Part VII: What kind of political entrepreneurship is required?

 This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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Can strong political leadership bring about institutional change leading to greater economic and personal freedom?  That idea is easy to challenge. It recalls the oft quoted passage by Lord Acton:

“Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority” (Acton 1887). 

Yet, powerful leadership has attractions to many citizens. I don’t think the question of whether strong political leadership could be consistent with greater economic and personal freedom should be dismissed out of hand.

Restoring order

The attraction of strong leadership is most understandable in chaotic situations where social order has broken down and lives, liberty and property are threatened by groups that have resorted to violence to pursue nefarious ends. Under such circumstances there may be grounds to hope that a strong leader will be able to restore order and protect the rights of individuals.

As Vincent Ostrom pointed out, the ubiquity of coercion means that order and organization in human societies depends upon a Faustian bargain involving use of organized force (Ostrom 1997, p.121). As explained by Paul Aligica and Peter Boettke:

“The implication is that social order and its institutional dynamics are perceived as shaped by and operating under the shadow of the ongoing tension between the threat of chaos and the threat of tyranny” (Aligica and Boettke 2009, p.61).

Benevolent despotism

Some of the best advice for despots who wish to promote freedom and flourishing was provided by Lao Tzu:

“Govern the state by being straight forward; wage war by being crafty; but win the empire by not being meddlesome” (Tzu 1963, LVII p.64).

Aristotle’s politics is somewhat more challenging to libertarians, but Fred D. Miller makes a strong case that it is not anachronistic to attribute to Aristotle a concept of individual rights and support for a moderate degree of liberalism. (Miller 1995, pp.373-378).

Robert Faulkner observes that Aristotle ranks greatness of soul as the "crown" needed to perfect all the virtues, including justice. He writes:

 “Aristotle calls greatness of soul a kosmos. It is an ornament of good character that is also an exalting order: an ordering heightened by an awareness of the grand activities such a soul calls for and is owed” (Faulkner 2007, loc. 250/3375). 

According to Faulkner:

“Aristotle's diagnosis comes to this: the great-souled man is at once drawn above humanity and drawn to humanity. He exhibits his superiority by aiding his fellows, and yet his wish is less to aid them than to avoid being or appearing dependent on them” (Faulkner 2007, loc. 565/3375).

Faulkner suggests that while Nicomachean Ethics seems to imply that greatness of the soul is a desirable attribute of political leaders, Aristotle moderates that view elsewhere in his writings. In Ethics, Aristotle suggests that greatness, especially great power, is overrated: “it is possible for one who is not a ruler of land and sea to perform noble action” (Faulkner 2007, loc. 692/3375).

In more recent times, Max Weber’s argument that effective leaders must have charisma may be relevant in considering the potential role of leaders in restoring liberty. Weber argued that effective leaders must have a charismatic form of authority because that is the only form of authority capable of overcoming the constraints of organisation, legality and tradition:

“Devotion to the charisma of the prophet, or the leader in war, or to the great demagogue in the ecclesia or in parliament, means that the leader is personally recognized as the innerly 'called' leader of men. Men do not obey him by virtue of tradition or statute, but because they believe in him” (Weber 1946, p.79).

Weber argued that charismatic authority is required for leaders to be effective in their struggle against the impersonal forces of bureaucratization. It tends to appear in moments of crisis, when the leader performs a ‘miracle’ for a group that feels otherwise impotent and deeply threatened. Xavier Márquez suggests that Weber's conception of charismatic authority allows some demagogues to play a genuinely democratic role in modern societies when viewed through contemporary theories of representation (Márquez 2024).

Thus far, the discussion suggests that it is not possible to rule out the possibility that a benevolent despot could promote freedom and flourishing if he or she wished to establish supportive institutions and had appropriate leadership qualities. However, that seems unlikely to be a frequent occurrence.

 Does autocracy support economic freedom?

The point was made earlier in this series (Part II) that it is easier to identify individual political leaders who have contributed to low or falling freedom levels than those who have contributed to high or rising freedom levels. That is because political entrepreneurship tends to be less focused on individual leaders in countries where governments have greater regard for individual liberty. 

Nevertheless, the idea that autocrats have sometimes helped produce better outcomes may not be entirely fanciful. There may be some substance lying behind folklore that attributes improvements in economic freedom to autocrats such as Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Park Chung Hee in South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and Augusto Pinochet in Chile.

However, even if it can be shown that in some instances autocrats have fostered greater economic freedom, and that this has been followed by improvements in personal freedom, it does not necessarily follow that a period of autocracy was necessary or justified. People in the countries concerned are better placed than foreign observers to make judgements about the use of force by autocrats in particular circumstances, but the idea that autocrats are more likely to make positive contributions to economic growth than democratic leaders does not stand up to scrutiny. William Easterly tested the proposition by relating economic growth outcomes to the periods during which autocratic and other leaders were in office. He found that “leaders matter very little” (Easterly 2013, pp. 308-26).

There is also strong empirical evidence that democracy, and the personal freedom associated with it, is compatible with high levels of economic freedom.

Which democracies are supporting economic freedom?

Vincent Geloso and Alex Tabarrok have assembled evidence that democracy and economic freedom are highly correlated. Except for Singapore and Hong Kong there are no jurisdictions with high levels of economic freedom that are not also democracies (Geloso and Tabarrok 2025, p.116). Countries which have experienced the greatest democratization (Peru, Taiwan, Portugal, Spain, and Greece) have also experienced improvements in economic freedom. There have also been substantial improvements in economic freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe which experienced democratization following the collapse of communism in 1989 (Geloso and Tabarrok 2025, pp. 125-8). Geloso and Tabarrok provide some strong arguments to explain the correlation between democracy and economic freedom that they observe.

