Showing posts with label Why freedom?. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Why freedom?. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 24, 2025

What do Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives tell us about Flourishing Individualism?

 


This is a guest essay by Dr Theodore N. (Ted) Pauls.

Ted Pauls holds a Doctorate in Higher Education Administration and serves as a Professor of Business at Bethany College (Bethany, West Virginia). He has 32 years of college teaching experience including Bethany, Wheeling Jesuit University, and West Liberty University. He also currently serves as the President of the Brooke County Board of Education. Prior to entering academe, Ted served as a Marketing Director for a privately held corporation and as a stockbroker.

In my view, the topic of Ted’s essay is highly relevant to people who live in the liberal democracies. I often hear people claim that the priority given to personal freedom in those societies has caused them to become excessively individualistic. How can defenders of individual liberty respond to those who claim that excessive individualism has contributed to narcissistic behaviour, social isolation, and mental illness? We can’t deny that many individuals lack integrity in their dealings with others. We can’t deny that many individuals live lonely lives, lacking positive relationships with others. We can’t deny that many individuals seek to escape from reality and that some of them end up delusional.

However, we can explain that it is wrong to jump to the conclusion that the solution to those problems lies in further restricting opportunities for individual self-direction. We can explain that humans cannot fully flourish unless they have opportunities to exercise the practical wisdom and integrity required to direct their own lives in accordance with goals they choose and values they endorse. And we can also explain that the kind of individualism that we endorse is the flourishing individualism that Ted Pauls writes about in the following essay.

Ted writes:

 Flourishing individualism is a philosophical vision that places the rational, morally responsible individual at the center of ethics, politics, and human life. It is an ideal that affirms the dignity of the person, the objectivity of value, and the necessity of freedom—not merely as a constraint on power, but as the essential condition for human excellence. This article develops a theory of flourishing individualism by integrating key insights from three related and foundational works:

  • Leonard Peikoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (1991),
  • Edward W. Younkins’s Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism (2011), and
  • Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen’s The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics (2016).

Each of these works contributes to a shared theme: the defense of individual flourishing as the core moral aim and the view that political society exists to enable, not direct, that flourishing. Peikoff articulates Ayn Rand’s Objectivist ethics and politics as a fully integrated philosophical system grounded in reason, egoism, and laissez-faire capitalism. Younkins seeks to synthesize Aristotelian virtue ethics, Austrian economics, and Objectivist principles to argue that human happiness and social cooperation are best achieved in a free society. Den Uyl and Rasmussen develop a metanormative liberalism in which the moral diversity of flourishing individuals is protected by political principles that are themselves ethically grounded but non-perfectionist in character.

The result of their combined perspectives is a powerful moral and political framework that answers the challenge of modern pluralism without surrendering the objectivity of value. It is a theory that preserves the ethical centrality of virtue and the reality of human goods while insisting on the primacy of liberty and individual responsibility. This article unfolds this framework in five parts: (1) the moral foundations of individual flourishing, (2) the structure of virtue and self-perfection, (3) the social context of flourishing, (4) the political principles that protect freedom, and (5) the philosophical implications of flourishing individualism for contemporary thought.

The Moral Foundations of Flourishing

At the heart of flourishing individualism is the idea that human life has an objective standard of value and that each individual must discover and pursue their own good through rational action. This view stands in opposition to both subjectivist relativism and collectivist moralities that subordinate the individual to external purposes.

Peikoff Explains Rand on Reason and on Life as the Standard of Value


Leonard Peikoff, in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand presents a moral framework that begins with the facts of human nature. This book is the first comprehensive statement of Rand’s philosophy. Peikoff discusses Rand’s views on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics. Rand’s philosophy asserts that existence exists independently of consciousness, that reason is the primary means of understanding the world and one’s place in it, and that individuals should act in pursuit of their own self-interest. Ayn Rand’s ethics, as he explains, holds that value is that which one acts to gain or keep, and that the fundamental alternative at the base of value is life versus death. Since human beings do not survive automatically, but by the use of reason, the standard of value is not mere survival, but rational flourishing—living as the kind of being one is.

This leads to a morality of rational egoism. The purpose of morality is not to sacrifice the self for others, nor others for the self, but to guide each individual in achieving their own happiness through the use of reason. Moral principles are principles of self-perfection, of the kind of character and action required to live a fully human life.

Objectivist ethics is thus neither altruistic nor hedonistic. It affirms the individual as an end in himself and views the pursuit of one’s own rational interests as both morally right and practically necessary. It calls for independence, integrity, productivity, and pride—virtues that are both personally fulfilling and socially beneficial.

Rand’s Objectivism holds that an individual’s choice to live is required for ethical obligations to exist. On the other hand, Younkins, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen all maintain that there is an ethical obligation to choose life because life is one’s natural end and good and therefore choiceworthy.

Younkins on Flourishing and Human Nature


Edward W. Younkins, in Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society, expands on this foundation by situating it within the broader tradition of Aristotelian eudaimonism. He argues that human beings have a nature with specific potentials and that morality consists in actualizing these potentials over the course of a lifetime. Flourishing (or eudaimonia) is an activity of the soul in accordance with reason and virtue.

Younkins draws on Aristotle, Rand, contemporary neo-Aristotelian philosophers, Austrian economists, and others to argue that flourishing is not reducible to pleasure, wealth, or external success. It is a state of integrated self-realization involving rationality, moral character, purposeful work, and meaningful relationships. It requires that individuals make choices consistent with their nature and long-term well-being.

