Showing posts with label productivity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label productivity. Show all posts

Sunday, November 26, 2023

Does stakeholder capitalism contribute to human flourishing?

 


Many people reading this are likely to view the use of stakeholder terminology by business leaders as little more than a public relations tool. That is certainly how I have viewed it in the past. If you are a business owner, or executive, who wants to encourage employees, suppliers, customers, and community members to feel loyalty to your business, it makes sense to acknowledge that they may also have a stake in seeing it prosper. And it does no harm to remind governments of their stake in the prosperity of your business via its contributions to tax revenue.

However, I have recently come to associate stakeholder terminology with stakeholder capitalism. That ideology has close links to the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the increased tendency of businesses to seek rewards from governments for pursuit of environmental and social goals (ESG). Reading about stakeholder capitalism has added to my previously expressed concerns that such interactions between business and governments are leading liberal democracies more deeply into a corporatist quagmire.

Stakeholder capitalism


Michael Rectenwald’s book, The Great Reset and the Struggle for Liberty, has persuaded me that in advocating stakeholder capitalism, Klaus Schwab, the founder of the World Economic Forum (WEF), has in mind a corpus of ideas and policies that are fundamentally opposed to free markets and classical liberalism. Moreover, the WEF may have sufficient influence among powerful elites to eliminate the already dwindling influence that classical liberalism has been having on public policy.

Rectenwald’s book was written in response to a book by Klaus Schwab and Thierry Malleret entitled Covid-19: The Great Reset, which was published in 2020. Rectenwald draws attention to the open espousal of policies opposed to free markets in that book. Schwab and Malleret welcomed the possibility that governments might take advantage of the pandemic “to permanently increase their role”, and eliminate classical liberalism, which they refer to as neoliberalism. They write:

“COVID-19 is likely to sound the death knell of neoliberalism, a corpus of ideas and policies that can loosely be defined as favouring competition over solidarity, creative destruction over government intervention and economic growth over social welfare. For a number of years, the neoliberal doctrine has been on the wane, with many commentators, business leaders and policy-makers increasingly denouncing its “market fetishism”, but COVID-19 brought the coup de grâce.”

They go on to predict:

“Shareholder value will become a secondary consideration, bringing to the fore the primacy of stakeholder capitalism.”

Klaus Schwab has been advocating stakeholder capitalism for over 50 years, and has been influential in having that concept endorsed at international meetings of powerful people from business and government. The first Davos Manifesto, signed in 1973 states:

“The purpose of professional management is to serve clients, shareholders, workers and employees, as well as societies, and to harmonize the different interests of the stakeholders.”

The 2020 Davos Manifesto is titled: “The Universal Purpose of a Company in the Fourth Industrial Revolution”. It includes similar sentiments to the 1973 Manifesto, but goes on to state, among other things:

“B. A company is more than an economic unit generating wealth. It fulfils human and societal objectives as part of the broader social system. Performance must be measured not only on the return to shareholders, but also on how it achieves its environmental, social and good governance objectives. Executive remuneration should reflect stakeholder responsibility.”

Some CEOs would welcome a long muddled list of performance objectives because it offers them the opportunity to “do their own thing” and provide ready-made excuses for poor performance. Others would prefer to see governments pursue social and environmental objectives by more efficient mechanisms, and to have their own performance judged according to more tangible benefits to shareholders. How does the WEF propose to encourage compliance with its Manifesto?

The WEF’s ESG Index

The WEF published a report in 2020 setting out metrics for measuring company performance with regard to ESG goals. The title of the report is  Measuring Stakeholder Capitalism: Towards Common Metrics and Consistent Reporting of Sustainable Value Creation.

A mechanism for grading companies in terms of their environmental, social, and governance practices and plans might be thought to offer useful information to investors and consumers who concerned about the environmental and social impacts of their decisions. However, Rectenwald points out that it also has potential implications for interactions between business and government:

“Woke planners wield the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Index to reward the in-group and to squeeze non-woke players out of business.”

Ideological reach

In a recent Newsweek article, Jon Schweppe asks, Why did corporations go ‘woke’? His response, in brief, is that “this is part ideology, part price of admittance to an elite club, and part protection racket – doing everything one can to avoid upsetting the mob”.

Rectenwald’s book suggests to me that the WEF should come to mind following any mention of “ideology” and “an elite club” in this context. The corporate partners of the WEF include over 1000 of the world's largest business organisations. The annual meeting of the WEF in Davos is an invitation-only event but is widely reported in the media. Many notable political leaders, journalists etc. have been members of the Forum of Young Global Leaders, which is reserved for people under 40 years of age who show promise of global leadership. In addition, the WEF’s Global Shapers movement, a training camp for young change-makers (under 30 years old) has over 10, 000 active members.

Implications

Rectenwald points out that because ESG is “an impressionistic, qualitative, metric” it exposes business leaders and companies to the whims of woke arbiters. He cites the recent experience of Elon Musk who has been unfairly besmirched because he may have benefited from an emerald mine owned by his father in South Africa during the apartheid era. He sums up:

“In today’s political economy, satisfying shareholders, employees, and customers to earn profits has become less important for corporations than ingratiating the woke cartel and the governments that support it.”

Rectenwald’s book goes on to discuss possible implications for individual liberty of potential innovations such as an individual carbon footprint tracker, but in this essay I want to stick with the implications of stakeholder capitalism.

The Hayek quote at the beginning of the essay suggests another important implication of stakeholder capitalism. The quoted passage is from Law, Legislation, and Liberty (v3, p 82). The context of the quote is a paragraph in which Hayek is responding to the idea that large corporations should be required to consider the public or social interest. He suggests that “as long as the large corporation has the one overriding duty of administering the resources under its control as trustee for its shareholders its hands are largely tied; and it will have no arbitrary power to benefit this or that particular interest”. The paragraph ends by suggesting that obliging large corporations to consider the public interest gives them uncontrollable power that “would inevitably be made the subject of increasing public control”.

There is also reason for concern that obliging corporate managers to adhere to ESG will make them less accountable for productivity performance of enterprises because it will be difficult for company boards to assess the veracity of claims that performance has been adversely affected by ESG. Wokeness can be expected to provide a cover for inefficiency.

I acknowledge that stakeholder capitalism may have some positive implications for human flourishing, that should be offset against the negative implications discussed above. For example, in my book Freedom, Progress, and HumanFlourishing, I note that the difficulty that governments have been experiencing in agreeing upon concerted international action to combat climate change was ameliorated by the actions of business organisations in planning for a carbon free future.

Nevertheless, as I also argue in that book, there is more reason to be concerned about the implications of declining productivity growth than about climate change. By further reducing productivity growth, stakeholder capitalism seems likely to cause a great deal of economic misery.

