Wednesday, November 18, 2026

What do J.D. Vance’s books tell us about how he would use the powers of the presidency?

 


This is my second essay about J.D. Vance’s books. The first essay was entitled, What does Hillbilly Elegy tell us about J.D. Vance’s daimon? This essay is mainly about his most recent book, Communion: Finding My Way Back to Faith.

The question of how Vance would be likely to use the power of the presidency is of interest to me – and to many others who do not live in the United States – because it has potential to have a profound impact on the world in which we live. People all over the world must adjust to the impact of choices made by voters in the United States.

Prediction markets suggest that the probability of Vance being elected president in 2028 is now around 14% (Kalshi). The probability that he will be the Republican nominee is around 31% to 33%. The outcome of the recent U.S. mid-term elections has made it seem less likely that Vance will become president, largely because there is now perceived to be a higher probability that a Democrat will be elected. At this point we don’t even know whether Vance will seek to be the Republican nominee or whether the Democrats can nominate an electable candidate.

Vance seems to have provided an honest account of the evolution of his religious beliefs in Communion. On politics, the book avoids discussing the influence of post-liberals such as Adrian Vermeule and Patrick Deneen, but the views he expresses appear to place him close to that camp. They suggest a version of communitarianism, and I will argue that the main question it raises is how far he would rely on top-down direction rather than on spontaneous social change.

My essay on Hillbilly Elegy concluded that while that book tells us a good deal about Vance’s  values - family, individual agency, self-reliance and hard work- it only offers a hint of anything that could be called a supreme aim or guiding principle. That hint appears in the final pages, where he introduces us to Brian, a kid from Appalachian Kentucky who reminded J.D. of himself when he was fifteen years old. I suggested that J.D’s concern for children like Brian hinted that his daimon might be to give people like Brian a better chance in life.

 My reading of Communion suggests that Vance’s preoccupations are both narrower and broader than I had suggested in my essay on Hillbilly Elegy. They are narrower because Communion suggests that J.D.’s personal journey over the last decade has been strongly motivated by a desire to be a good father to his own children. They are broader because Vance, the politician, seems intent on waging a cultural war against “false prophet economists” who use GDP statistics to “argue the American Dream is healthy even as suicide and addiction rates soar and the laughter of children fades from our streets”.

In this essay, I focus on four issues that may shed light on the way Vance might use the powers of the presidency:

  • The implications of attributing past ethical shortcomings to Ayn Rand’s philosophy;
  • The question of whether principles that have governed international relations in the post-World War II era now have less validity because adherence to Christianity has declined in Europe;
  • The ethical foundation of Vance’s approach to economics;
  • Vance’s views about the role of government in cultural change.

A thread running through these issues is the one in the Hayek epigraph: whether a good society is better pursued by directing it from above or by allowing it to develop through the choices and interactions of free individuals.

I have endeavoured to focus on what Vance has written in Communion, but in some instances my interpretations and judgements may be influenced by other sources.

Attribution for past ethical shortcomings

Vance tells us that while he was at Ohio State University “getting drunk and acting like a jerk had filled the void left by God”. He acknowledges that his attitudes had something in common with those of Tucker Max, a popular figure at that time who blogged about his sexual and drinking exploits. Vance ends the relevant chapter by telling us that he “increasingly began to feel” that he was “not an especially good person”.

I think it is commendable for anyone telling their life story to confess to their past shortcomings. It is often interesting to learn how others have met ethical and other challenges and eventually redeemed themselves. J.D.’s life story certainly has a redemption theme. A characteristic of such redemption themes is that the narrator eventually develops toward actualization of an inner destiny.

The problem that I have with Vance’s confession is his apparent attribution of personal shortcomings to the philosophy of Ayn Rand. I am not an Objectivist and have no desire to spend the rest of my life defending Rand. However, I can’t ignore the impression that Vance left me with that he was attributing his boorish behaviour as a young man to his absorption of Rand’s philosophy.  

Vance suggests that Rand’s philosophy “filled a void left by the faith” he had discarded. A few pages later, he explains:

“My new life required a new philosophy, and like many young men on the political right, I had absorbed Ayn Rand’s hyper-individualism. I gave even love, the most selfless state of mind imaginable, a selfish Randian spin: Love is when we value another person so highly that it’s in our selfish interest to be nice to them. Conversely, when we no longer value someone, it’s fine to discard past affections.”

The main problem I have with that passage is its failure to recognize that Rand’s use of the word “selfish” is not the same as common usage of that word to describe opportunistic behavior showing no regard for others. I have written about that previously:

“I can’t remember when I first became aware that Ayn Rand viewed selfishness as a virtue, and had written a book entitled The Virtue of Selfishness. During the 1990s, I was certainly aware that most of the small number of Australians who knew of Rand’s existence were of the opinion that she and her followers were ethically challenged and encouraged narcissism. That view was later expounded in a book by Anne Manne, which I commented upon here.

In a post on this blog in 2009 I asked myself: Did Ayn Rand regard selfishness as a virtue? I knew she did, but I pondered the question because the heroes of Atlas Shrugged did not seem to me to be selfish. I noted that Rand’s view that selfishness is a virtue followed from a narrow definition of selfishness as “concern with one’s own interests”, and speculated that Rand had used that definition to draw attention to her opposition to the view that self-sacrifice is a virtue.

