This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive
Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important
books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a
Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has
numerous other publications, including an essay reviewing books by David L.
Norton, which was published here in January, a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book
“Total Freedom” published here in July, and an essay entitled, “How can Austrian
Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and
Flourishing?”, published here in October.
I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to publish Ed’s latest
essay at this time. I recently concluded a series of essays on political entrepreneurship by
suggesting:
“If we want institutions that are more supportive of freedom
and flourishing to become entrenched, we will need more supportive citizens
engaged in discursive processes at all levels of society …”.
It is difficult to have useful discourse with people
expressing opposing views if we focus exclusively on categorizing their
positions according to the political groupings or ideological tribes that seem
to provide their talking points. It can be more interesting, and is sometimes
more productive, to seek to understand the motivational systems, parenting
models, and moral foundations underlying the positions they adopt.
Ed Younkins writes:
The intense polarization
characterizing contemporary political discourse has prompted several
influential scholars to explore the deeper psychological and moral foundations
underpinning our ideological divisions. Three particularly significant
contributions to this understanding include Ronnie Janoff-Bulman's The Two Moralities: Conservatives, Liberals,
and the Roots of Our Political Divide, George Lakoff's Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, and Jonathan
Haidt's The Righteous Mind: Why Good
People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Each of these works approaches
the political divide through different disciplinary lenses—social psychology,
cognitive linguistics, and moral psychology respectively—yet arrives at a
similar fundamental conclusion: that political differences reflect much deeper
differences in moral intuitions and conceptual frameworks rather than merely
calculated disagreements about specific policies. Together, these works provide
complementary frameworks for understanding why political arguments often seem
so intractable and why each side frequently views the other as not merely
mistaken but morally deficient. This essay will first provide a short summary
and review of each of these three influential works before exploring how
libertarian thinking, particularly through the lens of neo-Aristotelian
flourishing and the "Individualistic Perfectionism" of Douglas B.
Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, might provide a compelling framework for
appealing to both liberal and conservative moral concerns while protecting the
space necessary for human flourishing.
The Two Moralities by Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
In her 2023 work
The Two Moralities,
social psychologist Ronnie Janoff-Bulman presents a framework for understanding
political differences rooted in the most fundamental motivational distinction
in psychology: approach and avoidance. She argues that these basic motivational
systems give rise to two distinct moralities: a proscriptive morality that
defends against negative outcomes and focuses on what we should not do, and a
prescriptive morality that moves us toward positive outcomes and focuses on
what we should do. The former can be viewed as a morality of justice that
emphasizes rules, impartiality, law, order, universal principles, retributive
justice, and equality of opportunity whereas the latter can be viewed as a
morality of care that is rooted in empathy, connection, compassion,
responsiveness, safety nets, and equality of outcomes.
At the individual and interpersonal
levels, Janoff-Bulman notes that both liberals and conservatives value both
moral dimensions—not harming others (proscriptive) and helping others
(prescriptive). The critical divergence occurs at the collective level, where
these moralities translate into distinct political worldviews. Conservatism is
rooted in a proscriptive "Social Order" morality focused on
protecting against threats—both external and internal—and maintaining societal
stability. Liberalism, conversely, is founded on a prescriptive "Social
Justice" morality focused on providing for the well-being of the nation's
constituents.
The
book also develops a distinction between moral mandates (absolutes rooted in
moral identity) and moral preferences (values open to negotiation). She notes
that moral mandates, typical of proscriptive morality, tend to produce rigid
moral judgments, resistance to compromise, and belief that moral transgressors
deserve blame or punishment. Prescriptive morality, however, tends to moralize
less about violations and more about failures to promote positive ends.
This framework leads to predictable
differences in policy preferences. Liberals, with their Social Justice
morality, focus on the economic domain where resource distribution is managed,
supporting regulation of markets, entitlements, and expenditures for health,
education, and social safety nets. Conservatives, with their Social Order
morality, focus primarily on the social domain (e.g., abortion and same-sex
marriage), where traditional roles and strict norms are regarded as bulwarks
against personal gratification believed to threaten societal stability.
Importantly, each side favors limited government in precisely the domain where
the other favors intervention—liberals support freedom in the social domain
while conservatives support liberty in the economic domain.
