What can Libertarians Learn from Foucault?

 

Before reading Mark Pennington’s recent book, Foucault and Liberal Political Economy: Power, Knowledge, and Freedom, it would not have occurred to me that libertarians could learn anything from the social theories of Michel Foucault. Pennington has persuaded me that some beliefs associated with Foucault, and postmodernism more generally, are not devoid of merit. As will be discussed below, however, the beliefs that he identifies as postmodern differ somewhat from the collection of beliefs that I have hitherto associated with postmodernism.

Pennington claims that liberals who are concerned about over-government can learn from Foucault about “multiple sources and potential forms of this ‘over-government’ in modern societies and how these threats to freedom have been neglected by, and in some cases resulted from, the dominant strands in liberal thought”.

The author aims “to enunciate the elements of a postmodern liberalism, and to show how this perspective might engage in a productive conversation with Foucault in ways that expose the illiberalism of contemporary societies and the dominant forms of social science and political philosophy that contribute to this state of affairs”.

Before considering Pennington’s claims about what liberals can learn from Foucault and the potential for liberals to engage productively with his ideas, I need to clarify how Pennington is able to argue that some of Foucault’s views are worthy of consideration and what Pennington means by “postmodern liberalism”.

Foucault’s views

 The main problem I have with the postmodernist movement is its disrespect for reason, truth and knowledge. Stephen Hicks suggests that Foucault’s views illustrate the direction and tone of the postmodern intellectual world:

“Michel Foucault has identified the major targets: “All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence.” Such necessities must be swept aside as baggage from the past: “It is meaningless to speak in the name of—or against—Reason, Truth, or Knowledge”.” (The sources of the quoted passages are cited in Hicks, 2004.)

Hicks explains that Foucault reduces knowledge to an expression of social power and urges that we play the brutal power politics game on behalf of the traditionally disempowered.

Pennington recognizes that Foucault has often been accused of undercutting the basis of his own critical analysis:

“If all knowledge is reflective of an arbitrary ‘will to truth’, then what of Foucault’s own truth claims?” 

More specifically:

“If all truth claims are understood as merely a way of exercising power over others, then how are people to know which if any of the ‘intolerable’ practices they find themselves in are worth challenging or resisting, let alone what might replace them.”

However, Pennington observes that there are many Foucaults, “reflected in the shifting emphases, styles of analysis and reinterpretations of his own words”:    

“Towards the end of his life … notably in essays such as ‘What Is Enlightenment?’, Foucault softened the power/knowledge coupling, adopting a stance that does not deny that there are better and worse forms of argument or that there are some more or less valid forms of knowledge; rather, he emphasises the importance of uncertainty, of keeping all truth claims under scrutiny, and of being aware of the routinised social processes that might block that very scrutiny.”

If postmodernism is characterized by the idea that truth claims merely reflect the exercise of social power, perhaps it could be said that towards the end of his life, Foucault’s views became somewhat less postmodern.

 Postmodern liberalism

In outlining the elements of “postmodern liberalism” Pennington notes:

“This ‘postmodern’ liberalism has not previously been coherently articulated, but strands of it are detectable in the writings of F. A Hayek, those of Deirdre McCloskey, and elements of the contemporary Austrian school of economics, as well as in the context of political philosophy apart from Hayek in the works of Michael Oakeshott, Gerald Gaus, and Chandran Kukathas.”

I have considerable knowledge of the views of some of those authors and great respect for all of them. I am not comfortable with their views being labelled as postmodern, even though some of them might not object to that label.

Pennington seems to me to be distancing “postmodern liberalism” from postmodernism when he acknowledges that it is possible to assess “the comparative plausibility of competing narrative explanations” and “social scientific truth claims”.

In his concluding chapter Pennington notes that the elements of “postmodern liberalism” include, among other things, a “philosophy of social science sceptical of socio-economic positivism and the efforts of conscious control it fosters”.

It seems to me that Pennington’s philosophy of social science could appropriately be labelled “unpretentious liberalism”. It stands apart from the pretence of knowledge and scientism associated with socio-economic positivism, without endorsing postmodernism’s disrespect for reason, truth and knowledge.

I hope the book will attract many readers who identify as postmodernists and that they will be captivated by the concept of postmodern liberalism. However, those who (like me) are allergic to postmodernism, may find the book easier to read if they substitute the words “unpretentious liberalism” whenever they see “postmodernism liberalism”.

Should libertarians attempt to influence culture?

Before considering what libertarians can learn from Foucault, it seems appropriate to acknowledge that there is nothing new about the idea that libertarians should take an interest in culture.

