I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to publish Ed’s latest
essay at this time. I recently concluded a series of essays on political entrepreneurship by
suggesting:
“If we want institutions that are more supportive of freedom
and flourishing to become entrenched, we will need more supportive citizens
engaged in discursive processes at all levels of society …”.
It is difficult to have useful discourse with people expressing opposing views if we focus exclusively on categorizing their positions according to the political groupings or ideological tribes that seem to provide their talking points. It can be more interesting, and is sometimes more productive, to seek to understand the motivational systems, parenting models, and moral foundations underlying the positions they adopt.
Ed Younkins writes:
The Two Moralities by Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
In her 2023 work The Two Moralities, social psychologist Ronnie Janoff-Bulman presents a framework for understanding political differences rooted in the most fundamental motivational distinction in psychology: approach and avoidance. She argues that these basic motivational systems give rise to two distinct moralities: a proscriptive morality that defends against negative outcomes and focuses on what we should not do, and a prescriptive morality that moves us toward positive outcomes and focuses on what we should do. The former can be viewed as a morality of justice that emphasizes rules, impartiality, law, order, universal principles, retributive justice, and equality of opportunity whereas the latter can be viewed as a morality of care that is rooted in empathy, connection, compassion, responsiveness, safety nets, and equality of outcomes.
At the individual and interpersonal levels, Janoff-Bulman notes that both liberals and conservatives value both moral dimensions—not harming others (proscriptive) and helping others (prescriptive). The critical divergence occurs at the collective level, where these moralities translate into distinct political worldviews. Conservatism is rooted in a proscriptive "Social Order" morality focused on protecting against threats—both external and internal—and maintaining societal stability. Liberalism, conversely, is founded on a prescriptive "Social Justice" morality focused on providing for the well-being of the nation's constituents.
The book also develops a distinction between moral mandates (absolutes rooted in moral identity) and moral preferences (values open to negotiation). She notes that moral mandates, typical of proscriptive morality, tend to produce rigid moral judgments, resistance to compromise, and belief that moral transgressors deserve blame or punishment. Prescriptive morality, however, tends to moralize less about violations and more about failures to promote positive ends.
This framework leads to predictable
differences in policy preferences. Liberals, with their Social Justice
morality, focus on the economic domain where resource distribution is managed,
supporting regulation of markets, entitlements, and expenditures for health,
education, and social safety nets. Conservatives, with their Social Order
morality, focus primarily on the social domain (e.g., abortion and same-sex
marriage), where traditional roles and strict norms are regarded as bulwarks
against personal gratification believed to threaten societal stability.
Importantly, each side favors limited government in precisely the domain where
the other favors intervention—liberals support freedom in the social domain
while conservatives support liberty in the economic domain.
Moral Politics by George Lakoff
First published in 1996, cognitive linguist George Lakoff's Moral Politics introduces perhaps the most famous metaphorical framework for understanding political differences. Lakoff argues that people's political reasoning is determined to a large extent by unconscious metaphors, with the central metaphor being the nation as a family. According to Lakoff, the political views of Americans on both ends of the political spectrum derive from this foundational metaphor, but they are informed by two very different conceptual models of the ideal family.
The conservative worldview centers on what Lakoff terms the "strict father" model. This model emphasizes the traditional nuclear family with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set and enforce strict rules for children's behavior. In this worldview, self-discipline, self-reliance, personal responsibility, hard work, and respect for legitimate authority are crucial qualities children must learn, typically through a system of reward and punishment. This model assumes the world is dangerous and competitive, and that children need strict moral guidance to develop the discipline necessary to succeed. This worldview supports a strong military, low taxes, free markets, and strict law-and-order.
The liberal worldview centers on the "nurturant parent" model, which stresses empathy, nurturance, fair distribution, and restitution. The primal experience behind this model is one of being cared for and cared about, with children's obedience coming from love and respect for their parents rather than fear of punishment. This model views the world as potentially cooperative and believes children develop best through explanation and mutual understanding rather than strict punishment. This worldview stresses empathy, social responsibility, cooperation, equality of outcome, protection of the vulnerable, safety nets, environmental protection, government regulation, and progressive taxation.