Unfortunately, major economic crises will probably need to be endured before political leaders inspired by classical liberalism emerge once again to implement the public policy reforms that are needed to restore free markets.


Tuesday, September 12, 2023

Where have the supporters of capitalism gone?

 

Cartoon by Peter Nicholson from “The Australian” newspaper: www.nicholsoncartoons.com.au

Some erstwhile supporters of capitalism probably don’t realize that they have gone missing. They still support private ownership of property and businesses, and may claim to see merit in the profit motive. However, they overlook that capitalism also involves “prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in a free market”.

The quoted words are from the Merriam-Webster definition of capitalism. Use of a definition from an American dictionary seems appropriate because the supporters of capitalism who have gone missing seem to me to be mainly Americans. That is unfortunate because Americans were once the world’s strongest supporters of capitalism.

In Australia, most of the people I hear talking about capitalism seem to use it as a term of disparagement. The people who support capitalism talk about free enterprise and economic freedom.

I have the impression that it is fairly common outside of America for supporters of capitalism to avoid using the word because it is commonly viewed as a term of disparagement. That may stem from the word’s origins. When I was growing up, someone told me that Karl Marx had invented the word. That is not correct. Marx rarely used the word. He preferred to describe capitalism as “the capitalist mode of production”. Nevertheless, even in America the term was apparently considered to be a socialist expression until well into the 20th century.

In the latter half of the 20th century, the strongest supporters of capitalism had no qualms about using the word. Milton Friedman used the word in the title of a book, Capitalism and Freedom. Friedman made it clear that he was writing about “competitive capitalism – the organisation of the bulk of economic activity through private enterprise operating in a free market”. Ayn Rand used the word in the title of a book, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. She defined capitalism as “a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights, in which all property is privately owned”.


Where have America’s supporters of capitalism gone? Johan Norberg prompted me to think about that question as I was reading his latest book,
The Capitalist Manifesto: Why the Global Free Market Will Save the World. This book is a follow-up to In Defence of Global Capitalism, which Norberg wrote about 20 years ago. Globalization has now become a dirty word to many erstwhile supporters of capitalism, but Norberg remains a strong defender of global capitalism.


Who opposes the free market?

One of the most interesting contributions of Norberg’s new book is his account of the changing opposition to the ideal of a global free market. Norberg wrote In Defence of Global Capitalism to counter the arguments of left-wing activists who mistakenly believed that free trade, foreign investment, and multinational corporations were making the world’s poor even poorer. George Monbiot, Oxfam, Bono etc. eventually began to see some merit in free trade, but opposition then migrated to economic nationalists on the conservative side of the political spectrum.

Norberg suggests that the opponents of globalization share an underlying misconception that it is a zero-sum game – someone’s gain is another one’s loss:

“The worldview is the same, the roles are just reversed – twenty years ago free trade was considered bad because we exploited them, now it is considered bad because they exploit us.”

Norberg seems to assume that most readers will already understand why free trade is a positive-sum game – beneficial to both importers and exporters. He uses colourful illustrations to reinforce the point:

“Free trade allows the farmer to grow a new mobile phone in his wheat field, the textile worker can sew a new motorbike and the author can (if lucky) write a holiday trip to Tuscany.”

The author argues that free enterprise is primarily about “opening the dams of human creativity – to let everyone participate and test their ideas and see if they work”.

The opposition of economic nationalists to free trade is associated with the narrative that during the early years of the 21st century, cheap imports from China caused deindustrialization and wage stagnation in the United States.  Norberg’s most important contribution seems to me to be in challenging that narrative. He makes the point that the loss of jobs in manufacturing is attributable largely to automation rather than import competition. He suggests that the slow-down in wages growth in the US dates from the mid-1970s, reflecting a necessary correction of cost levels because wages had previous been growing faster than productivity. The Rust Belt apparently lost more jobs in the decades before globalization reached the US, than it has in recent decades. The share of manufacturing jobs in the US declined more rapidly prior to 2001, when China was admitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), than it has in the decades since then.

 Fear of China

Economic nationalists suggest that the involvement of China in international supply chains has been particularly problematic because of the theft of technology. Norberg points out that China has been by no means unique in that respect. The US itself apparently once had a policy of smuggling inventions and bribing European artisans to reveal their secrets. There is evidence that the Chinese government has a relatively good track record in following WTO rulings relating to disputes about intellectual property and government subsidies.

Norberg acknowledges the potential for Chinese investment in digital and physical infrastructure to pose a security threat because the Chinese government views Chinese companies as its agents. He points out that this does not mean that the US and its allies were wrong to encourage China to open up to the outside world. He suggests that if China had not opened up, it is much more likely that the Chinese people would have generally perceived Westerners as irreconcilable opponents. He fears that use of trade barriers to isolate China could strengthen the most reactionary and nationalist forces in China.    

Leviathan’s helpers

Where have the capitalists gone? Many business owners and executives now seem to spend less time on conventional entrepreneurial activities than on seeking to ingratiate themselves with politicians and bureaucrats who are engaged in active industrial policy.  

The chapter in The Capitalist Manifesto entitled “Picking Losers” should be of particular interest to Jim Chalmers, Australia’s Treasurer. In his article in The Monthly (Feb 2023) Chalmers wrote:

“As the influential economist Mariana Mazzucato has explored in her work, markets built in partnership through the efforts of business, labour and government are still the best mechanism we have to efficiently and effectively direct resources.”  

Johan Norberg has quite a lot to say about Mariana Mazzucato’s naïve views. I will not attempt to provide a summary here because it might spoil the fun for readers. However, I particularly liked this sentence:

 “Governments are bad at picking winners, but losers are good at picking governments.”

That observation seems particularly relevant to Australia at present.

Concluding remarks

In focusing on reasons why support for capitalism has declined, I have failed to mention many of the virtues of capitalism discussed in The Capitalist Manifesto. For example, I was particularly interested in what Johan Norberg had to say about the relationship between capitalism and various aspects of happiness, in his chapter on “the meaning of life”.

I began by noting that many supporters of capitalism are reluctant to use the word because socialists have historically used it as a term of disparagement. I commend Johan Norberg for writing a capitalist manifesto. In doing that he is following in the footsteps of great advocates of economic freedom who had no qualms in talking about the virtues of capitalism.

In this book, Norberg has provided an interesting account of how many erstwhile supporters of capitalism have come to oppose global free markets. The most important contribution of the book, in my view, is the challenge it offers to the narrative that cheap imports from China have caused deindustrialization and wage stagnation in the United States.


Tuesday, September 13, 2022

What happened to creative capitalism?

 


The question I have posed above strikes me as being delightfully ambiguous. It could be asking what happened to bring to an end the era in which creative capitalism brought about high rates of productivity growth. Alternatively, it could be asking what happened to the concept of “creative capitalism” that Bill Gates presented to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2008.

My focus here is on the second interpretation, but I will end up discussing what has happened to the creativity of capitalism in the more traditional sense.

Why am I interested in the particular form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that Bill Gates referred to as “creative capitalism”? I don’t hear the Gates concept being much talked about these days, but I think that variants of this form of CSR have become more common over the last decade or so. It is worth considering whether Gates’ approach to CSR is changing corporate sectors in ways that may directly hamper the traditional creativity of capitalism, or indirectly hamper it via impacts on economic policies pursued by governments.


That is why I decided that the time had come to read Creative Capitalism, a book edited by Michael Kinsley, which was published in 2008. The book consists mainly of comments by eminent economists on the “creative capitalism” concept that Bill Gates presented to the WEF. I should confess at this point that deciding to read the book didn’t require me to judge that it might be worth buying. A copy was given to me last year by a friend who was downsizing his library. The book was sitting in my “unread” pile for many months waiting for me to show some interest. I am now glad I read it!

In the next section I will outline Gates’ concept and briefly discuss the different reactions of economists writing 14 years ago. That will be followed by consideration of possible consequences of changes in the nature of capitalism that seem to stem from Gates’ concept and similar ideas.

Gates’ concept

Bill Gates advocated a new approach to capitalism in which businesses would give more attention to recognition and reputation. As he put it:

Recognition enhances a company’s reputation and appeals to customers; above all it attracts good people to the organisation. As such, recognition triggers a market-based reward for good behavior.”

Gates advanced this view in the context of considering how self-interest could be harnessed to provide more rapid improvement in the well-being of poor people. However, pursuit of recognition seems to have become a strong motivator for the environmental and social objectives that are increasingly espoused by corporates. Gates does not mention the potential for pursuit of recognition for good behavior to have a positive influence on investors, but that also seems to have emerged as an important factor in recent years.

My review of the contributions of commentators is highly selective. I just focus here on what I see as the main points that were raised.

Some of the commentators suggested that entrepreneurs with philanthropic objectives might do better to do what Gates did, rather than to follow the approach he advocated in his speech to the WEF. Like some others before him, Gates pursued profits until he become extraordinarily wealthy and then established a foundation to pursue philanthropic objectives. An argument in support of that approach is that the pursuit of multiple “bottom lines” by companies adds to the difficulty of measuring their performance to ensure that executives can be held accountable for outcomes. 

Several of the commentators referred to Milton Friedman’s view, in Capitalism and Freedom, that CSR is a “fundamentally subversive doctrine” because, in a free society, “there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud” (p 133).

However, others pointed out that Gates’ proposal is consistent with a free society because he was suggesting that corporates can obtain a market-based reward for choosing to pursue non-pecuniary objectives of employees and consumers. Similarly, it is consistent with a free society for companies to seek to pursue non-pecuniary objectives of the shareholders who own them.

Consequences

It is likely that an increasing tendency for corporates to pursue non-pecuniary objectives would have a negative impact on measured productivity growth. However, that may be largely a problem in the measurement of productivity. Measures of productivity growth are biased to the extent that output indicators do not incorporate non-pecuniary goods that contribute human flourishing. If corporates are efficient vehicles for the pursuit of the non-pecuniary objectives of their shareholders, employees, and customers, it seems reasonable to suppose that pursuit of those objectives would contribute to the flourishing of the people concerned.

“The unknown ideal”

What happens if a company is not an efficient vehicle for the pursuit of the non-pecuniary objectives of its shareholders, employees, and customers?

In considering this question it is important to recognize that corporate sectors consist of large numbers of individual firms which compete for labor, capital, and customers. Individual firms are free to give different weight to different objectives. Some may see their only role as profit maximization, and may even seek recognition by asserting that they see that as a social responsibility. Others may seek a reputation for social responsibility by undertaking marketing exercises, without changing their practices. At the other extreme, some companies may devote themselves largely to pursuit of one or more non-pecuniary objectives, providing only minimal financial returns to shareholders.

It is customary for economists to assert that the market is capable of weeding out firms that are following inefficient strategies. Applying the usual market test, it appears reasonable to suppose that if individual companies pursuing the non-pecuniary objectives of workers, consumers, and shareholders are able to survive, the strategies they are following must pass the market’s efficiency test.

The Hayek quote at the top of this article is followed by his assertion that the argument for liberty rests on “the belief that it will, on balance, release more forces for the good than for the bad” (Constitution of Liberty, p 31). In considering how best to describe the spontaneous order of a free society, Hayek later suggested that capitalism “is an appropriate name at most for the partial realization of such a system in a certain historical phase, but always misleading because it suggests a system which mainly benefits the capitalists, while in fact it is a system which imposes upon enterprise a discipline under which the managers chafe and which each endeavours to escape” (“Law, Legislation, and Liberty”, V1, p 62)

The corporatist quagmire

Unfortunately, in the real world at present, the ability of the market to weed out inefficient firms and the strategies they adopt is greatly hindered by government intervention and expectations of future government intervention. If firms believe that pursuit of certain goals will be rewarded by governments, they have an incentive to establish reputations for pursuing those goals. Firms also have an incentive to seek government assistance as a reward for good behavior. The increasing prevalence of such interactions has led to the development of corporatist, rent-seeking cultures that have contributed to a long-term decline in rates of productivity growth in high-income countries.

It is also important to note that, in the realm of politics, what some people view as good behavior is often viewed in a different light by others. For example, political opinions differ on whether or not it is good for pension funds to take account of environmental policies in their allocation of funds. Investors are often uncertain about which view will prevail in the political arena. Such economic policy uncertainty adds to the normal commercial risks of investment. An example which comes readily to mind is the impact of policy uncertainty on future investment in gas-fired electricity generation in industrialized countries. Normal commercial considerations might suggest that is likely to be a profitable investment to meet demand for electricity when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining, but investors have to contend with the possibility that further regulatory interventions to discourage use of fossil fuels will render such investment unprofitable. It is reasonable to predict that blackouts will be more common in jurisdictions where such policy uncertainty prevails.

Political ideologies of governments also seem to be changing in ways that make it more difficult for markets to weed out firms adopting inefficient strategies. Over the last decade or so, the progressive side of politics has encouraged corporates to establish reputations for “woke progressivism”. That seems to have induced political conservatives to become increasingly disenchanted with corporates. That disenchantment has added to the antagonism associated with the increased tendency of many conservatives to espouse economic nationalism and populist views opposed to the corporate sector’s interest in free trade, international capital mobility, and technological progress.