Crucially, flourishing cannot be given or imposed—it must be chosen and achieved. This emphasis on agency echoes Objectivism’s moral individualism while adding a richer account of the variety and depth of human goods. The good life is not a fixed pattern but a dynamic process of self-perfection.

He also explains that Objectivist claims of value objectivity and claims of Austrian economists are compatible because that involve different levels of analysis. Rand’s sense of value-objectivity complements the Austrian sense of value-subjectivity because personal flourishing on an objective level transcends subjective value preferences.

Younkins’s book presents the essentials of a potential paradigm or conceptual framework for individual human flourishing in a free society. It is an attempt to forge an understanding from various disciplines and to integrate them into consistent, coherent, and systematic whole. His goal is to have a paradigm in which the views of reality, human nature, knowledge, values, action, and society make up an integrated whole. He recognizes that his potential framework will grow and evolve as scholars engage and extend its ideas.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen on Individualistic Perfectionism


Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen, in ThePerfectionist Turn, argue that ethical theory must return to a teleological and perfectionist framework that recognizes the centrality of human flourishing. Against dominant trends in analytic philosophy that treat ethics as a matter of rules, duties, or utility, they insist that the good life is the ultimate standard of evaluation.

Their contribution lies in developing a concept of “individualistic perfectionism”: the view that the good is self-perfection, but that this perfection takes diverse forms based on individual contexts, capacities, and choices. Flourishing is not a single ideal life but a framework in which many legitimate variations of the good life are possible.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen define human flourishing as objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed, and social. A person’s flourishing is desired because it is desirable and choice-worthy.

This view preserves the objectivity of morality while respecting the uniqueness of persons. It sees ethics as aspirational, not prohibitive—as a guide to excellence rather than a list of constraints. And it affirms the value of individual agency, creativity, and responsibility in moral development.

 Den Uyl and Rasmussen defend a template of responsibility, rather than a template of respect, as a framework within which to based one’s self-perfection. This agent-centered template recognizes the existential condition that each responsible and choosing individual must make a life for himself. Under this template self-direction and integrity are central to morality because personal responsibility for one’s life is primary.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen explain that political philosophy is unavoidably tethered to deeper, more foundational. and comprehensive perspectives and frameworks regarding reality, human nature, and ethics, Championing the tethered character of political philosophy, Den Uyl  and Rasmussen advocate individualistic perfectionism and the template of responsibility for a person’s self-perfection.

The Virtues of Flourishing: Self-Perfection in Practice

Flourishing individualism depends not only on abstract principles but on the cultivation of character. Virtue is the bridge between human nature and human flourishing: it is the habitual excellence of the soul in action.

All of these thinkers agree that virtues are not mere social conventions or rules of obedience but rational habits that support an individual’s life and happiness. While they differ in terminology and emphasis, they converge on a core set of traits that enable a flourishing life.

Objectivist Virtue Theory

Peikoff identifies seven cardinal virtues in Ayn Rand’s ethics: rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride. Each of these is a rational requirement of life, rooted in the objective needs of human survival and flourishing.

  • Rationality is the primary virtue: it is the commitment to reason as one’s only source of knowledge and guide to action.
  • Independence follows from rationality: it is the reliance on one’s own judgment rather than on the beliefs or authority of others.
  • Integrity is fidelity to one’s rational principles.
  • Honesty is the refusal to fake reality.
  • Justice is the principle of judging others objectively and giving them what they deserve.
  • Productiveness is the creation of material values.
  • Pride is moral ambitiousness—a commitment to achieving one’s moral worth.

These virtues are not sacrifices but achievements. They are the means by which an individual shapes a life worth living.

Younkins on Integrated Living

Younkins expands this list by emphasizing the integration of mind, body, and character. He argues that flourishing involves not just isolated traits but the harmonious development of the whole person. This includes intellectual virtues like wisdom and understanding, moral virtues like courage and benevolence, and practical virtues like industry and perseverance.

He also stresses the importance of purposeful work and the creation of value. Echoing Rand and the Austrians, Younkins sees economic activity not as a separate sphere but as an expression of human creativity and agency. Work is not a mere means to leisure; it is part of the good life.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen on the Diversity of Excellence

Den Uyl and Rasmussen agree that virtue is central but emphasize that virtue must be contextualized. Because flourishing is individualized, the specific content of virtue can vary with personal identity, role, and situation. What prudence or courage demands may differ between a soldier, a scholar, and an entrepreneur.

They resist reducing virtue to rule-following or to a fixed ideal life. Instead, they see it as a dynamic and developmental concept: excellence in the use of practical reason to navigate the world in pursuit of self-perfection. This view aligns with Aristotle’s emphasis on phronesis (practical wisdom) as the master virtue guiding others.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen add practical wisdom (prudence) to the Objectivist list of virtues. They explain that reason is a self-directing activity and that practical wisdom is the excellent use of practical reason and the central integrating virtue of a flourishing life.

The Social Context of Flourishing

Flourishing is personal, but it is not solitary. Human beings are social by nature, and many goods—friendship, love, trade, knowledge—require the presence of others. The moral vision of flourishing individualism recognizes this fact without collapsing the individual into the collective.

The Role of Trade and Civil Society

Peikoff emphasizes that trade—both economic and spiritual—is the proper mode of human interaction. In a society of rational individuals, people deal with one another by mutual consent for mutual benefit. Force, fraud, and parasitism are morally and practically incompatible with a flourishing life.

Younkins adds that civil society—the network of voluntary institutions, markets, and communities—is the natural habitat for human flourishing. Drawing on Austrian economics, he shows how spontaneous order arises from the free choices of individuals pursuing their own goals. Markets are not chaotic or amoral but forms of cooperation that reflect human values.