It seems to me, however, that none of the explanations offered for the observed correlation between democracy and economic freedom provide grounds to allay concerns, discussed in the preceding essay, about the future of economic freedom in the long-standing democracies.

Economic freedom levels are beginning to slip in some of the long-standing democracies. While many of the newer democracies have been experiencing increased dynamism, the increasing entanglement of government, industry and community organisations in the long-standing democracies has been associated with a decline in dynamism.

There is not much evidence that either the progressive or conservative sides of politics in the long-standing democracies are currently offering policies to advance economic freedom. The progressive side of politics is tending to pursue social and environmental agendas without regard for their impact on economic freedom, or growth in productivity or incomes. The conservative side of politics is tending to pursue economic nationalist agendas without regard for their impact on economic freedom, or growth in productivity of incomes.

Experience suggests that substantial political support for economic freedom will return only after economic crises threaten to cause widespread misery. That raises the issue of what kind of political entrepreneurship might help to make economic freedom more secure in the long-established democracies.

Learning from previous reform experience

Some prominent political leaders in democracies have been able to pursue reforms directed toward expansion of economic freedom. During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan pursued such reforms in the USA, as Margaret Thatcher did in Britain. The reforms currently being pursued by Javier Milei in Argentina seem to be similarly motivated, but at the time of writing it is too soon to judge how highly Milei’s reforms will rate in terms of broad libertarian criteria. The economic problems confronting the United States and Britain in the 1970s and 80s provided the context in which political leaders could initiate substantial changes in the direction of economic and social policies. That is even more true of the economic circumstances in Argentina prior to Milei’s election.

The reform efforts by Reagan and Thatcher can be viewed as examples of heroic leadership which increased economic freedom. However, heroic leadership of that kind is not solely the prerogative of presidents and prime ministers. Similar reform efforts in New Zealand and Australia were led by government ministers responsible for economic policy, Roger Douglas and Paul Keating respectively, with prime ministers adopting a facilitating role.

Political leaders can rarely claim to be the authors of their reform strategies. Policy development that has led to greater economic freedom has drawn heavily on the ideas of prominent academics including Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, on policy analysis in think tanks and on contributions of a few journalists who understand the issues.

In some instances, advisers within government bureaucracies have also played an important role in policy development. Roger Kerr, who held the position of Executive Director of the New Zealand Business Roundtable following a career in the New Zealand Treasury, provided a highly relevant comment about the need for advisors to focus their advice on their fields of expertise rather than on politics:

“Economists of all people should be conscious that the performance of bureaucrats in trying to pick winners and losers in the policy-advice market is likely to be as unimpressive as in the industrial domain – and for much the same reasons, namely lack of information and incentives. Perceived policy constraints are not always immutable. They can be shifted by reasoned analysis and well-constructed strategies for policy change, developed by interaction between political managers and technical advisers. Second-guessing political reactions can lead to narrowing of policy options and does less than justice, in recent New Zealand circumstances at least, to the intelligence of a number of politicians, on both sides of the political fence, who have been more aware of the gravity of New Zealand’s economic problems and prepared to tell the story like it is than many of their advising bureaucrats” (Kerr 1987, pp. 144-45).

Alf Rattigan is a prime example of a public servant who played a major innovative role in driving economic reforms in Australia.  Rattigan was chairman of Australia’s Tariff Board from 1963 to 1974 when it was replaced by the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC). He stayed on as chairman of the IAC until 1976, when he retired with ill health. Rattigan used his influence in those positions to play a pivotal role in terminating Australia’s long history of industry protection, which in turn, helped open Australia to the global forces that drove further market-based economic reforms. In a lecture presented in 2016, Paul Kelly, Editor-at-Large for The Australian and Australia’s most scholarly journalist, outlined the main elements that contributed to the success of Rattigan’s reform efforts (Kelly 2016). One element of Rattigan’s success was his integrity in taking seriously his legal responsibility as chairman of an independent statutory authority, in the face of opposition from the government of the day which believed that he should “accept the overall tariff policy of the government as given” and work within that framework. Another element was the ability of his professional staff to draw upon the methodology for measurement of effective rates of protection developed by Professor Max Corden. A small group of economically literate journalists played a crucial role in giving publicity to analyses demonstrating the costs of protection. Some groups, including farmers and miners, recognized that their members were disadvantaged by high levels of protection provided to the manufacturing sector and formed a free trade lobby. David Trebeck, an influential figure in the National Farmers Federation, said: “We fired the ‘bullets’ made by the IAC.” More politicians because advocates of free trade and political leaders eventually showed leadership by recognizing that “good policy is good politics”.

Unfortunately, looking back today on the economic reform efforts of the 1980s and 90s, it is apparent that the important reforms in the rules of the game made at that time have not become deeply entrenched. Political leaders obtained sufficient electoral support to implement market-friendly policies, but there does not seem to be much evidence that members of the public improved their understanding of the benefits of free markets in any of the countries in which reforms were undertaken.

Mass movements

The problem of ensuring adoption of government policies that more consistently advance economic and personal freedom is not merely a question of how to elect political entrepreneurs with their hearts in the right place to national leadership positions. Experience has shown that the longevity of reforms cannot be guaranteed even when they are supported by a strong coalition of interest groups and result in more favourable economic opportunities for a large majority of the population.

