.

Does Gaus’s evolutionary discussion help us to defend intuitions that natural rights exist?

In my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, I noted that, since ancient times, some philosophers have recognized that there is a foundation in human nature for intuitions about natural rights. I noted Haidt’s moral foundations theory and Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution but most of my discussion focused on Robert Nozick’s discussion of the evolution of norms and intuitions related to social cooperation for mutual benefit and the ethics of respect. (pp. 26-28) Nozick’s discussion is in his book, Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World, published in 2001.

Gaus’s discussion of cultural evolution overlaps considerably with Nozick’s, but there are differences of emphasis. As noted above, Gaus’s discussion emphasizes that public justification has always been a fundamental feature of moral life of humanity and that some moral rules become internalized as large majorities developed an emotional attachment to them. I think public justification is also implied in Nozick’s discussion of the merits of voluntary cooperation to mutual benefit because voluntary cooperation requires public justification.  (Nozick, p.259)

One difference of emphasis arises because of Nozick’s interest in the question of why conscious self-awareness was selected for in evolutionary processes. Nozick suggests that “if the function of conscious self-awareness was selected for because it makes us capable of ethical behaviour, then ethics, even the first layer of the ethics of respect, truly is what makes us human”. (p.300) Gaus is more interested in issues of public justification of norms and the question of “how we can live without oppression and subjugation in a complex and deeply divided world”.

I think Gaus’s evolutionary discussion is helpful to an understanding of why it is common for people to have intuitions that rules that restrain individual action require public justification to ensure that, as far as is possible, they are aligned with the personal normative convictions of community members.  Perhaps the intuition that people have a natural right to public justification of rules that restrain individual action is just as widespread and as strong as the intuition that individuals have a natural right to respect for their persons and property.

 Conclusions

This essay was prompted by my reading of Gerry Gaus’s book, The Open Society and its Complexities.

Gaus’s discussion of the evolution of human nature emphasizes the following points:

  • Public justification of rules and concern for personal autonomy were a fundamental feature of moral life even before the evolution of modern humans.
  • The evolved moral psychology of humans has allowed a wide variety of fairness norms to be followed in different circumstances and cultures.
  • Human nature is neither fundamentally tribalistic nor is it characterized by an ever-expanding circle of moral relationships. There is constant tension between tendencies toward expansion of moral concerns and pulling back to familiarity and social proximity.
  • The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality and diversity of moral perspectives.

Gaus argues that diversity can enhance the ability of a society to secure public justification of shared moral rules.

I think the points that Gaus emphasizes about human nature are helpful in considering the merits of an Open Society but I would have liked to have seen him give consideration to the relevance of other aspects of human nature such as the widespread view that exercise of practical wisdom is a virtue and the value that people place on self-direction. Consideration of practical wisdom and self-direction would have required consideration of studies with an individualistic focus as well as those that focus on social norms.

 It is possible to obtain insights about human nature from commonsense observations, introspection and reasoning, as well as from scientific research. On the basis of their observations and reasoning Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl were able to explain (in Norms of Liberty) that the human good is individualized, agent-relative and self-directed, as well as social. Their understanding of the nature of human good and individual flourishing provided a foundation for their normative conclusion that it is necessary for the politico-legal framework to recognize individual rights. Rights recognition makes it possible for individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others.

It is appropriate for conclusions about the rights of individuals to be based on the study of human nature rather than intuitions. Nevertheless, the intuition that humans have rights that should be respected is an important factor influencing individual behaviour. That influence could be expected to be stronger when people believe that individual rights are natural, in the sense of having a foundation in human nature. It seems to me that evolutionary theory supports that belief.

Gaus’s book left me thinking that the intuition that individuals have a natural right to public justification of the rules that restrain their actions may be as widespread and as strong as the intuition that they have a natural right to respect for their persons and property. More generally, it may be that humans tend to have strong intuitions that natural justice itself is a natural right.

Addendum

Readers might also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.