As politics comes to play an increasing role in the investment decisions of businesses, economic growth rates of industrialized countries are likely to decline. Since governments find it difficult to disappoint the expectations of voters, government spending is unlikely to be constrained to a correspond extent. Major economic crises seem likely to become more common. (I have discussed these issues more fully in Chapter 6 of Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing.)  

The obvious solution

Immediately after the passage in which Milton Friedman suggested that the social responsibility of business was to serve the interests of stockholders, he suggested that the social responsibility of union leaders is to serve the interests of their members. He then went on to write:

It is the responsibility of the rest of us to establish a framework of law such that an individual in pursuing his own interest is, to quote Adam Smith … “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. …” (Capitalism and Freedom, p 133).

Unfortunately, it seems likely that major economic crises will need to be endured before governments of industrialized countries once again see merit in confining themselves to core responsibilities in the manner that Adam Smith suggested.

Conclusion

Companies are increasingly choosing to adopt strategies to improve their reputations with employees, customers, and investors who have interests in social and environmental issues. That would not pose a problem in the context of the spontaneous order of a free society. Pursuit of multiple objectives may add to problems in holding executives accountable for an individual firm’s performance, but free markets are capable of weeding out firms that follow inefficient strategies.

Unfortunately, however, industrialized countries are now corporatist quagmires in which the ability of markets to weed out firms that adopt inefficient strategies is greatly hindered by government intervention and expectations of future government intervention. The obvious solution is to reduce government intervention in markets, but major economic crises will probably need to be endured before that happens.

Wednesday, August 10, 2022

How should Bill Carmichael's transparency project be pursued now?

 


Unfortunately, few readers of this blog will know anything about Bill Carmichael or his transparency project. My main purpose here is therefore to explain who he was and why the question I have posed above is worth considering.

W.B. (Bill) Carmichael died recently at the age of 93. In his obituary,  Gary Banks, former chair of the Australian Productivity Commission, described Bill aptly as “an unsung hero” of the Australian Public Service (APS).

In my experience, most members of the APS who are working on economic policy like to claim that they are contributing to the well-being of the public at large. However, I find it difficult to accept such claims unless the people concerned can demonstrate that they are actively seeking to either undo mistakes that governments have made, or to discourage governments from making more mistakes.

Bill Carmichael made a huge contribution in helping to undo mistakes that Australian governments made over many decades in insulating much of the economy from international competition. His efforts in support of trade liberalization have helped Australians to enjoy greater benefits from trade and greater productivity growth than would otherwise have been possible.

Alf Rattigan’s right-hand man

Bill’s contribution to trade liberalization was largely behind the scenes, helping Alf Rattigan, the former chairman of the Tariff Board, to pursue his reform efforts. Rattigan argued successfully that tariff reform was required because industries that had been given high levels of government assistance to compete with imports were inherently less efficient users of resources than those requiring lower levels of assistance or none at all.

As Gary Banks’ obituary indicates, Bill played an important role in developing strategies, writing the key speeches that Alf Rattigan delivered, dealing with difficult bureaucrats, and engaging with economic journalists who were highly influential in informing politicians and the public about the costs of protection and the benefits of international competition. Bill’s contribution reached its pinnacle in the early 1970s when the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) was established with an economy-wide mandate to ensure greater transparency to processes for provision of government assistance to all industries.

Bill eventually became chairman of the IAC. However, in my view, his most important contribution was made in helping to establish the organisation and ensure that it had access to the professional economic expertise it required to undertake research and produce quality reports.

Bill’s transparency project

Bill Carmichael’s interest in the transparency of trade policy did not end after he retired from the IAC in 1988. My reference to Bill’s transparency project relates specifically to the efforts he made during his retirement to bring greater transparency to trade negotiations. These efforts were made in collaboration with Greg Cutbush, Malcolm Bosworth, and other economists. The best way to describe that project is to quote some passages from an article in which Bill suggested that Australians are being misled about our trade negotiations and agreements. The article, entitled ‘Trade Policy Lessons from Australia’,  was published by East Asia Forum in 2016.

Bill wrote:

The goal of trade policy is not limited to increasing export opportunities. Nor is it just about improving trade balances. Rather trade policy is about taking opportunities to improve the economy’s productive base. When assessing a nation’s experience with bilateral trade agreements, this is the test that should be applied.

In each bilateral agreement Australia has completed to date, projections of the potential gains for Australia, based on unimpeded access to all markets of the other country involved, were released prior to negotiations. These studies did not, and could not, project what was actually achieved in the ensuing negotiations. The quite modest outcomes for Australia from those negotiations meant the projected gains conveyed nothing about what was eventually achieved. Yet the projections were still quoted to support the agreements after they were signed, as though they reflected actual outcomes.

This approach to accounting for the outcome of trade agreements has meant that Australia has missed opportunities for productivity gains. So how, given Australia’s recent experiences, can trade policy and negotiations be better conducted in future?

Australia cannot change how it negotiated its agreements with the United States, Japan, South Korea and China. But policymakers can refine their approach to future negotiations. Australia’s trade policy should be guided by a model based on its conduct in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The Uruguay Round confirmed that the domestic decisions needed to secure gains from unilateral liberalisation and those required to secure the full gains available from negotiations have converged.

The negotiations in the Uruguay Round took place at a time when former prime ministers Bob Hawke and Paul Keating were reducing Australia’s barriers to trade unilaterally. Their productivity-enhancing reforms were subsequently offered and accepted in the Uruguay negotiations as Australia’s contribution to global trade reform. Consequently, Australia secured all the gains available from trade negotiations: the major gains in productivity from reducing the barriers protecting less competitive industries, as well as securing greater access to external markets.

This was the kind of win–win outcome negotiators should seek from all trade agreements. It made a substantial contribution to the prosperity Australia has since enjoyed. 

In future trade negotiations, the Productivity Commission — Australia’s independent policy review institution — could provide a basis for market-opening offers by conducting a public inquiry and reporting to government before negotiations get underway.”

In a subsequent paper, publicly endorsed by a group of trade economists, Bill argued:

“If we are to close the gap between trade diplomacy and economic reality, we need to respect three lessons from experience: first, a major part of our gains from trade agreements depends on what we take to the negotiating table, not what we hope to take away from it ; second, liberalising through trade negotiations cannot be pursued simply as an extension of foreign policy ; and third, … future bilateral agreements should be subject to cost-benefit analysis before ratification.”

How should Bill’s project be pursued?