In recent years, centre-left and centre-right governments which have followed policies that are broadly consistent with relatively high levels of economic and personal freedom have become vulnerable to competition from populist political entrepreneurs who prophesy catastrophic environmental and social consequences if their radical policy proposals are not followed. Populist policy innovators on the left and right sides of politics tend to promote vastly different fears, and to offer vastly different policies. However, one common feature of those populist policy innovators is their attempt to exploit a systematic anti-market bias among electors.

The pertinent question is how the anti-market bias of public opinion can be reduced. History suggests that this has occurred to some extent in the past via complex processes involving, among other things, political entrepreneurship in social movements. For example, Joel Mokyr notes that the move toward free trade in Britain in the first half of the 19^th century involved the influence of post-Smithian political economy, the growing political power of the new industrial elite, and debates about income distribution and food supply. He writes:

“The careers of Victorian free-traders such as Richard Cobden and John Bright and the liberal Tories of the post-1815 era represent the kind of mixture of economic interests and liberal ideology that eventually secured victory for free trade” (Mokyr 2009, p. 153).

Mikayla Novak has noted the importance of entrepreneurship in propelling social movements to extend the effective domain of freedom. In that context she notes that “people such as William Lloyd Garrison, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Lech Walesa, and Nelson Mandela” played an important role in “opposing unsatisfactory institutions and situations” although they, themselves, were not necessarily classical liberals by orientation” (Novak 2021, p. 45).

Is it possible that at some time in the future a broad social movement promoting classical liberal views could become sufficiently influential to ensure that children are offered as much tuition about the spontaneous order of the free market as they are currently offered about the workings of ecological systems in the natural environment? If that ever happens it will occur because of the actions of individuals.  As Edward W. Younkins has suggested, the task of building a free society depends on individual advocates of liberty who are “dedicated to preserving and strengthening the ideological and moral foundations of a free society”. Younkins notes that it is especially through the “numerous interactions with individuals” during their everyday lives that advocates of liberty can “transmit the freedom philosophy to the general public” (Younkins 2011, pp. 168-69).

Please see the final part of this series: Summary and Conclusions

References

Acton, Lord (John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton) Acton-Creighton Correspondence (1887) Acton-Creighton Correspondence | Online Library of Liberty

Aligica, Paul Dragos and Peter J. Boettke, Challenging Institutional Analysis and Development: The Bloomington School (Routledge, 2009).

Easterly, William, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (Basic Books, 2013).

Faulkner, Robert, The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and Its Critics (Yale University Press, 2007).

Geloso, Vincent and Alex Tabarrok. “Two Peas in a Pod: Democracy and Capitalism”, in Scott C. Miller and Sidney M. Milkis (eds.) Can Democracy and Capitalism be Reconciled (Oxford University Press, 2025).

Kelly, Paul., “Economic Reform: A lost cause or merely in eclipse”, Alf Rattigan Lecture (The Australian and New Zealand School of Government, 2016).

Kerr, Roger, “Ideas, Interests, Experience and the Economic Adviser”, World Economy, 10, no. 2 (1987) pp. 131-54.

Márquez, Xavier, “Max Weber, demagogy and charismatic representation”, European Journal of Political Theory (2024).

Miller, Fred D., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Clarendon Press, 1995).

Mokyr, Joel, The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain 1700 – 1850 (Yale University Press, 2009).

Novak, Mikayla, Freedom in Contention: Social Movements and Liberal Political Economy (Lexington Books, 2021).

Ostrom, Vincent., The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of Democracies (The University of Michigan Press, 1997).

Tzu, Lao., Tao Te Ching, D.C. Lau translation (Penguin Books, 1963).

Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocation”, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited and translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

Younkins, Edward W. Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society, Towards a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism (University Press of America, 2011).

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good?

 

I am writing this during an election campaign in Australia. By international standards, both chief contenders for public office could be aptly described as neither conspicuously great nor notoriously bad.

However, over the last three years, Australians have experienced the worst government that I can remember. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the political alternative on offer would have been much better.

During the current election campaign, both chief contenders for national leadership have seemed oblivious to the decline in productivity growth that caused the good times to stop rolling on in this country. It has apparently not registered with them that vote-buying spending proposals are less appropriate under such circumstances than economic reforms to restore productivity growth. Moreover, the election campaign is being conducted as though nothing that has happened recently in the international economic and political environment might require Australians to prepare for difficult times ahead.

Fortunately, the question that I have posed above does not require me to consider which of the contenders for national leadership is most worthy of being prime minister of Australia.

Before I go any further, however, I should outline my (somewhat complicated) view of party politics in liberal democracies. I have yet to see a system of government that is better than the two-party system at enabling voters to hold governments accountable for their actions. One of the downsides of that system, however, is that it provides a strong incentive for political parties to reward team players who are willing to set aside their own views to support a party line. The insincerity that is often on display in the public performance of politicians makes it is difficult to avoid regarding politics as a disreputable profession. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that democratic political systems sometimes produce leaders who are highly principled and effective in enhancing opportunities for human flourishing.  

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good? That question has arisen from previous research that I have undertaken about the roles of culture, ideology, and political entrepreneurship as factors influencing levels of economic and personal freedom in different countries. I will briefly outline some points emerging from that research before discussing Robert Faulkner’s book, The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and its Critics (2007).

