Is Character Education Compatible with Individualistic Perfectionism?

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.)  

 

 Interest in Aristotelian ethics has produced diverse accounts of flourishing, virtue, and moral development. Kristján Kristjánsson has emerged as a contemporary defender of virtue ethics applied to psychology and education (Kristjánsson, 2015 and 2019). Meanwhile, Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl have developed a distinctive neo-Aristotelian liberalism centered on individualistic perfectionism and metanormative political theory (Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 2005 and 2020 and Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 2016).

This essay examines two distinct but complementary projects within a framework of neo-Aristotelian freedom and flourishing. While both projects share a commitment to human flourishing (eudaimonia) as an objective, naturalistic end, they diverge markedly in their primary focus—one on the normative ethics of character development, the other on the metanormative foundations of political liberty. This essay first summarizes Kristjánsson’s core arguments concerning character, practical wisdom, and education. It then critically evaluates his project before comparing it with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s theoretical architecture of Individualistic Perfectionism. The article concludes by discussing how Kristjánsson’s developmental insights can potentially be integrated with a liberty-centered perfectionist framework. It does this by assessing their compatibility and exploring how aspects of Kristjánsson’s educational and character-focused framework might enrich and build upon the political philosophy of Rasmussen and Den Uyl.

 Aristotelian Character Ethics and Moral Psychology

 Kristjánsson (2015) defends a conception of moral character grounded in Aristotelian virtue ethics. He rejects reductive behaviorist or situationist interpretations of moral psychology, arguing instead that virtues constitute integrated dispositions involving cognition, emotion, motivation, and action. Virtue, on this account, is not mere conformity to external rules but stable excellence of character.

Central to this framework is practical wisdom (phronesis), which Kristjánsson describes as the coordinating capacity that enables agents to deliberate well about particular circumstances. Practical wisdom integrates moral perception, emotional regulation, and rational judgment. It allows ethical flexibility without collapsing into relativism.

Kristjánsson further defends an objective but pluralistic conception of flourishing. Flourishing is grounded in human nature and rational agency, yet admits multiple instantiations shaped by personal talents, cultural contexts, and life projects. This position preserves moral realism while accommodating diversity.

He develops an account of virtue that emphasizes its cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions. The practical ramifications are thoroughly explored. Kristjánsson considers whether and how schools can counteract the effects of a poor upbringing, the role of teacher training in fostering virtue, and specific methodologies for classroom practice. He rejuvenates the Aristotelian idea that virtue is developed through guided practice, habituation, emotional attunement, the emulation of exemplars, virtue literacy, deliberative dialogue, and Habituation framing the school as a crucial polis for moral development.

Guided practice involves modeling appropriate responses, providing structured opportunities for practice, and offering corrective feedback. Habituation combines behavioral repetition with reflective endorsement where virtues are practiced in a variety of contexts such as classroom discussions, group projects, conflict resolution, and community service. Emotion education teaches that virtues imply states of character involving both right reason and rightly ordered emotions (i.e., affective cultivation). The goal is to align reason and feeling using practical tools such as classroom dialogue, literature discussions, and reflective journaling. The emulation of moral exemplars provides images of flourishing with reference to historical figures, literary characters, community leaders, or teachers themselves. Virtue literacy is concerned with providing students with a moral vocabulary and helping them to identify and differentiate virtues. Deliberative dialogue is connected to virtue literacy and involves students examining cases and reasoning together about what a virtuous agent would do. Finally, the creation of a whole-school ethos or culture supportive of virtue development is another potential methodological emphasis. Such a culture embeds virtues in school policies, reward systems, disciplinary procedures, extracurricular activities, mentoring systems, honor codes, and so on. This book thus provides an interdisciplinary framework, drawing from philosophy, education, psychology, and sociology, to argue for character education as the foundational process for initiating young people into a life of virtue.

 Flourishing as the Aim of Education 

In Flourishing as the Aim of Education, Kristjánsson (2019) extends Aristotelian ethics into educational theory. He criticizes technocratic schooling models that emphasize standardized performance metrics at the expense of moral development. Instead, he argues that education should aim at cultivating virtuous, practically wise, and autonomous individuals capable of responsible self-direction.