Lakoff uses these models to explain why certain political positions cluster together. For instance, he explains how conservatives can be "pro-life" when it comes to abortion yet support the death penalty—both positions reflect the strict father emphasis on reward and punishment for moral behavior. Similarly, he explains why liberals might support economic regulation but oppose social regulation, as this reflects the nurturant parent's emphasis on protection and care without authoritarian control.
An important aspect of Lakoff's
analysis is his contention that conservatives have been more effective than
liberals at understanding and leveraging these deep moral metaphors in
political discourse. He notes that while he personally favors the nurturant
parent model, recognizing the metaphorical nature of our political thinking is
crucial for productive political dialogue.
The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt
Jonathan Haidt's 2012 work The Righteous Mind represents perhaps the most comprehensive empirical investigation into the moral foundations of political differences. Haidt's work is structured around three central principles: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second; (2) There's more to morality than harm and fairness; and (3) Morality binds and blinds.
Haidt's first principle challenges the traditional view of human beings as rational actors who deliberate carefully about moral questions. Instead, he proposes the analogy of the rider (conscious reasoning) and the elephant (intuitive emotions), suggesting that moral reasoning is largely a post-hoc process used to justify intuitive moral judgments. This insight explains why simply presenting facts in political arguments rarely changes minds—the elephant of intuition largely determines where we end up, with the rider mainly serving as a public relations agent.
Haidt's second principle introduces his influential Moral Foundations Theory, which initially identified five (later six) foundational, innate, and psychological moral systems that combine to form human moral matrices. These foundations are:
- Care/harm: Sensitivity to suffering and need
- Fairness/cheating: Concerns about unfair treatment and cheating
- Loyalty/betrayal: Group cohesion and tribal identity.
- Authority/subversion: Respect for hierarchy and tradition
- Sanctity/degradation: Concepts of purity and the sacred
- Liberty/oppression: Reactance to domination and tyranny (added later).
Haidt's research indicates that political differences reflect different weightings of these moral foundations. Liberals tend to prioritize care, fairness, and liberty almost exclusively, while conservatives value all six foundations more evenly. This difference, Haidt argues, gives conservatives a rhetorical advantage because they can appeal to a broader range of moral intuitions.
Haidt's third principle—that "morality binds and blinds"—explains how moral matrices help form cohesive groups while simultaneously making it difficult to understand those outside our moral communities. This insight helps explain the intense polarization in contemporary politics—as moral groups form, they naturally create boundaries that heighten distinction from others.
A Libertarian Synthesis: Neo-Aristotelian Flourishing
The philosophical framework developed by Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen —termed Individualistic Perfectionism —provides a promising foundation for bridging the moral divide between liberal and conservative worldviews. This approach integrates Aristotelian ethical foundations with a political commitment to individual liberty, arguing that a society that protects individual rights through what they call "metanormative principles" creates the essential conditions for diverse forms of human flourishing to be pursued without social conflict.
Rasmussen and Den Uyl's central insight recognizes that human flourishing is individually realized yet socially contextual—that while we achieve our good through our own actions and choices, we do so within communities and relationships that provide the necessary context for that flourishing. This nuanced understanding respects the conservative emphasis on tradition, community, and moral order while simultaneously upholding the liberal commitment to personal autonomy, social progress, and individual rights.
A libertarian framework grounded in neo-Aristotelian flourishing possesses unique potential to resonate with foundational moral concerns across the political spectrum. By examining this potential through the moral frameworks identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt, we can see how such an approach might bridge seemingly irreconcilable moral divides:
Addressing Both Approach and Avoidance Moralities: Janoff-Bulman's distinction between prescriptive and proscriptive moralities finds synthesis in the concept of individual flourishing. The protection of negative rights (the right not to be aggressed against) addresses the conservative proscriptive concern with protection from harm, while the positive pursuit of excellence through self-direction addresses the liberal prescriptive concern with providing for human well-being. A society that protects liberty creates the conditions for both freedom from interference and freedom to pursue excellence.