Moral Politics
by George Lakoff
First published in 1996, cognitive
linguist George Lakoff's
Moral Politics
introduces perhaps the most famous metaphorical framework for understanding
political differences. Lakoff argues that people's political reasoning is
determined to a large extent by unconscious metaphors, with the central
metaphor being the nation as a family. According to Lakoff, the political views
of Americans on both ends of the political spectrum derive from this
foundational metaphor, but they are informed by two very different conceptual
models of the ideal family.
The conservative worldview centers
on what Lakoff terms the "strict father" model. This model emphasizes
the traditional nuclear family with the father having primary responsibility
for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set and
enforce strict rules for children's behavior. In this worldview,
self-discipline, self-reliance, personal responsibility, hard work, and respect
for legitimate authority are crucial qualities children must learn, typically
through a system of reward and punishment. This model assumes the world is
dangerous and competitive, and that children need strict moral guidance to
develop the discipline necessary to succeed. This worldview supports a strong
military, low taxes, free markets, and strict law-and-order.
The liberal worldview centers on the
"nurturant parent" model, which stresses empathy, nurturance, fair
distribution, and restitution. The primal experience behind this model is one
of being cared for and cared about, with children's obedience coming from love
and respect for their parents rather than fear of punishment. This model views
the world as potentially cooperative and believes children develop best through
explanation and mutual understanding rather than strict punishment. This
worldview stresses empathy, social responsibility, cooperation, equality of
outcome, protection of the vulnerable, safety nets, environmental protection,
government regulation, and progressive taxation.
Lakoff uses these models to explain
why certain political positions cluster together. For instance, he explains how
conservatives can be "pro-life" when it comes to abortion yet support
the death penalty—both positions reflect the strict father emphasis on reward
and punishment for moral behavior. Similarly, he explains why liberals might
support economic regulation but oppose social regulation, as this reflects the
nurturant parent's emphasis on protection and care without authoritarian control.
An important aspect of Lakoff's
analysis is his contention that conservatives have been more effective than
liberals at understanding and leveraging these deep moral metaphors in
political discourse. He notes that while he personally favors the nurturant
parent model, recognizing the metaphorical nature of our political thinking is
crucial for productive political dialogue.
The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt
Jonathan Haidt's 2012 work
The Righteous Mind
represents perhaps the most comprehensive empirical investigation into the
moral foundations of political differences. Haidt's work is structured around
three central principles: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning
second; (2) There's more to morality than harm and fairness; and (3) Morality
binds and blinds.
Haidt's first principle challenges
the traditional view of human beings as rational actors who deliberate
carefully about moral questions. Instead, he proposes the analogy of the rider
(conscious reasoning) and the elephant (intuitive emotions), suggesting that
moral reasoning is largely a post-hoc process used to justify intuitive moral
judgments. This insight explains why simply presenting facts in political
arguments rarely changes minds—the elephant of intuition largely determines
where we end up, with the rider mainly serving as a public relations agent.
Haidt's second principle introduces
his influential Moral Foundations Theory, which initially identified five
(later six) foundational, innate, and psychological moral systems that combine
to form human moral matrices. These foundations are:
- Care/harm: Sensitivity to suffering
and need
- Fairness/cheating: Concerns about
unfair treatment and cheating
- Loyalty/betrayal: Group cohesion and
tribal identity.
- Authority/subversion: Respect for hierarchy and tradition
- Sanctity/degradation: Concepts of
purity and the sacred
- Liberty/oppression: Reactance to domination
and tyranny (added later).
Haidt's research indicates that
political differences reflect different weightings of these moral foundations.
Liberals tend to prioritize care, fairness, and liberty almost exclusively,
while conservatives value all six foundations more evenly. This difference,
Haidt argues, gives conservatives a rhetorical advantage because they can
appeal to a broader range of moral intuitions.
Haidt's third principle—that
"morality binds and blinds"—explains how moral matrices help form
cohesive groups while simultaneously making it difficult to understand those
outside our moral communities. This insight helps explain the intense
polarization in contemporary politics—as moral groups form, they naturally
create boundaries that heighten distinction from others.
A Libertarian Synthesis:
Neo-Aristotelian Flourishing
Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen
The philosophical framework
developed by Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen —termed Individualistic
Perfectionism —provides a promising foundation for bridging the moral divide
between liberal and conservative worldviews. This approach integrates
Aristotelian ethical foundations with a political commitment to individual
liberty, arguing that a society that protects individual rights through what
they call "metanormative principles" creates the essential conditions
for diverse forms of human flourishing to be pursued without social conflict.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl's central
insight recognizes that human flourishing is individually realized yet socially
contextual—that while we achieve our good through our own actions and choices,
we do so within communities and relationships that provide the necessary
context for that flourishing. This nuanced understanding respects the
conservative emphasis on tradition, community, and moral order while
simultaneously upholding the liberal commitment to personal autonomy, social
progress, and individual rights.