Younkins explains that an entrepreneur attains wealth and his other objectives by providing people with goods and services that further flourishing on earth. He views entrepreneurs as specialists in prudence—the virtue of applying one’s talents to the goal of living well. In turn, Den Uyl and Rasmussen see a parallel between entrepreneurship and moral conduct. They discuss the creativity of human beings both in producing wealth and in building moral character, two enterprises that require alertness, insight, and evaluation and are parts of a flourishing life. They explain that both ethical wealth and economic wealth are a function of one’s actions taken to produce a good life.

Virtue and Community

While the state must not impose virtue, communities and relationships play an essential role in cultivating it. Younkins, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen all stress the importance of cultural norms, moral education, and social practices that support character development. Families, friendships, institutions of learning, and the arts all contribute to the conditions of flourishing.

But these institutions must be voluntary and diverse. The ethical pluralism of flourishing individualism requires a social order that permits experimentation, innovation, and personal growth.

Political Philosophy and the Framework for Flourishing

Ethics identifies the good life for the individual; political philosophy identifies the kind of social order that makes the pursuit of that life possible.

Peikoff, Rand, and Objectivism: Rights as Moral Principles

Peikoff and Rand emphasize that because human beings survive by reason, and because reason is a volitional faculty, freedom is the political condition required for moral agency. Rights are objective principles that protect the individual’s freedom to act.

The proper political system, therefore, is laissez-faire capitalism: a system that protects rights and bans the initiation of force. It is not morally neutral but grounded in the recognition that each individual has a moral right to live for their own sake.

Younkins: Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Civil Society

Younkins explains that the natural negative right to liberty is concerned with regulating conditions for human flourishing They are not directly concerned with promoting the attainment of flourishing. He agrees with Den Uyl and Rasmussen’s long held view that rights are metanormative principles that protect self-directedness, a universal requirement to all manifestations of human flourishing.

He also demonstrates that political freedom enables the emergence of complex, adaptive systems—markets, associations, cultural norms—that support flourishing. He draws on Austrian insights to argue that no central planner can substitute for the decentralized knowledge and creativity of individuals.

This view also entails limits on political authority. The state must be constrained by rule of law and dedicated to protecting liberty—not managing outcomes or mandating virtues.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen: The Metanormative Structure of Liberalism

Unlike Rand, Den Uyl and Rasmussen (as well as Younkins) distinguish between normative and metanormative principles. Ethics is normative: it guides individuals in living well. Politics is metanormative: it defines the conditions under which individuals can peacefully pursue diverse goods.

This leads to a perfectionist yet non-perfectionist liberalism: one that values flourishing and virtues but refrains from legislating them. The liberal order is justified not by neutrality but by its compatibility with ethical pluralism and moral agency.

Philosophical Implications and the Future of Flourishing Individualism

Flourishing individualism reconciles objectivity with freedom, pluralism with virtue, and individuality with community.

It offers:

  • Objectivity without authoritarianism: Morality is real, but political authority is limited.
  • Pluralism without relativism: There are many good lives, but not all lives are equally good.
  • Agency in a world of systems: Individuals are not products of structures but shapers of their own destiny.
  • A humanistic ideal: The individual is not a cog in the machine but a creator of values.

In a time of cultural fragmentation and political overreach, this philosophy offers a bold and humane alternative. It calls on us to build a society that respects liberty, cultivates virtue, and honors the rationality and free will of each person.

Together, these books by Peikoff, Younkins, and Den Uyl and Rasmussen provide essential  ideas for a robust framework for understanding flourishing individualism—a life of rational self-interest, virtue, and freedom.


References

Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Douglas B. Rasmussen. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

Peikoff, Leonard. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York: Dutton, 1991.

Younkins, Edward W. Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2011.

Thursday, May 29, 2025

Are integralists opposed to natural rights?

 


Who are integralists? And why should anyone be interested in their views about natural rights?


I knew next to nothing about integralists before reading Kevin Vallier’s book, All the Kingdoms of the World, published in 2023. I read the book because of my interest in political movements that may pose a threat to liberty. By examining integralism, the author aims to help liberals and post-liberals to understand religious anti-liberalisms.

Vallier writes:

“Catholic integralists say that governments must secure the earthly and heavenly common good. God authorizes two powers to do so, they assert. The state governs in matters temporal, and the church in matters spiritual. Since the church has a nobler purpose than the state (salvation), it may authorize and direct the state to support it with certain policies, such as enforcing church law. At times, the church may need assistance to advance its objectives.”

After reading that, my first thought was that it would be necessary for Catholics to make up a high proportion of the population of a country before integralism could possibly be a force to be reckoned with. The idea that governments should enforce Catholic church law in countries like the United States and Australia would seem almost as preposterous to most citizens as the idea that the governments of those countries should enforce Sharia law.

Yet, groups of people who have strong anti-liberal convictions (socialists and environmental activists as well as religious extremists) often find ways to exert political influence that is disproportionate to the numbers of their supporters.

Vallier suggests that the modern integralist movement was founded around 2012 as a movement for spiritual renewal based on views of Thomas Pink. However, integralism has been transformed by Adrian Vermeule and his allies to have a greater focus on politics. Vallier suggests:

“Vermeule is building a new anti-liberal elite designed to steer the New Right.”

Rather than attempt to provide a comprehensive review of Vallier’s book, I focus here on the views of Adrian Vermeule and their implications for natural rights.