Points emerging from previous research

• Cultural values do not fully explain levels of economic and personal freedom in different countries. Suppression of liberty in countries with relatively low levels of economic and personal freedom, e.g. China, Iran and Venezuela, is a product of the ideologies of the governments concerned rather than the cultural values of the peoples. Similarly, a substantial number of countries with relatively high personal and economic freedom are performing better in that regard than can readily be explained on the basis of prevailing cultural values.
• It is not difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have historically been major players determining outcomes in many jurisdictions where economic and personal freedom seems substantially at variance with underlying cultural values. There are good reasons for that. Media coverage tends to focus on political leaders, the challenges they face and the policies they adopt.
• Douglas North saw political entrepreneurship as being required to overcome high transactions costs involved in changing institutions – the rules of the game of society. There are high transactions costs associated with institutional change because institutions are path dependent, e.g. embedded in culture.
• Political entrepreneurship takes place within culture and is concerned with interpreting and influencing culture as well as formal rules (constitutions, laws and regulations). Some research suggests that successful political entrepreneurs tend to advance their ambitions by focusing on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties do not satisfy. They win support by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas.
• Max Weber argued that charismatic and demagogic leadership may be required to overcome the impersonal forces of bureaucratization within democracies. Demagogic leaders are responsible for their cause, and thus capable of intentionally and rationally directing state power towards its achievement.  
• Weber suggested that demagogic leadership can be consistent with democracy, but he seems to have left aside the question of whether a demagogic leader can be both good and great.

The essays from which those points were abstracted can be found here and here.

 The Case for Greatness

 In making the case for greatness Robert Faulkner observes that thoughtful citizens and appreciative historians have no difficulty in acknowledging the greatness of people like George Washington, Winston Churchill and Nelson Mandela. By contrast, many of those who generalize about human affairs display a doubting cynicism about such greatness. He notes that “social scientists speak much of rational maximizing, power seeking, self-interest, and popular voice, but not much of extraordinary judiciousness, honorable aims, and knowing justice” and that “influential professors of philosophy and literature talk confidently of autonomy and equal dignity, while deprecating ambition for office and accomplishment as elitist domineering or a remnant of repressive culture”.

The author’s key contention is that the accounts of political greatness by Aristotle, Plato, and Xenophon “illuminate our experiences of a Mandela or a Margaret Thatcher far better than the critical and doctrinal theorizing that is more familiar and has been in the works for three or four centuries”.

 The book begins by considering Aristotle’s account of an honorable and just form of grand ambition. It then considers the political dangers and psychological dynamics of the less bounded and less just forms of ambition, using Alcibiades and Cyrus as examples of individuals who seek to rule empires. That is followed by a chapter discussing George Washington as an example of a gentleman-statesman. Along the way, the author notes the role of Niccolo Machiavelli in turning the orientation of much thinking about human affairs from what men should do “from duty and the best life” to what men do to advance themselves and their followers in wealth and power. The final chapters discuss modern theories that obscure the moral-political phenomenon of political greatness and make it “peculiarly alien to our apprehension and sensibilities”. One of the final chapters is devoted to discussion of the egalitarian theories of John Rawls and Hannah Arendt. The other discusses the theories of Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche.

In what follows, I focus mainly on what the author has to say about Aristotle. Readers who are looking for a more comprehensive summary of The Case for Greatness should read the review by Paul A. Rahe.

Faulkner observes that Aristotle ranks greatness of soul as the "crown" needed to perfect all the virtues, including justice. He writes:

 “Aristotle does not mince words on this topic, and neither should we. No greatness without goodness, yes, but also no true goodness without greatness. The great-souled human being, in claiming a worthy stage, claims for human excellence the prominence and tasks it deserves. Accordingly, while greatness of soul "cannot exist without" such other virtues as moderation and justice, it also "enhances their goodness." A man of such virtue is too noble to stoop, or to accept the second best, especially in his own conduct. Aristotle calls greatness of soul a kosmos. It is an ornament of good character that is also an exalting order: an ordering heightened by an awareness of the grand activities such a soul calls for and is owed.”

Aristotle views the great-souled man as having a disposition to claim great honours because he considers himself worthy of them. The great-souled man has a true estimate of his own worth. He claims tasks that no-one else can do, or do as well. The great-souled man disdains the offices commonly sought by other ambitious people; he seeks the tribute and high offices that are “great things.

Aristotle equates greatness of the soul with magnanimity - which he also equates with excellence and justice. However, the great-souled man’s disposition is complicated because he seeks great positions and honours from others as well as virtue of soul for himself. Aristotle suggests that the great-souled man holds that nothing is greater than his own virtue and seems to regard any honour as less than what is due a soul of such worth.

The great-souled man’s desire for superiority may harbour a despotic impulse, but his virtue gives this impulse something of an honorable and just direction. Faulkner writes:

“It is the priority of virtue and honor, so understood, that largely distinguishes Aristotelian greatness of soul and a Washington.”

Later, he explains more fully:

“Knowledge of his virtue helps uphold the great man amidst changing fortune. Unlike Machiavelli's great man, his measure is not ambitious mastery of fortune, but living well amidst fortune's gifts and trials. It is after this purification of grand ambition that Aristotle sharply separates true pride from the all-too-common arrogance of the privileged. "In truth," "rightly," "justly," only the good should be honored.”

Faulkner concludes:

“Aristotle's diagnosis comes to this: the great-souled man is at once drawn above humanity and drawn to humanity. He exhibits his superiority by aiding his fellows, and yet his wish is less to aid them than to avoid being or appearing dependent on them.”