A few months later, I wrote on the topic, How far can Ayn Rand’s ethical egoism be defended? That post was an attempt to summarize some of the views of participants in a Cato symposium on ‘What’s living and dead in Ayn Rand’s moral and political thought’. One of the aspects I focused on was the question of whether Rand, like Aristotle, viewed virtue – including regard for others - as a constitutive part of the agent’s own interest, or as an instrumental strategy for attaining that interest. Although the participants in the discussion were all scholars familiar with Rand’s writings, they were unable to agree on that point.”

Scholars differ in their understanding of some aspects of Rand’s philosophy. One doesn’t need to know much about Objectivism, however, to understand that getting drunk and acting like a jerk are not consistent with it. Rand considered that it was immoral for people to impair their cognitive faculties deliberately through heavy drinking. Acting like a jerk contradicts her ideal of a self-respecting individual. She would likely suggest that anyone who feels a lack of self-respect should reflect on whether those feelings are warranted, for example because they have breached standards of integrity that they have previously chosen to live by.

Anyone who is aware that they have breached their own standards should obviously take steps to modify their behaviour. I am glad that Vance has apparently found a way to do that and have no comment to make on the approach he has adopted.

However, the manner in which Vance has linked his recollections of Rand’s philosophy to his own behaviour as a young man signals to me that, as president, he would be likely to oppose the individualism advocated by classical liberals.

International relations

In 2024 Senator J.D. Vance was invited to attend the Munich Security Conference. He tells us that he was invited “as a curiosity: a skeptic of the foreign policy consensus of the previous half century”. Vance explained his position thus:

“Whatever benefits had accrued, and whatever world wars had been avoided, the fruits of the so-called rules-based international order, especially since the mid-1990s, were rotten. And my original instinct was to throw this in everyone’s face: The fruits of your leadership are pointless wars of choice and declining life expectancy in your own country. Perhaps your life’s work was for naught.”

Some of what Vance writes about his position at the Conference makes sense to me. The note of realism he injected about the limited ability of the United States to assist in the defence of Ukraine rings true. The U.S. “needed Europe to step up”; it “couldn’t unilaterally police any conflict of its choosing”.

I begin to have problems with Vance’s position, however, when he suggests that the decline in the extent to which political leaders refer to God in their speeches in international forums such as the Munich Security Conference has deep significance. He suggests that when NATO was being set up, Christianity gave the NATO participants “a shared moral language”. Over the decades that followed, however, the West “forgot what it stood for”:

“In the vacuum, we saw a new creed take form: a secular global liberalism that maintained the vocabulary of rights while shedding the religious foundation that gave them meaning.”

What are we to understand from that? When supporters of secular global liberalism (or a rules-based international order) advocate policies to discourage rape and pillage, why should that be less credible or meaningful than when Christian nationalists advocate the same policies? Adherence to norms that protect natural rights is not the exclusive preserve of Christian nationalists.

Since Vance is making his claims about the growth of secular values in the context of a discussion of defense policy, perhaps he has in mind that those values and rising economic prosperity have been accompanied by a decline in the willingness of people to defend their country if war breaks out. There is some evidence to support that view, but recent research has shown that proximate conflicts also affect citizens’ willingness to fight. (See reference for Sorg et al below).

Vance’s discussion of international relations suggests to me that it is appropriate to label him as a Christian nationalist. He certainly blends nationalist sentiments with his Roman Catholic beliefs. It seems likely that a distinctive blend of Christianity and nationalism would tend to play a larger role in the foreign policy of the United States if he became president. 

However, it is difficult to specify what that might entail. For example, is Vance’s understanding of Christianity consistent with the isolationist policies some commentators suggest that he espouses, or does it entail closer relations between the United States and countries with high rates of Christian church attendance? Since Pew data indicates that rates of church attendance are substantially higher in Mexico than in the U.S., perhaps it means that the U.S. would be likely to seek closer relations with Mexico under a Vance presidency. Who knows?  A Christian nationalist foreign policy could entail any objective that Vance can somehow portray to be consistent with Christianity and the interests of the United States.

Economics

Vance has a low opinion of economics as a profession and considers that economic considerations play too great a role in background debates on policy issues.

One of Vance’s sources of economic inspiration is Oren Cass, who writes extensively about economic issues. After referencing a book written by Cass, Vance writes:

“In that book, Oren argues that “economic piety” has taken over American public life. In particular, he argues that an obsession with maximizing consumption has focused our policy, and indeed our entire culture, on a potentially harmful metric.”

The point Cass and Vance are attempting to make is that a focus on consumption fails to account for people as anything besides consumers and thus undervalues other ways of measuring a good life. Vance is particularly concerned that we should recognize that a job isn’t just a source of income: it “allows people to feel accomplished and provides community”.

One issue this raises is whether the conceptual apparatus of economics can incorporate aspects of the good life that are not encompassed by consumption (more precisely, the consumer goods that money can buy).  It is not difficult to show that those aspects of the good life can be incorporated even under the restrictive utility maximizing assumptions of conventional neoclassical economics. I discussed relevant economic issues in 2008 in a post entitled: “Are libertarians baffled by down-shifters?”

