How can the study of human nature help us to reach normative conclusions in political philosophy?

When I read the sentence quoted in the epigraph above, the thought crossed my mind that Aristotle would have agreed with it. Aristotle based his philosophy on his observation of human nature. The reason why Aristotle came to mind will become apparent as you read the essay.

The quoted sentence written by Gerry Gaus is from the Preface of The Open Society and its Complexities (p.x). I have previously written about this book in an essay entitled: What does Gerry Gaus tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for political entrepreneurship?

I have three objectives in writing this essay:

• The first is to outline Gaus’s discussion of the social evolution of human nature and how that provides a basis for his normative conclusions about the desirability of an Open Society.
• The second is to consider what we need to know about human nature to reach normative conclusions about the desirability of an Open Society.
• The third is to consider whether Gaus’s approach helps us to defend the intuition that natural rights exist.

The evolution of human nature  

Gaus argues that human nature has been shaped by evolution, including cultural evolution. Humans are a norm-guided species. Social norms are predominantly a cultural phenomenon – a product of cultural evolution. The norms associated with different types of social order differentially encourage some aspects of human nature while discouraging others. Gaus suggests that “the truly outstanding feature of our evolved moral psychology is our ability to follow a wide variety of sharing and fairness norms in different circumstances and cultures”. (p.86)

Gaus suggests that the common view that publicly justified moral rules are a modern Western invention fails to appreciate that public justification has been a fundamental feature of moral life from the beginning:

“From the very beginning, human morality has relied on public justification: the rules of the group must be such that the members’ personal normative convictions and interests align with them.” (p.50)

Gaus is critical of the “tribal collectivist” view that humans “are simply, at bottom, natural egalitarian collectivists”. He begins his evolutionary story with conjectures about the complex social life of ancestral Pan – the posited common ancestor of humans, chimps and bonobos. Concern for personal autonomy may have its roots in a social life where individuals displayed a keen sense of self-interest in competition for alpha status, and in rebelling to avoid dominance.

Gaus acknowledges that Late Pleistocene (LPA) hunter-gather societies engaged in egalitarian meat-sharing. That was a means of reducing the variance in food intake, but it also reflects successful efforts by subordinates to control would-be bullies and upstarts. Under that interpretation, the egalitarian ethos of LPA societies was not inherently collectivist. LPA societies “appear characterized by a near-obsession with resisting the authority of would-be dominators”. LPA societies also exerted immense social pressure against innovators who sought to introduce new techniques to improve their own lot. This may have been an effective way to protect distributive shares.

People in LPA societies had a strong ethic of reciprocation – they engaged in the conditional cooperation that enables markets to function. Social support was more readily available to those who had a reputation for being willing to assist others.

Social norms developed in LPA societies as some moral rules became internalized because large majorities developed an emotional attachment to them and willingly complied with them. The exercise of self-control in conforming to social rules was a highly prized virtue in many small hunter groups.

About 17,000 years ago, there was a rise in inequality brought about by the development of forager clans, leading to creation of hierarchical states. The state’s organization gave it a decisive military advantage over more egalitarian groups. Grain-based monoculture may be the creation of hierarchical states rather than a cause of it.

Gaus presumably adopts F. A. Hayek’s view of the Open Society (or Great Society) as a society in which coercion of some by others has been reduced as far as possible and individuals are free to use their own knowledge for their own purposes. He argues that the morality of the Open Society scales up the norms of reciprocity and fairness while incorporating the ancient concern with autonomy and personal freedom: “the core rights of person and property become universal”. (p.133)

The recent emergence of WEIRD morality (the morality of Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democracies) may have occurred as a consequence of teachings of the Catholic Church opposed to incest, which was once defined so broadly that it led to the breakup of kin- and clan-based morality. Gaus notes Jonathan Haidt’s data (The Righteous Mind, 2012) indicating that the moral reasoning of WEIRD populations is largely focused on individuals and centres on the dimensions of liberty-oppression, care-harm, and fairness-cheating.  In contrast, most other moral systems, including those of conservatives in WEIRD societies give greater emphasis to loyalty-betrayal, authority-subversion, and sanctity-degradation.

Gaus suggests:

“Extending core morality beyond kin-based networks may have been the critical development of WEIRD morality, but WEIRD morality too manifests a push toward expansion of the impartial network and pulling back by kin and ethnic markers and the power of social proximity. Human social life is defined by this constant tension between the push to wider moral relations and the pulling back of familiarity and social proximity. To describe human morality as either tribalistic or an ever-expanding circle is evocative but fundamentally distorting.” (p. 90)

Gaus goes on to suggest that although cultural evolution does not render humans unfit for the Open Society, they may well be unfit for Millean liberalism (and by implication, WEIRD morality). He argues that Millean progressivism “is a recipe for drastically reducing social learning (aka imitation), throwing us back on our cognitive capacities. That, however, is in turn a recipe for undermining ultra-social cooperation, and would probably make any significant system of social rules dysfunctional”. (p.102)

The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality, entailing moral rules that lead toward extended cooperation rather than conflict and division. Diversity of moral perspectives is fundamental to the moral life of the Open Society. Thus, the existence of increasingly diverse moral perspectives can enhance justification of the Open Society and public justifications of those moral rules must be as accommodating to diversity as possible. (pp. 164-167)

Gaus concludes:

 “a variety of different moral perspectives can, counterintuitively, enhance the ability of a society to secure public justification of shared moral rules. Each has his own opinion of the point and value of these rules, yet each can particulate in, and indeed enhance a social process that can generate a self-organized social morality.” (p. 167)

That description of an important characteristic of an Open Society seems to be as close as Gaus comes to reaching a normative conclusion about the desirability of an Open Society.