The views of Adrian Vermeule

Vermeule is a Harvard law professor, and a leading scholar in administrative law. He became interested in integralism soon after his conversion to Catholicism in 2016.

Vermeule has little to say about integralism as an ideal. His focus is on “helping integralists to develop a serious theory of the state and a theory of state capture.”

Vallier notes that Vermeule builds on Patrick Deneen’s criticism of liberalism in his book, Why Liberalism Failed. In response to Deneen’s book, I wrote an essay entitled, “Is John Locke responsible for the failings of liberal democracy?” I suggested that Deneen’s argument that John Locke is responsible for the failings of liberal democracy stems from a mis-reading of a paragraph in the Second Treatise of Government. Nevertheless, I welcomed Deneen’s support for practices that sustain culture within communities and his recognition that it is important for members of self-governing communities to have exit rights.  

Vermeule rejects Deneen’s belief that “Politics and human community must percolate from the bottom up, from experience and practice.” Vermeule argues that in order to protect religious communities, Catholics must take over the state and destroy liberalism from the top down.

Vermeule brought to integralism a non-originalist, non-contextualist legal philosophy. Rather than adopting the usual approach of American conservatives who read the U.S. Constitution according to the framer’s intent or the text’s plain meaning, Vermeule argues that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with “the common good”.

The concept of “common good” is linked to natural law. Natural law is seen to direct humans to pursue goods that help them to flourish. Since humans flourish in groups, natural law determines the common good for each group as a whole. An effective criminal justice system is an example of a common good.

However, Vallier tells us that Vermeule seeks to advance the common good theologically as well as politically via a strong administrative state:

“The state can help citizens grasp and follow the natural law, promote the earthly common good, and even help them pursue the heavenly common good—corporate salvation in Christ. The administrative state serves as the church’s deputy for the salvation of souls.”

Vermeule’s vision of “integration from within” requires integralists to capture the state and turn it toward religious objectives. That will be possible, he asserts, because liberalism is doomed.  The tendency of liberals to push for new liberties will eventually exceed the populace’s appetite for freedom. As members of the public object to whatever appears on the progressive liberal agenda beyond legalisation of divorce, contraception, abortion, same-sex marriage and transgenderism, the persecution of non-liberals will become more aggressive. Non-liberals will crave the return of “strong gods”.  

Vermeule apparently believes that “a small, devoted cadre can instigate a Catholic-led American counterrevolution against liberalism.” Vallier suggests that in Vermeule’s view, Catholics have only two options: “become rulers or become subjects.” He states:

“Make no mistake: Vermeule means to install a ruler.”

Vallier discusses several reasons why a peaceful transition to integralist rule is unlikely to be possible. The most important point he makes is that even if Vermeule is correct about the collapse of liberalism, he has “no story” about why integralism must follow liberalism. Integralists would be competing with other groups. They would struggle to dominate Catholics with more moderate views and nonviolent unbaptized resistors, let alone “violent and enraged” progressives.

Vallier also argues that, once established, an integralist order would lack moral stability.  His line of argument is somewhat complicated, but his main point seems to be that “the integralist ideal depends on people acting from a firm grasp of the true good” rather than from fear.  He notes that Václav Havel’s observation that under communist rule in Eastern Europe everyone ended up complying with authoritarian social norms to avoid punishment, rather than from moral conviction.

The relevance of natural rights

The only reference I could find to natural rights in Vallier’s book is in a reference to John Finnis’s book, Natural law and Natural Rights. Vallier discusses human rights in the context of Catholic social thought. He notes:

“The Catholic Church embraces many such rights. These include the right to health care, the right to vote, and freedom of religion. Catholic social thought claims that governments exist to protect universal human rights. The church has not set natural law aside, though. When we talk about human rights, we thereby talk about natural law.”

At that point, the author provides a reference to Finnis’s book (pages 198-200) which contains a discussion of the grammar of rights. In his discussion of natural law and natural rights, Finnis notes that some values have been widely recognized in all human societies. All human societies show a concern for the value of human life, cooperation, property, and reciprocity. That provides the background against which Finnis develops his list of basic values, including life, sociability, and practical reasonableness. Practical reasonableness requires one “to bring one’s own intelligence to bear effectively … on choosing one’s actions and lifestyle, and shaping one’s own character”. Finnis argues that an important implication of practical reasonableness is that “it is always unreasonable to choose against any basic value, whether in oneself or in one’s fellow human beings.”

I can understand why Vallier views human rights in the context of Catholic social thought. Since one of his aims is to “reach out to those skeptical of liberal order”, none of his arguments “presupposes liberal commitments”. I hope he persuades many readers that integralism is inconsistent with the declaration of religious freedom adopted by the Second Vatican Council in 1965. However, from my perspective (as a non-Catholic) that doesn’t get to the heart of the matter.

In my view, the heart of the matter is whether integralism is consistent with recognition of natural rights. From my reading of Vallier’s book, it seems obvious that integralists are opposed to government recognition of the natural rights of individuals. For example, integralists want governments to help them to discourage heresy and apostasy.

As I see it, the best way to defend classical liberalism from the advocates of integralism, Sharia law, communism, illiberal progressivism, and every other brand of authoritarianism, is by promoting an understanding that government recognition of natural rights offers a solution to the social problem of enabling people to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of any person or group being given preference over that of others. Drawing extensively on the wisdom of other people, I sought to explain that approach in my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing.   

Tuesday, April 1, 2025

Can the concept of political entrepreneurship help us to understand authoritarianism?

