Does Aristotle’s assertion that a viable political system requires a supportive culture still have relevance today?

 

Some readers may be wondering why anything written about culture and politics over 2000 years ago could possibly have contemporary relevance. Fred D. Miller J.R. makes a strong case that Aristotle’s views remain relevant in his recently published book, Aristotelian Statecraft. In particular, Miller demonstrates that we can still learn a lot from Aristotle about the relationships between moral character, culture and political systems.

In the first part of this essay I will draw upon Miller’s book, particularly Chapter 15, to explain the basis for Aristotle’s assertion that a viable political system requires a supportive culture. In the second part I will outline Miller’s observations about the contemporary relevance of the relationship between culture and political systems. In the third part I will reflect on implications of Miller’s work for the role political entrepreneurship in institutional change, drawing on my recent essays on that topic.

Aristotle’s thesis

At this point I should explain why I think Aristotle was intending to convey the idea that a viable political system requires a supportive culture in the sentence quoted in the epigraph (Pol. V.9.1310a). The quote appears in a context where Aristotle is writing about laws being democratic or oligarchic. Since he is also referring to a constitution as something that might be influenced by education of the young, it seems reasonable to infer that in this context he sees a constitution as being constituted mainly of mores (i.e. informal institutions).

Aristotle observes that the moral character of a polis reflects the moral character of its citizens. His thesis that a viable political system requires a supportive culture can be seen to stem from his moral psychology. The line of argument is summarized in the following points:

• Individuals develop character traits, including social virtues, through their voluntary habitual actions in social settings. Good character has two components: pursuit of virtuous ends; and practical wisdom to choose the best means to those ends.
• Justice and friendship are the most important social virtues. Justice aims at establishing some kind of equality among individuals whereby they all get what properly belongs to them and can cooperate for mutual advantage. Friendship goes beyond justice. Friends choose what is good for each other, and each believes their own good is chosen by the other. Friendship entails trust as well as respect.
• “When a number of individuals cooperate in an association over a period of time, their shared character traits and practical knowledge become an integral part of the culture of the association.” (p. 370)
• Political friendship – a situation where individuals regard fellow citizens as their friends - is closely related to consensus. It is typically found in a society where the rich and the poor (and others with divergent interests) agree about important issues and trust people in authority to act in the common interest.
• However, if people are not careful to treat each other justly, political friendship will be eroded, resulting in civil strife between parties with divergent interests. As the culture is corrupted “individuals will seek to aggrandize themselves at the public expense and the association will become unjust, unstable, and fragile”.

Miller concludes:

“The practical upshot of Aristotle’s thesis is that legislators and policy makers should be concerned about supporting and advancing culture by promoting education and the institutions and practices necessary for the formation of virtuous character traits.” (p. 371)

Miller’s observations about contemporary relevance

The point about emergence of civil strife among those with divergent interests seems to me to be relevant to explaining the link between interest group politics and growth of populism in Western democracies. I will return to that topic later.  

In discussing the contemporary relevance of Aristotle’s thesis, Miller focuses on the role of culture in the political transition of the countries that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s. Miller sets the scene for that discussion by noting that Alexis de Tocqueville advanced similar ideas to Aristotle in Democracy in America.

Tocqueville noted that democratic political institutions suited to common traits of Americans could not easily be transferred to Europe. He suggests that traits such as self-help, mutual beneficence, and active participation in voluntary associations made Americans more self-reliant and less dependent upon government support.

Miller also draws upon Douglas North’s views on the path-dependence of culture. He quotes a passage in which North cites examples of unsuccessful attempts to transplant to other countries the constitutions and laws of the United States and other successful Western countries. Those attempts failed because the formal institutions being transplanted were incompatible with the prevailing cultures of recipient countries.

Miller’s observations about the political transition following communist rule draw initially on the work of Svetozar Pejovich (“The Uneven Results of Institutional Change in Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of Culture”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 2006). Pejovich’s theoretical framework rests on the idea that the transactions costs of integrating new formal rules are higher when members of the community perceive the consequences of those rules to conflict with their prevailing culture. He applies that framework to discuss the great disparity in economic freedom among Central and Eastern European countries in 2004, advancing the hypothesis that countries with a stronger Western cultural influence have been more successful in making the transition than those with a tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christianity or Islam. Pejovich observes that culture in the less free and unfree groups has “a bias toward collectivism, egalitarianism, and shared values that predates communism”.

Miller expands Pejovich’s analysis to cover political and personal freedom and extends the period covered to 2002. Drawing upon a range of sources, he identifies three groups of countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for 2020-2022: consolidated democracies; consolidated semi-democracies; and hybrid regimes. The consolidated democracies are Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The consolidated semi-democracies are Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. The19 hybrid regimes include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia, and Hungary.

The author notes that most of the countries that got off to a good start after the fall of communism have continued their trajectories to consolidate democratic capitalism.  He adds: “A notable exception was Hungary, which was demoted to the hybrid zone after a conservative government adopted a new constitution.”

Miller notes that most countries in the hybrid group have made little progress to democratic capitalism. He then adds:

“On the other hand, it is noteworthy that none of these countries have reverted to outright authoritarianism. It is as if they have an inner tendency preventing them from rising above or falling below a certain level. Aristotle’s thesis suggests a plausible explanation of this phenomenon: the parameters of political change are determined to a significant extent by a country’s underlying culture.”

Implications for political entrepreneurship

Miller’s book contains a great deal of information about Aristotle’s view of statecraft which is highly relevant to consideration of political entrepreneurship. In this section of the essay, however, I want to focus on two of my essays discussing the roles of culture and political entrepreneurship as determinants of economic and personal freedom.

The first of these essays is entitled Part II: Can cultural values explain freedom levels? In that essay I observe the existence of a weak positive relationship between economic freedom and an index of facilitating values that I have developed and a strong positive relationship between Christian Welzel’s emancipative values index and personal freedom levels. This research is broadly supportive of the view that culture plays an important role as a determinant of formal institutional settings.

However, my main focus was on outlier countries, whose freedom levels could not be readily explained by culture. I suggested that outlier status can be attributed to the influence of political entrepreneurship. It is relatively easy to identify individual political entrepreneurs who have contributed to institutional outcomes in countries with economic and/or personal freedom ratings substantially lower than might be predicted by underlying cultural values. However, when governments have relatively high regard for individual liberty, political entrepreneurship tends to be more subtle, and less focused on individual national leaders.