Transcending the Family Metaphor: Lakoff's strict father and nurturant parent models both find accommodation within a framework that allows different conceptions of the good to coexist. Rather than imposing a single vision of the good life (whether strict or nurturant), the libertarian framework provides the metanormative space for both approaches—and countless others—to be pursued without social conflict. This respects the conservative emphasis on parental authority in raising children according to their values while upholding the liberal commitment to diverse lifestyles and family structures.
Engaging Multiple Moral Foundations: Haidt's moral foundations theory reveals why libertarianism has struggled politically—by focusing predominantly on the liberty/oppression foundation—but also suggests its potential for broader appeal. A neo-Aristotelian libertarianism naturally engages:
(1) the care/harm foundation by
minimizing state violence and allowing voluntary compassion flourish;
(2) the fairness/cheating foundation
through consistent application of rules and opposition to cronyism;
(3) the loyalty/betrayal foundation
by allowing authentic communities to form voluntarily;
(4) the authority/subversion
foundation through respect for legitimate authority in appropriate spheres;
(5 the sanctity/degradation
foundation by protecting the inviolability of the person; and
(6) the liberty/oppression foundation as its central political commitment.
A neo-Aristotelian libertarian framework provides a compelling account of moral development that incorporates insights from both traditional conservatism and progressivism. The concept of self-directedness—central to Rasmussen and Den Uyl's conception of flourishing—acknowledges the conservative insight that discipline and character are essential for human excellence while simultaneously affirming the liberal commitment to personal autonomy and self-determination.
This approach recognizes that virtue cannot be coerced but must be chosen—that moral responsibility emerges from the opportunity to make genuine choices and experience their consequences. The conservative emphasis on moral order is respected not through state enforcement but through the recognition that certain virtues (honesty, integrity, courage, temperance) are naturally conducive to flourishing across most conceptions of the good life. Meanwhile, the liberal emphasis on social progress is honored through the understanding that different individuals and communities may discover different aspects of human excellence through experimentation and learning.
Contrary to the caricature of libertarianism as atomistic individualism, a neo-Aristotelian framework recognizes that human flourishing is inherently relational. Rasmussen and Den Uyl's work emphasizes that self-direction—the capacity to shape one's life according to one's values—necessarily occurs within social contexts and depends on relationships with others for its full actualization.
This understanding allows a libertarian framework to honor the conservative emphasis on family, community, and tradition as essential contexts for moral development while simultaneously protecting the liberal commitment to diverse forms of relationship and association. By creating a framework of rights that allows multiple forms of community to flourish, this approach enables what Rasmussen and Den Uyl term "the possibility of diversity in human flourishing"—recognizing that different individuals may require different social contexts and relationships to achieve their particular forms of excellence.
A crucial psychological insight connecting moral foundations to political structures involves the relationship between threat sensitivity and political preferences. Research noted by Janoff-Bulman indicates that conservatives generally demonstrate higher sensitivity to threats—a finding consistent with their emphasis on social order and protection. A libertarian approach addresses this concern not through state control but through the protective functions of just institutions—what classical liberals called "the constitution of liberty."
Similarly, the liberal emphasis on openness to experience and social progress finds expression in the innovative potential of free societies. A framework that protects individual liberty creates space for both the cautious and the bold, the traditional and the innovative, to coexist and learn from one another through voluntary exchange and cooperation rather than political imposition.
The bipolar frameworks explored by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt show why liberals and conservatives misunderstand each other. Yet Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism offers a framework that resonates with both moral cultures. Their neo-Aristotelian ethics argues that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is the proper moral standard: an objective but individualized ideal grounded in rational self-direction, virtue, and meaningful activity.
