Behavioral Economics and Human Flourishing: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

 

Behavioral Economics has emerged over the past seven decades as a significant development in economic thought challenging the idealized assumptions of perfect rationality that have long dominated neoclassical economics. Yet, for all its insights into human cognition and decision-making, the field has generated controversy regarding its normative implications. Should behavioral economists address their findings to public policy makers who could nudge citizens toward supposedly better choices? Or should they address their recommendations to individuals, empowering them to make better decisions for themselves?

The concepts of nudging and choice architecture initially played a role in gaining the attention of public policy makers to interventions informed by the behavioral sciences. The more recent approach holds that individuals require the knowledge that traditionally has been in the domain of researchers and government officials.

This essay argues for the latter approach. Drawing on the neo-Aristotelian tradition of human flourishing as an essentially self-directed activity, and on the work of Robert Sugden, Winton Bates, Douglas J. Den Uyl, and Douglas B. Rasmussen. Behavioral Economics can make a valuable contribution to human flourishing, but only when its insights are placed in the hands of individuals rather than autocrats. The most useful ideas from Behavioral Economics are those that help self-directed human beings understand their own cognitive tendencies and design choice architectures that serve their own conception of the good life. People need to be empowered to contribute toward designing their own decision environments and therefore choose if and how they want to nudge themselves.

The Development of Behavioral Economics

The intellectual roots of Behavioral Economics run deep. Adam Smith, often celebrated as the father of economics for his Wealth of Nations, also wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which explored the psychological and moral dimensions of human action. Smith understood that human beings are not mere calculating machines but creatures of sentiment, sympathy, and social connection.

The modern Behavioral Economics movement, however, is typically traced to the 1950s and the work of Herbert Simon. Simon introduced the concept of bounded rationality, arguing that human beings, in all but the simplest decision contexts, are simply unable to make fully optimal decisions. Rather than maximizing, Simon suggested that people satisfice. They seek outcomes that are good enough given their cognitive limitations and the information available to them.

The field gained substantial momentum in the 1970s with the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Their prospect theory offered a descriptive model of decision-making under risk that departed radically from expected utility theory. Prospect theory demonstrated that people are loss-averse (they feel losses more acutely than equivalent gains) and that they weigh probabilities non-linearly, overweighing small probabilities and underweighing large ones. Kahneman later popularized the distinction between System 1 (fast, automatic, intuitive) and System 2 (slow, deliberative, analytical) thinking, a framework that has become central to understanding how cognitive biases and heuristics (mental shortcuts) operate.

Richard Thaler, building on these foundations, developed nudge theory in collaboration with Cass Sunstein. Their 2008 book, Nudge, argued that choice architecture (the way options are presented) can be designed to steer people toward better decisions without eliminating any options or significantly changing economic incentives. Thaler and Sunstein termed this approach libertarian paternalism suggesting that nudges preserve freedom of choice while gently guiding people toward choices that improve their welfare.

Other significant contributions include the  endowment effect (the finding that people value what they already possess more highly than identical items they do not own), regret aversion theory (the tendency to avoid decisions that might later be regretted), mental accounting (people divide financial resources into psychologically meaningful distinct categories rather than treating all resources as fungible), framing (the way alternatives are presented can influence decisions) anchoring and adjustment  (a person tends to start with an initial reference point and adjust away from that anchor), and halo theory (the tendency for one positive characteristic to influence judgments about other characteristics).

 Libertarian Paternalism and the Threat to Autonomy

The normative turn in Behavioral Economics—exemplified by Thaler and Sunstein's libertarian paternalism—has drawn criticism. The core problem is epistemological: how can policy makers know what truly serves individuals' welfare? As critics have noted, behavioral economists often treat perfect rationality as an ideal against which real decisions are judged, and any deviation from this ideal is taken as grounds for intervention.

 Mark D. White has made an argument that the findings from behavioral economists are partial, the policies prescribed by libertarian paternalists are misconceived, and that both strengthen cognitive biases and inspire nudges. White argues against the use of paternalistic nudges by government and makes a positive case for individual choice and autonomy.

 The fundamental objection is that proponents of libertarian paternalism nudges fail to take seriously their targets' true preferences. Without a defensible notion of true preferences, the justification for nudging people toward choices they would not have made of their own accord is lacking. 

Robert Sugden and the Community of Advantage

 Robert Sugden offers a compelling alternative vision for how Behavioral Economics should engage with normative questions. In The Community of Advantage, Sugden reconstructs and defends the liberal tradition in normative economics in light of the findings of Behavioral Economics. He argues that behavioral economists should address their recommendations and findings to individuals showing them how they can coordinate their behavior to attain mutual benefit.

 Sugden's key insight is that the market is a community of advantage—a network of mutually beneficial transactions in which participants come to see one another as cooperative partners rather than rivals. When people participate in market exchanges, they can act with the intention of achieving mutual benefit, rather than merely pursuing personal benefits. Joint action in voluntary transactions permits mutually beneficial cooperative schemes.

 Sugden rejects libertarian paternalism on several grounds. First, he argues that the concept of latent preferences—the idea that individuals have underlying preferences that can be revealed through proper choice architecture—is psychologically ungrounded. People do not have consistent, context-independent underlying preferences. Second, Sugden contends that behavioral economists should not make recommendations about public policy. Rather, recommendations should be addressed to individuals as the directors of their own lives, advising them how to pursue their own interests.

 Sugden abandons core elements of traditional normative economics—notably “the view from nowhere” associated with the idea that an economist or policy maker can objectively determine what would make people better off and advances a contractarian alternative. He advocates addressing individuals as agents responsible for their own decisions.  His approach successfully reconciles the liberal tradition with the findings of Behavioral Economics.

Neo-Aristotelian Flourishing and Self-Direction 

The neo-Aristotelian tradition offers a philosophical framework that complements Sugden's liberal approach to Behavioral Economics. For Aristotle, eudaimonia (human flourishing) is the ultimate end of human action. Flourishing is not merely a subjective feeling of well-being but an objective state of living well and doing well, achieved through the exercise of virtue over a complete life.

Contemporary neo-Aristotelians such as Den Uyl, Rasmussen, and Bates emphasize that human flourishing is essentially a self-directed activity. The agent chooses autonomously to the extent that he selects his actions from a set of alternatives that has not been decreased by the coercive actions of others. As Bates has observed, it is good to be aware of how you are being nudged so that you can make a conscious choice to accept or reject the suggestion involved.

 Rasmussen and Den Uyl characterize human flourishing in terms of objective human goods while emphasizing agent-relativity, individuality, self-directedness, sociality, and practical wisdom. Flourishing is not a passive condition that someone else can simply deliver to an individual. It is an activity involving the exercise of one’s practical wisdom. 

 If flourishing is essentially self-directed, then the discovery that individuals sometimes make predictable errors does not automatically establish a warrant for external direction. Instead, it creates a reason for improving people’s capacity for self-direction.

 

Behavioral Economics can function much like a mirror. It can show individuals things about themselves that they might otherwise fail to notice. The appropriate question becomes not: “How can behavioral experts make people choose better? but “How can knowledge of human behavioral tendencies help people become better directors of their own lives?”

 

Bates argues that human flourishing is ultimately self-directed and involves the exercise of practical wisdom and responsibility. Bates observes that people should be aware of how they are being nudged because awareness provides an opportunity consciously to accept or reject the suggestion. He therefore sees Behavioral Economics as potentially useful for human flourishing when its insights are directed toward individuals rather than primarily toward paternalistic policy makers. 

 

Den Uyl and Rasmussen's template of responsibility, developed in The Perfectionist Turn, provides a framework for understanding how individuals can take responsibility for their own flourishing. The template emphasizes that individuals are the best judges of their own interests and that external interventions—however well-intentioned—cannot substitute for self-direction.

From this perspective, the proper role of Behavioral Economics is not to provide policy makers with tools for manipulating choice but to provide individuals with information they can use to make better decisions for themselves. As Bates has argued, Behavioral Economics can make a useful contribution in helping to make us aware of how nudges may affect the choices we make. If one wants to help individuals to make better decisions, it is better to address the information to individuals responsible rather than to autocrats.

 Situations Where Behavioral Economics Serves Self-Directed Flourishing

1. Retirement Saving: Overcoming Present Bias Through Self-Nudging

 One of the most well-documented findings in Behavioral Economics is present bias—the tendency to prioritize immediate gratification over future well-being. This leads many people to undersave for retirement. Rather than waiting for governments to mandate automatic enrollment in retirement plans, self-directed individuals can design their own choice architectures. They can arrange for automatic transfers from their checking accounts to retirement accounts, set up calendar reminders to review their savings progress, or commit to increasing their contribution rate each year. The key is that the individual, not the policy maker, chooses the nudge and the goal.

 2. Health, Exercise, and Nutrition: Designing Personal Choice Architectures

 People frequently intend to exercise, eat well, sleep adequately, or maintain other healthy practices but find their immediate preferences competing with long-term goals. Behavioral Economics can identify mechanisms such as present bias, default effects, commitment problems, and environmental cues. A self-directed individual can deliberately rearrange his or her environment: placing exercise equipment where it is visible, scheduling workouts, preparing healthy food in advance, using reminders, or making unwanted behaviors less convenient.

 The modern food environment is saturated with cues that trigger System 1 responses—impulse purchases of unhealthy snacks, oversized portions, and marketing that exploits our cognitive biases. Self-directed individuals can design personal choice architectures that serve their health goals. They might rearrange their kitchen so that healthy foods are more visible and accessible, use smaller plates to manage portion sizes, or implement a rule that they will only eat what they have prepared themselves. These are nudges, but they are self-imposed nudges, chosen by the individual in service of their own conception of flourishing.

 3. Investment Decisions: Managing Loss Aversion and the Endowment Effect

 Behavioral Economics has enormous practical value in personal finance. People commonly exhibit present bias, loss aversion, overconfidence, status-quo bias, mental accounting, and difficulties with self-control. Awareness of these tendencies can help an individual to construct voluntary mechanisms that support personally selected financial goals.

 Investors are prone to loss aversion, holding onto losing investments too long in the hope of recovering losses, and the endowment effect, overvaluing assets they already own. Self-directed investors can use behavioral insights to improve their decision-making. They might set pre-established rules for selling investments (e.g., sell if an asset declines by 20 percent), or regularly review their portfolio with a focus on opportunity costs rather than sunk costs. Awareness of these biases is the first step toward overcoming them.

 4. Career and Life Planning: Countering Status Quo Bias

 Status quo bias—the tendency to stick with current arrangements even when change would be beneficial—can prevent people from making important life transitions. Self-directed individuals can use behavioral insights to overcome this inertia. They might set a specific date for reviewing career options, seek out information about alternatives systematically, or imagine that a decision has turned out badly and work backward to identify what could have gone wrong. These techniques engage System 2 thinking and help counteract the automatic preference for the familiar.

 The sunk cost fallacy may cause someone to continue pursuing an unsuitable career simply because substantial time has already been invested. The endowment effect can cause an individual to overvalue a current position. Status quo bias can make change seem costlier than it actually is. The halo effect can cause someone to overvalue an institution because of its reputation.

 5. Consumption and Spending: Overcoming Framing Effects

 Consumers encounter choice architectures constantly. Retailers, websites, advertisers, subscription services, and salespeople routinely frame choices, establish defaults, use scarcity messages, exploit social proof, and influence attention.

 How options are framed dramatically affects choices. A product described as "90% fat-free" is more appealing than one described as "10% fat," even though they are identical. Self-directed consumers can protect themselves from framing effects by developing habits of deliberate evaluation. They might translate percentage discounts into actual dollar amounts, compare products on objective attributes rather than marketing claims, or implement a "cooling-off" period for major purchases. By understanding how framing works, individuals can make choices that reflect their genuine preferences rather than the influence of presentation.

 Behavioral knowledge therefore strengthens consumer autonomy. Rather than requiring government to protect people from every persuasive influence, education can help individuals become more capable evaluators of their own choices.

 6. Social and Cooperative Ventures: Mutual Benefit Through Voluntary Coordination

 Sugden's insight that market participants can act with the intention of achieving mutual benefit has practical implications. Self-directed individuals can use behavioral insights to design cooperative arrangements that serve shared goals. For example, a group of neighbors might agree to a system of reminders for recycling, or a team at work might implement a "no-meeting Wednesday" to protect focused work time. These are nudges, but they are chosen jointly and voluntarily, reflecting the participants' own values and goals. They represent the kind of community of advantage that Sugden describes—voluntary cooperation that benefits all participants.

Conclusion: Behavioral Economics for Human Flourishing

 Behavioral Economics has given us powerful tools for understanding human decision-making. Its insights into bounded rationality, cognitive biases, and the influence of choice architecture are valuable contributions to our self-knowledge. But these insights can be used in different ways.

 The libertarian paternalist approach—exemplified by Thaler and Sunstein—treats cognitive biases as problems to be solved by wise policy makers who nudge citizens toward better choices. This approach is problematic. It assumes that policy makers can know what is truly good for individuals, it fails to take seriously the plurality and subjectivity of people's values, and it risks undermining autonomy and self-direction.

 The alternative approach, advanced by Sugden, Bates, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen, treats behavioral insights as resources for self-directed individuals. On this view, Behavioral Economics should inform ordinary people about the evidence and let them decide for themselves. The goal is not to replace individual judgment with expert judgment but to equip individuals with better tools for making their own decisions.

Designing and empirically testing self-nudges should be on behavioral economists’ research agendas. Self-nudging respects individual autonomy and helps to alleviate concerns about paternalism and manipulation. People can learn to use nudges to regulate their own behavior.

This approach aligns with the neo-Aristotelian tradition, which understands human flourishing as essentially a self-directed activity. Flourishing is not something that can be imposed from outside; it must be chosen and pursued by each individual. The role of Behavioral Economics, then, is not to provide a substitute for individual judgment but to enhance it—to help individuals understand their own cognitive tendencies, recognize when they are being influenced, and design choice architectures that serve their own conception of the good life. 

The six situations discussed above illustrate how this might work in practice. In each case, the individual, not the policy maker, is the agent of change. The individual chooses the goal, selects the nudge, and takes responsibility for the outcome. This is Behavioral Economics in service of autonomy, freedom, and human flourishing.

Perhaps the deepest application is metacognition—thinking about one’s own thinking. Behavioral Economics gives individuals a vocabulary for examining their own judgments. A person can recognize confirmation bias, anchoring, loss aversion, present bias, overconfidence, framing effects, availability effects, status-quo bias, and other tendencies. The goal should not be to eliminate bias completely. That would be unrealistic. Rather, individuals can learn to recognize when particular biases may be influencing an important decision.

As Sugden reminds us, the market is a community of advantage—a network of voluntary exchanges in which participants can pursue mutual benefit. The same spirit should guide the application of Behavioral Economics. Let us share our insights with one another, learn from the evidence, and design our own choice architectures. Let us be the directors of our own lives, using the tools that Behavioral Economics provides to pursue our own flourishing, in our own way, on our own terms. 

Recommended Reading

Bates, Winton. 2016. “Is Economics Becoming a Branch of Psychology?” Freedom and Flourishing. May 22.

Bates, Winton. 2020. “How is Behavioral Economics Related to Human Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. May 19.

Bates, Winton. 2021. Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing. Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books.

Den Uyl, Douglas J and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn; From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Hertwig, Ralph and Reijulas,Samuli . 2020. “Creating Citizen Choice Architects” Behavioral Scientist (Sept.28).

Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. 

Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. Penn State University Press.

Simon, Herbert A. 1957. Models of Man: Social and Rational. New York: Wiley. 

Simon, Herbert A. 1982. Models of Bounded Rationality: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization." MIT Press.

Smith, Adam. 1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Various editions.

Sugden, Robert A.  2018. The Community of Advantage; A Behavioral Economist’s Defense of the Market. Oxford University Press.

Thaler, Richard H. and Sunstein, Cass R. 2008. Nudge Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Yale University Press. 

Thaler, Richard H. 2015. Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics. New York: W.W. Norton.

White, Mark D. 2013. The Manipulation of Choice: Ethics and Libertarian Paternalism. Palgrave Macmillan.

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

----------------------------“How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

---------------------------“How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 2, 2025.

----------------------------- “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

----------------------------- “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

----------------------------- “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

 ----------------------------- “Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. March 19, 2026.

----------------------------- “Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. June 4, 2026. 

----------------------------- “The Architecture of Freedom: Randy Barnett’s Natural Law Case for a Free Society” Freedom and Flourishing. June 26, 2026.

----------------------------- “Robust Political Economy and Neo-Aristotelianism: Complementary Visions of Freedom and Flourishing” Freedom and Flourishing. July 10, 2026.

------------------------------ “Is Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Consistent with Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 26, 2026.

-------------------------------"Henry B. Veatch’s Neo-Aristotelian Defense of Reality, Reason, and Rights” Freedom and Flourishing. August 30, 2026.

What kind of Politics is Consistent with Consent of the Governed?

 

I have been thinking about the kind of politics that is consistent with consent of the governed since reading Max Borders’ book Underthrow: How Jefferson’s Dangerous Idea Will Spark a New Revolution. The book was published in 2023, but I have only recently read it.

The second chapter of the book is entitled “Politics is the Pathology” but Borders' target is contemporary politics. He argues that contemporary politics “brings out the worst in all of us”. He then goes on to argue for social action – a different kind of political activity - which will promote consent of the governed.

A question which the book raises for me is whether underthrow initiatives can be successful in bringing about substantial movement toward consent of the governed without some support from within contemporary political systems.

What does consent mean?

Consent of the governed figures prominently in Borders’ book. He quotes from the United States Declaration of Independence, which asserts that governments “derive their just powers from consent of the governed” and that when government becomes destructive of individual rights, which include “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness”, “it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government”.

I understand that the American revolutionaries saw election of representatives as the primary vehicle for consent. That view of consent appears to have much in common with the concept of ‘government legitimacy’ as described by modern political scientists who focus on procedural rules such as the existence of free and fair elections. It also appears to have a lot in common with the concept of ‘tacit consent’ as described by John Locke:

John Locke wrote:  

“The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. And to this I say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government” (Two Treatises of Government, ed. Thomas Hollis, London: A. Millar et al., 1764, Second Treatise, Chapter VIII para 119).

However, Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration, held that no generation has a right to bind following generations. On that basis, he argued that every constitution and law naturally expires at the end of 19 years. He added: “If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of right.”

Would endorsement of a constitution by a majority of voters every 19 years constitute consent of the governed? It might come closer to that ideal than any constitution for any country on earth at present, but a substantial minority of citizens could still claim that they have not given consent to some, or all, of the constitutional provisions agreed to by the majority.

Borders argues that consent of the governed means “a real, contractual civil association that a sovereign person selects in a governance market”. I will outline his ideal model of consent after considering the case he makes that we should be concerned about consent.

What is so important about consent?

Borders makes a powerful moral point by asking questions:

• “if you could choose nonviolent means of achieving social goals such as poverty relief, wouldn’t you?”
• “if it is possible to help the poor (and for the poor to help each other) without resorting to violence, isn’t this something we ought to do?”

He also suggests that it is immoral to impose monolithic systems upon people who prefer to live in a different political, cultural, or economic niche.

The implication is that if any of the current activities of government can be undertaken without resort to the coercive powers of the state (violence) then it is immoral for those activities to performed in a manner that requires citizens to submit to those coercive powers.

Throughout the book, Borders links lack of consent of the governed to a set of interconnected problems in liberal democracies.  These include expansion of authoritarian control; partisan tribalism and civil conflict; an unhealthy focus on national sensationalism; and weakening of community and civil society.

Borders advocates that monolithic systems should be peacefully underthrown rather than violently overthrown.

So, what does underthrow entail?

 Borders has borrowed the concept of “underthrow” from Michael P Gibson, who suggests: “We can underthrow the state one contract at a time.”

The approach to underthrow that Borders develops in this book is based on the framework for utopia that Robert Nozick developed in Part II of Anarchy, State and Utopia. Borders suggests that Nozick’s framework – a scaffolding hospitable to pluralism – can serve as a strategic construct for subversive innovation:

“In reordering Nozick’s premises into a strategic framework of niche creation I call subversive innovation, I look around at the authoritarian powers in our midst. Then, I seek out weak joints or legal gray areas to exploit, in which one might apply a liberatory strategy or recruit new constituencies through entrepreneurial means. Carving niches means experimenting with new governance systems, however modest, hoping that these systems prevail in competition. Such is the delicate dance of dissidence.”

Subversive innovations that Borders mentions in this book include Uber, Airbnb and Bitcoin. The discussion of subversive innovation overlaps considerably with that in The Social Singularity (which I discussed here) and The Decentralist (discussed here). In Underthrow , however, the author also discusses Balaji Srinivasan’s proposals for start-up societies and proposes a program to create a “network state”.

Borders ends this book by urging people to join him in creating a society that will work toward establishing consent of the governed. He views the Freemasons as providing a model for the values-based association of like-minded people that he has proposed.

The political context

I wish Max Borders every success in his ongoing Underthrow activities. I admire his enthusiasm as a political entrepreneur who is seeking “to help people of conscience become a countervailing force”.

Before going further, I should clarify why I have referred to Max as a political entrepreneur. The main reason is that I propose to refer below to a series of essays about political entrepreneurship that I wrote last year. However, I think the description is apt because Max’s innovative endeavours encompass aspects of both economic and political entrepreneurship.

In the epigraph to my essays on political entrepreneurship, I quoted Don Lavoie’s understanding of the links between economic entrepreneurship and culture:

“Entrepreneurship necessarily takes place within culture, it is utterly shaped by culture, and it fundamentally consists in interpreting and influencing culture.”

From Lavoie’s perspective, “entrepreneurial acts are the readings of, and contributions to, different conversations”. In the third essay, I suggested that political entrepreneurs respond to public discourse, using it as a basis for policy innovation.

While developing the line of reasoning leading to his proposals for establishing a society of like-minded individuals Borders is highly critical of the contemporary politics in liberal democracies. I share his concerns about interest group politics (see this essay about the incentives that political entrepreneurs are faced with, this essay about the information constraints facing political entrepreneurs, and this essay about the erosion of norms of political behaviour).

However, as noted at the outset, I find it difficult to see how it will be possible to bring about substantial movement toward consent of the governed without some support from within contemporary political systems. As Borders recognises, subversive innovators face huge difficulties in competing with social insurance programs that are funded by compulsory tax payments.

Perhaps substantial public support for economic freedom (policies that are more consistent with consent of the governed) will return if the current trajectory of many liberal democracies lead to deepening economic crises. Deepening economic crises do seem likely but policy change leading to greater economic freedom will depend on election to government of political entrepreneurs who support greater economic freedom. In the absence of enlightened political leadership, economic crises may well result in deepening authoritarianism.

I concluded my consideration of what kind of political entrepreneurship is required to promote greater liberty by noting that, unfortunately, important reforms in the rules of the game made in some countries during the 1980s and 90s did not become deeply entrenched. Political leaders obtained sufficient electoral support to implement market-friendly policies, but there does not seem to be much evidence that members of the public improved their understanding of the benefits of free markets in any of the countries in which reforms were undertaken.

That led me to consider how the anti-market bias of public opinion could be reduced and to note the historical role of political entrepreneurship in social movements in promoting liberty. I ended by endorsing the view of Ed Younkins that it is through the “numerous interactions with individuals” during their everyday lives that advocates of liberty can “transmit the freedom philosophy to the general public”.

Max Borders’ political entrepreneurship seems to me to be a positive step toward establishing a broadly-based social movement that will enable substantial steps to be taken toward making consent of the governed a reality. Hopefully, one day that movement will become sufficiently influential to enlist the support of political entrepreneurs within government that will be necessary to enable citizens to opt out of coercive collectivism.

Conclusion

Max Borders makes a compelling moral case that we should prefer peaceful, voluntary paths to social goals over means that require citizens to submit to the coercive powers of the state, and underthrow offers a model for how such paths might be built one contract, one niche, at a time. But the question I raised at the outset remains: can underthrow deliver substantial movement toward consent of the governed without support from within contemporary political systems?

The experience of market-friendly reforms in the 1980s and 90s suggests that action within contemporary political systems can be helpful. The reforms occurred because political entrepreneurs won sufficient electoral support to legislate change, but those changes did not become deeply entrenched, in part because the public's underlying understanding of why free markets serve human flourishing was never substantially improved. Subversive innovation of the kind Borders proposes may be one of the more promising ways of closing that gap: niches that actually work can teach by demonstration in a way that political argument alone cannot.

Rather than viewing underthrow and electoral political entrepreneurship as rival strategies, I see them as potentially complementary: subversive innovation can demonstrate what consent-based alternatives look like in practice, while political entrepreneurs working within existing systems can widen the legal and political space in which those alternatives are permitted to grow.

Henry B. Veatch’s Neo-Aristotelian Defense of Reality, Reason, and Rights

 

This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

In an age of philosophical fragmentation, the voice of Henry B. Veatch stands as an indispensable corrective. Recognized as one of the leading neo-Aristotelian thinkers of the twentieth century, Veatch devoted his long and distinguished career to defending a vision of philosophy rooted in realism, teleology, and the conviction that ethics and politics must be grounded in the nature of things. His many articles and books represent a sustained and powerful argument against the dominant trends of modern and postmodern thought.

Veatch revised and reinterpreted Aristotle’s ethical framework at a time when utilitarianism, subjectivism, skepticism, existentialism, emotivism, and positivism dominated philosophical discourse. During that period, contemporary ethics had fragmented into relativism, nihilism, and reductionist theories that failed to account for the richness of moral experience. 

He disagreed with prevailing trends in modern philosophy such as the anti-foundationalism of postmodern thought, the persistence of Kantian and neo-Kantian ethical theory, nominalism, and the dominance of linguistic analysis. Veatch argues that contemporary moral philosophy often attempts to evade individual responsibility, either by reducing morality to subjective preferences or by attaching morality to social institutions via collectivist ethical theories.

This essay will explore Veatch's contributions to metaphysics, his account of human nature and teleology, his conception of practical wisdom (phronesis), his critique of Kantianism and postmodernism, and his defense of natural law and human rights. It will then examine his influence on contemporary philosophers Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, comparing and contrasting their views with Veatch's own.

Metaphysics and the Defense of Realism

At the heart of Veatch's philosophical project lies a commitment to metaphysical realism. This commitment is nowhere more evident than in Intentional Logic (1952), where Veatch argues that "logic necessarily presupposes a metaphysics". He insists that logic cannot be understood as a mere formal calculus or as a set of rules for manipulating symbols. Rather, logic must be grounded in the nature of things themselves—in the way the world actually is.

Veatch's realism is thoroughly Aristotelian. He maintains that the world consists of substances with natures or essences, and that our concepts and judgments are true insofar as they correspond to these real structures. The cognitive relation between knower and known is, in his view, a relation of identity—not in the sense that the knower becomes the object known, but in the sense that the mind grasps the essence of the thing. Predication, similarly, involves the relation of identity between the abstracted essence and the individuals that instantiate it.

This metaphysical realism has profound implications for every other area of philosophy. If there are real natures and essences, then there are real facts about what things are and what they are for. And if there are real facts about what things are for, then there are real standards of goodness and badness, right and wrong. Veatch's metaphysics thus provides the foundation for his entire ethical and political philosophy.

Veatch's realism also leads him to reject the nominalism that pervades much modern philosophy. He argues that the denial of universals and essences leads inevitably to skepticism and relativism. If there are no real natures, then there is no basis for making objective claims about what anything is or ought to be. The only alternative, he insists, is to recover the Aristotelian understanding of the world as a realm of intelligible structures that we can come to know through reason.

Human Nature and Teleology 

Veatch's account of human nature is inseparable from his teleological view of the world. For Aristotle, as for Veatch, every natural thing has a telos. Human beings are no exception. We are rational animals, and our distinctive end is to live in accordance with reason.

In Rational Man (1962), Veatch takes aim at the modern denial of teleology. Against this view, he argues that ethical knowledge is possible and that it is "grounded in human nature". Human beings have a nature, and that nature determines what is good for them.

Veatch's teleology is not, however, a simplistic or reductive one. He does not believe that human well-being is something simple or that the moral life consists merely in following rules or recipes. Rather, he presents a "pluralistic understanding of human well-being without lapsing into moral relativism". There are many goods that contribute to human flourishing, and they must be integrated and balanced in the course of a well-lived life.

 This pluralistic teleology is crucial for understanding Veatch's ethics. Unlike utilitarians, who reduce the good to pleasure or happiness, Veatch recognizes a diversity of goods—knowledge, friendship, virtue, excellence in various activities, and so on. Unlike Kantians, who separate the right from the good and insist on duty for duty's sake, he insists that moral obligations are ultimately grounded in what is good for human beings. The good is prior to the right--we have duties because there are things that are truly good for us and for others. 

Veatch explains that ethics must be grounded in metaphysics. He provides an objective foundation for morality rooted in human nature and the rational pursuit of human flourishing. His Aristotelian realism holds that all beings have a natural end (or telos) and that each individual is responsible for his own moral development. This responsibility is the foundational existential fact from which ethics begins. He defends a teleological account of morality in which good is determined by the fulfillment of one’s human nature. Unlike Ayn Rand, for Veatch, an individual’s obligation to act to fulfill his human nature does not depend upon a pre-moral “choice to live”.

Veatch challenges the naturalistic fallacy by addressing the fact-value distinction through which many philosophers contend that moral choices are merely expressions of subjective preferences rather than statements of fact. Calling the fact-value dichotomy untenable, he explains that human nature contains normative implications and that moral claims cannot be divorced from human nature. 

Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) and the Moral Life

 Rationality is the defining characteristic of humanity guiding individuals toward a flourishing life. A person’s nature as a rational being shapes his ethical obligations. Veatch recognizes that moral decision making is contextual and requires the exercise of reason in concrete situations.

 Central to Veatch’s ethics is phronesis (practical wisdom) which discerns the contextual, particular, and contingent circumstances to determine what is morally required at the time of action. Practical wisdom is concerned with applying general moral principles to particular circumstances. Viewing rationality as the sole arbiter of action, his ethics includes the ability to reason and act including the ability to discern and correct errors.

Veatch's conception of the moral life is centrally organized around the Aristotelian virtue of practical wisdom. For Veatch, the moral life is not merely one of following rules or recipes, nor is human well-being something simple. Rather, the moral life, which Veatch calls "rational or intelligent living," is "the life of practical wisdom where individual judgment of the particular and the contingent is paramount". 

This emphasis on practical wisdom reflects Veatch's conviction that ethics cannot be reduced to a set of general principles or algorithms. The situations we face in life are always particular and contingent, and they require the exercise of judgment—the ability to see what is called for in this situation, with these people, under these circumstances. Practical wisdom is the virtue that enables us to make these judgments well.

At the same time, practical wisdom is not a form of intuition or feeling. It is a form of reason—practical reason. The practically wise person does not feel his way through moral situations; he sees them clearly, understands what is at stake, and discerns what the relevant goods and virtues require. Practical wisdom is thus both intellectual and moral. It  involves knowledge of the good and the ability to apply that knowledge in concrete situations. 

Veatch's account of practical wisdom also has important implications for his view of moral education and character formation. Virtues are not innate. They must be acquired through practice and habituation. The moral life requires learning, discipline, and experience. But it is not merely an art, for it deals with what is truly good and bad for human beings, not merely with what is useful or pleasant.

Critique of Kantianism and neo-Kantianism 

Veatch was a critic of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy. In For an Ontology of Morals (1971) he critiques contemporary trends in ethical theory, "including the deontological tradition dating back to Kant". His fundamental objection to Kantianism is that it severs morality from any grounding in human nature and human goods.

Kantian ethics, in Veatch's view, makes the fundamental mistake of supposing "that moral imperatives can be derived independently of consideration of human ends". Kantian moral theories "generally argue that moral duties are duties to perform certain actions 'without' reference to any end to be achieved".

Veatch also objects to the Kantian separation of the phenomenal and noumenal realms, which he sees as a form of idealism that undermines realism. Kant's "transcendental turn" represents a fateful departure from the Aristotelian understanding of knowledge as the grasp of an independently existing reality. By restricting knowledge to the phenomenal realm and relegating things-in-themselves to the noumenal, Kant makes it impossible to know the real natures of things—including human nature. Without knowledge of human nature, there can be no objective ethics.

Veatch's critique extends to neo-Kantianism as well. He argues that "moral and ethical distinctions cannot be rightly or adequately understood if they are regarded simply as matters of linguistic use but are grounded in the very being and nature of things". The linguistic turn in philosophy is, in Veatch's view, merely another form of the Kantian error. It treats morality as a matter of language or convention rather than as a matter of objective truth about human flourishing.

Postmodernism and the Linguistic Turn 

Veatch was equally critical of postmodernism, which he saw as the culmination of the modern trajectory away from realism and toward various forms of skepticism, relativism, and constructivism. He opposed the "linguistic turn" in philosophy, which treats language as the primary or exclusive subject of philosophical inquiry.

Veatch's objections to postmodernism are rooted in his realism. If there are no real natures or essences—if everything is a social construction or a product of language—then there is no basis for objective knowledge or moral truth. Postmodernism leads inevitably to a kind of nihilism in which all claims are equally valid (or equally invalid) and there is no way to distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong. Against this, Veatch insists that "our rules of language are determined by real necessities in the world". Language is not a self-contained system that creates reality. It is a tool for referring to and describing a reality that exists independently of us.

Veatch's opposition to postmodernism is thus not merely a matter of intellectual preference. It is a matter of philosophical necessity. If we abandon realism, we abandon the possibility of philosophy itself as a quest for truth. If we abandon the possibility of truth, we abandon the possibility of any meaningful ethics or politics.

Human Rights and Natural Law

Veatch's most sustained treatment of political philosophy appears in Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? (1985). In this work, Veatch "finds the basis for human rights in natural law". He "builds his argument step by step, carefully laying the foundation for his central assertion that our basic rights are discoverable directly in the facts of nature".

His theory of natural rights is grounded in an account of human nature that recognizes the connection between moral duty and human flourishing. He sees these rights as derived from duties that a person owes to himself to flourish as an individual human being. Each of us is bound by nature to fulfill that obligation. A person’s duty to self-perfection creates the right not to have that pursuit interfered with. It follows that, if one expects to hold these rights, then he must accord them to all other persons, as well. These natural rights are conditioned by the reciprocal duties of other rational being. Because the rights are grounded in reality, their validity does not depend upon social agreement or legal codification. 

Veatch's natural law theory is thoroughly Aristotelian. Just as every natural thing has a telos that determines what is good for it, so too human beings have a nature and a telos that determine what is good for them and what they have a right to. Rights are not arbitrary conventions or creations of the state; they are grounded in the very being and nature of human persons.

Veatch insists that "law must be based on ethics" and that "ethics in turn must be grounded in fact and therefore must have a basis in nature". This is a direct challenge to the positivist view that law is merely a matter of social convention or sovereign command. It is also a challenge to the view that rights are merely creations of the state—a view that leaves individuals vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority or the state.

Veatch's defense of natural law is also a defense of what Aristotle called "a natural justice"—a justice that is not merely conventional but is grounded in the nature of things. This natural justice provides a standard by which positive laws can be judged and, if necessary, resisted. It is the foundation of any genuine theory of human rights. 

Influence on Rasmussen and Den Uyl

Veatch's influence on contemporary philosophy has been considerable, particularly on the work of Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl. These two philosophers have acknowledged Veatch as a major influence on their thinking. Indeed, Rasmussen and Den Uyl's The Perfectionist Turn  (2016) opens with a quotation from Veatch's Rational Man: "In Aristotle's eyes, ethics does not begin with thinking of others; it begins with oneself".

Rasmussen and Den Uyl share with Veatch a commitment to Aristotelian realism, teleology, and natural law. They defend "a version of Aristotelian ethics" and argue that "the Aristotelian approach to ethics supports the natural rights which form the most secure basis for liberal principles". Like Veatch, they hold that "human flourishing is the ultimate moral standard".

Moreover, Rasmussen and Den Uyl have been instrumental in bringing Veatch's work to a new generation of readers. The Liberty Fund edition of Rational Man contains an introduction by  Rasmussen, and both philosophers have written appreciatively of Veatch's contributions. They have also described Veatch as seeing "human beings as part of a natural order that is not ultimately constructed by humans but is nonetheless knowable and open to human flourishing".

Points of Agreement

The agreement between Veatch and Rasmussen and Den Uyl is substantial. First, all three are committed to metaphysical realism—the view that there is a real world independent of our minds and that we can know it. Second, all three embrace teleology—the view that natural things, including human beings, have ends or purposes that determine what is good for them. Third, they all regard human nature as philosophically relevant, holding that moral obligations and rights are grounded in human nature and human flourishing. Fourth, all three are critical of Kantianism, which they see as separating morality from any grounding in human goods, and of postmodernism, which they see as leading to skepticism, subjectivism, and relativism. Fifth, all three emphasize the importance of rationality, practical wisdom, and practical agency in the moral life. Sixth, they all are defenders of individual liberty and human flourishing. Rasmussen and Den Uyl describe themselves as advocating individualistic perfectionism and Veatch's defense of natural rights provides a foundation for liberal principles. Indeed, Rasmussen and Den Uyl have argued that a realist turn—namely, one in which the natural order is the basis for individual rights—is needed to bring about a proper understanding and defense of liberty.

Points of Disagreement

Despite this deep agreement, there are also differences between Veatch and Rasmussen and Den Uyl. The most important disagreement concerns how natural rights are conceptualized and grounded.

Veatch holds that "natural rights are derived from duties one naturally owes to oneself". According to Veatch, each individual "has eudaimonic obligations of self-perfection to himself, and, in virtue of these obligations to self, all other persons are obligated not to prevent that person’s self-perfecting activity". In other words, rights are grounded in duties—specifically, the duty that each person owes to himself to pursue his own flourishing.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl, however, see flaws in Veatch's view. Their main criticism is that his argument cannot provide a person with any right protective of non-self-perfecting behavior. An individual will, at best, have rights vindicating his rightful (i.e., dutiful) actions. In other words, if rights are grounded in duties to oneself, then one has rights only insofar as one is fulfilling those duties. This would leave no room for rights that protect actions that are not directly aimed at self-perfection—including, perhaps, many of the ordinary activities of daily life.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl offer a different account of rights. For them, what a person owes himself for the sake of his own flourishing includes his support for and adherence to a system of rights universally protective of self-directedness. Rights are not derived from duties to oneself in a simple, linear way. Rather, the system of rights is a necessary condition for human flourishing. One has an obligation to support a system of rights because such a system is essential for flourishing—not because one has a direct duty to perform specific self-perfecting actions.

 Veatch viewed natural rights as a direct extension of natural law ethics. For Veatch, rights are normative claims derived from an individual's moral obligations to fulfill their natural end. The political order is tasked with fostering an environment where natural law and moral virtue can be pursued. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that Veatch’s direct derivation creates a structural tension when applied to a modern, pluralistic society containing diverse individual lives. They propose a fundamental distinction between normative ethics and metanormative principles. 

 Normative Ethics addresses the question, "How should I live a flourishing, virtuous life?" This is personal, highly individualized, and teleological).  Metanormative principles (rights) address the political/legal question, "How can diverse, individual moral agents coexist peacefully without compromising the self-directed nature of their respective pursuits of flourishing?" For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, natural rights) are not meant to compel personal virtue directly. Rather, rights are metanormative framework rules whose sole purpose is to protect the possibility of self-directed action for all individuals alike. Rights establish a political structure of non-interference.

Another difference concerns the relationship between the universal and the individual. Rasmussen and Den Uyl claim that universal and individual orders are separate. While Veatch emphasized the universal aspects of human nature and human perfection, Rasmussen and Den Uyl introduce a radical emphasis on the individualized and agent-relative character of eudaimonia. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that while human nature provides universal forms of goodness (e.g., health, knowledge, friendship, virtue), actual human flourishing is always particular, individual, and context-dependent. What constitutes flourishing for a specific person depends on his unique talents, circumstances, choices, and personal history. Because flourishing is inherently self-directed and individualized, it cannot be standardized, centrally planned, or forced upon an individual by a political authority. Veatch, while recognizing individual responsibility, remained closer to classical and Thomistic traditions that emphasize a more uniform, shared human good realized within a cohesive moral community.

Conclusion

 Veatch stands as one of the most important neo-Aristotelian philosophers of the twentieth century. His defense of metaphysical realism, teleology, and natural law represents a powerful alternative to the dominant trends of modern and postmodern philosophy. His account of human nature and practical wisdom offers a rich and nuanced vision of the moral life, one that avoids both the abstractions of Kantianism and the relativism of postmodernism.

Veatch's influence on contemporary philosophers such as Rasmussen and Den Uyl is a testament to the enduring power of his ideas. While Rasmussen and Den Uyl share Veatch's commitment to Aristotelian realism, teleology, and natural law, they have developed his views in important ways—particularly in their account of the grounding of natural rights. Their disagreements with Veatch are not rejections of his project but rather refinements and developments of it. 

In an age of philosophical confusion and moral uncertainty, Veatch's voice remains as relevant as ever. His insistence that philosophy must be grounded in reality, that ethics must be grounded in human nature, and that rights must be grounded in natural law offers a path forward for those who refuse to accept the skeptical and relativistic conclusions of so much modern thought. As Veatch himself might have said, swimming against the current is never easy—but it is sometimes the only way to reach the truth.

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References

 Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 1991. Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order. La Salle, IL: Open Court.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. Pennsylvania State University Press.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  2018. "Remembering an Aristotelian Radical: Henry Veatch and Rational Man." Law & Liberty, September 19.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 2020. The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Palgrave MacMillan.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1952. Intentional Logic: A Logic Based on Philosophical Realism. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. Rational Man 1962. A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1971. For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1985. Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1990 Swimming Against the Current in Contemporary Philosophy. Occasional Essays and Papers. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1978.  "Natural Law: Dead or Alive?" Literature of Liberty 1, no. 4 (October–December).

 Veatch, Henry B. 1954.  Realism and Nominalism Revisited. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

----------------------------“How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

---------------------------“How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 2, 2025.

----------------------------- “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

----------------------------- “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

----------------------------- “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

 ----------------------------- “Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. March 19, 2026.

----------------------------- “Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. June 4, 2026. 

----------------------------- “The Architecture of Freedom: Randy Barnett’s Natural Law Case for a Free Society” Freedom and Flourishing. June 26, 2026.

----------------------------- “Robust Political Economy and Neo-Aristotelianism: Complementary Visions of Freedom and Flourishing” Freedom and Flourishing. July 10, 2026.

------------------------------ “Is Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Consistent with Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 26, 2026.