Looking at the data base used in this analysis, 24 countries can be identified as belonging to the former Soviet bloc. Of those,10 have both economic and personal freedom levels within a range of plus or minus 1 unit of that predicted by underlying cultural values. Armenia is the only country in which both personal and economic freedom are greater the predicted level; Albania is the only other country where economic freedom is greater than the predicted level. Azerbaijan is the only country with both personal and economic freedom are less than the predicted level and is also the only country with economic freedom less than the predicted level. Apart from Armenia, the countries with personal freedom greater than the predicted level are Bosnia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia and Romania. Apart from Azerbaijan, the countries with personal freedom levels lower than the predicted level are Belarus, Russia and Tajikistan.

This analysis provides some support for the Aristotle/Miller thesis even though it suggests that political entrepreneurship can also play an important role in determining economic and personal freedom levels.

The second of my essays relevant to the role of culture and political entrepreneurship is entitled Part VI: What are the consequences of path dependence? In that essay I argue that the culture of preferment-seeking and plunder currently associated with interest group politics in Western liberal democracies took a long time to reach its current state, but it is now entrenched and will be difficult to overcome. The problem arises from path dependence. Changing the rules of the game to reduce the adverse impact of interest group politics poses a large challenge for reform-minded political entrepreneurs.

The development of my line of argument has features in common with the Aristotle/ Miller thesis outlined above. The most obvious common element is reference to Douglas North’s views on the path dependence of culture.

My line of argument also relies heavily on the views of James M Buchanan about social virtues. Those views have an Aristotelian flavour. Buchanan argues that two norms underpin liberal democracy: that a sufficient proportion of the population can make their own choices and prefer to be autonomous rather than dependent on others; and that a sufficient proportion of the population enter relationships with others based on reciprocity, fair dealing, and mutual respect. My attempt to link Buchanan’s views to Aristotle has led me to John Passmore’s book, The Perfectibility of Man (1970). Buchanan claims that book “remains the definitive work on the history of ideas” related to its title. From the little I have read of Passmore’s book, it is clear that he is influenced by Aristotle (but more critical of Aristotle’s views than I am).

I began my path dependence essay with famous quotes from Frédéric Bastiat about the state being the great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else; and the universal franchise as likely to result in universal plunder. It is now clear to me, however, that Bastiat’s comments should be viewed in the light of Tocqueville’s observation that democratic political institutions suited to common traits of Americans could not easily be transferred to Europe. In that light, at the time they were made Bastiat’s comments seem to have been more pertinent to continental Europe than to the Anglosphere. Over the last 150 years, democratic political institutions do seem to have had greater resilience in the Anglosphere than in other parts of the world.

However, in my view Aristotle’s warning that social trust will be eroded if people are not careful to treat each other justly has now also become highly pertinent to the Anglosphere. We are seeing increasing evidence that as the culture is corrupted “individuals will seek to aggrandize themselves at the public expense”. Our democratic political institutions now seem to be becoming increasingly “unjust, unstable, and fragile”.

Conclusion

 This essay was prompted by my reading of Chapter 15 of Fred Miller’s book, Aristotelian Statecraft. That chapter discusses how Aristotle’s observation that the moral character of a polis reflects the moral character of its citizens supports his view that a viable political system requires a supportive culture.

In that chapter, Miller also discusses the varied political transition of countries following the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s to illustrate that democratic capitalism is only viable if culture is supportive. He demonstrates that the countries that have been most successful in making the transition have had a history of relatively strong Western cultural influence. Cultural influences in many of the other countries seem to hold them back from either advancing strongly toward democratic capitalism or reverting to outright authoritarianism.

I also considered whether the Aristotle/Miller thesis is consistent with the conclusions of two essays in my series on political entrepreneurship. The findings of my essay on the extent to which cultural values explain freedom levels are broadly supportive of the role of cultural values, even though I emphasize that political entrepreneurship can also play an important role.

My essay on the consequences of path dependence offers strong support for the Aristotle/ Miller thesis in the context of considering the gradual erosion of social virtues in Western liberal democracies. I think we are now observing the consequences of failure to heed Aristotle’s warning that social trust will be eroded if people do not treat each other justly.

Can the rise of populism be explained as a reaction to the rule of experts?

 

In an essay written over 15 years ago I observed that we were beginning to see a populist reaction to the rule of experts in the United States and (to a lesser extent) in Australia. In more recent essays, however, I have tended to see populism as a manifestation of interest group politics. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, but it may be useful to consider how the rule of experts and populism are both entangled with interest group politics.

My 2010 essay

The essay was entitled: Does Australia also have a ruling class? It was prompted by an article by Angelo Codevilla which suggested that Democrat and Republican office-holders in recent governments in the United States had shown “a similar presumption to dominate and fewer differences in tastes, habits and opinions ... than between both and the rest of the community”. He claimed: “They think, look, and act like a class.”

Codevilla discussed several characteristics of this “ruling class”. For example, he suggested that they believe themselves to be “the best and brightest while the rest of Americans are retrograde, racist, and dysfunctional unless properly constrained”. They view the common people’s words as “like grunts, mere signs of pain, pleasure and frustration”.

I concluded that while Australia also had a self-appointed ruling class which could be identified with the public service and the political left, I didn’t think the conservative side of Australian politics was as closely identified with that ruling class as in the United States. That explains why populist politicians were not particularly popular in Australia at that time.

In retrospect, however, I think I also displayed some “ruling class” attitudes in my essay:

“In my view the words of non-experts on complex economic issues do have little more value than a grunt. Whether we are talking about economic policy, brain surgery or plumbing, I think it should be self-evident that the views of experts count for more than those of non-experts.”

I still think that the views of experts should count for more than those of non-experts, although these days I try to avoid being offensive. Apart from the tone of my comment, I should have made clear that there are reasons to doubt that some of those who claim economic expertise know what they are talking about. The claims that some economists make about the potential to regulate complex market systems to produce better outcomes deserve no more respect than the similar claims of non-experts.

In his book, Expert Failure, published in 2018, Roger Koppl brings an economic perspective to “the problem of experts”. I will briefly consider Koppl’s line of argument in the following section.