It seems to me that there is nothing unusual about people taking non-pecuniary factors into consideration in making work choices. Among people I know, some seem to me to place too little emphasis on non-pecuniary factors, and some place too much emphasis on such factors. In either case, however, it is appropriate that they should make their own choices and live with the consequences.

Cass (and Vance) raise another issue that has more substance. That is whether policymakers give too much attention to national statistics of consumption and GDP.  Vance is not the first politician to draw attention to this issue. In 1968, Robert F Kennedy concluded a critique of GNP (a concept closely related to GDP) by saying that the metric “measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile”.

In making the point that trying to maximize GDP makes no moral sense, Vance suggests:

“A Christian approach to economics would demand something different; concern for GDP, yes, but only insofar as it promotes human flourishing.”

I agree with that assertion - even though it remains true if one substitutes ‘secular humanist’ for ‘Christian’.

However, when one attempts to specify the goods of a flourishing human, it is notable that the countries in which persons chosen at random have likely been most successful in attaining those goods have relatively high levels of economic and personal freedom and relatively high per capita GDP levels. In discussing determinants of opportunities to obtain basic goods in Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, I concluded:

“High incomes appear to be the most pervasive element, but liberty and a culture of trust have played an important role in facilitating the underlying economic development process which has enabled incomes to rise.”

The list of basic goods of a flourishing human that I suggested in my book was as follows:

  • Wise and well-informed self-direction.
  • Health and longevity.
  • Positive relationships.
  • Living in harmony with nature.
  • Psychological well-being.

In the process of arriving at that list, I suggested that any attempt to identify the basic goods must remain a matter for ongoing reflection and discussion. Some have suggested that spirituality should be added to that list. Teodora Ciobanu has provided an interesting discussion of that in her chapter of the recently published book, From Politics to Morality: Implications of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Norms of Liberty. She suggests that it is possible for religion to become a unifying purpose in one’s life “without diminishing in any sense the natural dimension of one’s existence and the other basic goods worth pursuing”.

As might be expected, Communion contains paragraphs that support the economic nationalism of the Trump administration. However, Vance also hints at a possible policy agenda directed toward encouraging young people to have children:

“Our young people may differ in some ways from those in Korea or Japan, but all of them are responding to the economic and cultural incentives: work more, consume more, achieve more. Suppress the biological urge to fall in love and have babies. Sacrifice family for your cubicle. We—across political movements and countries—have done this to ourselves. And it is no coincidence that we embraced this hypereconomic logic at the very moment our civilization moved away from Christianity.”

The role of government

Vance’s view of the role of government seems to be strongly influenced by Rerum Novarum, the 1891 encyclical by Pope Leo XIII addressing the rights and duties of workers, employers, and the state. Leo XIII held that because people are fundamentally social, their mediating institutions such as unions and churches ought to be prioritized. According to Vance, “Pope Leo XIII’s theory of human nature strikes a balance so perfect it seems divinely inspired”. Vance likes Leo XIII’s emphasis on duty and family and his rejection of libertarian and liberal views of culture.

Vance refers to subsidiarity:

“This idea that we all exist within particular spheres of family, community, and on and on, building up to a nation, is called subsidiarity. And it recognizes that each sphere of life depends on the others. It is very hard to be a good family man unless you have a decent wage and have support from friends, community, and church.                                                                                And it’s tough for those institutions to thrive without a functional political system.”

When I look up subsidiarity, however, the definition of that word has a more specific emphasis on social and political issues being handled by the smallest, lowest, or least centralized competent authority.

The principle of subsidiarity seems to me to be consistent with classical liberalism. There are loopholes, however, which may enable a president to exercise excessive power while pretending to endorse subsidiarity. Governments can often define a phenomenon as a social problem and to decide which authorities are competent to deal with it.

The issue of whether low birth rates pose a problem that warrants government intervention is an example of potential misuse of subsidiarity. If we begin with the proposition that each woman of child-bearing age is a competent authority to decide how many children she should have, it seems to me that the onus is on those who want higher birth rates to argue the case transparently. The paragraph from Vance’s book quoted at the end of the previous section asserts that something has suppressed the biological urge to fall in love and have babies. However, it doesn’t tell us why we should be concerned about the individual choices that have produced that outcome.

When we come to consider what could or should be done to raise birth rates, we are confronted by ethical questions. From what I have read on the subject, raising birth rates would require a cultural change that could not be achieved with minor adjustments to existing policy measures to support families. A president who wanted to achieve substantial change would need to contemplate major changes in taxation and expenditure to address financial security issues that currently discourage many people from cohabiting and having babies. The provision of the required financial incentives raises the issue of why those who choose to remain childless or to have small families should be required to subsidize those who choose to have large families.

In Hillbilly Elegy, Vance suggested that while public policy could help with cultural problems, “there is no government that can fix these problems for us”. His view may now have changed but it is not clear how far he would be willing to go in proposing changes in economic incentives to arrest the decline in birth rates.

A more fundamental issue raised by Vance’s attribution of low birth rates to a “work more, consume more, achieve more” culture is that it seems to stem from a view of culture as something imposed on individuals, rather than an outcome of individual choices and interactions. He seems to associate the classical liberal view of culture with atomistic individualism where humans are viewed as isolated economic units.