What do we need to know about human nature to reach normative conclusions supporting an Open Society?

I don’t think we need an evolutionary account of the shaping of human nature to reach normative conclusions supporting an Open Society. Gerry Gaus could have argued that humans have a variety of different moral perspectives by merely referring to evidence such as that presented by Jonathan Haidt. He didn’t need his interesting account of the evolution of human nature to make the point that moral rules can only secure “public justification” if they are as accommodating to diversity as possible.

That is not intended as a criticism. Gaus made clear that his primary intention in providing the evolutionary account was to counter the view (attributed to Hayek among others) that our evolved moral sentiments constantly cause us to rebel against the Open Society and resort to a “tribal” moral outlook.

Gaus’s discussion of the evolution of moral norms helped him to focus on some aspects of human nature that are relevant to assessment of politico-legal orders. However, it seems to me that Gaus overlooked other relevant aspects of human nature such as the importance to individual flourishing of the exercise of practical wisdom and self-direction. The relevance of those aspects might have been given more prominence if Gaus had considered some studies with an individualistic focus on virtues and values.

The study by Martin Seligman and Christopher Petersen of virtues that are ubiquitous and valued in every culture is relevant in this context. By reading the basic writings of all the major religious and philosophical traditions, the researchers found that six virtues were endorsed by “almost every single one” of these traditions: wisdom and knowledge, courage, love and humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. That list incorporates the ancient cardinal virtues of practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice and the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. Seligman and Petersen identified 24 character strengths that they viewed as the routes by which the virtues can be achieved. One aim of the study was to assist people to identify their own character strengths. The study recognizes that individuals who have different character strengths have potential to flourish in different ways. (The study is described in Martin Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 2012, pp. 125-161.)

Another relevant approach is Shalom Schwartz’s theory of basic values. The findings of his surveys suggest that the value priorities in 82 countries exhibit a similar hierarchical order, despite substantial differences in the value priorities of individuals within those countries. The 10 basic values identified in that study were self-direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, security, power, achievement, hedonism, and stimulation. (See: Schwatz, S.H., 2012, ‘An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values’, Online Readings in Psychology and Culture.)

There are no doubt other empirical studies that identify the importance of practical wisdom and self-direction to individual flourishing.

However, as Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl (often referred to as the Dougs) have pointed out, “the character of human flourishing is not discovered solely by a scientific study of human nature. Considerations of the requirements and conditions for human volition and action, cultural and social practices, and commonsense observations are part of the process”. The Dougs add: “The point of entry for such reflection most often occurs when we examine our lives as a whole and wonder what they are for”. (Norms of Liberty, 2005, p.116).

The Dougs present a Neo-Aristotelian account of human flourishing in which the human good is explained to be objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed and social. After providing that explanation, the authors conclude:

“Regardless of whether or not the forgoing outline of human flourishing meshes with Aristotle’s, it clear that human flourishing is, for our theory of individualistic perfectionism, something plural and complex, not monistic and simple. As we have noted, this view of human flourishing amounts to a version of moral pluralism because there are many goods that help to define human flourishing. Further, there is no single good or virtue that dominates all others and reduces them to mere instrumental values.” (p.143)

The Dougs do not refrain from declaring that human flourishing is good. Flourishing occurs when individuals actualize their natural potential to be good humans. (p.122)

The Dougs note that the individualized and agent-relative character of human flourishing poses the problem of how it can be possible for individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others. They explain that recognition of individual rights solves that problem because it enables individuals to flourish in different ways provided that they do not interfere with the rights of others. (pp. 76-96)

I hope that this brief outline of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl’s discussion of human flourishing provides sufficient evidence that their normative conclusions in political philosophy are based on their study of human nature.

Does Gaus’s evolutionary discussion help us to defend intuitions that natural rights exist?

In my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, I noted that, since ancient times, some philosophers have recognized that there is a foundation in human nature for intuitions about natural rights. I noted Haidt’s moral foundations theory and Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution but most of my discussion focused on Robert Nozick’s discussion of the evolution of norms and intuitions related to social cooperation for mutual benefit and the ethics of respect. (pp. 26-28) Nozick’s discussion is in his book, Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World, published in 2001.

Gaus’s discussion of cultural evolution overlaps considerably with Nozick’s, but there are differences of emphasis. As noted above, Gaus’s discussion emphasizes that public justification has always been a fundamental feature of moral life of humanity and that some moral rules become internalized as large majorities developed an emotional attachment to them. I think public justification is also implied in Nozick’s discussion of the merits of voluntary cooperation to mutual benefit because voluntary cooperation requires public justification.  (Nozick, p.259)

One difference of emphasis arises because of Nozick’s interest in the question of why conscious self-awareness was selected for in evolutionary processes. Nozick suggests that “if the function of conscious self-awareness was selected for because it makes us capable of ethical behaviour, then ethics, even the first layer of the ethics of respect, truly is what makes us human”. (p.300) Gaus is more interested in issues of public justification of norms and the question of “how we can live without oppression and subjugation in a complex and deeply divided world”.