Kristjánsson proposes an integrated model of moral education combining habituation, reflective understanding, and autonomy-supportive pedagogy. Students should internalize moral reasons rather than merely conform to behavioral expectations. He introduces the concept of “virtue literacy,” emphasizing moral vocabulary, ethical reasoning skills, and practical application. 

Importantly, Kristjánsson situates education within a broader moral ecology. Schools, families, peer cultures, and social institutions jointly shape moral development. Effective character education therefore requires institutional coherence between stated values and organizational practices.

Flourishing as the Aim of Education represents an expansion and deepening of Kristjánsson’s earlier work. Explicitly an outgrowth of his previous monograph, this book shifts the focus from character per se to the overarching aim it serves: student flourishing. Taking the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia as its basis, Kristjánsson develops a theoretical study of flourishing that goes beyond Aristotle’s approach.

Kristjánsson contends that education’s ultimate purpose is to contribute to the student’s “good life.” This good life, however, must involve more than moral virtue or subjective happiness. He introduces the “Flourishing–Happiness Concordance Thesis” to critically examine the relationship between objective flourishing and subjective well-being, questioning whether they always align. He observes that these don’t always go hand in hand He contends that, yes, one can have happiness with flourishing but one can also happiness with no flourishing, no happiness with flourishing, and, of course, no happiness with no flourishing.  A significant and novel argument in the book is that even “supreme moral virtue” is insufficient for full flourishing. Kristjánsson proposes that flourishing requires engagement with “self-transcendent ideals” and the cultivation of “awe-filled enchantment”.

This leads him to incorporate elements often overlooked in standard character education literature: contemplation, wonder, awe, and what he terms “epiphanies”—transformative moments of moral and existential insight. He also extends the theory of exemplarity, arguing for the emulation of moral exemplars as a pathway to flourishing that moves beyond traditional models. By allowing for social, individual, and educational variance within the concept of flourishing, Kristjánsson provides a nuanced framework that engages with socio-political and spiritual issues, making it relevant for diverse educational contexts. Each chapter concludes with practical “food for thought” for educators, bridging theory with classroom practice. 

Critical Evaluation

While Kristjánsson’s synthesis is philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed, several limitations warrant scrutiny. First, his framework occasionally under-theorizes political constraints on institutional moral authority. Although he emphasizes autonomy-supportive education, he remains relatively silent on the legitimacy boundaries between education and moral governance.

From a flourishing individualist perspective, this raises concerns about value imposition. Even well-intentioned character education programs risk homogenizing moral outlooks and undermining pluralism. Kristjánsson’s emphasis on shared virtues requires careful specification to avoid transforming education into ideological socialization.

In addition, Kristjánsson’s reliance on institutional coordination presupposes cooperative alignment among cultural actors. In highly pluralistic societies, such coherence is unlikely. Without robust protections for parental choice and civil society autonomy, flourishing-oriented education may become politically contested.

Nevertheless, these limitations do not undermine the core contribution of Kristjánsson’s work. Rather, they highlight the need for integration with political theories that safeguard moral agency while enabling character development.

 Rasmussen and Den Uyl: Individualistic Perfectionism and Metanormativity

Rasmussen and Den Uyl articulate a distinctive neo-Aristotelian framework grounded in their philosophy of Individualistic Perfectionism. Flourishing is agent-relative: individuals pursue objective goods in diverse ways shaped by personal context and responsibility. Ethical objectivity does not entail uniform life plans. 

Their political theory is structured around metanormativity. In Norms of Liberty (2005), they argue that rights function as higher-order norms that protect the social space necessary for flourishing without prescribing substantive moral ends. Political institutions should enable flourishing conditions rather than enforce ethical ideals.

Norms of Liberty addresses what the authors term “liberalism’s problem”: how to establish a political/legal order that does not preferentially structure the conditions for one person’s or group’s flourishing over another’s. Their brilliant solution is the distinction between normative and metanormative principles.