A libertarian framework grounded in
neo-Aristotelian flourishing possesses unique potential to resonate with
foundational moral concerns across the political spectrum. By examining this
potential through the moral frameworks identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and
Haidt, we can see how such an approach might bridge seemingly irreconcilable
moral divides:
Addressing Both Approach and
Avoidance Moralities: Janoff-Bulman's distinction between prescriptive and
proscriptive moralities finds synthesis in the concept of individual
flourishing. The protection of negative rights (the right not to be aggressed
against) addresses the conservative proscriptive concern with protection from
harm, while the positive pursuit of excellence through self-direction addresses
the liberal prescriptive concern with providing for human well-being. A society
that protects liberty creates the conditions for both freedom from interference
and freedom to pursue excellence.
Transcending the Family Metaphor:
Lakoff's strict father and nurturant parent models both find accommodation
within a framework that allows different conceptions of the good to coexist.
Rather than imposing a single vision of the good life (whether strict or
nurturant), the libertarian framework provides the metanormative space for both
approaches—and countless others—to be pursued without social conflict. This
respects the conservative emphasis on parental authority in raising children
according to their values while upholding the liberal commitment to diverse
lifestyles and family structures.
Engaging Multiple Moral Foundations:
Haidt's moral foundations theory reveals why libertarianism has struggled
politically—by focusing predominantly on the liberty/oppression foundation—but
also suggests its potential for broader appeal. A neo-Aristotelian
libertarianism naturally engages:
(1) the care/harm foundation by
minimizing state violence and allowing voluntary compassion flourish;
(2) the fairness/cheating foundation
through consistent application of rules and opposition to cronyism;
(3) the loyalty/betrayal foundation
by allowing authentic communities to form voluntarily;
(4) the authority/subversion
foundation through respect for legitimate authority in appropriate spheres;
(5 the sanctity/degradation
foundation by protecting the inviolability of the person; and
(6) the liberty/oppression
foundation as its central political commitment.
A neo-Aristotelian libertarian
framework provides a compelling account of moral development that incorporates
insights from both traditional conservatism and progressivism. The concept of
self-directedness—central to Rasmussen and Den Uyl's conception of
flourishing—acknowledges the conservative insight that discipline and character
are essential for human excellence while simultaneously affirming the liberal
commitment to personal autonomy and self-determination.
This approach recognizes that virtue
cannot be coerced but must be chosen—that moral responsibility emerges from the
opportunity to make genuine choices and experience their consequences. The
conservative emphasis on moral order is respected not through state enforcement
but through the recognition that certain virtues (honesty, integrity, courage,
temperance) are naturally conducive to flourishing across most conceptions of
the good life. Meanwhile, the liberal emphasis on social progress is honored through
the understanding that different individuals and communities may discover
different aspects of human excellence through experimentation and learning.
Contrary to the caricature of
libertarianism as atomistic individualism, a neo-Aristotelian framework
recognizes that human flourishing is inherently relational. Rasmussen and Den
Uyl's work emphasizes that self-direction—the capacity to shape one's life
according to one's values—necessarily occurs within social contexts and depends
on relationships with others for its full actualization.
This understanding allows a
libertarian framework to honor the conservative emphasis on family, community,
and tradition as essential contexts for moral development while simultaneously
protecting the liberal commitment to diverse forms of relationship and
association. By creating a framework of rights that allows multiple forms of
community to flourish, this approach enables what Rasmussen and Den Uyl term
"the possibility of diversity in human flourishing"—recognizing that
different individuals may require different social contexts and relationships
to achieve their particular forms of excellence.
A crucial psychological insight
connecting moral foundations to political structures involves the relationship
between threat sensitivity and political preferences. Research noted by
Janoff-Bulman indicates that conservatives generally demonstrate higher
sensitivity to threats—a finding consistent with their emphasis on social order
and protection. A libertarian approach addresses this concern not through state
control but through the protective functions of just institutions—what
classical liberals called "the constitution of liberty."
Similarly, the liberal emphasis on
openness to experience and social progress finds expression in the innovative
potential of free societies. A framework that protects individual liberty
creates space for both the cautious and the bold, the traditional and the
innovative, to coexist and learn from one another through voluntary exchange
and cooperation rather than political imposition.