Faulkner suggests that while Nicomachean Ethics seems to imply that greatness of the soul is a desirable attribute of political leaders, Aristotle moderates that view in the Politics and Ethics. In Politics, he doesn’t forget the best man’s claims but presents them “only after defending at length the more common and political claimants to rule”. At one point he even praises “the decent and equitable man” over the great man. In Ethics, Aristotle suggests that greatness, especially great power, is overrated: “it is possible for one who is not a ruler of land and sea to perform noble action.”

Faulkner writes:

“Given the likelihood of war, the difficulties of preserving any regime, and the extreme rarity of the best regime, there will be opportunities enough for noble deeds, great things, and superiority over others. A great-souled man will have his opportunities; he will be often needed. But such a force, if a blind force, may also harm itself and those whom it would rule, including the most thoughtful. Whatever else Aristotle's Ethics and Politics may be, whatever the defects, his is surely a model effort to supply comprehensive light to the grandly ambitious and to those who depend on them.”

Faulkner ends his book with a discussion of Nietzsche, who “unlike Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, trumpets an animus against ordinary people”. Faulkner’s final comment:

“Nietzsche's proposals and diagnoses alike invite us to look to more moderate accounts, whether in examples such as a Washington or in the historians and philosophers who took seriously what is good and true as well as what is strong and great. To encourage such looking is what this book is about.”

My assessment

I think Robert Faulkner has made a stronger case for goodness than greatness as a desirable attribute in political leaders. Greatness is required in times of crisis, but competence will suffice most of the time. It is important to recognize, however, that winning an election doesn’t make a person competent in dealing with public policy issues. People can acquire skills relevant to statecraft in a variety of different ways but, as in other professions, on-the-job experience seems indispensable to high-level performance.

The case that Faulkner makes for goodness leads to the question of what we mean by goodness as applied to political leaders. As I see it, there are two different aspects to this question.

The first concerns personal ethics. Should citizens expect the holders of high office in a democracy to conform to widely accepted norms of ethical behaviour? If we expect our sporting heroes to confirm to such norms in their off-field behavior, there is perhaps an even stronger case for the similar standards to be applied to politicians. Since politicians regularly ask voters to trust them to implement policies, it seems appropriate for voters to expect them to demonstrate trustworthiness in their personal behavior. (Of course, the personal ethics of candidates is only one of the matters that voters should consider, and other matters may well be more important in particular instances.)

The second aspect concerns confusion of soulcraft and statecraft. Soulcraft, the means by which individuals flourish and find fulfillment in life, is a matter that is best left for individuals to pursue in the manner they choose for themselves. Since self-direction is fundamental to individual flourishing, it is a mistake to believe that it can be advanced via government action to promote particular views of moral excellence. Aristotle may have had reason to believe that was possible in a polis in the ancient world, but it is certainly not possible in modern societies which are characterised by much greater diversity of cultural and religious influences.

Some Neo-Aristotelian philosophers have drawn a clear distinction between soulcraft and statecraft. In their book Norms of Liberty, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl imply that the main role of statecraft is to restore or construct a political/ legal order in which “it might be possible for different individuals to flourish and to do so in different ways (in different communities and cultures) without creating inherent ethical conflict in the overall structure of their social/ political context.” (p 83)

In my view, we should judge our political leaders to be very good if they can manage to move the political/legal order toward achieving that outcome.

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.

What were the highlights of my second trip to India?

 

The highlights of my recent trip to south-west India included visiting waterfalls and historical sites, seeing elephants and tigers in the wild, and enjoying some cultural experiences as well Indian food.

The waterfalls, elephants and history were included on my list when I discussed the possibility of a trip to southern India with Ms Bharathi of Tour Seed over a year ago. I knew before the trip that some lucky tourists also see tigers in the wild but I wasn’t overly optimistic about that. I knew I would enjoy the food but I didn’t expect the cultural experiences to be as enjoyable as they were.

My first trip to India occurred in 2022 and was confined to the north of the country. I wrote about it here. I enjoyed my first trip to India so much that I wanted to see more.

My recent trip began in Bangaluru. From there I went to Mysore, Kabini, Ooty, Athirappilly, Thekkady, Alleppey, and Kochi. The places I visited are shown as red dots on the map.

 

Since this post is about highlights, I will focus on a small selection of experiences.

The first highlight I have chosen is the palace of Mysore. It was the royal residence of the Wadiya family, maharajas, who ruled the Kingdom of Mysore from the late 1300s until 1950. The Kingdom of Mysore covered a large slab of southern India.

The Mysore palace is not particularly old. It was completed in 1912, replacing a wooden palace that had burnt down.

It is easy to see why the palace is a major tourist attraction. It is both opulent and beautiful.

The second highlight is the Kabini wildlife sanctuary, where I saw tigers, elephants, spotted deer and other animals.

 

Athirappilly falls is the third highlight. The person in the photo is my driver, Raju Gowda, who accompanied me to the base of the waterfall. Raju showed great skill in driving under fairly challenging conditions - on narrow winding roads in hilly country as well as in city traffic.

 

The fourth highlight was my visit to Thekkady. I enjoyed being shown spice gardens, and a trekking and rafting experience but the display of martial arts and gymnastics at the Kadathanadan Kalari Centre was an unexpected pleasure.

 

I have chosen a food experience as the fifth highlight. This is a meal I was served on a houseboat at Alleppey. I cannot claim to have eaten it all, but I was able to eat much more than I had anticipated when the meal was served to me.