Normative principles guide individual moral conduct—they are the virtues and goods that constitute a flourishing life. Metanormative principles, in contrast, concern the political/legal framework that makes the pursuit of diverse moral lives possible. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that individual rights (understood as negative liberties) are metanormative principles. Their function is not to directly promote human flourishing but to “create a space for each person to pursue a different and distinct form of life” by protecting the possibility of self-directed activity. Rights are thus “context-setting”; they establish the conditions under which moral conduct can occur, recognizing that coerced action can never be moral.

This allows them to advocate for a “perfectionist basis for non-perfectionist politics.” A neo-Aristotelian perfectionist ethics (which holds that flourishing is an objective, individualized telos) supports a non-perfectionist politics that refrains from legally mandating any particular vision of the good life.

In The Perfectionist Turn  (2016),  Rasmussen and Den Uyl shift from defending liberalism to fleshing out the “individualistic perfectionism” in ethics that undergirds their political theory. They challenge the assumption that a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework cannot support liberal politics by detailing the features of this alternative ethical system.

Individualistic Perfectionism maintains that while human flourishing is an objective end grounded in human nature, its concrete realization is uniquely individualized for each person. Generic goods (e.g., knowledge, friendship, health) and virtues (e.g., rationality, justice, courage) are necessary but must be integrated by individual practical wisdom (phronesis) in light of one’s specific circumstances, talents, and relationships. This ethics is agent-relative and anti-constructivist; moral truth is discovered in reality, not constructed by rational agreement. The book positions this framework as a major alternative to prevailing constructivist approaches in contemporary ethics.

 

In The Realist Turn (2020), they further emphasize responsibility and moral agency as central components of human flourishing. Flourishing requires self-directed practical reasoning within institutional frameworks that respect individual sovereignty.

The Realist Turn completes the trilogy by defending the metaphysical realism required for both individualistic perfectionism and natural rights. The authors argue that the entire project rests on the conviction that “man and the world exist apart from our cognition of them, and that people can know their nature”.

They launch a sustained critique of constructivism—the view that moral principles are determined by idealized rational procedures rather than discovered facts about reality. Constructivism, they contend, severs ethics from metaphysics, leading to a procedural, rule-governed, “one-size-fits-all” approach that cannot account for the individualized, context-sensitive nature of flourishing. In contrast, metaphysical realism holds that values are “fact-based” and discovered through rational engagement with the world. This realist turn is presented as essential for a proper comprehension and defense of freedom, as it grounds rights in the natural order of things.

Compatibility with Kristjánsson

Kristjánsson’s Aristotelian psychology essentially aligns with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s ethical foundations. All emphasize objective flourishing, rational agency, practical wisdom, and character development. Kristjánsson’s developmental account of how virtues emerge complements Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s more abstract normative framework.

However, tensions arise regarding institutional authority. Kristjánsson’s educational perfectionism contrasts with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s insistence on metanormative neutrality. A synthesis would reinterpret Kristjánsson’s insights through voluntary institutional contexts: families, private schools, community organizations, and civil associations rather than centralized state programs.

Kristjánsson and Rasmussen and Den Uyl share fundamental philosophical commitments that make their projects broadly compatible within the neo-Aristotelian tradition.

1. Objective Flourishing: Both affirm that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is an objective, naturalistic end, not a mere subjective preference.

2. The Role of Virtue: Both see moral virtue as a central constituent of the good life. Kristjánsson’s entire educational project is built on this premise, while Rasmussen and Den Uyl list virtues and generic goods necessary for any individualized flourishing.

3. Anti-Constructivism: Both reject constructivist approaches to ethics. Kristjánsson grounds character in a realist anthropology, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl make the critique of constructivism a centerpiece of their metaethical and metaphysical arguments.

4. The Social Nature of Flourishing: Both acknowledge that flourishing is inherently social. Kristjánsson emphasizes the educational community, while Rasmussen and Den Uyl view friendship as a constituent good and sociality as a necessary condition.