Expert Failure

Koppl acknowledges that we must rely on experts even though experts may not be completely reliable and trustworthy sources of the advice we require from them.

 He defines an “expert” as anyone paid to give an opinion. That definition leaves open the question of whether experts are reliable or unreliable.

 Koppl adopts the Hayekian view that knowledge is generally emergent from practice, often tacit, and embodied in our norms, habits, practices, and traditions. His comparative institutional approach leads to the conclusion that expert error and abuse are more likely when experts have monopoly power, and less likely in a “competitive” market for expert opinion.

I expect most economists would view that as commonsense, but it is far removed from standard practice in many fields which rely on expert knowledge. Based on his study of the use of expert witnesses in law, Koppl observes that it is common to encounter the view that it is scandalous for the opinions of men of science to be challenged, even by other scientists. It is often held that the knowledge of expert witnesses is or should be uniform, unambiguous and certain. Experts are often encouraged to come to a common understanding rather than to offer competing views.

Koppl observes that the division of knowledge makes it impossible for anyone to avoid a limited and partial perspective, which implies a parochial bias in our perceptions and judgments. That kind of bias cannot be eliminated by blinding protocols – such as the double-blind requirements used in testing of pharmaceuticals.  It can only be mitigated by multiplying the number of experts and putting them in positions of genuine rivalry.

The book contains an interesting discussion of epistemic systems design in an experimental economics laboratory. In that setting, the experimenter is in the god-like position of defining unambiguously what the truth is and examining how close experimental subjects come to it in different institutional settings. The knowledge gained of which institutional structures promote the discovery and elimination of error is relevant to the real world. Experimental systems design studies offer opportunities to test the role of network structure in producing reliable knowledge in scientific fields.

Koppl comments:

“Rather than attempting to instruct people in how to form true opinions, we might reform our social institutions in ways that tend to induce people to find and speak the truth.”

However, at the end of the next chapter, after considering the problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion in government -  referred to as the rule of experts or the entangled deep state - the author suggests that the experimental approach of “piecemeal institutional reform (which is mostly borrowed from Vernon Smith) does not have an obvious application to the entangled deep state.”  He concludes:

“If my diagnosis of the deep state is at all correct, reform is urgently required. I freely confess, however, that I have no specific ideas on how we might attempt to roll back the deep state with a reasonable prospect of success.”

Nevertheless, Koppl offers useful insights into the nature of the problem arising from the rule of experts. His conclusion that the problem of experts “mostly boils down to the question of knowledge imposition” is highly relevant to consideration of institutional approaches to determination of public policies.

In the introductory chapter to his book Koppl explains that he values pluralistic democracy and is as much opposed to populism as to the rule of experts.  He argues for pluralism on the grounds that each of us has at best a partial view of the truth:

“In a pluralist democracy, competing partial perspectives on the truth have at least a chance to be heard and to influence political choices. Decisions in a political system – be it populist, elitist, or something else – that override or ignore plural perspectives will be based on knowledge that is at best limited, partial, biased.”

In the process of developing that view Koppl refers to an article by Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Accetti (“Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements?” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 20(2), 2015) which describes populism and technocracy as two organizing poles of politics which are both opposed to “party democracy”. I will now discuss that article because it raises the question in my mind of whether party democracy has more in common with interest group politics than with pluralism.

Party democracy, interest group politics and pluralism

 Bickerton and Accetti argue that whilst populism and technocracy are usually assumed to be opposed to each other, there is also an important element of complementarity between them. Both populism and technocracy are predicated on an implicit critique of party democracy. The authors suggest that “if we accept the idea that politics is increasingly structured in terms of this conflict between populism and technocracy, then we find that even the very possibility of articulating a defense of party democracy is excluded from the political spectrum”.

I have no difficulty agreeing with Bickerton and Accetti if they are just using different words to say that both populism and the rule of experts are opposed to pluralistic democracy. Technocracy seems to correspond closely with rule of experts, but “party democracy”, as the authors describe it, seems to me to corresponds more closely to interest group politics than to the role of encompassing political groups in a two-party pluralistic democracy.

The authors define party democracy as a political regime based on two key features: the mediation of political conflicts through the institution of political parties; and the idea that the specific conception of the common good that ought to prevail and therefore be translated into public policy is the one that is constructed through the democratic procedures of parliamentary deliberation and electoral competition. The role of political parties in “mediation of political conflicts” is the focus of my concern.

The authors suggest that an important function performed by political parties is that of “integrating a plurality of particular interests” and moulding them into “an overarching conception of the common good”. When political parties aim to do such things, it seems to me that they end up cobbling together coalitions of interest groups which seek to obtain benefits for themselves at the expense of others. That is essentially what interest group politics is about.

In my view, better outcomes are produced when political parties take on the role of encompassing political groups in two-party pluralistic democracies. In discussing the importance of encompassing political groups in a two-party system of government, Mancur Olson asserted that the leader of a party “whose clients comprise half or more of the society naturally is concerned about the efficiency and welfare of the society as a whole” because this affects the party’s electoral prospects.  (See further discussion and reference here.)

 As I have explained elsewhere (for example in a recent essay on the consequences of path dependence) the growth of interest group politics has tended to contract economic freedom, constrain economic growth and increase public debt levels. As a result, voters have tended to become increasingly disenchanted with conventional politics.

It seems to me that as party politics has increasingly focused on pandering to particular interest groups it has helped to bring about a situation where more people have become more willing to listen to populists who tell them that they are being disadvantaged by the policies of conventional political leaders. Unfortunately, most of those populist leaders advance policies that are likely to produce even worse economic and social outcomes.

The ubiquity of populism, rule of experts, and interest group politics

Looking at recent politics in the United Sates, it might seem appropriate to identify the Democratic Party with rule of experts and the Republican Party with populism. However, that assignment understates the extent of populism in the Democratic Party, which tends to seek popular support by attributing economic woes to the wealthy 1% of the population in much the same way as economic nationalists in the Republican Party attribute economic woes to import competition and immigration. It also understates the extent to which the current Administration relies on commercial expertise – dealmaking – in running the government. It seems that the rule of one group of experts has been replaced by rule of another group with different expertise. The problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion have changed their character but have not disappeared.