I think Gaus’s evolutionary discussion is helpful to an understanding of why it is common for people to have intuitions that rules that restrain individual action require public justification to ensure that, as far as is possible, they are aligned with the personal normative convictions of community members.  Perhaps the intuition that people have a natural right to public justification of rules that restrain individual action is just as widespread and as strong as the intuition that individuals have a natural right to respect for their persons and property.

 Conclusions

This essay was prompted by my reading of Gerry Gaus’s book, The Open Society and its Complexities.

Gaus’s discussion of the evolution of human nature emphasizes the following points:

• Public justification of rules and concern for personal autonomy were a fundamental feature of moral life even before the evolution of modern humans.
• The evolved moral psychology of humans has allowed a wide variety of fairness norms to be followed in different circumstances and cultures.
• Human nature is neither fundamentally tribalistic nor is it characterized by an ever-expanding circle of moral relationships. There is constant tension between tendencies toward expansion of moral concerns and pulling back to familiarity and social proximity.
• The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality and diversity of moral perspectives.

Gaus argues that diversity can enhance the ability of a society to secure public justification of shared moral rules.

I think the points that Gaus emphasizes about human nature are helpful in considering the merits of an Open Society but I would have liked to have seen him give consideration to the relevance of other aspects of human nature such as the widespread view that exercise of practical wisdom is a virtue and the value that people place on self-direction. Consideration of practical wisdom and self-direction would have required consideration of studies with an individualistic focus as well as those that focus on social norms.

 It is possible to obtain insights about human nature from commonsense observations, introspection and reasoning, as well as from scientific research. On the basis of their observations and reasoning Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl were able to explain (in Norms of Liberty) that the human good is individualized, agent-relative and self-directed, as well as social. Their understanding of the nature of human good and individual flourishing provided a foundation for their normative conclusion that it is necessary for the politico-legal framework to recognize individual rights. Rights recognition makes it possible for individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others.

It is appropriate for conclusions about the rights of individuals to be based on the study of human nature rather than intuitions. Nevertheless, the intuition that humans have rights that should be respected is an important factor influencing individual behaviour. That influence could be expected to be stronger when people believe that individual rights are natural, in the sense of having a foundation in human nature. It seems to me that evolutionary theory supports that belief.

Gaus’s book left me thinking that the intuition that individuals have a natural right to public justification of the rules that restrain their actions may be as widespread and as strong as the intuition that they have a natural right to respect for their persons and property. More generally, it may be that humans tend to have strong intuitions that natural justice itself is a natural right.

What does Don Lavoie tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for the plans of political entrepreneurs?

One of the questions that I have been contemplating in recent months is whether the tariff policies of President Trump could be part of a coherent economic plan. Can his policies be rationalized in terms of revenue raising objectives, the optimum tariff argument, provision of appropriate incentives to manufacturing industries to meet defence or employment objectives, or the pursuit of foreign policy objectives? Is it possible that he is assigning policy instruments to objectives in a manner consistent with a rational plan?

The presumption underlying such questions is that it is preferable for political entrepreneurs to endeavor to ensure that their economic plans are coherent rather than unprincipled, unpredictable, and capricious. Although that may be a reasonable presumption, there is another other option that should be considered. Perhaps it is appropriate for political entrepreneurs to refrain from engaging in economic planning.

I was reminded of that while reading Don Lavoie’s book, National Economic Planning: What is Left?  Don Lavoie was an economics professor at George Mason University, where he taught from 1981 until his death in 2001. This book was originally published by the Cato Institute in 1985 and was reprinted by the Mercatus Center in 2016.

In this book Don Lavoie explains, among other things, that political entrepreneurs are confronted with a fundamental knowledge problem when they seek to plan economic activities, The epigraph quoted above (from page 181) encapsulates an important implication of the knowledge problem.

Lavoie’s explanation of the information problem begins with the insights of F. A. Hayek. The data that a planning agency would require to engage in rational economic planning resides in the separate minds of millions of people. The data exists only in a dispersed form that cannot be fully extracted by any single agent in society. The only way that knowledge can be used effectively is by relying on competitive struggles in a market system.  (p. 56)

The most obvious implication is that it is impossible for markets to be replaced by comprehensive economic planning. However, more modest attempts to steer the market towards particular outcomes also obstruct the source of knowledge which is essential to rational decision-making. (p. 56-7)

Lavoie points out that the only way we can know whether we are squandering resources by over- or underinvesting in microprocessors or steel, for example, is via “the messages contained in the relative profitability of rival firms in these industries”. He adds:

“But this is precisely the information we garble when we channel money toward one or another of the contenders. Deprived of its elimination process, the market would no longer be able to serve its function as a method for discovering better and eliminating worse production techniques. Without the necessity of responding to consumers’ wants or needs, businesses would never withdraw from unprofitable avenues of production.” (p.181)

Lavoie notes that advocates of industry policy disagree on the directions in which the market should be steered. For example, Felix Rohatyn wanted to funnel aid to sunset industries while Robert Reich wanted to funnel it to sunrise industries. He sums up:

“It is the main conclusion of the argument that I have called the knowledge problem … that there are no rational grounds on which Reich could ever convince Rohatyn or vice versa on such matters as are involved in economic change. As a result, such battles are sure to be fought with weapons other than carefully reasoned argument.” (p. 200-201)

Lavoie notes that Rohatyn and Reich both argued that it is the responsibility of a strong leader to coordinate the actions of the rest of us. (p.190) The coordination they had in mind seems to be more akin to the coordination that military leaders impose by giving orders to subordinates than the coordination among individuals that occurs voluntarily and spontaneously in a free market.