Finally, there is my visit to Kochi. I enjoyed being shown the historical sites of Fort Kochi, including tourist attractions celebrating Vasco da Gama’s voyage of discovery. However, I have chosen the cannon ball tree, with flowers growing out of its trunk, as one of the highlights of my visit. I also enjoyed the Kathakali performance of the Mahabharata story. A handout in English explaining the story line helped me to understand what was happening.

 

Perhaps I should add a final word about the way my trip was organized. When I tell people that the trip was tailored to my specifications, that I had a driver, and stayed in excellent hotels, I sometimes also feel that I need to explain that it was not particularly expensive. In saying that, I am making a comparison with the cost of staying in similar hotels in group tours, or self-drive holidays, in countries such as Britain or Canada, rather than with the cost of backpacking. At this stage of my life, I feel inclined to leave backpacking to people who are younger than I am.

How do democratic institutions survive in Papua New Guinea?

 

In countries with endemic law and order and corruption problems, outbreaks of rioting and looting often lead to military dictatorship, or some similarly authoritarian style of government.

However, I don’t think many people expect the recent outbreak of rioting and looting in Port Moresby and other major cities in Papua New Guinea (PNG) to result in authoritarian government. In the 50 years since it gained independence from Australia, PNG leaders have muddled through several major crises without resort to authoritarianism. Local leaders, including military leaders, have generally displayed little appetite for radical change. They have responded to major crises by seeking to uphold the PNG constitution. Responses to the Sandline crisis of 1997 are a prime example.

The Sandline crisis

In January 1997, the PNG government approved a contract to engage Sandline International – a firm employing mercenary soldiers – to neutralize the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). The aim of the exercise was to reopen the Panguna copper mine which had been shut down in 1989 as a consequence of BRA activities seeking Bougainville’s independence from PNG.

General Jerry Singirok, the commander of the PNG defence force, did not believe that the proposed Sandline operation would succeed, and was concerned that it might result in mass civilian casualties. He also believed that the Sandline contract was unconstitutional. He resolved to expel the mercenaries from PNG before they were able to begin military activities on Bougainville. To achieve that objective, Singirok and some trusted colleagues devised and implemented Operation Rausim Kwik. The operation received overwhelming public support in PNG.

I don’t propose to present my view on whether Jerry Singirok did the right thing. I encourage readers of this blog to make up their own minds after reading Singirok’s recently published book, A Matter of Conscience: Operation Rausim Kwik. I enjoyed reading the book. It was given to me for Christmas by one of my brothers, who lives in PNG. As well as discussing the matters of conscience that Singirok had to consider, it provides an exciting account of the planning and implementation of this secret military operation.

My purpose in the remainder of this essay is to sketch out how the Sandline contract and Rausim Kwik were viewed in Australia, and to offer some additional thoughts about PNG institutions.

Australian views of the Sandline crisis

As I remember, there was intense interest in the Sandline affair in Australia. News stories about mercenaries and mutiny always attract attention but the Sandline affair was of particular interest because of the proximity of PNG to Australia, PNG’s history as an Australian colony, and the large number of Australians who had lived and worked in PNG or had family living there.

As the former colonial power, the Australian government didn’t want to interfere overtly unless it became necessary for action to be taken to protect Australian citizens. The official reaction of the government could be described as hand-wringing.

Prior to the Sandline affair, Australian authorities had been trying to persuade their counterparts in Port Moresby that peace on Bougainville could only be achieved via a negotiated settlement. Support provided under the Defence Cooperation Program included a requirement that the helicopters provided could not be used as “gunships”, and other similar conditions. Sir Julius Chan, the PNG prime minister, claimed that it was Australia’s reluctance to provide adequate support that had led his government “to go to the private sector”.

The Australian government did not send a strong message to the PNG government about its opposition to employment of mercenaries in the region until after Jerry Singirok had taken action to arrest the Sandline executives. At that point the Australian PM, John Howard, sent three senior public servants to PNG to urge Sir Julius to cancel the Sandline agreement and deport the mercenaries. The emissaries threatened that Australia might not continue its aid program if the PNG government continued in the proposed use of mercenaries to put down the rebellion on Bougainville.

In his public address to the nation, Singirok reassured the public that he was not conducting a military coup. Nevertheless, he insisted that the government ministers involved should step aside pending a judicial inquiry into the hiring of Sandline.

I think there was as much concern in Australia about Singirok’s mutinous behaviour as about the PNG government’s employment of mercenaries. The actions of the military commander in preventing implementation of government policy seemed like a step in the direction of military dictatorship. Singirok notes that the Australian High Commissioner handed him a diplomatic note from Canberra stating among other things:

“We strongly believe that it is essential that the PNGDF obey the directives of the PNG government and cease any illegal or unconstitutional activity.”

However, I doubt that the Australian government’s hand-wringing had much influence in ensuring that the Sandline crisis ended peacefully.

PNG institutions

Some prominent PNG citizens helped to end the Sandline crisis by assisting negotiations between Singirok and Sir Julius Chan. Singirok was dismissed as commander of the PNG defence force, but his demands were met. The PM and two other ministers stepped aside while an inquiry was held. Normal constitutional processes were resumed.