Their key innovation is distinguishing personal moral norms (virtues) from political norms (rights). Rights are metanormative principles that secure the social space for individuals to pursue flourishing without coercion. Government’s purpose is not to impose virtue but to protect the conditions under which virtue can be chosen.
This appeals to liberals by protecting autonomy, diversity, and opportunities for self-development. It appeals to conservatives by emphasizing responsibility, character, and self-reliance. Both gain a coherent justification for a free society grounded in human nature and moral psychology.
A
free (libertarian) society that protects rights is therefore the best context
for human flourishing. It avoids paternalism, respects individuality, and
encourages voluntary cooperation. It offers a unified moral language that
transcends ideological tribes and affirms the dignity of rational,
self-directing persons.
Neo-Aristotelian flourishing is
social at its core: friendship, love, family, and associational ties are
essential for living well, but these cannot be legislated from above.
Voluntariness and consent ensure relationships are authentic, nurturing the
liberal desire for care and the conservative requirement for loyalty and order.
Moreover, the psychological
diversity identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt becomes an asset, not
a threat, in a libertarian context—each person is free to pursue the forms of
life and virtue most suited to their traits, goals, and allegiances.
Conclusion: Toward a Moral Politics of Liberty
The works of Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt collectively demonstrate that our political differences run deep—to the very foundations of how we conceptualize morality, family, and society. Yet within their frameworks we can also discern the possibility of a politics that honors the legitimate moral concerns of both left and right while transcending the limitations of each.
A libertarian approach grounded in neo-Aristotelian flourishing and informed by the Individualistic Perfectionism of Rasmussen and Den Uyl offers the promise of such a politics. By creating the metanormative conditions for diverse forms of human excellence to be pursued without social conflict, such a framework respects the conservative emphasis on moral order while upholding the liberal commitment to social progress. It acknowledges the importance of both reason and emotion in moral motivation, recognizes the social nature of human flourishing, and provides the institutional framework for both stability and innovation to coexist. Such an approach provides a common vocabulary for both sides to agree that a free society that protects the necessary moral space for self-directedness and self-determination is the best system for individuals to potentially fulfill their highest human potential.
Such an approach will not satisfy those who seek political victory for their particular moral vision. However, for those who seek a society in which different moral visions can coexist peacefully—where both the strict father and nurturant parent, both the social order and social justice advocate, can live according to their values without imposing them on others—it offers the most promising path forward. In recognizing that human flourishing is inherently pluralistic—that there are many forms of excellence and no single template for the good life—we can begin to build a politics that protects the space for that diversity rather than attempting to eliminate it through political power.
The promise of a free society is not
that it will produce uniform agreement on moral questions, but that it will
allow people with different moral intuitions to live together in peace,
learning from one another through voluntary interaction rather than coercive
imposition. In this respect, a thoughtfully articulated libertarianism may
represent not just another political position, but the necessary framework for
moving beyond our current political impasse toward a more inclusive and morally
sophisticated politics.
Ultimately, society best enables
flourishing not by dictating the good life but by protecting the conditions
that make countless good lives possible. This vision honors the depth, dignity,
and complexity of persons, uniting liberals’ and conservatives’ highest
aspirations under the banner of freedom and flourishing.
Recommended Reading
Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Rasmussen, Douglas B. (2016). The Perfectionist Turn: From
Metanorms
to Metaethics. Edinburgh University Press.
Haidt, Jonathan. (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are
Divided by politics and Religion. Vintage.
Janoff-Bulman, Ronnie. (2023). The Two Moralities: Conservatives, Liberals,
and the roots of the Political Divide.
Lakoff, George (1996 and 2002). Moral
Politics: How liberals and Conservatives Think. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2005). Norms of Liberty: A
Perfectionist Basis
for Non-Perfectionist Politics. Penn State University Press.
Rasmussen, Douglas
B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2020). The
Realist Turn: Repositioning
Liberalism.
Palgrave Macmillan.
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