Lavoie argues that economic planning is inherently militaristic: “The practice of planning is nothing but the militarization of the economy”. In making that point he notes that the theory of economic planning was from its inception modeled after feudalistic and militaristic organizations. (p. 230)

Some would argue that a degree of militarization is a price worth paying, or even desirable, to achieve a range of national objectives. Indeed, the conventional theory of democracy seems to entail top-down direction. Prior to elections, political leaders tell voters about their plans for education, health, social security etc. and are expected to implement those plans after they are elected.  

I am not aware of anything that Lavoie wrote that discusses the legitimacy of the concept of national objectives and the question of whether planning (and militarization) may be necessary in the pursuit of social objectives. However, he provided a highly relevant discussion of the concept of democracy in a book chapter entitled, ‘Democracy, Markets, and the Legal Order: Notes on the Nature of Politics in a Radically Liberal Society’. (The book is: Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Eds.) Liberalism and the Economic Order, Cambridge University Press, 1993.)

In that chapter Lavoie notes that Western liberals tend to view democracy and markets “as in some sort of necessary tension with one another”. We tend to think that “taking democracy too far undermines markets and that taking markets too far undermines democracy”. He attributes that view to “liberalism’s gradual drift into compromises with conservatism and socialism”.

Lavoie argues that liberalism needs to reinterpret its notions of markets and democracy so that they are seen to be essentially complementary. Our economics needs to take account of the cultural underpinnings of markets and our politics “needs to move beyond the model of the exercise of some kind of unified, conscious democratic will and understand democratic processes as distributed throughout the political culture”. The force of public opinion is best perceived as the distributed influence of political discourses throughout society rather than as “a concentrated will”.

Lavoie suggests that what we should mean by democracy is a distinctive kind of openness in society rather than a theory about how to elect the personnel of government:

“Democracy is not a quality of the conscious will of a representative organization that has been legitimated by the public, but a quality of the discursive process of the distributed wills of the public itself.” (p.111).

It seems to me that those who see merit in Lavoie’s view of democracy have good reasons to be skeptical about the worth of top-down planning to achieve national objectives. Individuals have different priorities and objectives that deserve to be recognized. National plans cannot solve the knowledge problem entailed in giving appropriate recognition to individual differences. 

Is it too soon to be asking in what part of the world will the next golden age be located?

 

The question posed above occurred to me as I was reading the final pages of Johan Norberg’s latest book, Peak Human: What We Can Learn from the Rise and Fall of Golden Ages.

Johan Norberg is a senior fellow at the Cato institute. He is a historian of ideas and a prolific author. If Norberg has a fan club, I might qualify for honorary membership. I have written about some of his previous books on this blog (here and here) and have read others.

Norberg explains what he means by a golden age in these terms:

“A golden age is associated with a culture of optimism, which encourages people to explore new knowledge, experiment with new methods and technologies, and exchange the results with others. Its characteristics are cultural creativity, scientific discoveries, technological achievements and economic growth that stand out compared with what came before and after it, and compared with other contemporary cultures. Its result is a high average standard of living, which is usually the envy of others, often also of their heirs.”

The author suggests that the most important precondition for a golden age is “an absence of orthodoxies imposed form the top about what to believe, think and say, how to live and what to do.” He doesn’t present the golden ages he has identified in utopian terms. He acknowledges that countries concerned all practiced slavery, denied women basic rights and “took great delight in exterminating neighbouring populations”.

As implied in the epigraph, Norberg argues that civilizations decline when they lose cultural self-confidence. He suggests that episodes of creativity and growth are often terminated because of the perceived self-interest of people who fear change and feel threatened by it. Free speech is replaced by orthodoxies and free markets are replaced by increased economic controls. The fears of those seeking stability and predictability often become self-fulfilling.

 In my view, Norberg has done an excellent job in explaining why golden ages have emerged and disappeared at different times in different parts of the world.

However, I think there may be an omission in the author’s identification of golden ages. I will briefly discuss that before focusing on the question of whether the Anglosphere is in decline.

Identifying golden ages

Norberg discusses seven golden ages in his book. Since he doesn’t provide a summary timeline showing their duration, I asked ChatGPT to construct the following:

• Athens: 480–404 BC
• Rome: 27 BC–AD 180
• Abbasids: 750–950
• Song dynasty: 960–1279
• Renaissance Italy: 1490–1527
• Dutch Republic: 1609–1672
• Anglosphere: c. 1688 onward.

If that timeline is broadly correct, it suggests that the largest gap between golden ages occurred between the end of the golden age of Rome and the beginning of the golden age of the Abbasids. What was happening at that time? Although the golden age of Rome may have ended around 180, following the death of Marcus Aurelius, the decline and fall of the Roman empire took a few more centuries. The last emperor of the Western Roman empire was deposed in 476. Plato’s Academy in Athens apparently continued to function until 532, when the seven last philosophers left to seek refuge with the Persian king. Interest in Greek philosophy grew in Persia during the 6^th and 7^th centuries, partly because of the presence of scholars associated with schismatic Christian sects.