Roger Koppl’s reference to the “entangled deep state” reflects his awareness that the rule of experts is not immune to interest group politics. He notes that participants in the American deep state “have a variety of competing and parochial interests”. More generally, interest group politics is strongly associated with the entanglement of entrepreneurs and interests in private and public sectors.

Interest group politics seems to have attended to the pleas of increasingly narrow groups in recent years. As well as seeking support of broad economic groups such as unions, industry groups, and groups with differing social and environmental attitudes, political parties have increasingly sought the support of narrow interest groups by engaging in identity politics. The progressive side of politics has favoured groups that have previously been disadvantaged by ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation. The conservative side of politics has pushed back against what they label as wokeness, while seeking support from some groups, e.g. young men, who perceive themselves to be disadvantage by it.

Another interesting development in interest group politics in the United States is the emergence of an alliance between conservative populists and the high-tech community. It is not easy to comprehend how populists who claim to be concerned about economic and social impacts of competition from imports and immigration could be complacent about the economic and social impacts of AI. Action by the U.S. government to facilitate rapid development of AI has been accompanied by a change in the economic nationalist narrative away from its populist roots to emphasize the importance of retaining technological leadership in AI in the face of increasing competition from China.

The warning of President Eisenhower, quoted in the epigraph, might now be relevant for reasons that he could not have foreseen. Public policy is not only at risk of becoming the captive of a scientific-technological elite supported by the administrative state, it is also at risk of becoming the captive of a scientific-technological elite controlling the development of powerful AI models.

However, I don’t think we should assume that a future in which AI models will have an increasing influence on social and economic outcomes will necessarily be worse than a future in which the entangled deep state retains its current influence.  It is possible that rivalry between different AI models will ensure that their social and economic impacts are relatively benign and consistent with pluralistic democracy. Even now, greater use of truth-seeking bots has potential to lessen the problem of rational ignorance, and thus to reduce the susceptibility of voters to populists peddling false narratives.

Conclusions

The rise of populism in the Western liberal democracies can be explained to some degree as a reaction to the “ruling class” attitudes of experts within governments.  I have recently tended to see populism as a manifestation of interest group politics, but it is worth considering how the rule of experts and populism are entangled with interest group politics.

The essay has outlined the views presented by Roger Koppl in his book, Expert Failure. Koppl offers the useful insight that the main problem arising from the rule of experts is knowledge imposition. Expert error and abuse are more likely when experts have monopoly power and are less likely when experts are placed in positions of genuine rivalry. Koppl argues that pluralist democracy is superior to both the rule of experts and populism because it enables competing partial perspectives on the truth to have a chance to be heard.

I have also considered the view of Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Accetti that both populism and technocracy are predicated on an implicit critique of party democracy. I suggested that party democracy, as the authors described it, seemed to have more in common with interest group politics than with pluralistic democracy. In my view, interest group politics is largely to blame for the poor economic and social outcomes that have encouraged the growth of populism.

My main conclusion is that the rule of experts, populism, and interest group politics are currently ubiquitous on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics. Populism is certainly not confined to one side of politics and populist governments don’t eliminate problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion. In the U.S. a populist executive has continued to discourage rival views, while attempting to substitute expertise in commercial deal-making for expertise in statecraft.

The emergence of an alliance between the current U.S. Administration and the high-tech community poses a risk that public policy may become captive to a scientific-technological elite controlling the development of powerful AI models.  We should not assume, however, that a future in which AI models have an increasing influence on social and economic outcomes will necessarily be worse than one in which the entangled deep state retains its current influence. Rivalry between AI models may even have potential to produce better outcomes.

What was wrong with the Washington Consensus?

 

Just as I was reading the final chapters of William Easterly’s book, Violent Saviours: The West, the Rest, and Capitalism Without Consent, the United States government abducted the president of Venezuela to stand trial on drug charges in New York. I was pleased to see Nicolás Maduro facing justice, even if for the wrong reasons, but at the time of writing it remains to be seen whether the U.S. actions will advance the economic and personal freedom of Venezuelans.

 In the light of recent developments, Easterly’s conclusion seem to me to be excessively optimistic. He states:

“Adam Smith’s prophesied movement of “nations into some sort of respect for the rights of one another” had been partially fulfilled. The relation of the West to the Rest, previously based on coercion, was now based mainly on consent.”

Under the presidency of Donald Trump, the U.S. seems to me to be behaving like a colonial power. President Trump makes no secret of the fact that he is more interested in control of additional territory, oil, and other resources than in promoting respect for human rights, free trade, and the liberal international order.

Apologists for President Trump can claim, with some justification, that big powers have always swung their weight around in their own interests despite their rhetoric supporting the liberal international order. Nevertheless, public support for international norms of behaviour has hitherto signaled a willingness to be held to account publicly for breach of those norms.

 Easterly qualifies his statement that the relation of the West and the Rest is now based mainly on consent:

“The trend toward freedom is neither inexorable nor irreversible. As of this writing, new threats to freedom have emerged with proposed increases in US tariffs and possible restrictions on foreign students. It’s a little premature to declare the attainment of a liberal paradise.”

With the benefit of observation of recent events, however, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the world is currently moving rapidly away from the ideal of relations between nations being based on consent rather than coercion. It is possible, nevertheless, that oppressed people in some countries will manage to achieve more economic and personal freedom over the next few years. The best we can hope for is that before too long Washington will once again embrace the ideal that relations between nations should be based on consent rather than coercion.

Before I discuss Easterly’s view of the Washington Consensus, I will briefly outline what Violent Saviours is about.

The West’s conflicted view of the Rest

Violent Saviours offers a historical account of the conflict between the duelling visions that have influenced the conduct of Western nations toward the rest of the world since the 17^th and 18^th centuries. On the one hand, there are the liberal ideas of consent, self-determination, and equality that make possible positive-sum gains from commerce between groups and individuals. On the other hand, there are the opposing illiberal ideas of coercion, paternalism and racism that yielded a negative sum world of conquest.

Adam Smith was a leading advocate of liberal ideas and a critic of many aspects of colonialism. However, some well-intentioned Enlightenment philosophers (e.g. Condorcet) offered support for the “Development Right of Conquest”. Condorcet sought to justify conquest as offering the hope of eventually “civilizing” the locals.