 


In this essay I discuss the relevance of the concept of political entrepreneurship to an understanding of political outcomes that have substantially affected personal and economic freedom in different countries. The essay has a particular focus on authoritarianism. My understanding of that concept is based on  the view of Hans Eysenck that people who have an authoritarian personality are attracted to the possibility of oppressing others. People who have authoritarian values see such oppression as justified. Authoritarian governments oppress people by restricting their personal and economic freedom to a greater extent than other governments.

The essay focuses on political outcomes which seem incongruent with underlying cultural values in a range of countries. It suggests that political entrepreneurship has influenced the ideologies currently reflected in personal and economic freedom in those countries. It also considers the current role of political entrepreneurship in harnessing cultural and economic grievances to pursue a range of different ends in the liberal democracies.

The essay draws on some of my previous research on the extent to which cultural values can explain authoritarianism and on the influence of cultural backlash and economic grievances on political outcomes in liberal democracies. That research is summarized prior to considering the nature and relevance of political entrepreneurship.

Can cultural values explain authoritarianism?

My answer to that question is that cultural values do not fully explain authoritarianism – the ideologies of some governments are at variance with cultural values. The best way to explain how I came to that conclusion is by referring readers to the accompanying graph which shows levels of economic freedom and personal freedom for 85 countries. Please note that the personal freedom scale on the vertical axis is in reverse order with highest levels of personal freedom at the bottom. (The graph has previously been published in an article in The Savvy Street in 2023.)

Please focus on the labelling of data points. I have attached country labels only to those data points where freedom ratings are substantially different from predicted levels based on indexes of emancipative and facilitating values which were constructed using World Values Survey data. The methodology for constructing these indexes is explained in the Savvy Street article and on this blog (here and here).

The colour of the labelled points depends on whether freedom is greater than or less than predicted—green if greater than predicted, red if less than predicted. The size of the labelled points is larger if both personal and economic freedom are greater than or less than predicted.

It is clear from the graph that freedom ratings of most of the countries with low personal and economic freedom are substantially lower than predicted by corresponding emancipative and facilitating values. The countries in which both personal and economic freedom is less than predicted include China, Iran and Venezuela. It seems obvious that suppression of liberty in those countries is a product of the ideologies of the governments concerned rather than the cultural values of the peoples.  

The graph also shows that a substantial number of countries with relatively high personal and economic freedom are performing better in that regard than can readily be explained on the basis of prevailing values. Most of the countries concerned are not the high-income countries of North America, Western Europe, Oceania, and East Asia that come to mind when one thinks of countries with relatively high levels of economic and personal freedom.

The existence of countries in which freedom levels are substantially greater than predicted by facilitating and emancipative values suggests that government support for economic and personal freedom may precede or accompany the evolution of facilitating and emancipative values. The transition to high levels of economic freedom often takes place over an extended period. As market-friendly economic reforms promote the growth of economic opportunities, this could be expected to lead to the gradual evolution of facilitating values supporting higher levels of economic freedom. The growth of economic opportunities could be expected to encourage people to place higher value on personal autonomy and to become more trusting of others.

Milton Friedman observed that economic freedom “promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other” (Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 1982, 9). As economic development proceeds, the evolution of emancipative values provides additional support for personal freedom.

The correlation between economic and personal freedom is strikingly evident in the graph. There are not many countries with relatively high personal freedom and low economic freedom, or vice versa. Argentina—which stands out as the only country having high personal freedom despite low economic freedom—helps illustrate why that is so. In the published article, I suggested:

“In Argentina, the decline in economic freedom over the last 20 years has been accompanied by worsening economic prospects, which seem likely to lead, before long, to an economic and political crisis. Hopefully, the political response to the crisis will be to restore greater economic freedom and make personal freedom more secure, rather than to restrict personal freedom to suppress criticism of government policies.”

A few months after that comment was published, Javier Milei was elected president of Argentina and has successfully introduced policy reforms to expand economic freedom. (Unfortunately, I cannot claim that my essay was influential in bringing that about.)

Cultural and economic grievances as explanators of political change

In the preceding essay on this blog I discuss the question: “Is cultural backlash a major determinant of political outcomes in the liberal democracies?” My intial focus was on the view which Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart presented in their book, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism (2019),  that the spread of post-materialist values has induced a cultural backlash among cultural conservatives. They suggested on that basis that the combination of authoritarianism and populist rhetoric is a threat to liberal democracy.

In my view, Norris and Inglehart were mistaken in attributing cultural backlash to the spread of post-materialist values. I argued that it would be more correct to attribute cultural backlash to the illiberalism of progressives who have been advocating what Yascha Mounk has described as the identity synthesis (see: The Identity Trap, 2023). The identity synthesis has provoked a backlash because it rejects neutral rules like equal opportunity and free speech in favour of action to promote the interests of particular groups that have suffered from discrimination in the past.

Some recent research by John Burn-Murdoch, published in the Financial TimesWhy the Maga mindset is different’, March 7, 2025) has suggested that over the last 20 years the values held by people who identify with the right wing of U.S. politics has moved closer to the values of people in Turkey, Russia and China than to people who identify with the right wing of politics in Europe. It remains to be seen what impact, if any, this apparent retreat from classical liberal values will have on the institutions of liberal democracy in the United States. 

Norris and Inglehart acknowledge that economic grievances also play an important role in encouraging people to support policy remedies proposed by populists. In that context, I have referred to some research published in an essay on this blog that has highlighted the adverse impact that slower economic growth can have on life satisfaction, particularly of young people. I suspect that the longer-term slowdown in economic growth in the liberal democracies might be more important in generating support for populist policies than are grievances that can be related directly to the impact of import competition or immigration.