As I was pondering what was happening between 180 and 750, I began to wonder whether India’s golden age might have been worth discussing in this book. While visiting India last year I read William Dalrymple’s book, TheGolden Road: How Ancient India Transformed the World. As well as discussing India’s impact on religion and culture throughout much of Asia, Dalrymple. points out that over the period from about 250BC to AD 1200, India was an important centre of commerce and trade, and an innovator in fields such as astronomy and mathematics.

India was the source of the numerical system with 10 digits including zero, that we use today. Norberg mentions that important contribution, but Dalrymple discusses it at greater length.

Another fascinating topic discussed by Dalrymple is the close relationship between the merchant classes of early India and the Buddhist monastic movement. Dalrymple emphasizes the importance of trade between India and the Roman empire. He notes that as the Roman empire crumbled, India’s trade with Europe was replaced by expansion of its trade with south-east Asia.

Is the Anglosphere in decline?

The Anglosphere refers to those nations where the English language and cultural values are dominant. Few would dispute that over the last couple of centuries the Anglosphere, first led by Britain and then the United States, played a leading role among nations in demonstrating the benefits of liberal democracy, free markets, technological innovation, and free international trade. Life in the Anglosphere has been far from ideal even in respect of those criteria, but there can be no doubt that we have been living in an age of widespread prosperity that is without historical precedent. As Norberg points out, the whole world has benefited from the spread of golden-age conditions fostered by the Anglosphere, with global extreme poverty declining from 38 to 9 percent in just the period since 1990.

However, Norberg notes that “many ominous signs of decline are clearly present in our time”. He mentions the “hubristic overreach” of U.S. attempts to reshape the Middle East through military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the financial crash of 2008, and the growth of “crippling public debt”. He suggests that a series of crises, including the Covid pandemic, have fostered “a sense that the world is dangerous and that we need to protect ourselves from it”. He writes:

“Most worryingly, rich counties have experienced a major backlash against globalization and trade, and immigrants have become scapegoats, just as they were in so many other eras of decline, potentially shutting us out from our most potent source of constant revitalization.”

Norberg notes that both China and Russia “have recently taken a totalitarian turn and are working hard to devastate neighbours”. He suggests, nevertheless, that Russia and China will have a hard time trying to challenge the Anglosphere-led world order because it will be difficult for them to find reliable friends among advanced states. 

Unfortunately, in the short time since the book was written, the government of the United States has adopted an international stance that seems to be inconsistent with the continued existence of an Anglosphere-led world order. Countries that have long regarded themselves as allies of the U.S. are now forced to contemplate seriously how they can best protect their own interests if the U.S. pursues isolationist policies.

The book ends on a somewhat optimistic note. The author observes that there are roughly fifty prosperous, open societies around the world. If one of them fails, “that will not stop others from picking up the torch”. He adds:

“That prompts the question of where the next golden age will come from.”

After considering various possibilities, however, he suggests that “perhaps this is the wrong way to look at it because we now have a “truly global civilization” in which every literate person anywhere in the world can draw upon the accumulated knowledge of humanity and learn skills in any field. In that context, “no one country can hold a monopoly on the ideas that can make them prosper”.

I agree with the general thrust of that argument. The technology required for future golden ages is not deposited in a library that can be easily destroyed. However, the geographical location of societies that are open and prosperous is still an issue worth considering. It isn’t much consolation for citizens in the United States, Britain or Australia to know that their children and grandchildren may be able to draw upon the accumulated knowledge of humanity and learn skills in any field, if institutional change impinges adversely on their incentives to do such things. Opportunities for human flourishing depend on whether political entrepreneurs will restore and maintain sufficient economic freedom.

It is in that context that I ask: Is it too soon to be asking where the next golden age will be located?

I suggested an optimistic answer to that question in Chapter 6 of Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing. Looking beyond looming economic crises, I am still optimistic that the governments of most liberal democracies will eventually introduce institutional reforms to enable the drivers of progress to restore growth of opportunities.

Are declining economic growth rates likely to have undesirable impacts on social attitudes?

 

Research for an earlier essay on this blog led to the conclusion that declining economic growth rates in high income countries are likely to cause an increasing proportion of the population of those countries to feel that their standard of living is worse than that of their parents at a comparable age, and therefore to experience lower average life satisfaction. In this essay I extend that analysis to consider the social attitudes of people in the USA, Britain and Australia who feel worse off than their parents.

In the previous study I used data from the World ValuesSurvey to examine the relationship between the perceptions of respondents about their standard of living relative to their parents at a comparable age and economic growth in the countries in which they reside. That data was then linked to average life satisfaction.

The main findings were:

• Perceptions of standard of living relative to parents are positively related to past economic growth experience of the countries in which people live.
• In the high-income countries, low growth has a greater adverse impact on young peoples’ perceptions of their standard of living relative to parents than on the corresponding perceptions of old people.
• The perception of having a lower standard of living than parents at a comparable age has a substantial adverse impact on life satisfaction ratings.

These findings imply that lower economic growth rates would be likely to result in an increasing proportion of the population having lower living standards than their parents, and hence, lower average life satisfaction. The psychic costs of adjustment to lower economic growth would initially fall most heavily on young and middle-aged people.

Those findings raise questions about likely changes in social attitudes if economic growth prospects continue to decline in high-income countries, resulting in an increasing proportion of people who feel worse off than their parents were at a comparable age. This essay uses World Values Survey data to explore how some of the social attitudes of people who perceive themselves to have a lower standard of living that parents differ from those of the rest of the population.

I focus on three high-income countries – USA, Britain and Australia. The USA survey was undertaken in 2017, the British survey in 2022, and the Australian survey in 2018.

Figure 1 provides further evidence that people in the USA, Britain and Australia tend to have lower average life satisfaction if they perceive that their standard of living is lower than that of their parents.

 

Demographics

Figure 2 indicates that people who perceive themselves to be “worse off” than their parents tend to be concentrated in the 25-54 age groups.

 

Figure 3 suggests that the sex composition of those who feel “worse off” than their parents differs somewhat by age group in the countries considered, but I have no idea why. There appears to be a higher percentage of young women in that category in Australia, a higher percentage of women in the 30-49 age group in Britain and a higher percentage of older women in the United States.

 

Work and Success

Figure 4 indicates that those in the “worse off” category are less likely to agree that hard work brings a better life.

 

Attitude to Migrants and Migration

The only conclusion I can draw from Figures 5 and 6 is that Australians who feel “worse off” than their parents tend to have more negative attitudes toward migrants and immigration than those who feel better off or about the same.

 

Trust

Figure 7 suggests that a lower percentage in the "worse off" category say most people can be trusted.

Figure 8 suggests that a lower percentage of those in the "worse off" category have confidence in the justice system.

Priority given to Freedom

Figures 9 and 10 suggest that there is not much difference between the three groups in terms of priority given to freedom. Slightly fewer of those in the “worse off” category tend to give freedom higher priority than equality. Surprisingly, in Australia and Britain, slightly more of the people in that category tend to give freedom higher priority than security.

 

Government objectives

Figure 11 indicates that those in the “worse off” category are more inclined to want government to take more responsibility to ensure everyone is provided for. The percentages shown are for the top 3 ratings on a 10 point scale.

 

Figure 12 indicates that those in the “worse off” category are less inclined to give high priority to economic growth. Respondents were asked to select from a list which national aim should be given highest priority. Other items on the list include having strong defence forces and individuals having more say in decision making.

 

Politics

Figure 13 suggests that those in the “worse off” category are no more interested in politics than other people in the countries considered.

 

Figure 14 suggests that people in the “worse off” category are no more likely to consider that it is good to have a strong political leader.

 

Figure 15 suggests that people in the “worse off” category are no less likely to consider that democracy is important.

 

Figure 16 suggests that people in the “worse of” category are less likely to be satisfied with political system performance than are people in the other categories.

 

Figure 17 suggests that people in the “worse off” category are as strongly opposed to political violence as are people in the other categories.

 

Conclusions

The social attitudes of people who perceive their standard of living to be worse than that of their parents at a comparable age are similar in many respects to those of people who perceive their standard of living to be better or about the same as that of their parents.

However, there are some important differences. People who perceive their standard of living to be worse than that of their parents at a comparable age are more inclined to:

• Skepticism about hard work bringing a better life;
• Pessimism about trustworthiness of others and lack of confidence in the justice system;
• Collectivism in terms of responsibility for the wellbeing of citizens;
• Negativity about giving high priority to economic growth; and
• Dissatisfaction with political system performance.

That combination of attitudes seems likely to be self-perpetuating because it is likely to promote policy responses that will lead to lower economic growth and a further increase in the proportion of the population who perceive their standard of living to be worse than that of their parents. Adoption of more market-friendly economic policies to facilitate higher economic growth seems unlikely to occur before that course of action becomes more obviously necessary to avert major economic crises.   

How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?

 

This guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins is a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book “Total Freedom”, which was published 25 years ago. The epigraph is from page 354 of that book.

Ed Younkins is Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. He is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. Ed has numerous other publications, including an essay reviewing books by David L. Norton, which was published here in January.    

 Ed Younkins’s review was previously published in 2001 in “Le Québécois Libre”. 

There are two reasons why it is appropriate for it to be re-published now.

First,“Total Freedom” deserves more attention, and the 25^th anniversary of its publication is a particularly appropriate time for that to occur.

Second, in the light of declining economic and personal freedom in many parts of the world, the defense of liberty has become more urgent than it was 25 years ago. Ian Vásquez and his colleagues responsible for measurement of human freedom for Cato and the Fraser Institute have noted that on a world-wide basis, and using a population weighted comparison, a high point for freedom occurred in 2005–2007, followed by a steady decline through 2019, and a precipitous descent in 2020 through 2021 associated with government responses to the Covid virus (“The Human Freedom Index 2024, pp. 21-25). The latest data suggest although some recovery has occurred since, human freedom remains lower than in the year 2000.

Younkins ended his review by noting that he was “looking forward to seeing what Sciabarra will offer us next that will contribute toward the development of a comprehensive defense of freedom.” Chris Sciabarra has continued to make important contributions in this field even though illness has somewhat constrained his efforts.

Here is Ed Younkins’s review of:

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew, Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism (Pennsylvania State University Press: 2000).