F.A. Hayek actively rejected this caricature. In his famous essay, Individualism: True and False, Hayek explicitly argued that "true individualism" is inherently social, relying on the organic, spontaneous networks of family, friends and local communities.

The sentence from Hayek’s essay quoted in the epigraph draws attention to the potential for society to be diminished when individual minds seek to control or direct it. Attempts to impose order from above impact adversely on the spontaneous forces of social change. If a substantial number of women are unable to have as many babies as they would like that may itself tend to bring about corrective cultural change. As birth rates decline, people who aspire to become grandparents have an added incentive to help their children attain the financial security necessary to support families. That is less likely to happen if family support is seen to be a government responsibility.

More generally, if people in a free society perceive the emergence of a cultural problem, there are strong reasons to expect them to respond spontaneously in ways that will alleviate it. By contrast, top-down interventions often make families and communities dependent on ongoing government support, including tariffs and other measures to support employment in uncompetitive industries and occupations.

Conclusion

In this essay I have asked what J.D. Vance’s latest book suggests about how he would be likely to use the powers of the presidency of the United States. A memoir of faith is limited evidence for that question, and my conclusions are tentative.

Vance’s account of his time at Ohio State left me with the impression that he attributes his boorish behaviour to Rand’s philosophy. I think that is a misreading of Rand, and I suspect it reflects a broader tendency to see classical liberal individualism as a corrosive force. Whether that would shape his approach as president is unclear.

On international relations, Vance makes some points I find persuasive, such as the limits on US capacity to police conflicts of its choosing. However, he appears to blend nationalist sentiment with his Catholic faith. It is hard to say what that blend would entail in practice, and the United States may well move further from the rules-based order.

On economics, I agree with Vance that GDP matters only insofar as it promotes flourishing. My concern is that high incomes, economic freedom and trust have been the most pervasive foundations of the basic goods, so economic nationalism could trade away the very conditions for flourishing. His hints about encouraging young people to have children raise the question of how far he would go in changing economic incentives.

On the role of government, Vance endorses subsidiarity, which is consistent with classical liberalism. The risk I see is that the principle gives a president latitude to define which problems are cultural and which authorities are competent to address them. His remark in Hillbilly Elegy that no government can fix these problems for us suggests some restraint, but Communion does not tell us whether he still holds that view.

If Hayek is right, the cultural problems Vance diagnoses are more likely to be corrected by free individuals responding to them than by direction from above. What he proposes in respect of birth-rate policy would be an early test of which view he holds.

References

Bates, Winton Russell, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing (Hamilton Books, 2021).

Ciobanu, Teodora, “Is Norms of Liberty Compatible with Religion” in From Politics to Morality: Implications of Rasmussen and DenUyl’s Norms of Liberty, ed. Edward W. Younkins (Bloomsbury: 2026).

Hayek, F.A., “Individualism: True and False”, republished as Chapter 7 in Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt R. Leube, The Essence of Hayek, Hoover Institution Press, 1984.

Sorg, Alexander, Wolfgang Wagner and Michal Onderco, ‘Fighting for their country: How proximate conflict shapes citizens’ attitudes’, European Journal of International Security (2025).

Vance, J.D., Communion: Finding My Way Back to Faith (Harper Collins, 2026).

Vance, J.D., Hillbilly Elegy (Harper Collins, 2016).


Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Review of: "From Politics to Morality: Implications of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Norms of Liberty", Edited by Edward W. Younkins

 



This review is by Leah Goldrik, a longtime friend, as well as a librarian and author with a background in history and philosophy. I am pleased that Leah has taken up my suggestion to write the review.  


Leah’s review
was first published on “Common Sense Ethics”. Some other essays by Leah that have previously been republished on “Freedom and Flourishing” are listed at the end of the essay.

Leah writes:

This fall I'm excited to review From Politics to Morality: Implications of Rasmussen and Den Uyl's Norms of Liberty. This timely new book of essays on political theory, economics and Neo-Aristotelian ethics commemorates the twenty year anniversary of Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics, the groundbreaking work by Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, and includes an essay by longtime friend, Winton Bates, author of Freedom and Flourishing. 

Part of the Capitalist Thought series, the book's essays range from topics as diverse as the extent of government power, the protection of individual natural rights to the cultivation of cohesive society. What is the proper role of government in shaping the moral lives of individuals? Should political institutions encourage citizens to live according to particular moral values, or should their primary responsibility be to protect the freedom necessary for individuals to make their own choices? These important questions lie at the heart of From Politics to Morality.

Bringing together contributions from respected scholars across philosophy, political theory, economics, and ethics, this collection revisits some of the most important questions surrounding individual liberty, morality, and the legitimate authority of the state. Rather than simply revisiting the arguments of Norms of Liberty, the contributors explore how its ideas continue to influence contemporary political debates and offer new perspectives on the relationship between personal freedom and the moral life.

One of the most interesting aspects of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s original argument is their attempt to reconcile two ideas that are often considered incompatible: moral perfectionism and political liberalism. In philosophical terms, perfectionism holds that human beings have a nature and that there are objective standards of human flourishing. In other words, there are better and worse ways for individuals to live their lives. However, accepting that objective moral standards exist does not necessarily mean that governments should impose a particular vision of the good life upon their citizens.