Over the period from 1776 to 1865, the liberals were mainly on the losing side. They were unable to prevent the West’s adoption of illiberal policies such as colonial conquest and population removal (in countries such as the U.S, and Australia). However, liberals had some victories during that period; most notably, they were able to bring about abolition of the slave trade and of slavery in the United States.

Easterly suggests that over the period from 1865 to 1945 most economists abandoned liberal morality: “Commerce expands but without moral constraints on plunder”. The regression of freedom culminated in World War II, during which liberalism had to fight for its survival.

The period since 1945 has seen the partial victory of liberal ideas with the end of colonialism and a surge in commerce which has partially restored agency to people in the former colonies. Easterly notes that some economists – notably Milton Friedman, P. T. Bauer, and Amartya Sen – revived the idea of individual freedom as “an end in itself”.

It is possible to quibble with some aspects of that account, but I think the important point to focus on is the current state of the conflict between the duelling visions. Easterly writes:

“Yet the legacy of the past is still here. While obviously not equating modern development efforts with slavery, genocide, and colonialism, the question remains of what violations of consent today in the name of progress should be out of bounds.”

That provides the context in which I would like to consider the Washington Consensus.

 The Washington Consensus

The Washington Consensus was the term John Williamson, an economist, invented in 1989 to describe the set of policy reforms that the US Treasury, the World Bank and the IMF believed would be good for Latin American countries. The ten propositions of the Washington Consensus combined fiscal discipline with selective deregulation. They were broadly pro-market but did not entail a vastly diminished role for government. As an advocate of a greater measure of economic freedom than required by the ten points in the Washington Consensus, I recall being bemused to see opponents equate it with “neoliberalism” and “market fundamentalism”. John Williamson had a different reaction. As he discussed in the paper from which I obtained the epigraph, he was concerned that the term was often being used to refer to a more radical pro-market view than he had intended.

The policy ideas in the Washington Consensus were certainly applicable beyond Latin American countries and were not confined to economists in Washington DC. Those ideas were widely accepted by economists with expertise in economic policy in many different countries. I think they are still widely accepted by economists today.

As I was reading Easterly’s discussion of the Washington Consensus, the thought crossed my mind that the era in which it held sway was actually the high point in economic development policy as advocated by the World Bank. The Washington consensus seemed to show more recognition of the importance of economic freedom than subsequent policy approaches emerging from Washington.

One of the problems that Easterly mentions is that many observers thought that pro-market reforms were only desirable if they produced immediate economic gains. The reforms led to anti-globalization protests because they didn’t have an immediate positive impact on economic growth and were often associated with worsening of poverty. As time went on, however, “there was more evidence of growth turnarounds and poverty reduction correlated with movements away from extreme state control”.

As I was reading this, I tried to recollect what I had written in the 1990s about the adjustment process following an expansion of economic freedom. I wrote about some aspects of that question in an article entitled “The New Zealand Model of Economic Reform: A Review” (published in: Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997), ANU Press). My work suggested that the lack of clear evidence of economic benefits in some countries that had undertaken economic reforms in the 1980s could be attributed partly to the time required for new policy directions to become embedded and for adjustment to occur: 

“Profound changes in behaviour, including changes in the willingness of individuals to learn new skills and business practices, are required as people respond to the incentives that policy reforms provide.  It takes time even for the most innovative firms and individuals to accept that new market incentives are likely to be sustained and to develop and implement new strategies.  Widespread adoption requires sufficient time for these new strategies to become demonstrably successful.”

I am pleased that I wrote that even though I missed an important point that Easterly makes. He suggests that the emphasis “on material results alone – on both sides of the debate – neglected Sen’s and others’ arguments for freedom as an end in itself”.

I don’t see freedom as an “end in itself” – freedom is necessary because human flourishing is an individualized and self-directed process. What I think Easterly means is that institutional freedom would be no less desirable if individuals chose to use it ways that made no contribution to economic growth e.g. by increasing the amount of time they spent on leisure activities.

Easterly also suggests that the manner in which foreign governments were encouraged to adopt Washington Consensus polices was problematic:

“Low and middle-income countries could get badly needed loans from the World Bank and IMF only if they agreed to reforms decreed by Bank and Fund staff. The fatal combination of foreign advisors with some coercion would keep discrediting promarket recommendations made by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in the 1990s, especially for Africa, Latin America, and Russia.”

A few pages on, however, the author notes that “the association of liberal reforms with a Washington-imposed Consensus did not turn out to be fatal”. He follows that observation with a long list of “homegrown reformers” who have pursued pro-market reforms. (I have reproduced the list here.)

Unfortunately, Easterly’s list of reformers does not include Javier Milei, president of Argentina. It was probably compiled too soon for that to be possible.

Now that I have mentioned Javier Milei it is worth noting that the U.S. government offered a $20 billion bailout for Argentina prior to the country’s recent legislative elections. The offer was apparently made with strings attached — namely, that the funds would be available only if Milei’s party won the election.

It seems to me that if the U.S. president were to promote a general policy of assisting those low-income countries whose political leaders enthusiastically expand economic and personal freedom, he might be worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize.   

Conclusion

William Easterly’s book, Violent Saviours, offers an insightful account of the conflict between liberal and coercive views of economic development since the 17^th and 18^th centuries. He suggests that the legacy of the past is still with us because development economists and policy makers are still confronted by the question of what violations of consent should be out of bounds.

That provided the context in which I considered Easterly’s views of what was wrong with the Washinton Consensus – the moderately pro-market economic policies advocated by the U.S. Treasury, the World Bank, and the IMF during the 1990s. Easterly is clearly sympathetic to espousal of pro-market policies. However, he makes a strong case that such policies should be advocated to promote economic freedom rather than to promote “material results alone”.

The view that Easterly presents is consistent with the idea that liberty is desirable because it provides opportunities for individuals to flourish in the manner they choose.

What questions should I focus on in 2026?

Happy New Year!

If I had asked myself at the beginning of 2025 what questions I should focus over the next 12 months I would have mentioned the implications of declining economic growth rates in high income countries.  I have been particularly interested in the consequences of an increasing proportion of the populations of high-income countries coming to feel that their standard of living is worse than that of their parents at a comparable age. My research suggests that people tend to feel miserable when they assess their standard of living to be lower than that of their parents. I wrote several essays on that topic, including one entitled: How difficult would it be for individuals to adjust to zero economic growth?