In Total Freedom, Chris Matthew Sciabarra offers a provocative, scholarly, and original work in social theory for the analysis of society and human liberty. The author aims to reclaim the dialectical method, the art of context keeping, in the name of liberty and from the authoritarian left in order to make it the foundation for a radical (i.e., one that goes to the root) defense of libertarianism.

The necessity of context

Sciabarra is convinced that a successful libertarian project must stress the necessity of context – the totality of systemic and dynamic connections among social problems. More specifically, the libertarian ideal cannot be isolated from the context upon which it depends and freedom cannot be defended successfully when separated from its broader requisite conditions. The author proposes in Total Freedom a metatheoretical foundation upon which to construct a comprehensive libertarian social theory. Rather than making a convincing argument for liberty, he offers a means for structuring the methodology of social inquiry. The book is about how a context-sensitive methodology can be used to defend freedom. In order to think about freedom, people need to grasp the totality of its prerequisites and implications. Emphasizing the indivisible unity of theory and practice, Sciabarra says that any effort to understand or change society requires an analysis of its many related aspects.  

Sciabarra explains that dialectics emphasizes the centrality of context in the intertemporal analysis of systems. It is a thinking style that stresses the contextual analysis of systems across time. Dialectics may be viewed as a method of analysis, a mode of inquiry, or a type of meta-methodological orientation or set of assumptions about how we approach the object of our study. Dialectics is an approach to thinking that attempts to grasp the full context of a philosophy or social problem. Dialectical thinking endeavors to understand the whole through differential vantage points and levels of generality and by a systemic and dynamic extension of analytical units. 

The author emphasizes that dialectical thinking necessitates that we do not engage in context dropping, but instead make every possible effort to see interconnections between seemingly disparate branches of knowledge. Such an approach compels scholars to investigate empirically the potential connections between various spheres in an effort to attain integrated knowledge of the full context. Since people are not omniscient, understanding a complex world thoroughly requires an on-going investigation of its many interrelated facets from shifting vantage points. 

Down to earth dialectics

As a methodological orientation, dialectics has been employed in the analysis of systems of argumentation, philosophy, ethics, linguistics, history, culture, psychology, social theory, political economy, etc. One of Sciabarra's goals is to capture the essence of the many dialectical approaches that have appeared throughout intellectual history. He argues that in its origins dialectics is not an especially Hegelian or Marxian tradition, but rather in its inception it is firmly Aristotelian. 

Sciabarra explains that, although the pre-Socratics and Plato were the earliest practitioners of dialectics, it was Aristotle, the true father (or fountainhead) of dialectical inquiry, who first articulated its theoretical principles and techniques. Plato had connected dialectics to an idealist ontology that entailed the search for comprehensive transcendent truth. Plato's unrealistic epistemological standard was for human beings to somehow attain a synoptic perspective on the whole society. 

Aristotle brought the dialectic down to earth by severing its principles from their Platonic-idealist formulation. The Aristotelian idea of dialectics eliminates cosmology from philosophy and relies on a minimalist metaphysics that states that existence is what it is, that consciousness is our means for understanding it, and that everything that exists is part of one reality. The history of dialectics is filled with battles between the synoptic Platonic idealist conception and the contextual Aristotelian realist understanding. As a dialectical reality, Sciabarra tells us that we should rightfully criticize those who form dialectical abstractions with no regard for their relationship to the facts of reality. 

Sciabarra explains that Aristotle advocates shifting our viewpoints on any object of study in order to illuminate different aspects of it. In this way, Aristotle keeps the Platonic predilection for organic unity, but acknowledges the central importance of context. Aristotle's principles of inquiry call for us to constantly shift our perspective on any object of study. Each point of view provides a different context of meaning. It is by piecing together the various perspectives that a person can gain a comprehensive understanding of the full context of the object. 

Like Aristotle, the Medieval Scholastics applied dialectical principles to the argumentative arts. Sciabarra observes that they brought dialectics to the consideration of Biblical texts and thus began the centuries-long journey toward the secularization of the human mind because they were brave enough to subject the scriptures to analysis, something that was disapproved of for centuries before.  

Sciabarra argues that Hegel's conception of the dialectic harks back to the Ancient Greek ideal of organic unity and to the Platonic penchant for the divine. In turn, Marx anchored dialectics to investigations of the real world. However, Marx's vision presumed god-like planning and control of many nuances, tacit practices, and unintended consequences of social action. He also presumed a total grasp of history and often attempted to study the present as if from an imagined future. When Marxists suggest that history can lead to a victory over human ignorance, they are implying privileged access to total knowledge of future social conditions. This is inherently utopian and undialectical since it is unbounded by the context that exists and is based on a « synoptic delusion, » a belief that one can live in a world in which every action produces consistent and predictable outcomes.

The art of context keeping

 If dialectics is the art of context keeping, then historical materialism proposes a theory of history that places the theoretician outside the context of the human condition. The problem occurs when Marx steps into the future to evaluate the present. He assumes the information needed by future planners will be available despite the fact that these planners will have destroyed the context (i.e., the price system), which permits such information to be generated and socially traded. By holding this incorrect assumption, Marx is placing himself outside the historical process that he analyzes. Sciabarra observes that it is as though Marx is permitting himself privileged access to information about a future that is ontologically and epistemologically impossible. Such a Utopian way of viewing the world is essentially an a-contextual, a-historical search for human ideals with no understanding of the limits or nature of reason. It is as if people can step outside the bounds of culture and society to re-create the world. 