The
bipolar frameworks explored by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt show why
liberals and conservatives misunderstand each other. Yet Rasmussen and Den
Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism offers a framework that resonates with both
moral cultures. Their neo-Aristotelian ethics argues that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is the proper moral
standard: an objective but individualized ideal grounded in rational
self-direction, virtue, and meaningful activity.
Their
key innovation is distinguishing personal moral norms (virtues) from political
norms (rights). Rights are metanormative principles that secure the social
space for individuals to pursue flourishing without coercion. Government’s
purpose is not to impose virtue but to protect the conditions under which
virtue can be chosen.
This
appeals to liberals by protecting autonomy, diversity, and opportunities for
self-development. It appeals to conservatives by emphasizing responsibility,
character, and self-reliance. Both gain a coherent justification for a free
society grounded in human nature and moral psychology.
A
free (libertarian) society that protects rights is therefore the best context
for human flourishing. It avoids paternalism, respects individuality, and
encourages voluntary cooperation. It offers a unified moral language that
transcends ideological tribes and affirms the dignity of rational,
self-directing persons.
Neo-Aristotelian flourishing is
social at its core: friendship, love, family, and associational ties are
essential for living well, but these cannot be legislated from above.
Voluntariness and consent ensure relationships are authentic, nurturing the
liberal desire for care and the conservative requirement for loyalty and order.
Moreover, the psychological
diversity identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt becomes an asset, not
a threat, in a libertarian context—each person is free to pursue the forms of
life and virtue most suited to their traits, goals, and allegiances.
Conclusion: Toward a Moral Politics
of Liberty
The works of Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff,
and Haidt collectively demonstrate that our political differences run deep—to
the very foundations of how we conceptualize morality, family, and society. Yet
within their frameworks we can also discern the possibility of a politics that
honors the legitimate moral concerns of both left and right while transcending
the limitations of each.
A libertarian approach grounded in
neo-Aristotelian flourishing and informed by the Individualistic Perfectionism
of Rasmussen and Den Uyl offers the promise of such a politics. By creating the
metanormative conditions for diverse forms of human excellence to be pursued
without social conflict, such a framework respects the conservative emphasis on
moral order while upholding the liberal commitment to social progress. It
acknowledges the importance of both reason and emotion in moral motivation,
recognizes the social nature of human flourishing, and provides the
institutional framework for both stability and innovation to coexist. Such an
approach provides a common vocabulary for both sides to agree that a free
society that protects the necessary moral space for self-directedness and self-determination
is the best system for individuals to potentially fulfill their highest human
potential.
Such an approach will not satisfy
those who seek political victory for their particular moral vision. However, for
those who seek a society in which different moral visions can coexist
peacefully—where both the strict father and nurturant parent, both the social
order and social justice advocate, can live according to their values without
imposing them on others—it offers the most promising path forward. In
recognizing that human flourishing is inherently pluralistic—that there are
many forms of excellence and no single template for the good life—we can begin
to build a politics that protects the space for that diversity rather than
attempting to eliminate it through political power.
The promise of a free society is not
that it will produce uniform agreement on moral questions, but that it will
allow people with different moral intuitions to live together in peace,
learning from one another through voluntary interaction rather than coercive
imposition. In this respect, a thoughtfully articulated libertarianism may
represent not just another political position, but the necessary framework for
moving beyond our current political impasse toward a more inclusive and morally
sophisticated politics.
Ultimately, society best enables
flourishing not by dictating the good life but by protecting the conditions
that make countless good lives possible. This vision honors the depth, dignity,
and complexity of persons, uniting liberals’ and conservatives’ highest
aspirations under the banner of freedom and flourishing.
Recommended Reading
Den
Uyl, Douglas J. and Rasmussen, Douglas B. (2016). The Perfectionist
Turn: From Metanorms
to Metaethics. Edinburgh University Press.
Haidt, Jonathan. (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are
Divided by politics and Religion. Vintage.
Janoff-Bulman, Ronnie. (2023). The Two Moralities: Conservatives, Liberals,
and the roots of the Political Divide.
Lakoff, George (1996 and 2002). Moral
Politics: How liberals and Conservatives Think. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2005). Norms of Liberty: A
Perfectionist Basis for
Non-Perfectionist Politics. Penn State University
Press.
Rasmussen, Douglas
B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2020). The
Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan.