I raise this question without much optimism that greater transparency of trade policy can be achieved in the short term. There is no more reason to be optimistic that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade will suddenly become receptive to ideas that challenge its claims about the benefits of trade agreements it has negotiated than there was to be optimistic that its predecessor, the Department of Trade and Industry, would be receptive in the 1960s to the ideas of Rattigan and Carmichael which challenged the protectionist orthodoxy of that department. Added to this, it is difficult to ignore signs that protectionist sentiment is on the rise again in Australia in the wake of the Covid 19 pandemic and fears that a further deterioration in international relations could lead to disruption of international shipping.

Nevertheless, as Bill might say, none of that should stop us from pursuing longer-term goals.  I hope that some people reading this will feel motivated to think constructively about how Bill Carmichael’s transparency project could be pursued as a longer-term exercise in institutional reform.

Sunday, January 30, 2022

Would a good society seek to maximize a social welfare function?



 This article is about my personal experience in attempting to understand social welfare, the concept of a good society, and my role as an economist involved in the processes of social choice. I decided to write about this topic after writing an article for Savvy Street on the related topic, “Can social planning enhance individual flourishing?”

When economists talk about maximizing social welfare, they are referring to a concept that appears to have something to do with the well-being of people. However, the concept is best viewed as a signaling device to suggest that the social planner claims to have obtained insights about society from studying an abstract mathematical model. Such signaling is not helpful to consideration of the merits of policy proposals.

Maximizing social welfare can encompass policies that would enlarge the economic pie (national product) so that there is potential for everyone to be given a larger slice. In that case, it might be reasonable to argue that the policy would receive widespread support among citizens. A good society - one that is good for the people who live in it – could be expected to adopt such policies. However, claims about pursuing social welfare objectives make such policies no more attractive than if they are advocated to simply expand opportunities for individual flourishing.

Maximizing social welfare can also encompass policies to redistribute the economic pie in a manner that advocates believe will somehow enhance the collective well-being of citizens.  When maximizing social welfare is said to require redistribution of the cake, some citizens will be advantaged at the expense of others. It is possible for some policies of this nature to receive widespread support (e.g. provision of a basic social safety net) but that is less likely when extensive redistribution is proposed to equalize the utility that different individuals obtain at the margin from additional income.

Whose welfare function should we maximize?

The idea of social welfare maximization implies the existence of a social welfare function reflecting insights about determinants of collective well-being and expressing the “general will’ of the people. It was over 50 years ago that I began to realize that this idea is highly problematic. My libertarian friends might find this hard to believe, but it happened while I was studying welfare economics.

An article by Francis M Bator influenced me greatly, although perhaps not in the way the author intended. As I was reading Bator’s article - ‘The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, The American Economic Review, 17(1) March 1957 - I remember feeling that this was an object of great beauty. I suppose the article seemed beautiful for the same reasons that abstract art can seem beautiful. Bator provides a geometric presentation of the derivation of a production possibilities curve, then proceeds to derivation of the utility possibility frontier, which he then crowns with a social welfare function, as shown in the diagram above.

Bator’s description of that diagram left a lasting impression on me. He tells us that BB represents the grand utility possibilities frontier, showing at each point the maximum utility for person X given any feasible level of utility for person Y, and vice versa. He then proceeds to explain the “bliss point”, Ω, in the following words:

“To designate a single best configuration we must be given a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function that denotes the ethic that is to “count” or whose implications we wish to study. Such a function – it could be yours, or mine, or Mossadegh’s, though his is likely to be non-transitive – is intrinsically ascientific.”

What Bator meant by ascientific is that the function involves ethical valuations. However, the point that has stuck in my mind is that despite the heroic assumptions Bator was making in constructing his beautiful geometric edifice, he did not try to pretend that it could be crowned with a social welfare function aggregating the preferences of all citizens. The function depicted “could be yours, or mine, of Mossadegh’s”. (Mohammad Mosaddegh was an Iranian prime minister who held office from 1951 until 1953, when his government was overthrown - apparently in a coup orchestrated by M16 and the CIA.)

Is it possible to make sense of the diagram? 

As I look at the diagram now, the idea of choosing between the utility levels of different people seems problematic. It would also be problematic to some modern utilitarians whose social welfare function is defined simply in terms of maximizing average life satisfaction (making the implicit ethical judgement that everyone deserves to have the same life satisfaction). In that case, if the axes measure the life satisfaction of X and Y, the bliss point would be defined by the intersection of the possibility frontier and a 450 line drawn from the origin. The 450 line would represent all points where X and Y have equal life satisfaction – X and Y would each have maximum life satisfaction at the bliss point.

However, I reject that modern utilitarian view. It seems to me to reflect an inadequate understanding of the determinants of individual flourishing. As argued in Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, even though average life satisfaction may be a reasonable indicator of the average psychological well-being of large groups of people, psychological well-being is just one of the basic goods of a flourishing human. In my experience, when people are encouraged to offer more than perfunctory responses to questions about how they are faring, they tend to talk about a combination of different things such as their aspirations and the choices they have made, their health, and their personal relationships. Satisfaction is relevant, but does not encompass all relevant aspects of human flourishing.

To make sense of the choices represented in the social welfare function depicted, I would need to replace “utility” with “opportunity to flourish”. Even then, I would need good reasons to make an ethical judgement about whether X and Y deserve to have their opportunity to flourish enhanced or restricted.

What are the implications for social choice?

While Bator’s description of the social welfare function let the cat out of the bag for me, I remember reading about Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem at about the same time. I think the main lesson I took away was that the processes of government must inevitably be somewhat dictatorial. That makes it important to have constitutions that protect liberty and electoral processes that are capable of kicking tyrants out of office.

While studying welfare economics, I also took a course in public choice in which I had my first exposure to The Calculus of Consent, by James M Buchanan and Gordon Tulloch. That book and other writings by Buchanan have had a profound impact on my views about the good society and the role of economists.

Buchanan and Tulloch noted that when individuals are considering constitutional rules that they expect to be in place for a long time, they are uncertain as to what their own interests will be in any of the whole chain of later collective choices made according to those rules. Such uncertainty may enable people to set aside their current economic interests in making constitutional choices. One implication is that individuals will tend to choose somewhat more restrictive rules for social choice-making for areas of potential political activity that could involve violation of liberty.

Buchanan and Tulloch link liberty directly to the concept of a good society:

“The acceptance of the right of the individual to do as he desires so long as his action does not infringe on the freedom of other individuals to do likewise must be a characteristic trait in any “good” society. The precept “Love thy neighbor, but also let him alone when he desires to be let alone” may, in one sense, be said to be the overriding ethical principle for Western liberal society.” (p 217).

 Buchanan later warned that the norms that underlie democratic institutions are under threat when politics is allowed to become little more than a ‘commons’ through which competing coalitions seek mutual exploitation.  (For further discussion of this please see Chapter 6 of Freedom, Progress, and HumanFlourishing).

What should economists do?

Economists who advise on public policy often view themselves as social planners who are advising benevolent despots. They are frequently disappointed to find that those whom they advise give higher priority to political and personal goals than to publicly stated economic objectives, or lack the political power to implement recommendations.  

James Buchanan suggested that economists should adopt a contractarian approach, with a focus on the consequences of rules and, in particular, on the question of what rules of the game individuals might accept voluntarily as participants in an authentic constitutional convention. In providing an example of this approach, Buchanan suggested that such a convention would be unlikely to endorse rules of the game which allow majorities in a single generation to impose public debt burdens on subsequent generations of taxpayers. (Nobel prize lecture).

My career

The focus of my career in public policy advice was partly contractarian. For most of my public service career I had the good fortune to work in agencies of the Australian government (predecessors of the Productivity Commission) which undertook research and published reports on the economic implications of changing the rules of the game for economic development. The focus of much of this work was assessing effects of barriers to international trade and other forms of industry assistance.

I note that my career was only partially contractarian because the agencies were required to make recommendations to the government according to specific terms of reference for individual inquiries and more general guidelines. The specific terms of reference were sometimes designed to ensure that governments received politically palatable recommendations, but the research and policy analysis published in inquiry reports, and in annual reports, informed policy-making processes in ways that led eventually to adoption of rules of the game more favourable to free trade.

The advisory agencies were given general guidelines including having “to have regard to the desire of the Australian Government …  to improve and promote the well-being of the people” and to “improve the efficiency with which the community’s productive resources are used”. I do not believe that the collectivism reflected in the reference to people and privately owned capital as “the community’s productive resources” had one iota of influence on the research and policy analyses conducted by the agencies.

I have endeavored to maintain a focus on the implications of different “rules of the game” in the public policy aspects of my subsequent consulting career and my writing on freedom and flourishing on this blog and in my books. There have been some lapses, but I hereby forgive myself 😄 . It has not always been easy to avoid falling into the trap of viewing oneself as a social planner advising a benevolent despot. 

Wednesday, April 22, 2020

What are the implications of declining productivity growth in high-income countries?



The graph shown above indicates that productivity growth rates in high-income countries have declined. That decline seems evident even if we disregard the low productivity growth in the years immediately following the global financial crisis. (Selection of high-income countries for inclusion in the graph was based largely on aggregate GDP.)

The productivity indicator used in the graph - multifactor productivity (MFP) – is that part of GDP growth that cannot be explained by changes in labour and capital inputs. It reflects the influence of technological progress and production efficiency.

The most obvious implication of a decline in MFP growth rates is a lower rate of growth in per capita incomes. Declines in MFP growth are sometimes offset by more rapid growth of employment, through higher immigration, or more rapid growth of capital stock, through higher investment levels. However, such offsetting factors are not sustainable over the longer term.

In most instances, and in the longer term, it seems reasonable to expect a ½ percent lower rate of growth in MPF to be reflected in a ½ percent lower rate of growth in average incomes. Over 10 years, a decline in average income growth from, say, 2 percent per annum to 1.5 percent per annum would amount to the difference between a 22 percent and 16 percent increase in income.

That is not negligible, but it doesn’t cause me a great deal of angst. As noted previously on this blog (in a post written when I was more sceptical about the number of countries experiencing a decline in productivity growth) the slow-down in measured productivity growth in the U.S. and some other countries may be attributable, in part, to difficulty in measuring the outputs of the information and communications technologies (ICT) industries. When consumers can download more stuff that they do not have to pay for, the quality of their lives improves, even though that isn’t reflected in average income and consumption measurements.

It is also likely that some part of the decline in measured productivity growth may be attributable to environmental and social regulation. I am sceptical about the merits of much of that regulation, but I acknowledge that some of it provides benefits to humans that should be offset against associated income losses.

However, there is an implication of declining productivity growth that governments and their dependents should be thinking more seriously about. That is the potential for revenue growth to decline. Unless the revenue to GDP ratio is raised, a lower rate of growth of MFP is likely to translate to lower growth of government revenue. (Note that the same difficulty in measuring the outputs of the ITC industries for productivity estimation also applies to measuring income, sales and value added for tax purposes.)

Lower revenue growth has interesting implications in the context of expected ongoing increases in government spending. As previously discussed on this blog, under existing programs, substantial increases in government spending seem likely to occur as the proportion of elderly people in the populations of many countries continues to rise.

So, why not raise the revenue to GDP ratio by changing the tax mix in favour of more efficient taxes that have less adverse effects on economic incentives? The political obstacles to tax reforms have not always been insuperable, but revenue-raising reform proposals are less likely to be supported than revenue-neutral proposals.

Another option is to raise the revenue to GDP ratio by raising tax rates. That is also likely to encounter political obstacles but, more importantly, the adverse effects on incentives seem likely to further reduce productivity growth. The marginal excess burden of taxes tends to rise as the tax rate is increased (see discussion here).

Yet another option is to let public debt continue to rise and hope debt servicing doesn’t become too much of a problem. We may actually see some problems emerging with that strategy over the next few years with increased public debt incurred in response to COVID-19. Perhaps central banks will succumb to government urging to over-stimulate economies to allow the “inflation tax” to reduce debt to GDP ratios. However, that would make ongoing debt accumulation a more costly strategy because it would result in high interest rates and thus higher costs of debt servicing over the longer term.

We haven’t considered debt default, but you have to be desperate to consider that!

My point is that governments and their dependents do not have any easy options available to adjust to an ongoing decline in productivity growth.

Economists advising governments will likely suggest that the best way forward is adoption of a package of reforms (including tax reforms) to raise productivity growth, combined with action to prune government spending. What governments will do, however, will depend to a large extent on the relative political power of different interest groups. In most countries, that seems to me likely to point more toward spending cuts than toward productivity-increasing reforms.

So, it seems reasonable to speculate that declining growth in productivity will be ongoing and result in cuts in government spending in policy areas where political resistance is likely to be weakest. Which policy areas are likely to be most affected?

Tuesday, April 7, 2020

What are innovation commons?



“An innovation commons is a system of rules for cooperation to facilitate pooling of information in order to maximize the likelihood of opportunity discovery”. That is how Jason Potts defines innovation commons in his book of that name.

Hopefully, that brings to mind hobbyists meeting in coffee shops, somewhere on the internet, or at backyard barbecues where they are tasting home brews and exchanging information about recipes. If so, you are on the track toward an understanding of innovation commons. If you have heard stories of successful entrepreneurs who obtained their most valuable ideas by interacting in similar ways, you might sense that innovative commons can be very important.

It might surprise you to learn that until recently few economists understandood the importance of innovation commons. Of course, those with an interest in technology would have read at some stage that Steve Jobs was once a member of the Homebrew Computer Club, and know of similar stories about other entrepreneurs who started as hobbyists or enthusiasts exchanging information freely with people with similar interests. However, it is one thing to know such stories and something quite different to realize that your professional understanding of the innovation process needs an overhaul.

Economists have thought of innovation in several different ways that view a single organization or individual as a prime mover. Innovative firms allocate resources to research and development, which leads to the launching of new products or adoption of cost-reducing technologies. Joseph Schumpeter’s bold entrepreneurs play the central role in innovation, leading to a dynamic process of creative destruction. Israel Kirzner’s innovative entrepreneurs are alert to profit opportunities. Edmund Phelps’ grassroots innovators are struck by new ideas, and then become investigators, experimenters and managers of innovation.

You might think that economists should be excused for overlooking the importance of innovative commons because they are a relatively new phenomenon. Jason Potts makes the point that common-pool innovation has existed since the beginning of market capitalism. He cites discussion of the Republic of Letters by Joel Mokyr, an economic historian. The Republic of Letters set up norms and incentives that supported a market place of ideas among the educated elite in Europe in the latter part of the 17th and early part of the 18th centuries (for a brief summary see my review of The Culture of Growth). In The Enlighted Economy, Mokyr makes a strong case that in Britain during the 18th century the ‘legitimization of systematic experiment carried over to the realm of technology’. He suggests that the proliferation of provincial ‘philosophical’ societies discussing practical and technical issues often served as clearing houses for useful knowledge between natural philosophers, engineers and entrepreneurs (p 48).

Recent examples of areas of technology where innovation commons are important include blockchain, civilian drone technology, AI and gene editing.

Jason Potts’ own innovative contribution has been to develop an economic framework to explore the collaborative processes through which information comes to be available in a form that a potential entrepreneur can discern as a profit opportunity, if sufficiently alert. The framework Jason has developed contributes to understanding of the knowledge, coordination and governance problems associated with innovation commons. In developing that framework, he draws heavily on insights of Friedrich Hayek about the importance of distributed knowledge, and insights of Elinor Ostrom about governance of commons.

Innovation involves a knowledge problem because relevant information is distributed so that each person with relevant expertise can only know part of the picture, and there is great uncertainty about how that information might be useful. Innovation commons enable individuals with expertise to cooperate to pool information and discover opportunities. The formation of such commons is ad hoc and rules for governance develop spontaneously to promote cooperation.

Innovation commons tend to be temporary. Once they have created information about entrepreneurial opportunities, that valuable resource is likely to be exploited by some member who can effectively capitalize on it. At that point the conventional model of entrepreneurship comes into its own, and the commons collapses to some other institutional or organizational form.

Much of the book is taken up by discussion of rules of innovation commons, institutions such as industry organisations and a critique of conventional approaches to innovation policy (public investment in innovation and building infrastructure for innovation).

There is also an interesting discussion of ways to combat an increasing tendency for enemies of innovation to prevent it, thus contributing to a slowdown in productivity growth, particularly at the technology frontier. The enemies of innovation present themselves as having concerns with safety, sustainability, tradition, fairness, justice etc. even when their intention is to avoid the losses they are likely to incur from disruption of existing technology.

Who will engage those enemies? This is a collective action problem: the costs are borne individually, but the benefits are an industry-specific public good that accrue to all who follow.
In some instances, the first mover can capture sufficient benefits to make it worthwhile to engage the enemies of innovation. Uber may have done that with its ride-sharing technology.

Jason suggests that governments may also help. One role he suggests is promoting collective learning to demystify a new technology. He mentions public broadcasting in that context, but public broadcasters seem to have been more comfortable helping the enemies of innovation. At a more ambitious level, he suggests that governments should work toward “a social contract, culture and institutional system that are tolerant of innovation and prepared to engage with its enemies”. Good luck with that!

Jason also suggests that innovative commons can play a role in creating a large pool of participatory stakeholders, each with a vested interest in developing the technology and its institutional (regulatory) framework. Examples include open-source software and technologies that have emerged from hackerspaces, such as 3D printing and cryptocurrencies.

Are innovative commons likely to result in a fundamental change in society?
Jason Potts’ answer:
“The innovation commons—including the adaptive behaviors and the institutions that compose it—are … a natural part of an open, evolving, market economy. They are not prima facie evidence of an emerging turn to a new type of more cooperative economic society.”

That is probably right! Nevertheless, as previously discussed here, it is possible to conceive of circumstances in which new technologies that are evolving in innovation commons - blockchain technology and decentralized collaborative organizations – could result in some quite fundamental changes in society.

Tuesday, March 3, 2020

Is cultural change responsible for a long term decline in productivity growth?



The story of cultural change that Edmund Phelps tells in Mass Flourishing has a happy beginning and a sad ending.

Phelps’ cultural story of the advent of rapid economic growth in Britain and America in the 19th century is much like that of Joel Mokyr and Deidre McCloskey (discussed here and here). The main difference is Phelps’ greater emphasis on grassroots innovation within firms.

Phelps makes a strong case that Joseph Schumpeter, famous for his theory of entrepreneurship, over-emphasized the importance of exogenous scientific discoveries (external to innovating firms) as a source of innovation. Phelps probably goes too far in downplaying scientific advances, but his story about the importance of grassroots innovation to the emerging modern economies seems highly plausible. He suggests:
“a modern economy turns people who are close to the economy, where they are apt to be struck by new commercial ideas, into the investigators and experimenters who manage the innovation process from development and, in many cases, adoption as well” (p 26).

Phelps describes a modern economy as “a vast imaginarium – a space for imagining new products and methods, imagining how they might be made, imagining how they might be used” (p 27).

A substantial part of the book is devoted to a discussion of socialism, as practiced in the Soviet Union, and corporatism, as practiced in Italy and Germany in the 1930s. The contemporary relevance of that discussion become relevant later in the book in his discussion of reasons for the decline in productivity growth that seems to have occurred in the U.S. since the 1960s.

Phelps’ focus on the U.S. economy as the main driver of technological progress seems appropriate. He notes that European countries experienced high productivity growth while playing the technological catch-up game, but their productivity growth has generally been lower than in the U.S. in recent decades. He attributes their lack of dynamism to ongoing corporatism over the decades since World War II. The classical corporatist model - involving state direction of industry and promotion of solidarity and social responsibility – has been augmented with codetermination of labour and capital (instead of owner-control) and stakeholderism (instead of a focus on income generation).

The author suggests that corporatism has also grown in the United States. Industries that have been subject to government policy interventions have been affected by a new populist type of corporatism as businesses have sought to use their political influence to mould government regulation to their advantage. The result is a “densely interconnected system of mutually beneficial relationships between private and public’, which tends “to redirect the economy’s innovation toward politicians”. He notes that supporters refer to that system as industry policy and detractors refer to it as corporate welfare. It should be referred to as rent-seeking.

The cultural change that Phelps sees as leading to a decline in economic dynamism is not fully reflected in changes in economic freedom indexes. He sees a deterioration in the “core functioning” of modern economies. This involves, among other things:
  • Managerialism, short-termism and the rise of a “money culture” in business, with wealth-seeking turning people away from innovation.
  • A rise in the litigiousness of American society - people who devote their time and energy to suing one another have less time and energy for innovation.
  • Excessive patent protection resulting in an economy clogged with patents – “a creator of a new method might require as many lawyers as engineers to proceed”.
  • More people aspiring to attain social station rather than to achieve something.
  • Adolescent culture – less willingness to accept temporary austerity in the quest for achievement; less ability to concentrate intensely (unable to resist distractions of social media).
  • A resurgence of traditional values putting more pressure on business to allow people to work from home etc.


Has this cultural change in U.S. business caused a decline in the long-term productivity growth rate? If so, what can be done about it?

In a series of posts written in 2015, I was sceptical that there had been a decline in long term productivity growth. I suggested that the slow-down in measured productivity growth in the U.S. and some other countries may be attributable, in part, to difficulty in measuring the outputs of the information and communications technologies (ICT) industries. I also noted research findings suggesting a technological diffusion problem, rather than a slow-down in technological advances, with productivity growth of global frontier firms remaining relatively robust.

The addition of a few more years of data seems to lend support to the view of the historical pessimists that there has been a long-term decline in U.S. productivity growth. And Phelps’s cultural change explanation does seem plausible.

Unfortunately, the remedies that Phelps offers are less plausible. He suggests that governments can act to restore dynamism if they become aware of its importance and gain some practical knowledge of how innovation is generated. He suggests:
Nations will have to push back against the resurgence of traditional values that have been suffocating in recent decades and revive the modern values that stirred people to go boldly forth toward lives of richness”.

Edmund Phelps seems to be hoping that a reinvented corporatism, perhaps inspired by the starship Enterprise, will foster grassroots innovation and be less prone to rent-seeking than the industry policies it replaces. Good luck with that!

I prefer to put my faith in the potential for new technologies to disrupt and subvert populist corporatism.

Friday, February 21, 2020

Does democracy cause growth?



This question has contemporary relevance, but it came to mind as I was reading Mass Flourishing, by Edmund Phelps, who won the Nobel in economics in 2006. Mass Flourishing, published in 2013, is subtitled How grass roots innovation created jobs, challenge and change.

Phelps’ hypothesis:
Political institutions arguably played a significant role in the creation of the modern economy. One of these was representative democracy, which arose rather close to the emergence of economic modernity” (p 92).


That challenged my prior view that political change favouring economic freedom, innovation and productivity growth came first, and that voting rights came later to redistribute the fruits of economic progress.

Phelps recognizes that democracy involves downside risks (e.g. tyranny of the majority, interest group politics) but gives plausible reasons why democracy may have helped promote economic growth:
  • A democracy would push the public sector to support the interests of lower and middle classes, thus encouraging business activity (including grassroots innovation) and public education. By contrast an autocracy would tend to be more interested in serving landed interests, national prestige etc.
  • Rule of the people tends to lend credibility to rule of law, thus reducing sovereign risk.
  • Elected politicians have an incentive to heed voters, whereas autocrats may not even be aware of their interests or concerns.

However, in my view Phelps' line of argument runs into problems when he considers whether the mechanics of democracy occurred at the right time and place to trigger an explosion of economic dynamism. He looks at the experience of five countries: Britain, America, France, Belgium and Germany.

In respect of Britain, he refers to the revolution of 1688 as having given representation to new wealth and new cities, and the Reform Act of 1832 as extending the franchise to men without property. The Glorious Revolution didn’t establish democracy and the Reform Act was too late to be a trigger.

Phelps refers to the U.S. Constitution of 1788 as having created a government that was radically more representative than Britain’s parliament at that time. However, my American friends keep telling me that their Founding Fathers established a republic rather than a democracy.

The experience of France seems to support the hypothesis. Both democracy and dynamism were slow to arrive in France. The experience of Belgium was ambiguous.

German experience didn’t support the hypothesis. There was strong innovation in Germany in the latter half of the 19th century, but little democracy except at local levels.

Phelps’ conclusion suggests a smaller role for democracy than his original hypothesis:
“In any case, the reasonable inference is not that modern democracy caused the modern economy or vice-versa, but that both sprang from the same matrix of values and beliefs—the same culture” (p 96).

Joel Mokyr has emphasized the role of institutional adaptability, rather than democracy, in facilitating growth. He responds as follows to the observation that commercial energy was combined with stable rule by an exclusive elite in 18th century Britain:
Yet British institutions also had to possess a built-in capability to adapt to radically changing circumstances, and every such adaptation led to further changes in the economic structure of Britain. It is this kind of dynamic that created the success that allowed the growth of useful knowledge and technological ingenuity to become the foundation of sustained economic development” (The Enlightened Economy, 2009, p 427).

The adaptations that Mokyr refers to include the reform of many institutions that had supported rent-seeking and redistribution. He suggests that by 1850, “the elite that ran British government no longer saw political power as a means to acquire more privileges”, but instead “made sure that no other political group would be able to do the same so it could keep what it already had” (p 395).

As noted at the beginning of this post, the question of whether democracy supports economic growth has contemporary relevance. Bill Easterly’s examination of economic growth experience in his book, The Tyranny of Experts, (discussed here) suggests that political leaders matter very little for either good or ill in driving economic growth. He argues that freedom promotes individualistic values that favour economic development. By contrast, autocrats tend to promote the interests of the kingdom (or state) above those of the individual and foster collectivist values that are inimical to economic development. 

China’s experience of autocrats promoting limited economic freedom, which has resulted in a major growth dividend in recent decades, is interesting in that context. As in Germany in the latter part of the 19th century, the leaders of China may see a degree of economic freedom as a way to promote the interests of the state.

 Finally, as a matter of empirics, there is evidence that if you classify countries as either democratic or non-democratic and control for other factors, the democratic countries have better growth performance. In a recent study covering 175 countries, Daron Acemoglu et al have found that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long run [JPE, 2019, 127 (1)].

Unfortunately, those findings do little to allay my concerns about the impact of interest group politics on future productivity growth in the western democracies. I will write more about that, and about Edmund Phelps views of possible causes of declining dynamism, in a later post.