Sean Dorney, an Australian journalist with over four decades of experience in reporting on Papua New Guinea, regards the professionalism of its defence force as one of PNG’s strengths. In his book, The Embarrassed Colonialist, published in 2016, he writes about the PNGDF under the heading: “A Developing Country’s Military With No Ambition to Rule”. He quotes General Toropo, who was then commander of the PNGDF, as saying that he cannot see a military coup ever happening in PNG because the PNGDF regards itself as a professional organisation and “has got beyond tribal and regional differences”. Dorney notes that prior to independence, Australia made a conscious effort to recruit soldiers from all around the country so that the defence force would not be dominated by a group from any one province or region.

Dorney has a less favourable view of the police force. He notes that a police department had not even been created until the decade before independence and suggests that inexperienced and untrained staff were major problems at that time. He notes that by international standards the size of the police force relative to population is very low in PNG.

The professionalism of the police force is obviously still a problem. The most recent bout of rioting and looting occurred after police went on strike because of a pay dispute. Hopefully, the increased foreign aid that Australia announced last year to police training etc. will be of some help in improving the professionalism of the PNG police force.

Improved policing is an obvious response to a law-and-order problem, but it may not be necessary to invest vast amounts of public money in crime deterrence in order to make the transition from a high to low crime society. In his book, The Enlightened Economy, Joel Mokyr points out that firm government enforcement of laws could not have played a major role in enabling Britain to achieve a low crime society. In the 18^th century, large parts of Britain were virtual “lawless zones” and in others, legal practice often deviated considerably from the letter of the law. Enforcement was largely a private enterprise with the courts at best serving as an enforcer of last resort. There was no professional police force. Daily law enforcement was in the hands of amateurs and part-time parish constables. Justice had to rely to a large extent on volunteers, local informers, vigilante groups and private associations specializing in prosecution of felons. Private law enforcement remained of substantial importance until well into the 19^th Century (pages 376-379).

The incentive to engage in crime depends on the alternative economic opportunities available to potential criminals as well as on the expected rewards of crime. The more general issue of what has been holding back the growth of economic opportunities in PNG, discussed previously on this blog, is relevant in this context.

Criminal activity has certainly been having an adverse impact on the growth of economic opportunities, and lack of economic opportunity has no doubt tempted more people to resort to crime. However, that does not necessarily make the problem intractable. One possible solution is for police to give highest priority to deterring the violence and theft that is having a major adverse impact on the economic opportunities of poor people.

The survival of democratic institutions in PNG does not seem to be seriously threatened by current levels of crime and corruption. There is a risk, however, that crime and corruption will reach a stage where criminal gangs directly threaten the survival of democratic institutions.  

Conclusions

Democratic institutions survive in Papua New Guinea because local leaders have generally responded to major crises by seeking to uphold the constitution. That was particularly evident in the Sandline crisis of 1997.

The PNG defence force has been aptly described as a developing country’s military with no ambition to rule. The defence force regards itself as a professional organisation that has “has got beyond tribal and regional differences”.

The professionalism of the PNG police force is more questionable. A more professional police force could help ameliorate PNG’s endemic law and order problems by giving highest priority to deterring the violence and theft that is having a major adverse impact on the economic opportunities of poor people.

The main risk to democratic institutions in PNG seems to me to lie in the potential for crime and corruption to expand to a point where criminal gangs take over the government.

Postscript

1. Noric Dilanchian has provided the following comment:

You've written a good article Winton.

As my only closely relevant background, in my last year in law school (1982) I helped a friend write her Law in Developing Societies course thesis about protests by indigenous people on Bougainville Island before the first major conflict.

Our conclusion then was that massive mining pollution and industry behaviour, among other factors I cannot remember, were conducive for societal collapse. It then happened.

I was also reflecting on your thinking in light of three books I read late in 2023 on the 20th century history of Iran. There a central problem was that the royal rulers always sought exclusive rule-supporting control over the armed forces. That had very bad consequences. As for the police in cities, they performed the connected with elites thug role comparable to and evident in Sydney during and before Premier Robert Askin's administration (1965-1975).

2. Pat Green wrote:

If I could draw comics, I would draw a helicopter way up in the sky, and attached to it is a silhouette of PNG. Hanging up high on the rope is a bunch of politicians cutting the rope above their heads with a big tramontina that has "idependence" etched on it.

There is no future in the current system. 

What does it mean to be an Aristotelian?

 

In my view,  Aristotelians are people who seek guidance from Aristotle's ethics in considering how to live their lives. Please read on for an explanation.

I was prompted to pose this his question by an article by John Sellars entitled ‘How to be an Aristotelian’ (recently published in Antigone).  While thinking about the question I read Sellars’ new book, Aristotle, Understanding the World’s Greatest Philosopher. By coincidence, at the same time I was reading Stoicism Today, Volume 4, which contains an article by John Sellars entitled ‘Hard Truths and Happiness’. I mention the Stoicism article because the approach that Sellars adopts in discussing what it means to be a Stoic seems to me to be relevant to considering what it means to be an Aristotelian. (I also think many of the articles in Stoicism Today are worth reading. It is fascinating to read about how people seek to apply this ancient philosophy in their daily lives.)

This article will meander around, so it is particularly important in this instance to foreshadow what I am going to tell you before I tell it to you. I will begin by outlining Sellars’ view about what it means to be a Stoic. I will then discuss the view Sellars presents of what it means to be an Aristotelian in his Antigone article before moving to a discussion of the approach he adopts in his book. I will conclude with some personal comments on what it means to be an Aristotelian.

What principles do you need to accept to be a Stoic?