However, we live in a world where the policies that political leaders sell to voters depend on how voters perceive reality. Those perceptions are not always accurate. Some opinion leaders on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics attempt to sell voters a distorted view of reality. As I wrote that I was reminded of a comment I made in my review of Michèle Lamont’s book, Seeing Others, 2023. I suggested:

On the question of factual accuracy, Lamont’s narrative, which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry with the wealthy one percent, seems to me to be just as questionable as Donald Trump’s narrative which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry about globalization and immigration. Neither of those narratives promotes an accurate understanding of economic reality.”

The concept of political entrepreneurship

Catherine De Vries and Sara Hobolt have suggested that competition between political parties in European countries is like competition in economic markets. In both contexts long-standing dominant players (firms or parties) may be challenged by disruptive new players. The central objective for both challengers and incumbents is the control of government and the delivery of public policies. Political entrepreneurs play a key role because a party that engages in successful political policy innovation can enjoy an effective monopoly on an issue and reap the consequent electoral benefits. (De Vries CE, Hobolt SB. Challenger Parties and Populism. LSE Public Policy Review. 2020; 1(1): 3, pp. 1–8. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31389/lseppr.3)

De Vries and Hobolt were writing about multi-party systems in which several political parties are competing for power. However, a similar form of competition occurs when an innovative political entrepreneur within a major political party challenges established leadership factions by offering a product that is more appealing to supporters of the party.

Valentina Ausserladscheider has contributed to an understanding of political entrepreneurism by providing a framework to consider reasons for the political success of Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, during the 1990s. Haider’s winning formula was based on a policy mix of authoritarian and and neoliberal policies, which was particularly successful during a time of economic turmoil and uncertainty. (See Chapter 9 of Culture, sociality, and morality : new applications of mainline political economy edited by Paul Dragos Aligica, Ginny Seung Choi, and Virgil Henry Storr, 2021).

Ausserladscheider emphasizes that the strategies of political entrepreneurs are not determined solely by voters’ ideological positions. Successful political entrepreneurs don’t offer the same policies as their competitors. They advance their political ambitions by focusing on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties do not satisfy, and on winning support by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas. For example, the entrepreneurial strategy of far-right parties is their “nationalist and nativist core ideology”, leading to policies such as immigration restrictions that are claimed to solve a range of problems.

As illustrated by the example of Jörg Haider, the strategies that political entrepreneurs follow to attract support can result in political programs that offer a mix of libertarian and authoritarian policies.

The influence of political entrepreneurs

From a cursory inspection of the accompanying graph, people who have rudimentary knowledge of global politics would have no difficulty identifying political entrepreneurs who have historically been major players determining outcomes in many jurisdictions where economic and personal freedom seems substantially at variance with underlying cultural values. There are good reasons for that. Media coverage tends to focus on political leaders, the challenges they face and the policies they adopt.

The role of political entrepreneurship is not always obvious in liberal democracies where the institutions of representative government have been respected for many decades. However, it doesn’t make sense to assume that changes in public opinion will be automatically reflected in public policy even in countries with representative government. In general, the responses of political markets to new information (e.g. poll data about shifts in public opinion on particular issues) depend to a much larger extent on decisions by big players than do responses to new information in financial and commodity markets.

A better understanding of the reasons why political entrepreneurs behave as they do might help us to assess whether current political developments are likely to expand or constrain economic and personal freedom. Those outcomes depend on both the motivations of the individuals concerned and on the social and economic context in which they operate.

Like other humans, political entrepreneurs are motivated by a range of factors. It is usually unrealistic to assume that they are motivated solely by a desire to maximize social welfare (whatever that means), to maximize the number of votes they obtain, to maximize personal wealth, or to obtain the perks of the office. Given the nature of their occupation, however, it seems reasonable to assume that political entrepreneurs obtain more satisfaction than most other people from constructing ideological narratives and selling them, and from exercising the political power required to implement policies.

In some instances, ideological predilections may play a dominant role. For example, while social and economic context helps to explain why revolutions occurred in China and Iran in the 20th century, the repression of individual liberty following those revolutions stemmed directly from the ideologies of revolutionary leaders - Mao Zedong in China and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.

Similarly, while the economic problems confronting the United States and Britain during the 1980s provided contexts in which substantial changes in the direction of economic and social policies could be contemplated, the responses of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher owe much to their respective commitments to economic freedom. The reforms currently being pursued by Javier Milei in Argentina seem to be similarly motivated.

Looking around the world, a range of different ideological predilections seem to be playing a role in policies advocated by political entrepreneurs. For example, we see ideological considerations playing a role among those seeking opportunities to expand the welfare state, to redistribute wealth, to promote “equity” for community groups which have suffered from discrimination in the past, to save the environment from CO2 emissions, to pursue international humanitarian goals, or to pursue nationalist goals by restricting immigration, raising trade barriers, and withdrawing from international organisations. Some of those policies have potential to impinge adversely on economic and personal freedom.

As we have seen earlier, even if political entrepreneurs are motivated mainly by a desire to exercise political power, the innovative aspect of their role requires them to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties (or factions) do not satisfy. They seek to attract support from people who are discontented with current economic and social outcomes by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas. Their success in attracting a loyal support base of customers who are willing to help them to sell their narrative depends to a large extent on the strength of competition from politicians selling different narratives, and on the extent of resistance by journalists and members of the public who consider their narratives to be incorrect or that their policy proposals are unworkable, unconstitutional, unethical, or otherwise unhelpful.

In my opinion, the ability of some political entrepreneurs (from both conservative and progressive sides of politics) to persuade large numbers of people to accept false narratives is posing an increasing threat to liberty in the liberal democracies. False narratives pose a threat to liberty because they often provide a basis for false beliefs that problems can be solved by restricting personal and economic freedom. For example, the personal freedom of people who refused vaccinations for Covid was restricted inappropriately in many countries because of false narratives that unvaccinated people were likely to spread infection. And economic freedom is currently being restricted in some countries through imposition of higher import barriers on the basis of false narratives about the impact of free trade.

A few decades ago, people seemed to have been more willing to put their trust in political commentators who took pride in remaining politically independent and well-informed. Those commentators were able to expose false narratives to a greater extent than now occurs, and thus to limit the influence of political entrepreneurs who base their policies on falsehoods.

In recent years, however, mainstream media has become increasingly polarized. The rise of social media seems to have aggravated the problem. Many exchanges of views about political issues on social media consist largely of recitations of false narratives promulgated by political leaders.

Some commentators who are independent and well-informed can still be found in both mainstream and social media, but prevailing cultures may need to give greater respect to the search for truth before those people will have sufficient influence to discourage political entrepreneurs from promoting false narratives.

Conclusions

Authoritarian and libertarian political outcomes don’t just appear out of nowhere. Underlying cultural values that have evolved over long periods of time go some of the way toward explaining levels of economic and personal freedom in different countries. However, political entrepreneurship also plays an important role.

The role of political entrepreneurs is most apparent in those countries where underlying cultural values are less supportive of economic and personal freedom. Political entrepreneurs have played an important role in some of those countries in promoting either more or less freedom than would be expected on the basis of underlying cultural values.

The role of political entrepreneurship has been more constrained in those liberal democracies where the institutions of representative government have been respected for many decades.

However, the ability of some political entrepreneurs (from both conservative and progressive sides of politics) to persuade large numbers of people to accept false narratives is posing an increasing threat to personal and economic freedom in the liberal democracies. Polarization of the media means that such claims are now less subject to independent scrutiny than they were a few decades ago.

Recent political developments are raising the question of whether cultural change in some liberal democracies has emboldened some political entrepreneurs to challenge conventions regarding government respect for judicial rulings on the legality of their activities. Governments that do not perceive themselves to be bound by judicial interpretation of laws and constitutions are unlikely to have much regard for individual liberty. Any government which claims that its actions are beyond legal challenge because they reflect the general will of the people is showing obvious signs of authoritarianism.


Addendum

Chris M Sciabarra has given me permission to publish the following comment, which he has provided by email:

"I just read the essay and enjoyed it; I'll have to give a bit more thought to it. You make some very good, persuasive points, though there are some claims that I need to process a bit more. I think the whole concept of political entrepreneurship has some weight here. I wonder how, for example, it might mesh not only with public choice thinking, but also with Hayek's insights about how the 'worst get on top' when political power becomes the only power worth having. If that's the case, then political entrepreneurship in a populist age morphs into a kind of political con game that attacks the very roots of liberal democracy---something you acknowledge in your conclusions.

One of the issues that concerns me is that while there was a backlash against the "identity synthesis" of illiberal progressives, I don't think that was the key factor that influenced the outcome of the election. Incumbent parties lost all around the world, whether they were perceived as 'right'- or 'left'-leaning. In the US, of course, Trump won over Harris. In the UK, the Conservative Party was defeated. The Liberal Democrats lost in Japan, while in France, a coalition of left-wing and centrist parties gained ground. And so forth. I think that inflation, stagnant wages, housing affordability, etc. led most incumbents to defeat because whoever is in power is the party that takes the blame for the conditions on the ground. 

That said, I also think that the "identity synthesis" on the illiberal left has only been replaced by a different kind of "identity synthesis" on the illiberal right, given the right's embrace of nationalism and, in many cases, a virulent form of nativism, riding on profound anti-immigrant fervor. Not to mention the illiberal right's obsession with scapegoating the smallest of minorities---like transgender-identifying people, who make up about 0.6% of the population. This is as much of an illiberal right-wing play on identity politics as anything we've seen on the left." 

Chris has now posted a more extensive review on Notablog . 

Notablog is also worth visiting for other reasons - including the opportunity to take a break from worrying about authoritarianism to listen to the "Song of the Day". 

An interesting diagram

I think the following diagram captures very well the illiberal cultures on the authoritarian socialist and authoritarian nationalist sides of politics, and the overlap between them.


Stephen Hicks posted the diagram on X and asked if anyone could tell him where it came from so that that he could give credit. I would also like to give credit to the person responsible for constructing this.

 

Monday, November 11, 2024

Did Robert Nozick hold a view of the evolution of natural rights that is similar to that held by John Hasnas?

 


This question came to mind while I was reading Chapter 4 of John Hasnas’s recently published book, Common Law Liberalism: A New Theory of the Libertarian Society. Chapter 4 was originally published in 2005 in Social Philosophy and Policy (22, 111-147) but I hadn’t previously read it.


In this chapter, entitled ‘Empirical Natural Rights’, Hasnas suggests that neither John Locke nor Robert Nozick offered adequate arguments for the existence of natural rights. (His discussion of Nozick focuses on Anarchy, State, and Utopia.) He offers an alternative conception of natural rights – empirical natural rights (ENR) – that evolve in the state of nature. He then proceeds to argue that ENR form a good approximation to the negative rights to life, liberty and property on which Locke and Nozick rest their arguments, and that ENR have instrumental moral value.

In the first part of this essay, I outline Nozick’s evolutionary explanation for emergence of the ethics of respect. Following that, I compare the evolutionary accounts offered by Hasnas and Nozick, and finish the essay considering the normative status of ENRs.

Nozick’s evolutionary explanation for the ethics of respect

As far as I know, Nozick never claimed to have provided an account of the evolution of natural rights, but I believe that he did so in Chapter 5 of Invariances (published in 2001). Since I outlined Nozick’s speculations about evolution of the ethics of respect in Chapter 2 of Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, I will reproduce some relevant paragraphs below:

“Nozick’s account of the evolution of the ethics of respect, draws upon biological evolution as well as cultural evolution. He suggests that the higher capacities of humans, including capacities for conscious thought, control of impulses and planning, have been selected for by evolution because of the benefits they bring, for example in enabling adherence to ethical norms.[i] Evolution may have shaped humans to enjoy the benefits of cooperative activity. A reputation for adhering to norms of cooperative behavior brings rewards by attracting further cooperation, and may have conferred reproductive advantages.[ii] A capacity for evaluating objects and desires might have been selected for, or exist as a beneficial side-effect of a combination of capacities.[iii] Conscious self-awareness may have been selected for because it makes humans capable of norm-guided behavior to mutual benefit.[iv]

Nozick suggests that internalization of norms brings ethics into play. Something other than (or in addition to) punishment by other people must support rules if they are to become ethical principles or values. The internalization of norms enables people to follow them when no-one is watching who can sanction deviations.[v]

The norm of social coordination and cooperation proposed by Nozick has these characteristics:

“It makes mandatory the widest voluntary cooperation to mutual benefit; it makes only that mandatory; and it (in general) prohibits interactions that are not to mutual benefit, unless they are entered into voluntarily by all parties, or unless these interactions (such as the act of punishing another) are in response to previous violation of the principle or to preparations to violate it”.[vi]

Moral progress, Nozick suggests, incorporates, among other things, shrinkage of the domain of mandatory morality to enable a domain of liberty and personal autonomy to be established, and for the ethics of respect to emerge.[vii] 

Nozick acknowledges that someone could agree that ethics originates in mutually beneficial coordinating activity and yet claim that conscious self-awareness is valuable for reasons other than norm following. He sums up:

“Still, if conscious self-awareness was selected for because it makes us capable of ethical behavior, then ethics, even the very first layer of the ethics of respect, truly is what makes us human. A satisfying conclusion. And one with some normative force”.[viii]

Since the ethics of respect entails recognition of Lockean rights, Nozick’s naturalistic explanation implicitly recognizes that such rights are natural.”

Comparison of Hasnas and Nozick

The differences between the evolutionary accounts offered by Hasnas and Nozick seem to me to amount to differences of emphasis. Nozick emphasized the link between conscious self-awareness and ethical behaviour, whereas Hasnas’s account seems to have a more Hayekian emphasis on evolution of rules that are not the result of deliberate human design. Hasnas emphasizes dispute settlement:

“Various methods for composing disputes are tried. Those that leave the parties unsatisfied and likely to again resort to violence are abandoned. Those that effectively resolve the disputes with the minimal disturbance to the peace of the community continue to be used and are accompanied by ever-increasing social pressure for disputants to employ them.

Over time, security arrangements and dispute settlement procedures that are well-enough adapted to social and material circumstances to reduce violence to generally acceptable levels become regularized.” (130)

 Hasnas acknowledges the normative significance of the rules that evolve:

“Over time, these rules become invested with normative significance and the members of the community come to regard the ways in which the rules permit them to act at their pleasure as their rights. Thus, in the state of nature, rights evolve out of human beings’ efforts to address the inconveniences of that state. In the state of nature, rights are solved problems.” (131)

The rules presumably came to have normative significance because people thought about them and recognized they had merit (aided by the persuasive efforts of Moses and other community leaders).

Hasnas does not claim that ENR fit the definition of natural rights as moral entitlements that humans possess simply by virtue of their humanity. He suggests that ENR are natural in the sense of having evolved in the state of nature and pre-date the formation of civil government.

I am not entirely persuaded that the distinction between ENR and natural rights is necessary. As far as I am aware, humanity didn’t exist prior to the biological and social evolution that resulted in the emergence of modern humans about 100,000 years ago.

Nevertheless, the question arises of whether it is possible to provide a normative justification for natural rights purely based on speculation about the evolutionary origins of ethical intuitions about rights to life, liberty and property.

The Normative Status of ENR

 Hasnas argues that ENR have instrumental moral value regardless of the moral theory and general approach to ethics one adopts:

“This is because empirical natural rights facilitate peaceful human interaction and peace is an important, if not pre-eminent moral value in virtually all moral theories.”

The author spends a few pages making this point. He has no difficulty persuading me of the importance of peace to the moral theory that I subscribe to. However, I see some groups of people in the world who claim to hold moral theories that support activities directed towards plundering, murdering, and enslaving others.

It seems to me that those of us who believe that peace is a pre-eminent moral value should be willing to provide explicit normative reasons why we consider peace to be so important.

 

 

 



[i] Nozick, Invariances, 243.

[ii] Nozick, Invariances, 246.

[iii] Nozick, Invariances, 276.

[iv] Nozick, Invariances, 299. Conscious self-awareness also enables each of us to recognize the existential responsibility of making a life for oneself. See: Den Uyl and Rasmussen, Perfectionist Turn, 7.

[v] Nozick, Invariances, 247-8.

[vi] Nozick, Invariances, 259.

[vii] Nozick, Invariances, 265.

[viii] Nozick, Invariances, 300.