I would not have predicted at the beginning of 2025 that during the year I would write an essay entitled: Are integralists opposed to natural rights? That was my most popular essay for the year, with over 4,000 views.

My interest in integralists followed serendipitously from my interest in the role of political entrepreneurship in institutional change. At the beginning of 2025 I was concerned to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship because there seemed to be increasing support in liberal democracies for leaders who proposed changes in the rules of the game which were likely to have detrimental impacts on prospects for individual flourishing. Some essays I wrote on the topic attracted over 3,900 views. I revised those essays during the year and published a series of essays in November addressing issues related to the question: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing?

I would not have predicted at the beginning of 2025 that I would have the opportunity to publish four scholarly essays by Edward W. Younkins, on topics that are central to the purpose of this blog.  An essay reviewing books by David L. Norton, was published here in January, a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book “Total Freedom” was published  here in July, an essay entitled, “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?”, was published here in October, and an essay entitled, “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing”, was published here in December. Those essays have all attracted a substantial number of readers.

What next?

It may be possible to predict what I will write about in 2026 from topics that I wish I could understand more fully. Those topics may provide the focus for my future reading.

In a recent post, I have already foreshadowed further reading related to political entrepreneurship and institutional change.

I also feel the need to improve my understanding of the implications of rapid advances in AI. I wrote a series of essays about robots and AI in 2015 and 2016 (one of the better ones is here ) but a lot has happened since then.

Another topic I would like to be able to understand is why birth rates are now below replacement levels in many high-income countries. Can this be attributed to economic insecurity, or has there been a fundamental change in values? Does it pose a threat to civilization, as some have suggested? Does it pose a problem for those of us who believe that human flourishing is an inherently self-directed process?

I don’t expect to be able to push back the frontiers of knowledge in any of the areas mentioned above but it would be nice to end the year with a better understanding of some of the issues involved.

It will be interesting to look back at the end of 2026 to what I have actually written about. I imagine the range of topics touched upon will be broader than the topics listed above. I also hope to be given the opportunity to publish more high-quality guest essays that are consistent with the purposes of this blog.

Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?

 

This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including an essay reviewing books by David L. Norton, which was published here in January, a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book “Total Freedom” published  here in July, and an essay entitled, “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?”, published here in October.

I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to publish Ed’s latest essay at this time. I recently concluded a series of essays on political entrepreneurship by suggesting:

“If we want institutions that are more supportive of freedom and flourishing to become entrenched, we will need more supportive citizens engaged in discursive processes at all levels of society …”. 

It is difficult to have useful discourse with people expressing opposing views if we focus exclusively on categorizing their positions according to the political groupings or ideological tribes that seem to provide their talking points. It can be more interesting, and is sometimes more productive, to seek to understand the motivational systems, parenting models, and moral foundations underlying the positions they adopt.

Ed Younkins writes:

 The intense polarization characterizing contemporary political discourse has prompted several influential scholars to explore the deeper psychological and moral foundations underpinning our ideological divisions. Three particularly significant contributions to this understanding include Ronnie Janoff-Bulman's The Two Moralities: Conservatives, Liberals, and the Roots of Our Political Divide, George Lakoff's Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, and Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Each of these works approaches the political divide through different disciplinary lenses—social psychology, cognitive linguistics, and moral psychology respectively—yet arrives at a similar fundamental conclusion: that political differences reflect much deeper differences in moral intuitions and conceptual frameworks rather than merely calculated disagreements about specific policies. Together, these works provide complementary frameworks for understanding why political arguments often seem so intractable and why each side frequently views the other as not merely mistaken but morally deficient. This essay will first provide a short summary and review of each of these three influential works before exploring how libertarian thinking, particularly through the lens of neo-Aristotelian flourishing and the "Individualistic Perfectionism" of Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, might provide a compelling framework for appealing to both liberal and conservative moral concerns while protecting the space necessary for human flourishing.

 

The Two Moralities by Ronnie Janoff-Bulman

In her 2023 work The Two Moralities, social psychologist Ronnie Janoff-Bulman presents a framework for understanding political differences rooted in the most fundamental motivational distinction in psychology: approach and avoidance. She argues that these basic motivational systems give rise to two distinct moralities: a proscriptive morality that defends against negative outcomes and focuses on what we should not do, and a prescriptive morality that moves us toward positive outcomes and focuses on what we should do. The former can be viewed as a morality of justice that emphasizes rules, impartiality, law, order, universal principles, retributive justice, and equality of opportunity whereas the latter can be viewed as a morality of care that is rooted in empathy, connection, compassion, responsiveness, safety nets, and equality of outcomes.

At the individual and interpersonal levels, Janoff-Bulman notes that both liberals and conservatives value both moral dimensions—not harming others (proscriptive) and helping others (prescriptive). The critical divergence occurs at the collective level, where these moralities translate into distinct political worldviews. Conservatism is rooted in a proscriptive "Social Order" morality focused on protecting against threats—both external and internal—and maintaining societal stability. Liberalism, conversely, is founded on a prescriptive "Social Justice" morality focused on providing for the well-being of the nation's constituents.

The book also develops a distinction between moral mandates (absolutes rooted in moral identity) and moral preferences (values open to negotiation). She notes that moral mandates, typical of proscriptive morality, tend to produce rigid moral judgments, resistance to compromise, and belief that moral transgressors deserve blame or punishment. Prescriptive morality, however, tends to moralize less about violations and more about failures to promote positive ends.

This framework leads to predictable differences in policy preferences. Liberals, with their Social Justice morality, focus on the economic domain where resource distribution is managed, supporting regulation of markets, entitlements, and expenditures for health, education, and social safety nets. Conservatives, with their Social Order morality, focus primarily on the social domain (e.g., abortion and same-sex marriage), where traditional roles and strict norms are regarded as bulwarks against personal gratification believed to threaten societal stability. Importantly, each side favors limited government in precisely the domain where the other favors intervention—liberals support freedom in the social domain while conservatives support liberty in the economic domain.