In his Stoicism Today article, John Sellars’ argues that Stoicism is a philosophy that is guided by the idea that people want to live well. Stoicism is a philosophy which makes claims about the nature of the world. It is a way of living, not merely a collection of exercises, or therapies, aimed at making people feel happy. Stoics believe that learning to live well within the world involves understanding what it is and how it works. However, Sellars implies that means more than just a commonsense understanding. He argues that if you want to get to grips with Stoic philosophy as a way of life, you need to get to grips with the fundamental principle that “everything is ultimately matter in a process of continual change”.

Everything in this world does seem to be in a process of continual change. Perhaps everything in the cosmos is matter. Who knows? I am not even sure what that means. In any case, I don’t understand how trying to get my head around the ultimate nature of the cosmos would make me a better human. It is interesting to read about the Higgs boson etc. but that seems to have less relevance in considering how I should live my life than the views of Robert Higgs on Facebook.

What principles do you need to accept to be an Aristotelian?

In his Antigone article, John Sellars makes what he describes as “a wild claim” that Aristotle “is the single most important human being ever to have lived”. To support that claim he finds reasons to rule out Jesus and other possible candidates. However, his main argument is that Aristotle shaped the way we think about so many things including by laying “the foundations for all empirical science”.

In considering what it means to be an Aristotelian, Sellars suggests that there are two ways in which we can use the word Aristotelian. The first involves “dogmatic Aristotelianism” – to subscribe to the truthfulness of the assertions that Aristotle made in the texts that he left behind. The second simply involves joining Aristotle in the ongoing process of trying to understand the world in which we live.

A few weeks ago I drew attention to the Antigone article in a Facebook post. In his response, Roderick Long, a philosopher, wrote:

“Seems like a false dichotomy:  either being an Aristotelean means being a rigid, dogmatic adherent of a fixed and detailed Aristotelean system, or else it means something so watered down that any sincere seeker after truth counts as an Aristotelean.  Neither of these, of course, is what we who call ourselves Aristoteleans mean by Aristoteleanism.  Sellars is unfortunately failing to reckon with the possibility that we can learn not just from Aristotle's truth-seeking attitude but from his actual arguments.”

My response to Roderick: 

“I am inclined to agree with you. However, when I praise Aristotle’s arguments about happiness, ethics etc. I am sometimes reminded (by people with science training) of all the things that Aristotle got wrong. So, if a case can be made that he was an early advocate of scientific method (rather than a dogmatist) that does seem an important rhetorical point”.

I added that I was interested to read Sellars’ book, to see what he writes there about Aristotle’s arguments.

What does Sellars’ book say about Aristotle’s arguments?

John Sellars’ book is a short intellectual history of Aristotle. It is intended to serve as an introductory text but some people who already have some knowledge of Aristotle’s writings may also benefit from reading it. I found it enlightening because I had not previously considered how one thing may have led to another in the development of Aristotle’s views at different stages of his life. For example, the time Aristotle spent studying animals on Lesbos seems to have been important in his rejection of reductive materialism and the development of his thoughts about the purposes of living organisms, including humans.

In the book, Sellars provides an account of Aristotle’s struggle with Plato’s views and the development of his own ideas about being, substance, the idea that natural entities have intrinsic purposes (natural teleology) and the difference between actuality and potentiality. He summarises thus Aristotle’s argument about what it means to be a human being:

“So, a human being is a living thing with a certain set of capacities: the ability to grow, move, and reproduce. These capacities are ones that we share with other animals. The distinctive capacity of humans, Aristotle says, is the ability to reason: humans are rational animals. The defining characteristic of humans, then, is the ability to think rationally. The vast majority of adult humans have this capacity; we are all, we might say, potentially thinking beings. However, we are only truly thinking beings when we are actually thinking, when we actualize that potential and use the capacity. In short, to be a human being is not to exist statically, but instead to engage in a whole range of distinctively human activities, the most important of which is thinking.”

However, the book also presents Sellars’ view, referred to above, that there are two different ways in which we can use the word Aristotelian and that he prefers the second view - being an Aristotelian simply involves joining him in the ongoing process of trying to understand the world in which we live.

While I think Sellars view of what it means to be an Aristotelian is excessively broad, I think he performs a useful service in demolishing the view that Aristotle was a dogmatist. He notes that some thinkers in the 16^th century, who were critical of clerical dogmatism, were aware that Aristotle was a champion of observation and open inquiry. He notes that even Galileo was happy to describe himself as an Aristotelian because he knew that Aristotle recognised that every theory is open to refutation by further observation.

My view

As already noted, I find it difficult to accept that everyone who is trying to understand the world in which we live is an Aristotelian. I think that is a necessary condition to be an Aristotelian, but not a sufficient condition.

It seems to me that Aristotelians accept certain philosophical principles, such as natural teleology, that are not accepted by everyone who is trying to understand the world. Unfortunately, my knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy is not sufficient to enable me to advance that argument with much confidence. Perhaps I am wrong. If you think that is so, please tell me why.

My main point is that in considering what it means to be an Aristotelian it is appropriate to adopt a line of argument like that adopted by John Sellars in considering what it means to be a Stoic. Like Stoics, Aristotelians are also guided by a philosophy which is concerned with what it means to live well. That philosophy is Aristotelian ethics.

The passage from Sellars’ book about the nature of a human being (quoted above) describes the philosophic foundation for Aristotelian ethics.

Many people who are trying to understand the world have no understanding of Aristotelian ethics and obtain no guidance from it in how they live their lives. I don’t think it makes sense to view such people as Aristotelians.