Sciabarra goes on to explore the manifestations of dialectics among those from the liberal tradition including Herbert Spencer, Carl Menger, Mises, Hayek, Rand, and especially Murray Rothbard. The author's goal here is to show how classical liberal and modern libertarian approaches embody conflicting orientations. He also describes how these thinkers have been richer, more complex, and more context-sensitive than their critics have been willing to acknowledge. Total Freedom documents how a contextual-dialectical approach informed many of the classical liberal, and libertarian thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries. 

A large portion of the second half of Sciabarra's work involves a comprehensive case study of the writings of Murray Rothbard, one of the major libertarian thinkers of the 20th century. Sciabarra attempts to identify the dialectical and undialectical aspects of Rothbard's wide-ranging anarcho-capitalist analytical model. Rothbard's work is used to expose and analyze the dialectical strengths and nondialectical weaknesses that are typical in modern libertarian social theory. 

Sciabarra observes that Rothbard, for most of his life, believed that libertarianism did not require a theory of culture. Rothbard appeared to think that his axiom of non-aggression could resolve social and political problems by itself. Like many other libertarians, he simply dropped the larger context which freedom requires in order to flourish and stressed libertarian goals without considering the problem of meeting them. He insisted that libertarianism was a political philosophy that could accommodate any culture. For example, Rothbard believed that men could simply use their reason to develop a permanently fixed Libertarian Law Code in accordance with anarcho-capitalist principles.  

Sciabarra questions the efficacy of such an imposition because it does not take into account the philosophical, cultural, and historical context upon which libertarian principles depend. The acceptance of a Libertarian Law Code in the real world would require a deeper understanding of personal and cultural factors. Rothbard had abstracted a single principle of non-aggression and created a dualistic tension between theory and reality by declaring that state institutions are at odds with human nature. This led Rothbard to universalize the market as a means of destroying the state.  

Sciabarra points out that later Rothbard realized that proponents of a free society needed a fully articulated theory of culture, since some cultures foster, while others threaten, a free society. Rothbard's later greater dialectical sensibility is exhibited in his theory of structural crisis which was simultaneously historical, political, economic, and sociological and in the foundations of his non-Marxist theory of class struggle. 

In need of an effective strategy

Toward the end of his book, Sciabarra briefly surveys the growing dialectical trend among libertarians such as Peter Boettke, Douglas Den Uyl, Don Lavoie, Douglas Rasmussen, Mario Rizzo, and others. Sciabarra is convinced that libertarianism as a social theory is valuable and offers a valid perspective on the nature of the crisis in modern society and that voluntary social relations, with all their preconditions and effects, are morally and consequentially preferable to the status quo and to statism in all its varieties. However, he does not believe that libertarian theorists have presented the best formulations and arguments in the context of social conditions that exist. Freedom cannot be defended successfully when severed from its broader requisite conditions. Libertarians must pay greater attention to the broader context within which their goals and values can be realized.

Sciabarra's message is that libertarians need an effective strategy that recognizes the dynamic interrelationships between the personal, political, historical, psychological, ethical, cultural, economic, etc., if they are to be successful in their quest for a free society. He explains that attempts to define and defend a non-aggression axiom in the absence of a broader philosophical and cultural context are doomed to fail. Libertarians must pay greater attention to the broader context within which their goals and values can be realized. The battle against statism is simultaneously structural (political and economic), cultural (with implications for education, race, sex, language, and art) and personal (with connections to individuals' tacit moral beliefs, and psycho-epistemological processes).

The author wants people to understand both the necessity for objective conceptual foundations for a free society and the need for cultural pre-requisites in the battle for the free society. The fight for freedom is multidimensional and takes place on a variety of levels with each level influencing and having reciprocal effects on the other levels. Dialectics require that people take into account and pay attention to all the levels and structures that a politics of freedom depends upon. Sciabarra contends that it is possible to look at society from different angles and on different levels of analytical generality in order to obtain an enriched portrait of its total form. Change must occur on many different levels and cannot be dictated from the realm of politics – it must filter through all the various levels.

The goals of Total Freedom are to defend the need for a dialectical libertarianism that synthesizes multiple disciplines and to reclaim dialectics as a viable methodology for libertarian social theory. The author accomplishes this in his well-documented, innovative, and academic treatise. He offers libertarianism as a valid and valuable perspective that is preferable to the status quo and to statism in all its varieties. However, Sciabarra stops short of developing his own substantive dialectical libertarian social theory. 

His work is primarily methodological and only articulates the view that a dialectical libertarianism is essential to the future of both dialectics and libertarianism. He has taken the first step by offering a metatheoretical structure for social inquiry, rather than a comprehensive argument for liberty. Sciabarra cautions that much work needs to be done to test the validity of various libertarian theories. I am looking forward to seeing what Sciabarra will offer us next that will contribute toward the development of a comprehensive defense of freedom.

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in an essay that Chris M. Sciabarra recently published to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the first two books in his "Dialectics and Liberty Trilogy": "Marx, Hayek, and Utopia" and "Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical," and the twenty-fifth anniversary of "Total Freedom." This "Trilogy Anniversary" essay can be found on both Notablog and Medium:

https://notablog.net/2025/06/09/a-trilogy-anniversary/

https://medium.com/@cm.../a-trilogy-anniversary-6265b10c1258