 

Moral Politics by George Lakoff 

First published in 1996, cognitive linguist George Lakoff's Moral Politics introduces perhaps the most famous metaphorical framework for understanding political differences. Lakoff argues that people's political reasoning is determined to a large extent by unconscious metaphors, with the central metaphor being the nation as a family. According to Lakoff, the political views of Americans on both ends of the political spectrum derive from this foundational metaphor, but they are informed by two very different conceptual models of the ideal family.

The conservative worldview centers on what Lakoff terms the "strict father" model. This model emphasizes the traditional nuclear family with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set and enforce strict rules for children's behavior. In this worldview, self-discipline, self-reliance, personal responsibility, hard work, and respect for legitimate authority are crucial qualities children must learn, typically through a system of reward and punishment. This model assumes the world is dangerous and competitive, and that children need strict moral guidance to develop the discipline necessary to succeed. This worldview supports a strong military, low taxes, free markets, and strict law-and-order.

The liberal worldview centers on the "nurturant parent" model, which stresses empathy, nurturance, fair distribution, and restitution. The primal experience behind this model is one of being cared for and cared about, with children's obedience coming from love and respect for their parents rather than fear of punishment. This model views the world as potentially cooperative and believes children develop best through explanation and mutual understanding rather than strict punishment. This worldview stresses empathy, social responsibility, cooperation, equality of outcome, protection of the vulnerable, safety nets, environmental protection, government regulation, and progressive taxation. 

Lakoff uses these models to explain why certain political positions cluster together. For instance, he explains how conservatives can be "pro-life" when it comes to abortion yet support the death penalty—both positions reflect the strict father emphasis on reward and punishment for moral behavior. Similarly, he explains why liberals might support economic regulation but oppose social regulation, as this reflects the nurturant parent's emphasis on protection and care without authoritarian control.

An important aspect of Lakoff's analysis is his contention that conservatives have been more effective than liberals at understanding and leveraging these deep moral metaphors in political discourse. He notes that while he personally favors the nurturant parent model, recognizing the metaphorical nature of our political thinking is crucial for productive political dialogue.

 

The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt

Jonathan Haidt's 2012 work The Righteous Mind represents perhaps the most comprehensive empirical investigation into the moral foundations of political differences. Haidt's work is structured around three central principles: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second; (2) There's more to morality than harm and fairness; and (3) Morality binds and blinds. 

Haidt's first principle challenges the traditional view of human beings as rational actors who deliberate carefully about moral questions. Instead, he proposes the analogy of the rider (conscious reasoning) and the elephant (intuitive emotions), suggesting that moral reasoning is largely a post-hoc process used to justify intuitive moral judgments. This insight explains why simply presenting facts in political arguments rarely changes minds—the elephant of intuition largely determines where we end up, with the rider mainly serving as a public relations agent. 

Haidt's second principle introduces his influential Moral Foundations Theory, which initially identified five (later six) foundational, innate, and psychological moral systems that combine to form human moral matrices. These foundations are:

• Care/harm: Sensitivity to suffering and need
• Fairness/cheating: Concerns about unfair treatment and cheating
• Loyalty/betrayal: Group cohesion and tribal identity.                                                       
• Authority/subversion: Respect for hierarchy and tradition
• Sanctity/degradation: Concepts of purity and the sacred
• Liberty/oppression: Reactance to domination and tyranny (added later). 

Haidt's research indicates that political differences reflect different weightings of these moral foundations. Liberals tend to prioritize care, fairness, and liberty almost exclusively, while conservatives value all six foundations more evenly. This difference, Haidt argues, gives conservatives a rhetorical advantage because they can appeal to a broader range of moral intuitions.

Haidt's third principle—that "morality binds and blinds"—explains how moral matrices help form cohesive groups while simultaneously making it difficult to understand those outside our moral communities. This insight helps explain the intense polarization in contemporary politics—as moral groups form, they naturally create boundaries that heighten distinction from others.

A Libertarian Synthesis: Neo-Aristotelian Flourishing

Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen

The philosophical framework developed by Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen —termed Individualistic Perfectionism —provides a promising foundation for bridging the moral divide between liberal and conservative worldviews. This approach integrates Aristotelian ethical foundations with a political commitment to individual liberty, arguing that a society that protects individual rights through what they call "metanormative principles" creates the essential conditions for diverse forms of human flourishing to be pursued without social conflict.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl's central insight recognizes that human flourishing is individually realized yet socially contextual—that while we achieve our good through our own actions and choices, we do so within communities and relationships that provide the necessary context for that flourishing. This nuanced understanding respects the conservative emphasis on tradition, community, and moral order while simultaneously upholding the liberal commitment to personal autonomy, social progress, and individual rights. 

A libertarian framework grounded in neo-Aristotelian flourishing possesses unique potential to resonate with foundational moral concerns across the political spectrum. By examining this potential through the moral frameworks identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt, we can see how such an approach might bridge seemingly irreconcilable moral divides:

Addressing Both Approach and Avoidance Moralities: Janoff-Bulman's distinction between prescriptive and proscriptive moralities finds synthesis in the concept of individual flourishing. The protection of negative rights (the right not to be aggressed against) addresses the conservative proscriptive concern with protection from harm, while the positive pursuit of excellence through self-direction addresses the liberal prescriptive concern with providing for human well-being. A society that protects liberty creates the conditions for both freedom from interference and freedom to pursue excellence.

Transcending the Family Metaphor: Lakoff's strict father and nurturant parent models both find accommodation within a framework that allows different conceptions of the good to coexist. Rather than imposing a single vision of the good life (whether strict or nurturant), the libertarian framework provides the metanormative space for both approaches—and countless others—to be pursued without social conflict. This respects the conservative emphasis on parental authority in raising children according to their values while upholding the liberal commitment to diverse lifestyles and family structures.

Engaging Multiple Moral Foundations: Haidt's moral foundations theory reveals why libertarianism has struggled politically—by focusing predominantly on the liberty/oppression foundation—but also suggests its potential for broader appeal. A neo-Aristotelian libertarianism naturally engages:

(1) the care/harm foundation by minimizing state violence and allowing voluntary compassion flourish;

(2) the fairness/cheating foundation through consistent application of rules and opposition to cronyism;

(3) the loyalty/betrayal foundation by allowing authentic communities to form voluntarily;

(4) the authority/subversion foundation through respect for legitimate authority in appropriate spheres;

(5 the sanctity/degradation foundation by protecting the inviolability of the person; and

(6) the liberty/oppression foundation as its central political commitment.