That is apparent in the consideration of interactions between culture and political institutions in a discussion between Chris Matthew Sciabarra and me entitled, “Should Libertarians be Attempting to Influence Culture?” which published on this blog in September 2024. The discussion began by considering John Stuart Mill’s concerns about the “tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling” and moved from there to considering Sciabarra’s interpretation of Ayn Rand’s view of power relationships. Sciabarra presented a Tri-level Model of Power Relations which was first derived from his reconstruction of Ayn Rand’s critical analyses of social problems, outlined in Part Three of Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical (Sciabarra, 2013).

In introducing his discussion of Rand’s view of power relationships, Chris Sciabarra commented:

“Winton suggests that Enlightenment humanism has been preoccupied with reason and reality, while postmodernism has been preoccupied with the use of power. Hence, it is startling that Rand, who most certainly placed herself in the reason and reality camp, also emerged with a critique of power relations.”

The question under discussion provoked responses from several libertarians and classical liberals. The response of Douglass Rasmussen, joint author of Norms of Liberty (Rasmussen and Den Uyl, 2005) is pertinent to this essay:

“Is there not a difference between saying libertarianism qua political philosophy should attempt to change culture and saying that a libertarian concerned in advancing libertarianism should attempt to change culture? The former concerns what the political/legal order should do, and the latter concerns what individuals should do.”

As I see it, attempting to understand the consequences for liberty and individual flourishing of interactions between culture, markets, social movements and government regulation does not obviate or preclude attempts to define the nature of a political/legal order that can ensure that individuals can flourish in different ways without colliding.

Foucault’s liberalism

 From my perspective, one of the most interesting aspects of Foucault’s philosophy, as discussed by Pennington, is his account of discourses as a kind of spontaneous order phenomenon.  Foucault challenges the role of individual or collective agency in the operation of power regimes. Power works through chainlike or network effects. As people adopt certain discourses they influence the actions of others.

Power does not emanate from a single point in a network. It emerges from diverse and at time contradictory attempts by actors to assert their place in society. There is no identifiable author of power relations. As Pennington puts it:

“The discourses and disciplines producing people’s patterns of thought, positionality and interests are largely unintended consequences of the multiple attempts to affect the conduct of others.”

 Thus, while power relations may appear to have a coherent structure, there is no single purpose, intention, or meaning that underlies that structure.

States of domination arise when a set of discourses align or crystalize with each other and with the juridical power of the state. Scientific discourses can pose a problem where people come to be classified relative to various norms (e.g. as deviant, perverted, insane) and subjected to discipline (which may include social punishments). In addition, bio-power operates through interventions to change social, economic or environmental conditions in the name of improving population health or providing security.

Pennington suggests that “it is with Foucault’s concept of bio-power and especially its economic manifestations where the most significant possibilities for a dialogue between the Foucauldian and postmodern liberal perspectives lies”. Late in Foucault’s career he “seems to favour an environment that preserves a ‘pluralism of rationalities’ so that people might remain alert to the possibility of multiple ways of their being governed and not being frozen into a particular classificatory grid and the roles and positions it creates”.

In my view, Foucault’s decentred account of power relations is often more plausible than theories which reduce the exercise of power to holding of positions in political office. A decentred account is consistent with the conclusion of my recent series of essays on political entrepreneurship. Even though it is possible to identify the policies adopted in some countries with the ideologies of authoritarian political leaders, I suggest:

“The problem of ensuring adoption of government policies that more consistently advance economic and personal freedom cannot be reduced to the question of how to elect better political entrepreneurs to national leadership positions. Institutional change is a complex process involving social movements, media organizations, and interactions between individual citizens, as well as local and national politics.”

I concur with Pennington that Foucault’s view of power relations provides support for an unpretentious liberalism which is deeply skeptical of economic and philosophical approaches which presuppose that the welfare of the population can be secured by a form of expert rule.

In Part II of his book, Pennington uses his theoretical lens to examine complex networks of institutional, physical, and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures associated with social justice, public health, ecological sustainability, and crime and punishment. He critically examines various overlapping systems of power - some focused on managing populations and others focused on guiding individuals. (In this paragraph I have relied on Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, to help translate the technical Foucauldian phrasing in Pennington’s summary – words including “dispositifs”, “bio-political” and “pastoral” - into plainer English.)

These systems share three features: (1) an excessive faith that social and economic life can be understood and controlled with scientific precision, (2) a belief that some central “steering” intelligence can identify and fix deviations from expected patterns, and (3) a bureaucratic, top-down way of handling risk. The author demonstrates that these features tend to shrink the space in which individuals can act freely.

Conclusion

So, what can libertarians learn from Foucault? Pennington's answer, as I read it, is not that libertarians should adopt postmodernism's skepticism of reason and truth - that skepticism, taken to its logical end, undercuts the very possibility of arguing for freedom over domination. Rather, what is valuable in Foucault is his decentred account of power: the recognition that domination need not flow from a single source or a deliberate design, but can emerge from the unintended convergence of discourses, institutions, and expert classifications. This is a lesson that liberals have sometimes neglected, having focused their concern about over-government on the formal power of the state while overlooking the more diffuse mechanisms in social justice, public health, ecological policy, and criminal justice that narrow the space for individuals to govern their own lives.

What Pennington calls postmodern liberalism – I prefer to call it "unpretentious liberalism" - captures what is worth taking from this encounter: a liberalism skeptical of the pretence of expert knowledge and socio-economic positivism, without embracing postmodernism's disrespect for reason and truth. Pennington's Foucault, particularly the later Foucault of "What Is Enlightenment?", is compatible with this project because he does not deny that some truth claims are better than others - he simply insists that we remain alert to the ways power can masquerade as expertise, and that we preserve a plurality of ways of being governed rather than being frozen into a single classificatory grid. That, it seems to me, is a genuinely liberal insight, however unfamiliar its Foucauldian packaging may be to libertarians who have, like me, generally kept their distance from postmodern thought.

References

Hicks, Stephen R. C., Explaining Postmodernism (Scholargy Publishing, 2004).

Pennington, Mark, Foucault and Liberal Political Economy: Power, Knowledge, and Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2025).

Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J, Norms of Liberty (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005).

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew, Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical, Second Edition (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013).

Can reliable international comparisons of human flourishing be made using subjective survey data?

 

The idea that human flourishing is the proper measure of a good society goes back to Aristotle, but modern attempts to compare flourishing internationally using subjective survey data raise difficult questions. That is illustrated in the scatter chart shown above - which compares the degree of human flourishing in different countries as measured by the new Global Flourishing Study (GFS) with average life evaluation data for those countries using the methodology of the World Happiness Report (WHR). The GFS flourishing index is based on surveys covering various aspects of human flourishing, while the WHR data derives from the Cantril Ladder approach: a single question asking people to rate their lives on a scale from 0 to 10, with 0 representing the worst possible life and 10 representing the best possible life.

One would expect people who give a relatively low rating to their lives under the WHR approach to be assessed as having a relatively low degree of flourishing under the GFS approach, and vice versa for those who give their lives a relatively high rating. Surprisingly, the chart suggests little correlation between the two indexes. People in Tanzania, Egypt and Kenya, for example, have lower average life evaluation ratings than people in Sweden, the U.S. and Australia, yet are assessed under GFS methodology to have higher average levels of flourishing.

This divergence raises three questions which the following sections of this essay address:

• Does the methodology of the GFS incorporate more reliable standards for international comparisons than the WHR/Cantril approach?
• Is the GFS approach to measuring human flourishing consistent with Aristotelian ideas about the nature of flourishing?
• Do composite indexes provide a more reliable basis for international comparisons of opportunities to flourish?

Reliability of GFS Methodology

The Global Flourishing Study includes over 200,000 survey participants in 22 countries. The countries were selected to maximize coverage of the world’s population and to ensure geographic, cultural and religious diversity. It is a longitudinal panel study with intended annual survey data collection for 5 years. The domains of flourishing covered in the study encompass health, happiness, meaning, character, relationships and financial security.

More confidence can be placed on analyses using subjective data for individual countries than on cross-country comparisons because the former pose fewer problems in interpretation of survey questions. (Recent trends in indicators of subjective wellbeing in some wealthy countries are suggesting that young people are experiencing greater difficulty flourishing in those countries. I strongly support research directed toward improving understanding of why this is occurring and have made a personal contribution to this work.)

My main concern in this essay is with excessive reliance on subjective data in making international comparisons. The authors of the GFS note that caution is needed in interpreting cross-national differences (VanderWeele, 2025, p.647) but that has not prevented attention being drawn to  country rankings.

The scatter charts shown below suggest that at a national level there is more correlation between GFS flourishing and “happiness” and “life satisfaction” indicators than between GFS flourishing and WHR life evaluation. Nevertheless, the GFS index suggests that people in some countries are flourishing despite relatively low average scores for happiness and life satisfaction.

 

The happiness question is: “In general, how happy or unhappy do you usually feel?” The life satisfaction question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with life as a whole these days?” There has been extensive research related to the question of what standard of comparison people use in responding to such questions. Some research has suggested that people compare their current state to an adaptation level — a running average of past experience when asked to rate their happiness or life satisfaction. A large body of work suggests that relative income often matters as much as or more than absolute income for self-reports on wellbeing. Cross-cultural research has found that the implicit comparison standard vary by culture. Moreover, seemingly trivial contextual factors can dramatically shift happiness and life satisfaction reports.

In some ways, the GFS is more susceptible to standard of comparison problems than a simple life satisfaction or happiness survey:

• Self-rated health is known to be heavily reference dependent. People assess their health relative to age peers, to their own past health, or to an idealized standard. Which reference point dominates varies by culture and age.
• Questions relating to meaning and purpose are especially vulnerable to context effects, because "meaning" is a highly abstract judgment with no obvious natural metric. Whatever has been made salient by preceding questions — religious identity, family, work — is likely to dominate the response.
• Questions about honesty, generosity, self-control and so on invite comparison to either an ideal standard or a perceived social norm. Those standards can diverge sharply.