5. The Need for Practical Wisdom (Phronesis): Both emphasize the role of individual judgment. For Kristjánsson, students must develop practical wisdom to navigate moral life. For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, phronesis is the faculty that integrates generic goods into a unique, individual life plan.

Despite shared ground, their focal points create significant divergences.

1. Primary Focus: Normative vs. Metanormative: This is the most fundamental difference. Kristjánsson’s work operates at the normative level: How do we become good and flourish? His subject is the content and process of moral education. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s work is primarily metanormative: What political framework allows different answers to the normative question to coexist? Their subject is the context for moral activity, not the activity itself.

2. The Role of Politics and the State: Rasmussen and Den Uyl rigorously limit the state’s role to securing rights (the metanormative framework), arguing politics is “not suited to making men moral”. Kristjánsson, while not prescribing a state-led curriculum, inherently sees public education as a key institution for normative character formation. A tension arises: if the state funds and regulates schools, can it do so without violating the “non-perfectionist” principle by endorsing a particular (Aristotelian) vision of the good?

3. The Sufficiency of Moral Virtue: Kristjánsson’s later work argues that moral virtue is necessary but not sufficient for flourishing, requiring awe, wonder, and self-transcendence. Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s list of generic goods is more traditional and inclusive, but their framework might accommodate Kristjánsson’s “enchanted” elements as legitimate aspects of an individualized flourishing life. However, their emphasis on self-direction and agent-relativity might view prescribed “spiritual” elements in education with more caution.

4. Scope of the “Social”: For Kristjánsson, the educational community is a direct vehicle for moral formation. For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, sociality is a good, but the political/legal order must be neutral among the diverse forms of social life individuals choose. The “open-ended” nature of sociality in their framework prioritizes voluntary association over the structured community of the school.

 Toward a Synthesis

Integrating the ideas of Kristjánsson with those of Rasmussen and Den Uyl has the potential to yield a richer framework of neo-Aristotelian freedom and flourishing. Kristjánsson provides the psychological and pedagogical mechanisms by which individuals acquire moral competence. Rasmussen and Den Uyl supply the political architecture that protects moral freedom.

Such a synthesis supports a decentralized moral ecology in which character formation occurs within voluntary institutions operating under a metanormative rights-based framework. Flourishing becomes both a personal achievement and a socially supported process without collapsing into paternalism.

 A synthesis must explicitly address autonomy, spontaneous order, and the role of civil society institutions. These concepts are central to Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s realist liberalism and provide the institutional context necessary for integrating Kristjánsson’s moral psychology without collapsing into state-centered perfectionism.

Autonomy, for Rasmussen and Den Uyl, is not merely negative freedom from interference but the positive capacity for self-directed practical reasoning and responsible agency. Flourishing requires individuals to function as authors of their own lives, exercising judgment in selecting values, projects, and commitments. Kristjánsson’s autonomy-supportive pedagogy aligns with this view insofar as it emphasizes internalization of moral reasons rather than external compliance. However, Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism insists that autonomy must be institutionally protected through rights-respecting frameworks that prevent coercive moral engineering.

Spontaneous order further clarifies how moral development can occur without centralized design. Following Hayekian insights incorporated into Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s realist turn, social coordination emerges through decentralized interactions, cultural evolution, and voluntary associations. Moral norms, educational practices, and character formation strategies evolve organically within communities rather than being imposed from above. Kristjánsson’s emphasis on moral ecology can be reconceived within this spontaneous order framework, where diverse educational models compete, adapt, and innovate according to local needs and values.

The institutions of civil society serve as the primary mediating structures between individuals and the state. Families, religious organizations, independent (private) schools, professional associations, charities, and community networks constitute the institutional infrastructure of a free society. These voluntary associations may be able to provide moral formation environments consistent with Kristjánsson’s character education goals while remaining compatible with Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s metanormative liberalism. They allow pluralistic experimentation in virtue cultivation without political homogenization.