A neo-Aristotelian libertarian framework provides a compelling account of moral development that incorporates insights from both traditional conservatism and progressivism. The concept of self-directedness—central to Rasmussen and Den Uyl's conception of flourishing—acknowledges the conservative insight that discipline and character are essential for human excellence while simultaneously affirming the liberal commitment to personal autonomy and self-determination. 

This approach recognizes that virtue cannot be coerced but must be chosen—that moral responsibility emerges from the opportunity to make genuine choices and experience their consequences. The conservative emphasis on moral order is respected not through state enforcement but through the recognition that certain virtues (honesty, integrity, courage, temperance) are naturally conducive to flourishing across most conceptions of the good life. Meanwhile, the liberal emphasis on social progress is honored through the understanding that different individuals and communities may discover different aspects of human excellence through experimentation and learning.

Contrary to the caricature of libertarianism as atomistic individualism, a neo-Aristotelian framework recognizes that human flourishing is inherently relational. Rasmussen and Den Uyl's work emphasizes that self-direction—the capacity to shape one's life according to one's values—necessarily occurs within social contexts and depends on relationships with others for its full actualization. 

This understanding allows a libertarian framework to honor the conservative emphasis on family, community, and tradition as essential contexts for moral development while simultaneously protecting the liberal commitment to diverse forms of relationship and association. By creating a framework of rights that allows multiple forms of community to flourish, this approach enables what Rasmussen and Den Uyl term "the possibility of diversity in human flourishing"—recognizing that different individuals may require different social contexts and relationships to achieve their particular forms of excellence.

A crucial psychological insight connecting moral foundations to political structures involves the relationship between threat sensitivity and political preferences. Research noted by Janoff-Bulman indicates that conservatives generally demonstrate higher sensitivity to threats—a finding consistent with their emphasis on social order and protection. A libertarian approach addresses this concern not through state control but through the protective functions of just institutions—what classical liberals called "the constitution of liberty." 

Similarly, the liberal emphasis on openness to experience and social progress finds expression in the innovative potential of free societies. A framework that protects individual liberty creates space for both the cautious and the bold, the traditional and the innovative, to coexist and learn from one another through voluntary exchange and cooperation rather than political imposition.

The bipolar frameworks explored by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt show why liberals and conservatives misunderstand each other. Yet Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism offers a framework that resonates with both moral cultures. Their neo-Aristotelian ethics argues that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is the proper moral standard: an objective but individualized ideal grounded in rational self-direction, virtue, and meaningful activity. 

Their key innovation is distinguishing personal moral norms (virtues) from political norms (rights). Rights are metanormative principles that secure the social space for individuals to pursue flourishing without coercion. Government’s purpose is not to impose virtue but to protect the conditions under which virtue can be chosen.

This appeals to liberals by protecting autonomy, diversity, and opportunities for self-development. It appeals to conservatives by emphasizing responsibility, character, and self-reliance. Both gain a coherent justification for a free society grounded in human nature and moral psychology.

A free (libertarian) society that protects rights is therefore the best context for human flourishing. It avoids paternalism, respects individuality, and encourages voluntary cooperation. It offers a unified moral language that transcends ideological tribes and affirms the dignity of rational, self-directing persons.

Neo-Aristotelian flourishing is social at its core: friendship, love, family, and associational ties are essential for living well, but these cannot be legislated from above. Voluntariness and consent ensure relationships are authentic, nurturing the liberal desire for care and the conservative requirement for loyalty and order.

Moreover, the psychological diversity identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt becomes an asset, not a threat, in a libertarian context—each person is free to pursue the forms of life and virtue most suited to their traits, goals, and allegiances.

Conclusion: Toward a Moral Politics of Liberty

The works of Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt collectively demonstrate that our political differences run deep—to the very foundations of how we conceptualize morality, family, and society. Yet within their frameworks we can also discern the possibility of a politics that honors the legitimate moral concerns of both left and right while transcending the limitations of each.

A libertarian approach grounded in neo-Aristotelian flourishing and informed by the Individualistic Perfectionism of Rasmussen and Den Uyl offers the promise of such a politics. By creating the metanormative conditions for diverse forms of human excellence to be pursued without social conflict, such a framework respects the conservative emphasis on moral order while upholding the liberal commitment to social progress. It acknowledges the importance of both reason and emotion in moral motivation, recognizes the social nature of human flourishing, and provides the institutional framework for both stability and innovation to coexist. Such an approach provides a common vocabulary for both sides to agree that a free society that protects the necessary moral space for self-directedness and self-determination is the best system for individuals to potentially fulfill their highest human potential.

Such an approach will not satisfy those who seek political victory for their particular moral vision. However, for those who seek a society in which different moral visions can coexist peacefully—where both the strict father and nurturant parent, both the social order and social justice advocate, can live according to their values without imposing them on others—it offers the most promising path forward. In recognizing that human flourishing is inherently pluralistic—that there are many forms of excellence and no single template for the good life—we can begin to build a politics that protects the space for that diversity rather than attempting to eliminate it through political power.

The promise of a free society is not that it will produce uniform agreement on moral questions, but that it will allow people with different moral intuitions to live together in peace, learning from one another through voluntary interaction rather than coercive imposition. In this respect, a thoughtfully articulated libertarianism may represent not just another political position, but the necessary framework for moving beyond our current political impasse toward a more inclusive and morally sophisticated politics.

Ultimately, society best enables flourishing not by dictating the good life but by protecting the conditions that make countless good lives possible. This vision honors the depth, dignity, and complexity of persons, uniting liberals’ and conservatives’ highest aspirations under the banner of freedom and flourishing.

Recommended Reading

 Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Rasmussen, Douglas B. (2016). The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh University Press.

Haidt, Jonathan. (2012).  The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by politics and Religion. Vintage.

Janoff-Bulman, Ronnie. (2023). The Two Moralities: Conservatives, Liberals, and the roots of the Political Divide.

Lakoff, George (1996 and 2002).  Moral Politics: How liberals and Conservatives Think.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Rasmussen, Douglas B.  and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2005). Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. Penn State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B.  and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2020). The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan.