Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good?

 

I am writing this during an election campaign in Australia. By international standards, both chief contenders for public office could be aptly described as neither conspicuously great nor notoriously bad.

However, over the last three years, Australians have experienced the worst government that I can remember. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the political alternative on offer would have been much better.

During the current election campaign, both chief contenders for national leadership have seemed oblivious to the decline in productivity growth that caused the good times to stop rolling on in this country. It has apparently not registered with them that vote-buying spending proposals are less appropriate under such circumstances than economic reforms to restore productivity growth. Moreover, the election campaign is being conducted as though nothing that has happened recently in the international economic and political environment might require Australians to prepare for difficult times ahead.

Fortunately, the question that I have posed above does not require me to consider which of the contenders for national leadership is most worthy of being prime minister of Australia.

Before I go any further, however, I should outline my (somewhat complicated) view of party politics in liberal democracies. I have yet to see a system of government that is better than the two-party system at enabling voters to hold governments accountable for their actions. One of the downsides of that system, however, is that it provides a strong incentive for political parties to reward team players who are willing to set aside their own views to support a party line. The insincerity that is often on display in the public performance of politicians makes it is difficult to avoid regarding politics as a disreputable profession. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that democratic political systems sometimes produce leaders who are highly principled and effective in enhancing opportunities for human flourishing.  

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good? That question has arisen from previous research that I have undertaken about the roles of culture, ideology, and political entrepreneurship as factors influencing levels of economic and personal freedom in different countries. I will briefly outline some points emerging from that research before discussing Robert Faulkner’s book, The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and its Critics (2007).

Points emerging from previous research

• Cultural values do not fully explain levels of economic and personal freedom in different countries. Suppression of liberty in countries with relatively low levels of economic and personal freedom, e.g. China, Iran and Venezuela, is a product of the ideologies of the governments concerned rather than the cultural values of the peoples. Similarly, a substantial number of countries with relatively high personal and economic freedom are performing better in that regard than can readily be explained on the basis of prevailing cultural values.
• It is not difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have historically been major players determining outcomes in many jurisdictions where economic and personal freedom seems substantially at variance with underlying cultural values. There are good reasons for that. Media coverage tends to focus on political leaders, the challenges they face and the policies they adopt.
• Douglas North saw political entrepreneurship as being required to overcome high transactions costs involved in changing institutions – the rules of the game of society. There are high transactions costs associated with institutional change because institutions are path dependent, e.g. embedded in culture.
• Political entrepreneurship takes place within culture and is concerned with interpreting and influencing culture as well as formal rules (constitutions, laws and regulations). Some research suggests that successful political entrepreneurs tend to advance their ambitions by focusing on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties do not satisfy. They win support by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas.
• Max Weber argued that charismatic and demagogic leadership may be required to overcome the impersonal forces of bureaucratization within democracies. Demagogic leaders are responsible for their cause, and thus capable of intentionally and rationally directing state power towards its achievement.  
• Weber suggested that demagogic leadership can be consistent with democracy, but he seems to have left aside the question of whether a demagogic leader can be both good and great.

The essays from which those points were abstracted can be found here and here.

 The Case for Greatness

 In making the case for greatness Robert Faulkner observes that thoughtful citizens and appreciative historians have no difficulty in acknowledging the greatness of people like George Washington, Winston Churchill and Nelson Mandela. By contrast, many of those who generalize about human affairs display a doubting cynicism about such greatness. He notes that “social scientists speak much of rational maximizing, power seeking, self-interest, and popular voice, but not much of extraordinary judiciousness, honorable aims, and knowing justice” and that “influential professors of philosophy and literature talk confidently of autonomy and equal dignity, while deprecating ambition for office and accomplishment as elitist domineering or a remnant of repressive culture”.

The author’s key contention is that the accounts of political greatness by Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon “illuminate our experiences of a Mandela or a Margaret Thatcher far better than the critical and doctrinal theorizing that is more familiar and has been in the works for three or four centuries”.

 The book begins by considering Aristotle’s account of an honorable and just form of grand ambition. It then considers the political dangers and psychological dynamics of the less bounded and less just forms of ambition, using Alcibiades and Cyrus as examples of individuals who seek to rule empires. That is followed by a chapter discussing George Washington as an example of a gentleman-statesman. Along the way, the author notes the role of Niccolo Machiavelli in turning the orientation of much thinking about human affairs from what men should do “from duty and the best life” to what men do to advance themselves and their followers in wealth and power. The final chapters discuss modern theories that obscure the moral-political phenomenon of political greatness and make it “peculiarly alien to our apprehension and sensibilities”. One of the final chapters is devoted to discussion of the egalitarian theories of John Rawls and Hannah Arendt. The other discusses the theories of Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche.

In what follows, I focus mainly on what the author has to say about Aristotle. Readers who are looking for a more comprehensive summary of The Case for Greatness should read the review by Paul A. Rahe.

Faulkner observes that Aristotle ranks greatness of soul as the "crown" needed to perfect all the virtues, including justice. He writes:

 “Aristotle does not mince words on this topic, and neither should we. No greatness without goodness, yes, but also no true goodness without greatness. The great-souled human being, in claiming a worthy stage, claims for human excellence the prominence and tasks it deserves. Accordingly, while greatness of soul "cannot exist without" such other virtues as moderation and justice, it also "enhances their goodness." A man of such virtue is too noble to stoop, or to accept the second best, especially in his own conduct. Aristotle calls greatness of soul a kosmos. It is an ornament of good character that is also an exalting order: an ordering heightened by an awareness of the grand activities such a soul calls for and is owed.”

Aristotle views the great-souled man as having a disposition to claim great honours because he considers himself worthy of them. The great-souled man has a true estimate of his own worth. He claims tasks that no-one else can do, or do as well. The great-souled man disdains the offices commonly sought by other ambitious people; he seeks the tribute and high offices that are “great things.

Aristotle equates greatness of the soul with magnanimity - which he also equates with excellence and justice. However, the great-souled man’s disposition is complicated because he seeks great positions and honours from others as well as virtue of soul for himself. Aristotle suggests that the great-souled man holds that nothing is greater than his own virtue and seems to regard any honour as less than what is due a soul of such worth.

The great-souled man’s desire for superiority may harbour a despotic impulse, but his virtue gives this impulse something of an honorable and just direction. Faulkner writes:

“It is the priority of virtue and honor, so understood, that largely distinguishes Aristotelian greatness of soul and a Washington.”

Later, he explains more fully:

“Knowledge of his virtue helps uphold the great man amidst changing fortune. Unlike Machiavelli's great man, his measure is not ambitious mastery of fortune, but living well amidst fortune's gifts and trials. It is after this purification of grand ambition that Aristotle sharply separates true pride from the all-too-common arrogance of the privileged. "In truth," "rightly," "justly," only the good should be honored.”

Faulkner concludes:

“Aristotle's diagnosis comes to this: the great-souled man is at once drawn above humanity and drawn to humanity. He exhibits his superiority by aiding his fellows, and yet his wish is less to aid them than to avoid being or appearing dependent on them.”

Faulkner suggests that while Nicomachean Ethics seems to imply that greatness of the soul is a desirable attribute of political leaders, Aristotle moderates that view in the Politics and Ethics. In Politics, he doesn’t forget the best man’s claims but presents them “only after defending at length the more common and political claimants to rule”. At one point he even praises “the decent and equitable man” over the great man. In Ethics, Aristotle suggests that greatness, especially great power, is overrated: “it is possible for one who is not a ruler of land and sea to perform noble action.”

Faulkner writes:

“Given the likelihood of war, the difficulties of preserving any regime, and the extreme rarity of the best regime, there will be opportunities enough for noble deeds, great things, and superiority over others. A great-souled man will have his opportunities; he will be often needed. But such a force, if a blind force, may also harm itself and those whom it would rule, including the most thoughtful. Whatever else Aristotle's Ethics and Politics may be, whatever the defects, his is surely a model effort to supply comprehensive light to the grandly ambitious and to those who depend on them.”

Faulkner ends his book with a discussion of Nietzsche, who “unlike Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, trumpets an animus against ordinary people”. Faulkner’s final comment:

“Nietzsche's proposals and diagnoses alike invite us to look to more moderate accounts, whether in examples such as a Washington or in the historians and philosophers who took seriously what is good and true as well as what is strong and great. To encourage such looking is what this book is about.”

My assessment

I think Robert Faulkner has made a stronger case for goodness than greatness as a desirable attribute in political leaders. Greatness is required in times of crisis, but competence will suffice most of the time. It is important to recognize, however, that winning an election doesn’t make a person competent in dealing with public policy issues. People can acquire skills relevant to statecraft in a variety of different ways but, as in other professions, on-the-job experience seems indispensable to high-level performance.

The case that Faulkner makes for goodness leads to the question of what we mean by goodness as applied to political leaders. As I see it, there are two different aspects to this question.

The first concerns personal ethics. Should citizens expect the holders of high office in a democracy to conform to widely accepted norms of ethical behaviour? If we expect our sporting heroes to confirm to such norms in their off-field behavior, there is perhaps an even stronger case for the similar standards to be applied to politicians. Since politicians regularly ask voters to trust them to implement policies, it seems appropriate for voters to expect them to demonstrate trustworthiness in their personal behavior. (Of course, the personal ethics of candidates is only one of the matters that voters should consider, and other matters may well be more important in particular instances.)

The second aspect concerns confusion of soulcraft and statecraft. Soulcraft, the means by which individuals flourish and find fulfillment in life, is a matter that is best left for individuals to pursue in the manner they choose for themselves. Since self-direction is fundamental to individual flourishing, it is a mistake to believe that it can be advanced via government action to promote particular views of moral excellence. Aristotle may have had reason to believe that was possible in a polis in the ancient world, but it is certainly not possible in modern societies which are characterised by much greater diversity of cultural and religious influences.

Some Neo-Aristotelian philosophers have drawn a clear distinction between soulcraft and statecraft. In their book Norms of Liberty, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl imply that the main role of statecraft is to restore or construct a political/ legal order in which “it might be possible for different individuals to flourish and to do so in different ways (in different communities and cultures) without creating inherent ethical conflict in the overall structure of their social/ political context.” (p 83)

In my view, we should judge our political leaders to be very good if they can manage to move the political/legal order toward achieving that outcome.

Can Empirical Natural Rights be viewed as metanormative principles?

 

Prior to attempting to answer the question posed above I briefly outline the concept of individual rights as metanormative principles - as discussed by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl - and consider the alternative approach that John Hasnas has adopted in his discussion of empirical natural rights.

Rights as metanormative principles

In their book, Norms of Liberty (published in 2005) Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl note that a rule qualifies as metanormative if it “seeks not to guide individual conduct in moral activity, but rather to regulate conduct so that conditions might be obtained where moral action can take place”. (p. 34) They argue that, as metanormative principles, individual rights solve a problem that is uniquely social, political, and legal. They describe the problem as follows:

“How do we allow for the possibility that individuals might flourish in different ways (in different communities and cultures) without creating inherent moral conflict in the overall structure of the social/political context—that is the structure that is provided by the political/legal order? How do we find a political/legal order that will in principle not require that the human flourishing of any person or group be given structural preference over others? How do we protect the possibility that each may flourish while at the same time provide principles that regulate the conduct of all?” (p. 78)

Recognition of individual rights solves the problem because it protects individual self-direction and enables individuals to flourish in different ways, provided they do not interfere with the rights of others.

The “instrumental moral value” of empirical natural rights

I was prompted to ask myself the question posed above as I was re-reading part of John Hasnas’s book, Common Law Liberalism (2024).

As I noted in an earlier essay published here, Hasnas offers an alternative conception of natural rights – empirical natural rights (ENR) – that evolve in the state of nature. He then proceeds to argue that ENR form a good approximation to individual rights as propounded John Locke.

Hasnas claims that he “can offer no argument that empirical natural rights have any intrinsic moral value.” He then goes on to argue that ENR have “instrumental moral value regardless of the moral theory and general approach to ethics one adopts”:

“This is because empirical natural rights facilitate peaceful human interaction and peace is an important, if not pre-eminent moral value in virtually all moral theories.” (p. 150)

Hasnas then proceeds to discuss why peaceful human interaction is necessary for the realization of deontological, consequentialist, and Aristotelian moral theories.

I think I can understand why Hasnas has adopted that approach. If you want moral theorists from a variety of different traditions to see merit in a new concept that you espouse, it is helpful to be able to argue that the concept is in harmony with their traditions.

However, it would be preferable, it seems to me, to be able to argue that recognition of ENR provides the metanormative conditions that enable moral conduct to take place, and that individual rights over-ride other moral claims.

Would Hasnas have grounds for concern that Kantians and Utilitarians might reject ENR as a metanormative concept?

My first thought was that their reactions might depend on how the metanormative principle was stated. Kantians and Utilitarians would have no obvious grounds to object to ENR being recognized as metanormative principles on the grounds that they protect individual self-direction and enable individuals to “to use their knowledge for their purposes”, provided they do not interfere with the rights of others.

The quoted words are from the Friedrich Hayek quote in the epigraph. (Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 1, p. 55.) It seems to me that use of one’s knowledge for one’s purposes comes close to the idea that human flourishing is best understood as “the exercise of one’s own practical wisdom.” As far as I can see, ENR are identical to the “rules of just conduct” referred to by Hayek.

Nevertheless, I think it is preferable to acknowledge the activity of flourishing explicitly because that is the best way to describe the human telos.

Would Kantians and Utilitarians object to a metanormative principle which recognizes that people seek to flourish in different ways?

I asked Chat GPT whether a person who subscribes to Kantian deontology would have grounds to object to my observation that they use their own practical wisdom to flourish. Here is part of her reply:

“They could argue that flourishing may occur as a byproduct of acting morally, but it is not the guiding principle. True moral worth arises when actions are performed out of respect for the moral law, not for the sake of achieving personal flourishing.”

When I think about it, I don’t think many Neo-Aristotelians would claim personal flourishing as their motive for acting with integrity toward others, even though they would view such behaviour as integral to their flourishing. People pursue the goods of a flourishing human because they perceive them to be good. The activity of flourishing is not about doing things that might raise one’s score in an imaginary index of individual flourishing.

From my reading, I don’t think many Utilitarians would raise strong objections to being told that they are seeking to flourish. At one point in On Liberty, J. S. Mill refers to “the judicious utilitarianism of Aristotle”, so it seems unlikely that he would have raised objections. Referring specifically to arguments for individual rights to be given an Aristotelian grounding, Leland Yeager suggests: “Such ‘Aristotelian’ arguments diverge from utilitarianism less in substance than in rhetoric.” (Leland B Yeager, Ethics as Social Science (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001) p. 222.

Conclusion

In discussing the normative significance of his concept of empirical natural rights (ENR) John Hasnas suggests that because they facilitate “peaceful human interaction” they have “instrumental moral value regardless of the moral theory and general approach to ethics one adopts.” I suggest that it would be preferable to be able to argue that recognition of ENR provides the metanormative conditions that enable moral conduct to take place, and that individual rights override other moral claims.

In exploring whether Kantians and Utilitarians might object to an argument for ENR to be viewed as metanormative principles I first suggested that they could have no objection to them being justified in Hayekian terms - recognizing that ENR protect individual self-direction and enable individuals to “to use their knowledge for their purposes”, provided they do not interfere with the rights of others.

It is possible that some Kantians and Utilitarians might object to a metanormative justification of ENR being framed in terms of allowing for “the possibility that individuals might flourish in different ways” on the grounds that they don’t recognize flourishing as a prime motivation for moral conduct. However, Neo-Aristotelians also pursue the goods of a flourishing human because they perceive them to be good rather than to raise their score in some imaginary index of personal flourishing.

 It seems to me that it would be very difficult for anyone who supports individual rights to object to them being viewed as metanormative principles. It would be almost as difficult to object to them being justified on the grounds that, among other things, they enable individuals to flourish in different ways.

Addendum

I have been thinking further about the question of whether there are reasons for anyone to object to a metanormative principle which recognizes that humans seek to flourish. It seems to me that to do that one would need to reject a description of human life that recognizes that it has inherent potentiality. For example:

“Humans, like all living things are teleological beings and have an inherent potentiality for their mature state – which is to say, they have what could be broadly called natural inclinations or desires to engage in activities that constitute their completion or fulfillment. They have a natural desire for their good.” (Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, The Perfectionist Turn, p 237)

That observation owes a lot to Aristotle but is it not still consistent with what we know about humans from the findings of biology, neurology, and psychology?

Second Addendum

This is what ended up in the first draft of the article I am writing:

The idea that it is natural for humans to seek to flourish should not be controversial.[1] It follows from a description of human life that recognizes that “like all living things … [humans] have what could be broadly called natural inclinations or desires to engage in activities that constitute their completion or fulfillment.”[2] Nevertheless, it may be worth adding that recognition of individual rights as a metanormative principle also protects the choices of those who wish to follow the directions of religious leaders rather than to be self-directed, and even of those who are motivated to behave in ways that might detract from their individual flourishing - provided they do not interfere with the rights of others.

---

[1] I raise the issue because Hasnas seems to imply that Kantians and Utilitarians might have reason to object to the concept of flourishing because it is associated with Aristotelian moral theory. He argues that peace is consistent with deontological moral standards and makes the realization of the ends of consequentialist moral theory more likely, as well as well as being necessary for human flourishing. See: Common Law Liberalism, p. 150.

[2] Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, The Perfectionist Turn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016), p. 237. The authors note that knowing that a particular activity is good for you will not necessarily provide you with a reason or motivation to engage in it.

Does your well-being depend on your PCNs?

 

The accompanying graphic suggests that it does. It is from Michael A Bishop’s book, The Good Life: Unifying the Philosophy and Psychology of Well-Being, published in 2015.

What is a PCN? A PCN is a positive causal network, or feedback loop. The general idea behind PCNs is that a person has a high level of well-being when they are experiencing a self-perpetuating cycle of positive emotions, positive attitudes, positive traits, and successful engagement with the world.

Bishop wrote the book to provide positive psychology with a solid foundation based on “a bit of fairly conventional philosophy of science”. He argues that the philosophical literature on well-being (hedonism, informed desire theory, and Aristotelianism) is too fragmented to provide positive psychology with a solid foundation.

The author observes that positive psychology offers practical, science-based advice about well-being. The explosion of scientific research on well-being has revealed homeostatically clustered sets of feelings, emotions, attitudes and behaviors. That provides the basis for positive psychology to be viewed as the study of the structure and dynamics of PCNs.

Bishop demonstrates that much research in positive psychology can be viewed in that light.

Consistency with my view of well-being

In my view, it makes sense to view psychological well-being as being at the opposite end of the spectrum to mental illness. Felicia Hupert and Timothy So viewed it as being on the opposite end of the spectrum to anxiety and depression. Those authors identified ten symptoms of well-being: competence, emotional stability, engagement, meaning, optimism, positive emotion, positive relationships, resilience, self-esteem, and vitality. They examined relationships among those symptoms in a study using data from a representative sample of 43, 000 Europeans. (‘Flourishing Across Europe’, Soc. Ind. Res. 2013.)

The view of psychological well-being adopted by Hupert and So seems to me to be easier to understand than Michale Bishop’s view that it consists of PCNs. Nevertheless, the two views don’t conflict. At one point Bishop actually suggests that it is possible to understand PCNs by contrasting them with negative or vicious causal cycles involving negative thoughts, feelings, attitudes, behaviors and dysfunctions.

Do PCNs constitute “The Good Life”?

As a neo-Aristotelian, the main objection I have to Bishop’s book is its title.

I am not particularly concerned that Bishop’s approach might be at variance with that of psychologists who claim to have an Aristotelian approach to positive psychology. Those people are well-intentioned but the indicators they use seem to be somewhat removed from what Aristotle had in mind when he expressed the view that human flourishing is a virtuous activity of the soul.

I guess that Aristotle would see a strong positive link between virtue and PCNs. After all, he saw virtue as being about not just about doing the right thing but also taking pleasure in it. Of course, Aristotle also acknowledged that people could obtain pleasure (but not eudaimonia) without being virtuous.

That raises the question of whether it is possible for a villain to have a high level of psychological well-being. In my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing I expressed a view implying that villains can’t have high level of psychological well-being:

“It may be possible for a villain to score highly on positive emotion and self-esteem, but I doubt that a villain could obtain a high overall score in a competently administered psychological assessment.”

I based that view on research findings relating to the dark triad.

Bishop presents a different view:

“In a culture in which cruelty is rewarded, a person naturally disposed to cruelty can have success and a high degree of well-being. This is not a consequence to jump for joy about. It’s just a sobering fact about our world that bad people can have well-being.”

Bad people can certainly have the outward signs of success in a culture in which cruelty is rewarded but I suspect that, even in that cultural context, people who take a stand against cruelty may tend to have stronger PCNs. (I could be wrong about that. It is an empirical question.)

In their book, Modernizing Aristotle’s Ethics, Roger Bissell and Vinay Kolhatkar suggest that humaneness is constitutive of a psychic state humans desire and cite evidence opposed to the widespread belief that ruthless people tend to get ahead in life, love, and especially business. (For references, please see my essay entitled ‘Is it possible for humans to flourish if they don’t live good lives?’, recently published on The Savvy Street).

Irrespective of whether bad people can have high PCNs, no Aristotelian could accept that they are flourishing. The view that bad people can live “good” lives is also opposed to the folk view of what it means to live a good life. (Please see the essay cited above for references and discussion.)

Conclusions

In his book, The Good Life, Michael Bishop argues that positive psychology should be viewed as the study of the structure and dynamics of positive causal networks (PCNs). PCNs are self-perpetuating cycles of positive emotions, positive attitudes, positive traits, and successful engagement with the world.

The view that psychological well-being is deeply rooted in strong PCNs seems to be consistent with the view that it lies on the opposite end of the spectrum to anxiety and depression.

The title of Bishop’s book is at variance with his view that it is possible for bad people to have strong PCNs. I am not convinced that it is possible for bad people to have high PCNs. Irrespective of whether that is so, however, people of bad character certainly do not live “the good life”.

Is it possible for humans to flourish if they don't live good lives?

 

I asked myself whether it is possible for humans to flourish if they don't live good lives after reading an article by Markus Knee and Damiel Haybron entitled "The Folk Concept of the Good Life: Neither Happiness nor Well-Being” (SSRN Electronic Journal, Jan. 2024).

I am not sure whether my attention was drawn to the article serendipitously or because of some kind of algorithmic conspiracy. An email from ResearchGate alerting me to the article arrived in my inbox on the same day that I had participated in a roundtable discussion on human flourishing with Ed Younkins, Roger Bissell, and Vinay Kolhatkar. We each presented views based on our three books:

Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society, by Edward W Younkins;

Modernizing Aristotle’s Ethics, by Roger E Bissell and Vinay Kolhatkar; and

Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, by Winton Russell Bates.

The roundtable discussion can be viewed on The Savvy Street Show. (The transcript of the discussion is available here.)

The article by Knee and Haybron

Knee and Haybron tested whether the folk view that a person “leads a good life” differs from the folk view that a person “is happy” and “is doing well” by asking survey participants to respond to vignettes involving socially sanctioned wrongdoing toward outgroup members. Their findings indicated that, for a large majority, judgments of bad character strongly reduce ascriptions of the good life, while having no impact at all on ascriptions of happiness or well-being.  They conclude that the lay concept of a good life is clearly distinct from those of happiness and well-being, likely encompassing both morality and well-being, and perhaps other values as well. Importantly, morality appears not to play a fundamental role among the folk in their views of either happiness or well-being.

So, who are the folk? There were 283 participants in this study (recruited on Prolific). It seems likely that the views of participants are representative of Americans. The sample has a bias towards females (64% female), but there is no obvious bias in the age of participants (average age 36, age range 19 to 78). I expect that folk in other countries with similar cultural heritage would have similar views, but that has not been tested   

Why should philosophers be interested in what folk think about the meaning of concepts? Socrates wandered around Athens asking people what they thought about the meaning of concepts, but I think modern philosophers have different motives. Socrates asked questions that were designed to encourage people to think more deeply rather than conducting surveys to assess their current views about the meaning of concepts.

I think the main reason why philosophers should be interested in what folk think about the meaning of concepts is because communication is easier if definitions accord with common usage of terms.

Differences between the views of the folk and the philosophers

Knee and Haybron claim that most philosophers assume that a good life is equivalent to well-being. I am not sure that “assume” is the correct word to use. Philosophers are usually careful to define the terms they use, so perhaps the authors mean that philosophers’ definitions of a good life and of well-being are at variance with the meaning that most folk give to those concepts.

One of the philosophers who has influenced my understanding of the meaning of human flourishing has adopted a definition of well-being that seems to me to make it equivalent to a good life. As I explain in the Introduction to Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, Neera Badhwar uses well-being in her definition of the highest prudential good (HPG):

“Well-being as the HPG consists of happiness in an objectively worthwhile life.”

I prefer to use the term flourishing, rather than well-being because flourishing better captures the dynamic nature of individual human development.

My understanding of human flourishing has also been strongly influenced by Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, who argue that human flourishing can be best understood as “the exercise of one’s own practical wisdom”.

I combined the Dougs’ perspective with Badhwar’s to define human flourishing as:

“the exercise of one’s own practical wisdom, with integrity, in the pursuit and achievement of happiness in an objectively worthwhile life”.

Objective worth entails moral virtues and choice-worthiness. In my book, I endorse the idea that the basic goods of a flourishing human constitute “living well” and “are the actual elements of a good life”. Perhaps the folk might not agree that the same elements are involved in the same proportions in “living well” as in “a good life”.  However, I hope most folk would agree with me that “living well” requires more virtue than “doing well”.

In any case, I claim that my view of human flourishing is close to the folk view of leading a good life.

I am not aware of any tests having been made of the folk view of human flourishing. Casual observation suggests to me that the concept of human flourishing is not used widely enough for there to be a general “folk view” of what it means. When I tell folk I have written a book about human flourishing I am often asked what flourishing means and how it differs from related concepts such as happiness and thriving.

How do Knee and Haybron view human flourishing?

Knee and Haybron seem to view human flourishing as involving no more virtue than lay perceptions of happiness and well-being. They claim that their results suggest that “philosophers following Plato in claiming that serious immorality precludes flourishing are defending a less-than-intuitive position”. Neo-Aristotelians who claim that lack of integrity impairs flourishing would presumably be viewed in the same light.

In his book, The Pursuit of Unhappiness (published in 2008) Dan Haybron discussed the question of whether Genghis Khan - who claimed to obtain happiness by conquering his enemies, taking their property, and outraging their wives and daughters – could be considered to have been a flourishing human (pp 159-60). In that context, he claims that it is “neither here nor there” to assert that Genghis Khan didn’t have a good life – a life that is desirable or choice-worthy. He is asserting that consideration of goodness is irrelevant to the question of whether a person is flourishing.

A Google search for “human flourishing” suggests to me that a view of human flourishing which has no reference to goodness is not currently widely accepted in the literature discussing human flourishing. Most of the items I found near the top of the list linked human flourishing to living a good life, being holistically good, engaging in meaningful activities, having regard to traditional virtues etc.

Does it matter if different people define human flourishing in different ways? Perhaps it adds only minor confusion to intellectual discourse. However, the way terms are used in intellectual discourse is likely to influence the folk view (common usage) over the longer term.  I think it would be unfortunate if we end up with a folk view of human flourishing that is indistinguishable from current folk views of happiness.

Conclusion

An empirical study by Marcus Knee and Daniel Haybron has found that the folk view that a person leads a good life differs from the folk view that a person is happy or doing well. Judgements of bad character strongly reduce ascriptions of the good life but have no impact on ascriptions of happiness or well-being.

I claim that the view of human flourishing that I have adopted is close to the folk view of living a good life.

However, Knee and Haybron seem to have a view of human flourishing that has no reference to goodness. Their view of human flourishing seems to be at variance with widely accepted views in relevant literature.

I doubt whether there is a folk view of human flourishing at present but one seems likely to develop with increasing use of the term. In my view, it would be unfortunate if we end up with a folk view of human flourishing that is indistinguishable from folk views of happiness and doing well. Those who wish to avoid that outcome should take advantage of every available opportunity to assert that human flourishing means living a good life.

Addendum

1. The Aristotle “quote” at the top of this essay is my interpretation of part of Nichomachean Ethics, Book 1, Chapter 7. In the 5^th paragraph, Aristotle considers the function (ergon) of a human (the capacities and activities that make a being human). That is the context in which he is considering what activities or actions eudaimonia, or human flourishing, requires. (Eudaimonia is often translated as happiness but it involves more than the modern, emotional state, concept of happiness). Aristotle asserts that human flourishing (the chief good) is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. What he means by “activity of the soul” is closely related to exercise of practical wisdom.

2. A revised version of this essay has been published on "The Savvy Street". The revised version incorporates quotes about flourishing from the books by Ed Younkins and Roger Bissell and Vinay Kolhatkar.

Can utopian thinking be dialectical?

 

This illustration of the fictional island of Utopia was apparently in the first edition of Thomas More’s book, Utopia, published in 1516. The word utopia was coined by More to mean ‘no place’ or ‘nowhere’, but More suggested that it could also have the same meaning as eutopia, meaning good place or happy place.

Modern dictionaries, such as Mirium-Webster and Cambridge, hedge their bets.  They define utopia as “a place of ideal perfection” or “a perfect society in which people work well with each other and are happy” and also as “an impractical scheme”, or “an imaginary or infinitely remote place”.

Examples of different usage

Both uses of the word occur in some of the books I have read recently. For example, in Marx, Hayek, and Utopia, Chris Sciabarra clearly takes utopia to mean “no place”, when he writes: “In this book, I explore the distinction between the possible and the impossible – between the radical and utopian – through a comparative analysis of the works of Karl Marx and F. A. Hayek.” Sciabarra suggests that for both Marx and Hayek, “Utopians internalize an abstract, exaggerated sense of human possibility, aiming to create new social formations based upon a pretense of knowledge”. Sciabarra notes:

“Despite their differences, both Marx and Hayek embrace a profoundly anti-utopian mode of inquiry. Marx identified this method as dialectics.”

Sciabarra views dialectics as “contextual analysis of systems across time”. (I have discussed application of the concept to problem definition in the preceding essay on this blog.)

An example of the use of utopia to denote a good place is in Fred Miller’s book, Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics. Miller writes:

“Aristotelian politics has two poles: one is ‘ideal’ or ‘Utopian’, concerned with identifying the best constitution consistent with human nature and with resources that can be expected to be available under the most favourable circumstances or, failing that, the best constitution attainable by a Greek polis; the other pole is ‘mundane’ or ‘empirical’, concerned with maintaining and preserving actually existing political systems.” (186)

Miller recognizes that in attempting to identify the best constitution, Aristotle is posed with the problem of the disparity between his ideal of a community composed of individuals qualified for and disposed to a life of ethical virtue, and the actual characteristics of community members. Nevertheless, Miller argues that “the study of the best constitution will provide guidance to the practical politician concerned with establishing or reforming a constitution in less fortunate or diverse circumstances”. (190)

Although Miller doesn’t mention dialectics, my impression from reading his subsequent chapter, “The Best Constitution”, is that Aristotle’s discussion of ideal constitutions was dialectical. His discussion of the prerequisites for an ideal constitution is preceded by a study of actual constitutions. He also considers factors such as the minimum and maximum level of population required for the polis to be self-sufficient for the good life of citizens.

Apologia

 A few years ago, I wrote a post on this blog entitled, ‘What purpose is served by utopian thinking?’. In that post I suggested that anyone who considers the nature and characteristics of an ideal society is engaged in utopian thinking.

The post contrasts an anti-utopian view and a utopian view. The anti-utopian view is that it is a waste of time to consider whether public policy is consistent with principles that should apply in an ideal society because outcomes are determined by power struggles.

 I suggested that the best way to challenge the arguments of those anti-utopians was to present some defensible utopian views:

1. Since human flourishing is an inherently self-directed activity undertaken by individuals, an ideal society must recognize that individuals have the right to flourish in the manner of their own choosing provided they do not interfere with the similar rights of others.
2. The flourishing of individuals depends on their ability to follow personal values, visions and aspirations that make their lives meaningful. Some of the most basic personal values of individuals – including respect for the lives, property, and liberty of others - are widely shared by people throughout the world.  
3. Progress toward an ideal society occurs when individuals have greater opportunities to meet their aspirations.

I think my argument was defensible in terms of the way I defined utopian thinking, but it would have been preferable to have adopted a more dialectical approach. My main point should have been that it is not necessary to choose between a world of power struggles and an unattainable world in which human nature has been transformed. We are more likely to improve opportunities for human flourishing if we approach public policy issues with a view to both (a) upholding ideals that ought to apply and (b) the real-world constraints that should not be overlooked.

By the way, I still think that much of the thinking that went into “Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing” was utopian, in terms of the way I defined that term. I think it is also true that there is a great deal of dialectical thinking in that book.

Conclusions

In considering whether utopian thinking can be dialectical it is important to be clear what we mean by utopian thinking. Under one definition, utopian thinking is out of this world. Under the alternative, anyone who considers what principles would apply in a good society is engaged in utopian thinking.

Chris Sciabarra adopts the first definition, and accordingly views utopian thinking as opposed to context-keeping and hence opposed to dialectical thinking.

Fred Miller adopts the second definition in his description of Aristotle’s somewhat dialectical discussion of an ideal constitution.

 I draw two conclusions:

1. People who claim to be opposed to utopian thinking don’t necessarily consider ideals and principles to be irrelevant to consideration of public policy issues.
2. People who defend utopian thinking may nevertheless be mindful of the need to consider real world context in considering public policy issues.

Addendum

I would like to draw attention to a response entitled 'Hayek, Bates, and Utopia', that Chris Sciabarra has posted on Notablog. In his response Chris mentions his excellent article, co-authored with Ryan Neugebauer, entitled 'Therapy for Radicals'. He also notes that Friedrich Hayek saw an important and honorable role for the notion of “utopia" in providing political inspiration. 

Is it helpful to adopt a dialectical approach to problem definition?

 

When you think of dialectical approaches the idea that may come to mind is thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis. As suggested in the sentence quoted above, I am viewing dialectical approaches more broadly in this essay. Before discussing the meaning of dialectics, however, it might be helpful for me to outline why I think problem definition is a topic worth considering.

Importance of problem definition

Fundamental values are clearly at stake in public discussion of some issues (e.g. abortion, the death penalty, assisted dying). 

Most people tend to agree about policy goals when it is not obvious that fundamental issues are at stake. For example, when people are discussing climate change, they tend to agree that exposure to extreme weather events has undesirable consequences for human flourishing. Similarly, when health services are discussed, people tend to agree that illness is undesirable; when education is discussed they tend to agree that literacy and numeracy are desirable; and when poverty is discussed, they tend to agree that it would be desirable for all humans to have the wherewithal to maintain a minimum standard of living.   

However, when a participant in public discussion proposes a remedial strategy, those who disagree often claim that the proposed strategy is built on an implausible view of the nature of the problem being addressed. Much public discussion is about questions such as: Is there really a problem? Is the problem one that individuals are normally expected to manage by themselves, or is some kind of collective action usually considered appropriate? What plausible explanations have been offered as to the causes of the problem?  Should we be thinking about how to tackle the causes of the problem or about how to alleviate symptoms? Which potential remedial strategies should be the focus of our attention? Discussion often focuses on the validity of research findings and other information offered to answer such questions.

Relevance of dialectics

I am adopting here the definition of dialectics proposed by Chris Sciabarra, in his book Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism:

“Dialectics is an orientation toward contextual analysis of the systemic and dynamic relations of components within a totality.” (173)

Sciabarra explains that “a totality” “is not simply an undifferentiated or all-encompassing whole”. He suggests it could be a two-person dialogue, an economy, or a social system. I will take the “totality” to encompass everything that can be shown to be relevant to the topic under discussion. If a dialectical approach to problem definition is adopted, the meaning of totality would be a matter for consideration in any specific context.

Sciabarra emphasizes that dialectics “is a thinking style that emphasizes contextual analysis of systems across time”. In a dialectical approach, “the aspects of a totality are understood systemically – that is, according to their spatial, or synchronic, interconnections – and dynamically – that is, according to their temporal, or diachronic, interconnections”.

Sciabarra offers his definition of dialectics after considering the use of dialectics from Aristotle to Hegel, and, after Hegel, by Marx, Hayek, Rand and others.

The question I have posed above - of whether it is helpful to adopt a dialectical approach to problem definition in public discussion - is not discussed explicitly in Total Freedom. However, that context seems to me to be one in which dialects has potential to be more helpful than alternative approaches.

In this essay I refer to some issues that have recently been the focus of public discussion to illustrate how a dialectical approach to problem definition would differ from the range of other methodological orientations. I focus on the four broad orientations that Sciabarra has identified: strict atomism, strict organicism, dualism, and monism.

Strict atomism

Strict atomists look at the world as if each aspect of it is separable from every other aspect. A recent Australian example of such an approach is the decision of the government of New South Wales (NSW) to build homes for “essential” workers in Sydney. The rationale given is: “NSW would grind to a halt without nurses, paramedics, teachers, police officers and firefighters, but many can’t afford a place to live in Sydney, close to where they work”. The announcement acknowledges existence of a more general housing affordability issue in Sydney but the government’s approach to dealing with that issue is clearly atomistic.

A dialectical approach would address a range of questions including whether anything is preventing the labour market from functioning flexibly to remunerate “essential” workers sufficiently to ensure that sufficient numbers are available to meet demand for their services in Sydney, and whether government regulation (e.g. zoning regulation) has been discouraging construction of sufficient affordable housing.

Strict organicism

Strict organicism relies on an illusory synoptic vantage point and views all relationships encompassed within the topic under discussion as constituents of a holistic principle at work. I see examples of strict organicism in recent discussion in Australia of the murder of women by their current or former male partners. Some people have suggested that this is a cultural problem which requires a fundamental change in men’s attitudes towards women. For example, Senator David Pocock stated: "we have a huge cultural issue" that needs to be "tackled". "This is going to take far more than some extra funding. This is a fundamental shift in the way that we treat women in this country.”

However, defining the problem as one that requires further improvements in men’s attitudes toward women tends to overlook the potential for other remedial action that is likely to be more effective in protecting the women whose lives are at greatest risk.

A dialectic approach would recognize that many of the men who kill their partners have known histories of violence. Research by Kate Fitz-Gibbon et al based on sentencing remarks by judges indicates that few intimate femicides occur without the offender having prior interaction with the criminal justice system.  This suggests the existence of effective intervention points that are not dependent on bringing about cultural change.

Dualism and Monism

 Sciabarra considers dualism and monism under the same heading. “Dualism is an orientation towards analysis by separation of a system’s components into two spheres”. “Monism is an orientation towards analysis of a system’s components as manifestations of a single factor”. Monists often embrace the dichotomies defined by dualists, while advocating a one-sided monistic resolution.

The mind-body dichotomy is a classic example of dualism. Another is the division of the social world into two spheres – the state and civil society (including the market). Sciabarra notes that dualist statists and dualist anarchists perceive these two spheres as fundamentally opposed and propose to resolve the conflict between them via monistic absorption of one sphere by the other. One side proposes a statist solution whereas the other proposes a civil society solution.

The debate about climate change provides examples of dualism and monism. For example, consider differences of opinion about CO2. On one side of the debate, many people argue that CO2 is polluting the atmosphere and causing adverse climate change. Their opponents argue that increased concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere have had beneficial impacts on crop yields and the growth of forests. A dialectic approach would recognise that those views are not necessarily in conflict. A central issue is at what CO2 concentration the adverse impacts are likely to exceed beneficial impacts.

Dualism and monism are also evident in the broader debate about action to reduce CO2 emissions. On the one side, some people consider the idea that CO2 emissions influence the climate as a hoax perpetrated by statists to gain greater control over the lives of ordinary people. On the other side, some people claim that the world is heading for disaster if urgent action is not taken to reduce emissions.

A dialectic approach would emphasize the importance of keeping context in mind when considering such issues.

Let us first consider an individual who wants to come to an informed view on whether extreme views of climate alarmists or sceptics should, or should not, be dismissed as implausible. That individual could be expected to spend many hours sifting through available scientific evidence. They might conclude, as I have, that projections of climate change models endorsed by the IPCC are more plausible than the views of climate alarmists and sceptics. On the other hand, they may come to different conclusions, as have some of my friends who seem to be fairly intelligent.

Now, let us consider the appropriate policy response of the Australian government in the light of two facts: Australian greenhouse gas emissions contribute just over 1 percent of global emissions, and on a per capita basis, Australia’s emissions are among the highest in the world. That context has considerable relevance in considering an appropriate policy response:

Climate alarmists should be encouraged to understand that even if Australia’s emissions went to net zero tomorrow, that would have an insignificant direct impact on global greenhouse gas emissions and would certainly not prevent the global calamity that they fear. A policy of rapid reduction in emissions may offer Australia the worst of all worlds – high cost of transition to a low emissions economy accompanied by high cost of adaptation to climate change.

Climate sceptics should be encouraged to understand that international sanctions may be imposed on Australia if this country is seen to be unduly slow in taking action to reduce emission levels.

 Conclusions

 In this essay I have considered whether a dialectical approach is relevant to problem definition in public discussion. I have adopted Chris Sciabarra’s view of dialectics as a thinking style that emphasizes contextual analysis of systems across time.

The examples of problem definition that I have considered – housing for “essential” workers in Sydney, murder of women by their current or former male partners, and the debate about climate change – support the view that a dialectical approach is preferable to strict atomism, strict organicism, dualism and monism.

It could be claimed that context-keeping is something that people who are skilled in problem definition do as a matter of course without declaring that they are adopting a dialectical approach. I have some sympathy with that claim but I note that I have had no difficulty finding examples where people who might be expected to have some skills in problem definition have adopted approaches that can be described as strict atomism, strict organicism, dualism and monism.

Some people need reminding about the importance of context-keeping.

How different were the views of Hayek and Rand on the role of reason?

 

I think many people who have some knowledge of the views of Ayn Rand and Friedrich Hayek have the impression that they had vastly different opinions on the role of reason. I certainly had that impression until recently.

I have changed my mind since reading Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical, by Chris Sciabarra.

In what follows, I begin by explaining why I had the impression that Rand and Hayek had vastly different views about reason, then outline why Sciabarra considers their views are similar in some respects, and follow that by attempting to identify the most important area of difference between them.

Opposing views?

The best way to explain why I thought Ayn Rand and Friedrich Hayek had vastly different views about reason is via some quotes.

Rand wrote:

“Rationality is man’s basic virtue, the source of all his other virtues.”