This institutional architecture preserves both moral substance and political restraint and avoids the false dilemma between moral relativism and state-enforced virtue. Instead, it supports a pluralistic ecosystem of character formation anchored in autonomy, spontaneous order, and voluntary cooperation. Within this framework, Kristjánsson’s developmental insights may potentially gain practical application while remaining compatible with liberty-centered political theory.

Kristjánsson’s detailed work on the process of flourishing has the potential to usefully complement Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s work on its preconditions. Several of his ideas may be able to be incorporated into a liberal perfectionist perspective without violating its metanormative constraints.

1. Articulating the “Individual” in Individualistic Perfectionism: Rasmussen and  Den Uyl assert that flourishing is individualized but say less about how individuals develop the capacity for such self-direction. Kristjánsson’s developmental psychology of virtue—how phronesis, empathy, and integrity are cultivated from childhood—provides essential content for understanding the “individual” who is to be the agent of his own flourishing. This can strengthen their ethics by showing how the capacity for self-direction is nurtured, not merely presupposed.

2. Enriching the Concept of Flourishing: Kristjánsson’s argument for the role of awe, wonder, and “epiphanies” offers a compelling expansion of the “generic goods” that constitute a flourishing life. A liberal perfectionist can argue that education should expose children to the potential for such experiences (through art, science, nature, philosophy) as part of developing their capacity to appreciate and pursue a full life, without dictating the specific objects of awe.

3. A Framework for Voluntary Educational Communities: Rasmussen and  Den Uyl’s framework favors voluntary association. Kristjánsson’s research provides a blueprint for what parents and educators in such voluntary communities (including charter schools, private schools, or homeschooling networks) might aim for in character education. It offers an empirically-informed “perfectionist” curriculum that respects pluralism by being one offered option among many, not a state-mandated monopoly.

4. Connecting Entrepreneurship and Moral Education: Rasmussen and Den Uyl draw an analogy between the entrepreneur and the moral agent, both navigating uncertainty with creativity and alertness. Kristjánsson’s work on exemplarity and moral development provides a pedagogical correlate: how to educate individuals to become such alert, creative moral “entrepreneurs” of their own lives. This creates a powerful synergy between their economic and ethical individualism.

Conclusion

Kristjánsson’s Aristotelian ethics and educational philosophy advance contemporary virtue theory by reconnecting flourishing with empirical psychology and institutional practice. In turn, Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism provides the necessary political safeguards for preserving individual moral agency.

Kristján Kristjánsson and the duo of Rasmussen and Den Uyl represent two strands of contemporary neo-Aristotelian thought. Kristjánsson delves deeply into the normative and developmental question of how human beings become virtuous and flourish, particularly through education. Rasmussen and Den Uyl address the prior political question of how to create a society where diverse, individualized pursuits of flourishing can coexist peacefully, grounding their answer in metanormative theory and metaphysical realism.

Their projects are not so much incompatible as they are complementary, operating at different levels of analysis. The primary tension lies at the intersection of state action and education. However, within a political order that respects rights as metanorms, Kristjánsson’s work may become invaluable. It provides a guide for the voluntary communities, families, and individuals that seek to answer the normative question within their own lives. By integrating Kristjánsson’s insights into the cultivation of character, practical wisdom, and a sense of wonder, the Individualistic Perfectionism of Rasmussen and Den Uyl could gain greater psychological depth and pedagogical traction. Together, these bodies of work potentially offer a more complete picture: a liberal society that protects the space for freedom, populated by individuals educated to use that freedom wisely in the pursuit of a truly flourishing life. 

 References

Den Uyl, Douglas J.  and Rasmussen Douglas B. (2016). The Perfectionist turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh University Press.

Kristjánsson, Kristján. (2015). Aristotelian Character Ethics: An Aristotelian Approach to moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.

Kristjánsson, Kristján. (2019). Flourishing as the Aim of Education: A neo-Aristotelian View. Routledge.

Rasmussen, Douglas B.  and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2005). Norms of liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-perfectionist Politics. Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  (2020). The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Edinburgh University Press.

 

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W (2025) “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 24, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W (2026) “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.