This distinction is central to the argument developed in Norms of Liberty and provides the foundation for the discussions in From Politics to Morality. Rasmussen and Den Uyl maintain that human beings are rational and self-directing individuals who must be free to make meaningful choices about their own lives. Genuine human flourishing cannot simply be imposed through political authority. It requires individual judgment, responsibility, and the freedom to pursue worthwhile goals.

Their approach offers an important alternative to political philosophies that view government as an instrument for creating a morally ideal society. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that the state should not attempt to dictate how individuals ought to live or enforce a comprehensive understanding of human flourishing. Instead, its primary responsibility is to establish and maintain a legal framework within which individuals can peacefully coexist and pursue their own conception of a worthwhile life.

This position is captured in their memorable phrase, “Statecraft is not soulcraft.” The expression challenges the assumption that political institutions should be responsible for cultivating the moral character of citizens. While morality remains essential to human flourishing, the development of moral character is ultimately a personal undertaking. Individuals must be able to reason, choose, and take responsibility for their actions. Without this freedom, moral development loses much of its meaning.

Importantly, Rasmussen and Den Uyl do not regard liberty as an absolute value detached from moral considerations. Their defence of individual freedom is grounded in a particular understanding of human nature. Because human beings are rational and volitional creatures, they require freedom to make decisions, pursue meaningful objectives, and develop their individual capacities. Liberty is therefore not simply a political entitlement or an abstract ideal. It is a necessary condition for genuine moral agency.

This is perhaps the most significant contribution of their philosophy. Rather than treating morality and liberty as competing principles, they demonstrate how the two can complement one another. Political freedom creates the conditions in which individuals can pursue moral excellence, while the recognition of human flourishing provides a philosophical foundation for protecting individual rights.

From Politics to Morality takes these arguments further by examining their implications for a range of political and philosophical traditions. The essays explore the relationship between Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s ideas and liberalism, conservatism, utilitarianism, natural law, and other influential approaches to political thought. This broad range of perspectives makes the collection particularly valuable, as it demonstrates that the questions raised by Norms of Liberty extend well beyond the boundaries of any single political ideology.

One especially interesting area of discussion concerns the relationship between liberal political theory and Catholic social thought. At first glance, these traditions might appear to have very different understandings of individual freedom, moral responsibility, and the role of political institutions. However, examining their potential compatibility raises important questions about the relationship between personal liberty, objective moral values, and the common good. This discussion adds another dimension to the collection and illustrates the continuing relevance of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s arguments.

The contributors also address the distinction between realistic and idealistic approaches to political philosophy. This is an important debate because political theories must consider both the moral aspirations of individuals and the practical limitations of political institutions. A political philosophy that demands too much from government risks undermining individual freedom, while one that ignores the moral foundations of society may struggle to explain why liberty and individual rights deserve protection in the first place.

The essays are particularly relevant to contemporary political discussions about the appropriate limits of government authority. Questions surrounding personal autonomy, property rights, individual responsibility, and the protection of natural rights remain central to political debate. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s framework provides a useful way of approaching these issues without assuming that political authority should be used to impose a particular vision of human flourishing.

Another strength of the collection is its recognition that individual liberty does not necessarily conflict with the interests of society as a whole. Indeed, a society that respects individual rights can provide the conditions necessary for cooperation, peaceful coexistence, and the development of meaningful relationships between individuals. Freedom does not require the rejection of moral responsibility or social obligations. Rather, it allows individuals to pursue their responsibilities through reasoned and voluntary action.

As a collection, From Politics to Morality succeeds in demonstrating the continued importance of Norms of Liberty within contemporary political philosophy. Its multidisciplinary approach gives readers the opportunity to consider the original arguments from a variety of perspectives, while the different contributions encourage further discussion rather than simply repeating established conclusions. The result is a thoughtful examination of the relationship between ethics and politics that is both philosophically substantial and relevant to current debates.

Although some of the discussions will be more accessible to readers with an existing background in political philosophy, the central questions explored throughout the book are important to anyone interested in the relationship between individual freedom, morality, and government. The collection is particularly useful for students and scholars studying political theory, neo-Aristotelian ethics, classical liberalism, and social philosophy.

Ultimately, the enduring contribution of Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s work is its reminder that liberty and morality need not be opposing forces. A commitment to individual freedom does not require abandoning objective moral values, just as a commitment to human flourishing does not justify unlimited political authority. Instead, genuine moral development depends upon the freedom to think, choose, act, and take responsibility for one's life.

From Politics to Morality provides an insightful opportunity to revisit these arguments and consider their significance. It challenges readers to reconsider the purpose and limits of political power while highlighting the importance of individual rights as the foundation for meaningful human flourishing. For anyone interested in the philosophical foundations of liberty and the moral responsibilities of political institutions, this is a valuable and thought-provoking contribution to the ongoing debate.

 

Some other essays by Leah Goldrick:

How can we overcome confirmation bias?

How can you develop the personality traits needed to resist social pressure?

Why did Aristotle view leisure as a fundamental aspect of a well-lived life?

How can we live seasonally and in tune with the natural world?

Thursday, November 5, 2026

Gerald Gaus and the Open Society

This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

 

Gerald Gaus’s The Open Society and Its Complexities (2021) is a response to three theses advanced by Friedrich A. Hayek regarding the Open Society. Hayek’s first thesis is that human beings are not made for a free society. Human evolved psychology makes us xenophobic, parochial, and egalitarian in ways that conflict with the diversity and impartiality of an Open Society. The second thesis is that the operation of institutions in the Open Society is so unclear that we cannot rationally evaluate, critique, or justify that type of society. The third thesis is that the Open Society cannot be governed. Because it is a complex, multidimensional, and dynamic system with many linear, nonlinear, and inextricably related intersections and feedback connections, it is an extremely hard or impossible to predict the effects we will have on society by intervening in it. These theses are pessimistic about the Open Society. Gaus’s achievement is to critically re-examine these theses and to argue that Hayek’s program underestimated the potential resources of human morality and the Open Society to deal with the challenges he perceived.


Gaus begins the book with three questions inspired by Hayek: Are human beings psychologically and morally suited to the Open Society?  Is the Open Society too complex to be morally justified? Is the Open Society too complex to be governed? The structure of the book follows those questions through three major parts: the evolution of a normative species; diversity and self-organized complexity; and the complexities of self-governance. Gaus’s project is therefore both philosophical and interdisciplinary. He draws upon moral philosophy, evolutionary theory, economics, political science, social psychology, complexity theory, and the study of institutions.

 

Although, in his book, Gaus provides an explanation of the emergence and maintenance of cooperative social arrangements, an important philosophical question remains: How should we evaluate the moral principles that have evolved, and what justifies the rights and institutions that make an open society desirable? An explanation of how moral dispositions and cooperative practices emerged does not, by itself, establish that those dispositions or practices are morally justified.

 

Toward the end of this essay, I explain how Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl’s theory of individualistic perfectionism, particularly their account of individual rights as metanormative principles, offers a complementary and underpinning philosophical foundation.  They argue that a neo-Aristotelian understanding of human flourishing supports a political order that protects individual liberty without requiring everyone to pursue the same conception of the good life.

The Evolution of Human Moral Behavior

 

The first part of the book explores the evolution of human moral behavior. Gaus rejects a simple picture of human beings as either selfish maximizers or altruistic cooperators. Instead, human beings are highly social creatures possessing capacities for reciprocity, cooperation, punishment, norm enforcement, moral learning, and cultural adaptation. This evolutionary perspective matters because the Open Society is not merely a political invention imposed upon human beings. It emerges from capacities that human beings have developed over long periods of social interaction. The implication is significant: liberal society must be understood as a dynamic social order whose functioning depends upon actual human capacities for cooperation and norm-following.

 

Gaus cites formal models and empirical evidence to show that the Open Society is grounded on the moral foundations of human cooperation originating in our distant evolutionary past, but has built upon them a complex and diverse society that requires rethinking both the nature of moral justification and the meaning of democratic self-governance. Instead of providing a traditional argument for the Open Society, Gaus offers an evolutionary account showing that the Open Society has advantages over alternative arrangements that will cause it to prevail. The features of the Open Society that foster cultural evolution have to do with diversity and complexity.

Diversity and Complexity

 

The second major theme is diversity. Gaus’s Open Society is much more diverse than the relatively homogeneous liberal societies often imagined by classical liberal theory. Individuals possess different values, preferences, identities, projects, moral perspectives, and notions of the good.

 

This second part takes up Hayek’s second thesis—that the Open Society is too complex for the practice of moral justification. Gaus endorses Hayek’s criticism of social contract theory, proposing instead a self-organization model of moral justification. According to this model, moral justification is not a matter of deriving principles from a hypothetical contract or a single collective choice, but rather emerges from socially interdependent decisions. Publicly justified rules aid self-governance through a process of continuous contestation and mutual adjustment.

 

Diversity can generate additional diversity. Gaus describes this as autocatalytic diversity. Interactions among different individuals and groups can create new choices, institutions, occupations, lifestyles, associations, and forms of cooperation. Diversity therefore becomes a source of further complexity. 

 

Freedom does not simply permit people to choose among an existing menu of alternatives. Their interactions can generate new alternatives. The social order is consequently not merely a system in equilibrium. It is evolutionary and generative. Gaus’s central concept is self-organization. A complex social order does not require a central designer. Individuals respond to one another, learn, imitate, compete, cooperate, and adjust. Order emerges from these interactions.

 

This is closely related to the Hayekian concept of spontaneous order, but Gaus develops the idea in a more systematic and contemporary framework. The Open Society is a complex adaptive system in which individual actions can generate patterns that no individual actor planned.

 

Public Justification and Polycentric Governance

 

Importantly, Gaus does not conclude that because an order is spontaneous it is beyond evaluation or governance. The third part of his book explores how self-governance can operate within complex systems. 

 

Gaus’s account of public justification is also important. In a diverse society, people will not share a comprehensive conception of the good. Therefore, political legitimacy cannot depend upon everyone sharing the same moral or religious worldview. Instead, social rules must be justifiable to people with diverse normative perspectives. Gaus’s approach attempts to explain how shared rules can emerge without requiring a centralized agreement on ultimate values. His self-organization model suggests that free and equal individuals can sometimes converge on common rules even when they value those rules for different reasons. 

 

This is an important development within liberal public reason theory because it shifts attention away from designing an ideal social contract and toward understanding how actual processes of argument, adaptation, coordination, and institutional evolution can generate publicly acceptable norms. Gaus’s libertarian neutralism embraces perspectival diversity and interspectival justice which involves rational bargains and compromises.

 

Gaus’s discussion of polycentricity extends the analysis from moral norms to institutions. Rather than imagining governance as a single hierarchical state directing society from above, Gaus emphasizes multiple centers of decision-making. Institutions can experiment, learn, compete, cooperate, and adapt.

 

Gaus’s primary target is what he terms the "synoptic delusion"—the belief held by political philosophers and central planners that society can be understood as a simple causal mechanism that can be designed, predicted, and optimized from the top down. Gaus demonstrates that an Open Society is a Complex Adaptive System. In complex systems outcomes emerge from linear and non-linear interactions among heterogeneous, rule-following agents.  Cause and effect are decoupled and even small policy interventions often produce unforeseen, unintended consequences.

System-wide order self-organizes from the bottom up rather than being commanded from above.

Consequently, ideal political theories (such as Rawlsian egalitarianism or strict libertarian utopianism) fail because they assume a static, predictable social model. They demand a level of institutional knowledge that no central authority or philosopher can possess. Crucially, Gaus argues that moral diversity is not a problem to be eliminated, but an engine of social discovery and resilience. Gaus describes diversity in the Open Society as autocatalytic. Free societies grant individuals room to experiment with diverse ways of living and thinking. This diversity drives innovation, specialization, and economic complexity. Increased complexity expands the range of possible social roles and moral perspectives, which in turn generates even greater diversity.

Instead of searching for a single, ideal standard of justice, Gaus argues that the Open Society relies on flexible, self-organizing moral rules that allow diverse agents to live together productively despite moral disagreements. Polycentric governance and decentralized rule-evolution allow society to adapt dynamically to unforeseen challenges.

 

His discussion draws upon the insights associated with Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School. Polycentric institutions can emerge from self-organized networks and can provide mechanisms for solving collective action problems without requiring comprehensive central planning. Thus, Gaus’s liberalism is not simply about limiting government. It is about understanding the architecture of a complex social order in which governance itself can be decentralized.

According to Gaus, the Open Society is characterized by three key features: autocatalytic diversity, unbounded technological innovation, and individual autonomy. These features make the Open Society a complex adaptive system that is difficult to control from the top or center but is resilient and adaptive from the bottom up. Gaus argues that the freedoms of our highly networked society are difficult to extinguish and that its ideals can be vindicated via grassroots exploration and consent. This is a cautiously optimistic argument about the long-term prospects for the Open Society, grounded in an evolutionary analysis of morality as a complex adaptive system.

 

Gaus’s approach is distinctively interdisciplinary, drawing on evolutionary analysis, primatology, anthropology, moral psychology, analyses of complex systems, experimental economics, and studies of norms. This methodological breadth reflects his pivotal role in the re-founding of “moral science” as an explicit form of social inquiry and his championing of philosophy, politics, and economics as a way of injecting empirical and strategic insights into traditional philosophical debates. His detached attitude toward morality, assessing it as an admirable but pragmatic mechanism, contrasts with the more prescriptive tone of much contemporary political philosophy.

Underpinning and Strengthening Gausian Complexity with neo-Aristotelian Perfectionism 

While Gaus’s analysis of social complexity is well done, an exclusively evolutionary defense of liberalism faces weaknesses. Evolutionary processes can sometimes select for illiberal, tribal, or authoritarian social structures if those structures offer short-term survival advantages. If moral rules are merely evolved social conventions, it becomes difficult to explain why an open society is good, rather than merely complex and adaptive.

 

 Evolutionary persistence does not establish moral validity. A disposition may have contributed to the survival or reproductive success of a group without being ethically defensible. Favoritism toward one’s own group, for example, may have supported cooperation among insiders while encouraging hostility toward outsiders. Likewise, an institution may endure because it benefits powerful participants rather than because it respects the rights and flourishing of everyone subject to it.

 

 Spontaneous order should not be treated as automatically just. Self-organizing processes can generate beneficial arrangements, but they can also operate within institutions that permit coercion, exploitation, or rights violations. The fact that a social pattern emerges spontaneously does not establish that it is morally legitimate.

Gaus’s dependence on formal empirical models, game theory, empirical evidence, evolutionary adaptation, and the social sciences displays his tendency to disregard or underrate traditional normative political philosophy. He appears to reject the traditional goal of political philosophy which is to determine or identify the best political order. An evolutionary theorist, like Gaus, should at some point judge what has evolved. 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl supply the necessary normative foundation. They remind us that social systems ultimately exist for the sake of real human beings striving to live meaningful, perfectible lives. Grounding the defense of the free society in human self-direction ensures that classical liberalism remains anchored in a firm defense of individual rights, preventing it from being reduced to pure pragmatic functionalism.

 Rasmussen and Den Uyl provide the missing normative anchor through their distinction between normative and metanormative principles. Normative principles guide individual moral conduct—they tell us how we ought to live. Metanormative principles, by contrast, regulate the conditions under which normative conduct could take place. Individual rights are metanormative principles: they establish the political and legal framework within which each person can pursue his or her own conception of the good life without being coerced by others. The linchpin of their argument is self-direction. Human flourishing is an objective, individualized, agent-relative achievement that each person must attain through his or her own practical reasoning and choice. Self-direction is both a necessary condition for, and an operating condition of, the pursuit and achievement of human flourishing. Because flourishing requires self-direction, and self-direction is thwarted by coercion, individuals possess natural rights to the conditions of their flourishing—rights that are grounded not in convention or utility but in the very nature of human beings as rational agents.

The complementarity between these approaches is structural. Gaus’s evolutionary-epistemic framework explains how the Open Society emerges, functions, and remains fragile. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s neo-Aristotelian perfectionism explains why it is worth defending and what its moral limits are. Spontaneous orders—markets, evolved legal rules, decentralized coordination—create conditions of prosperity and peace that no central planner could replicate. The spontaneous order of the market does not guarantee that anyone will flourish. It merely creates the space within which flourishing is possible. This is exactly what metanormative rights do. They do not guarantee success or even provide the conditions that make such action possible. The spontaneous order of general rules and the teleological structure of human action are not opposed but mutually supporting. The evolved rules of a free society create the conditions under which individual practical wisdom can operate effectively, while the metanormative framework of rights protects the sphere within which that wisdom is exercised.

Yet, the two approaches also differ in important respects. Gaus’s framework is fundamentally procedural and social. Moral justification emerges from the self-organization of diverse agents converging on shared rules. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s framework is teleological and individualistic. Rights are grounded in the nature of human flourishing as an objective good that each person must achieve in his or her own way. Gaus is more optimistic than Hayek about the capacity of evolved moral psychology to sustain the Open Society. Rasmussen and Den Uyl are more confident that a robust ethical foundation can be articulated without imposing a particular conception of the good on others. Gaus’s account risks leaving the Open Society normatively underdetermined and vulnerable to the objection that if some other arrangement produced more prosperity or coordination, it would be justified. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s account supplies a non-consequentialist ground: the right to self-direction is justified because self-direction is a necessary condition for human flourishing, and human flourishing is the ultimate standard of value.

 Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s metanormative framework provides the normative foundation that Gaus’s evolutionary account presupposes but cannot itself generate. Gaus shows that the Open Society is grounded on evolved moral foundations. Rasmussen and Den Uyl show why those foundations are not merely contingent facts but expressions of a deeper teleological structure. The Open Society is an emergent order that creates the conditions for human flourishing, and human flourishing is the ultimate end that justifies and limits political power. Liberty and flourishing are not opposed but interdependent. Liberty is the political condition for flourishing, and flourishing is the moral purpose of liberty.

In an age of polarization and skepticism about liberal institutions, this synthesis offers a defense of freedom that is both empirically grounded and ethically robust. Gaus’s evolutionary-epistemic framework explains the fragility and complexity of the Open Society; Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s neo-Aristotelian perfectionism explains why it deserves our understanding and our defense. Together, they articulate a vision of a free society that emerges spontaneously yet serves the ultimate end of human flourishing.

 

Conclusion

 

The relationship between Gerald Gaus’s The Open Society and Its Complexities and Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Norms of Liberty and The Perfectionist Turn illustrates the potential value of integrating evolutionary social science with neo-Aristotelian political philosophy. Gaus demonstrates how evolved moral capacities, cultural development, and self-organized complexity can help sustain an open society characterized by cooperation and diversity. Rasmussen and Den Uyl provide a complementary and underpinning ethical foundation by explaining why individual rights should protect the conditions necessary for self-directed human flourishing.

 

The resulting synthesis recognizes that an open society requires both an understanding of how cooperative social order develops and a defensible account of the principles that should govern it. Evolutionary success alone cannot determine moral legitimacy, while abstract principles alone cannot explain the full complexity of social life.

 

Individualistic perfectionism supplies a philosophical standard for evaluating the moral and political institutions that evolutionary processes produce. Metanormative rights protect the freedom necessary for individuals to pursue diverse forms of flourishing, while the insights of spontaneous-order theory help explain how those individuals can cooperate peacefully without a centrally imposed plan.

References

Bates, Winton. 2025. “How Can the Study of Human Nature Help Us Reach Normative Conclusions in Political Philosophy”. Freedom and Flourishing  (Oct. 31).

 Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

 Gaus, Gerald. 2011. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 Gaus, Gerald. 2016. The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gaus, Gerald. 2021. The Open Society and Its Complexities. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hayek, Friedrich A., 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 Hayek, Friedrich A. 1973. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1: Rules and Order*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 Popper, Karl R. 1945. The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

----------------------------“How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

---------------------------“How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 2, 2025.

----------------------------- “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

----------------------------- “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

----------------------------- “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

 ----------------------------- “Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. March 19, 2026.

----------------------------- “Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. June 4, 2026. 

----------------------------- “The Architecture of Freedom: Randy Barnett’s Natural Law Case for a Free Society” Freedom and Flourishing. June 26, 2026.

----------------------------- “Robust Political Economy and Neo-Aristotelianism: Complementary Visions of Freedom and Flourishing” Freedom and Flourishing. July 10, 2026.

------------------------------ “Is Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Consistent with Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 26, 2026.

-------------------------------"Henry B. Veatch’s Neo-Aristotelian Defense of Reality, Reason, and Rights” Freedom and Flourishing. August 30, 2026.

-------------------------------- "Behavioral Economics and Human Flourishing: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective” Freedom and Flourishing. October 4, 2026.