“The virtue of Rationality means the recognition and acceptance of reason as one’s only source of knowledge, one’s only judge of values and one’s only guide to action.” (Quotes from The Virtue of Selfishness, 1961, 31)

Hayek wrote:

“Like all other values, our morals are not a product but a presupposition of reason, part of the ends which our intellect has been developed to serve. At any one stage of our evolution, the system of values into which we are born supplies the ends which our reason must serve.” (The Constitution of Liberty, 1960, 63)

Chris Sciabarra notes that Rand recognized that individuals tacitly absorb the dominant values and ideas of the culture in which they live. (193) They develop the essentials of a “subconscious philosophy” from the earliest impressions of their childhood. (298) However, she saw each individual’s articulation of values and attitudes as a means towards rational integration or alteration, and analysis of values and attitudes at a social level as a means toward their explicit articulation or transcendence. (299)

While Hayek argued that reason helps us to observe social rules that enable us to get along with one another, he also argued that coercion to ensure compliance with those rules should be minimal. That was not only because coercion as such is bad, but because it is often desirable that social rules “should be observed only in most instances and that the individual should be able to transgress them when it seems to him worthwhile to incur the odium which this will cause”. He saw the system of values into which we are born as having emerged via social evolution. (COL, 58-9) He noted that “the existence of individuals and groups simultaneously observing partially different rules provides the opportunity for the selection of the more effective ones”. (COL, 63)

Hayek also recognized that “we must always strive to improve our institutions”, thus allowing for the possibility that conscious efforts in that direction could be successful. However, he suggested that we “can never synthetically construct a new body of moral rules” and “must take for granted much that we do not understand”. (COL, 63)

It seems to me that although Rand was more optimistic than was Hayek about the role of reason in enabling improvements in cultural values, their views about the role of reason were not diametrically opposed. Both recognized that individuals may have good reasons to question the dominant values of the culture in which they live.

Similar views about rationalism

Chris Sciabarra notes that Ayn Rand saw knowledge as the product of a conceptual integration of the facts of reality. She agreed with rationalists that human awareness is distinctly conceptual but departed from their view because they based their analyses on “floating abstractions” – dogmatic acontextual premises - rather than on concepts with perceptual roots. Leonard Peikoff, Rand’s close associate, has argued that rationalists pretend to have omniscience.

 Sciabarra suggests that Rand and her intellectual allies would have agreed with Hayek’s assessment that constructivist rationalism – the belief that deliberately planned social constructions produce outcomes that are superior to those of the spontaneous order of a free society - is an inappropriate extension of the Enlightenment faith in reason. He suggests that the crux of both Rand’s and Hayek’s critique of rationalism is as follows:

“The failure of rationalism was not a failure of reason. By ascribing to human beings the attributes of an omniscient deity, and then condemning human reason for not fulfilling this ideal, rationalists attack the genuine legitimacy of human cognition. Rand argued that this destructive pattern is reproduced by the advocates of altruism, who erect an impossible, self-abnegating standard of morality and then indict humanity for not being able to live up to it.” (212)

Hayek observed that constructivist rationalists tend to base their case on the synoptic delusion, “the fiction that all the relevant facts are known to some one mind, and that it is possible to construct from this knowledge of the particulars a desirable social order”. There is additional discussion of Hayek’s view of constructivist rationalism my recent essay: Did Hayek acknowledge the importance of individual self-direction in his vision of spontaneous order?

The most important difference?

I think the most important difference between Hayek and Rand about the role of reason concerns their differing views about the desirability of articulation of the rules underlying skills and customs of thought. As Sciabarra explains, Hayek acknowledged that the articulation of principles can be useful in transmitting know-how but noted that people often pass on know-how from generation to generation without being able to articulate the underlying principles involved. He quotes Hayek:

“Man has more often learnt to do the right thing without comprehending why it was the right thing, and he is still more often served by custom than by understanding.” (197-8)

Sciabarra points out that Rand believed that the articulation process was essential in the realm of morality because it enabled individuals not only to do the right thing but to know why it was the right thing to do. Rand held that an articulated philosophy is necessary for efficacious living: to live efficaciously it is necessary to choose, to choose it is necessary to define values, to define values it is necessary to know one’s own nature and the nature of the world. (200)

Rand proclaimed that the standard of value of the Objectivist ethics is “man’s life, or that which is required for man’s survival qua man”:

“Man has to be man—by choice; he has to hold his life as a value—by choice; he has to learn to sustain it—by choice; he has to discover the values it requires and practice his virtues—by choice.” (The Virtue of Selfishness, 28)

Personal perspective

I think Ayn Rand went too far in her assertions about choice and Friedrich Hayek went to too far in his assertions about the limits of human understanding.

I find it difficult to comprehend Rand’s assertion that humans have to choose to live. Does a new-born baby choose whether to accept the nourishment being offered by his or her mother? 

Some of Rand’s followers have attempted to explain that the choice to live is a fact inherent in the conditional nature of human life itself, but that seems to me to cloud the meaning of choice, and make it difficult to distinguish a choice from a survival instinct.

As I see it, rather than choosing whether to live or not live, it is more in accord with human nature for individuals to seek to discover or recognize what it means to be a human. As Henry Veatch wrote:

“We could say that this natural end or natural disposition of a human being is something pre-rational or pre-intelligent: it is just a fact that reason can do no more than recognize. And yet – and here is the decisive point – having come to recognize this pre-rational and pre-intelligent end, our human intelligence then sees that it is man’s natural end and hence the proper end for a human being to seek. It thus becomes an end which we do not seek merely in fact and automatically, toward which we are impelled uncritically and unreflectingly, but rather an end that we see that we have reason to seek and which we recognize as being the right and proper end for us as human beings.” (Rational Man, 79)

It is necessary to be aware of your natural end as a human being before making choices about what that potential means for the way you live your life.

In my recent post about Friedrich Hayek, referred to earlier, I suggested that he sometimes went too far in downplaying the ability of humans to understand the significance of abstract rules. I argued that most people are capable of understanding the purposes served by rules of just conduct and that it makes more sense to explain those purposes than to suggest that reverence for the traditional should be sufficient reason for compliance.

Conclusions

The views that Ayn Rand and Friedrich Hayek held about the role of reason are not as far apart as I had thought them to be prior to reading Chris Sciabarra’s book, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical.

Rand was more optimistic than Hayek about the role of reason in enabling improvements in cultural values but they both recognized that individuals may have good reasons to question the dominant culture in which they live.

Sciabarra argues that Rand’s intellectual allies would agree with Hayek’s denunciation of the constructivist rationalism of those who believe they knew enough about human nature to plan a perfect society. Rand’s allies also condemn rationalists for ascribing to humans the attributes of an omniscient deity.

In my view, the most significant difference between the views of Rand and Hayek concerns the desirability of articulation of reasons for adherence to moral rules. I agree with Rand on that point.

Despite my disagreements with some of the views of both Rand and Hayek on the role of reason, I agree with what I see as the central elements of their views on this topic. I strongly support Rand’s view that it is necessary for individuals to have an articulated philosophy if they are to live efficaciously, and I strongly support Hayek’s denunciation of constructivist rationalism.