The Cantril ladder approach used in the WHR was designed to be self-anchoring to address some of those problems. By asking respondents to define "best possible life" and "worst possible life" for themselves, this approach sidesteps the problem of imposing a culturally specific conception of flourishing.

However, the perceptions that respondents have of the best possible and worst possible life depend on the reference group they use as a basis for comparison. That would not pose a problem if there is broad agreement among people throughout the world on what constitutes the best possible and worst possible life. Perhaps such broad agreement exists, but I am not aware of definitive research findings about that.

Aristotelian perspectives

Modern researchers who seek to quantify the extent to which people are flourishing often refer to Aristotle as a source of inspiration for their focus on a broad concept of human flourishing rather than on happiness as an emotional state. That raises the question of whether the GFS approach is consistent with Aristotelian perspectives.

The GFS view of human flourishing as multi-dimensional is certainly consistent with Aristotle’s approach. The domains identified in the overview of the GFS seem to be broadly consistent with Aristotle’s understanding of the basic goods of a flourishing human (VanderWeele, 2025).

However, from an Aristotelian perspective, it is disappointing that the study does not acknowledge the central importance of practical wisdom (phronesis) to individual flourishing. Practical wisdom is the intelligent management of one’s life with a view to attaining the goods necessary to one’s own flourishing. The exercise of practical wisdom is so intimately related to actualization of unique potentialities in the context of available opportunities that it makes sense to view flourishing as synonymous with “the exercise of one’s own practical wisdom” (Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 2016, p. 33). 

Some research associated with the GFS has focused on mastery which is assessed by asking: “How often do you feel very capable in most things you do in life?” (Kim, 2025). There is some overlap between mastery and practical wisdom: the exercise of practical wisdom involves more than theoretical knowledge – it requires development of skills necessary to navigate real circumstances toward genuine flourishing. The mastery concept captures something of this efficacy dimension — the sense that one can actually direct one's life rather than being at the mercy of circumstances.

An important difference between mastery and practical wisdom is evident in the measurement of mastery in the GFS. Self-reported mastery ranges from 90% of the population in Mexico to 39% in Japan. Do such divergent responses reflect differences in the exercise of practical wisdom or differences in the incidence of hubris and modesty in different populations? There is no way of knowing. Responses to the mastery question capture a subjective sense of control which may have little to do with wisdom. Genuinely wise people with accurate perception of their own limitations do not necessarily score highly in their responses to the mastery question.

My point is that the exercise of practical wisdom – an activity integral to human flourishing – defies measurement using subjective survey data. There would be no point in including survey questions about the exercise of practical wisdom because the perceptions people have about the quality of decisions they make is often a poor guide to actual decision quality. A person of deficient character or limited understanding may feel entirely satisfied with their choices while lacking the practical wisdom required to make good choices.

Comparing opportunities using composite indexes

In deciding what to measure, it seems to me to be particularly important to understand the purposes for which measurements are being made. The overview of the GFS states:

“What we measure shapes what we discuss, what we know, what we aim for and the policies put in place to achieve those aims. We hope that the GFS itself, and the understandings that arise from it, will shift discussion and policy toward the promotion of flourishing” (VanderWeele, 2025, p.647).

That may be true, but it may also be a recipe for futile or counterproductive government interventions.

It seems to me that the central importance of practical wisdom to individual flourishing provides a strong reason to be modest about the ability of governments to promote human flourishing. The most governments can do is to influence opportunities available. The way individuals respond to those opportunities rests in their own hands.

 It is important to recognize that governments can have a profound impact on the opportunities for human flourishing. One of the most important contributions they can make is to reduce the negative impacts of their policies.

In Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, I identified five basic goods of a flourishing human:

·        Wise and well-informed self-direction

·        Health and longevity

·        Positive relationships

·        Living in harmony with nature

·        Psychological well-being (Bates, 2021).

I noted that it is possible to teach people about the virtues of wise and well-informed self-direction, but it is doubtful that anyone has ever learned to exercise much practical wisdom in the management of their lives without having to accept responsibility for the choices they make. From a public policy perspective, it makes more sense to focus on the opportunities of people to exercise self-direction than to attempt to measure the quality of choices that they make. That is why I focused on objective measures of liberty in discussing opportunities for self-direction (Bates, 2021, pp. 65-6).

In considering opportunities for health and longevity, I argued that objective data on healthy life expectancy is a better indicator than self-reported health of differing prospects for individuals a long and healthy life in different countries (Bates, 2021, pp. 67-8).

Subjective data on levels of trust were suggested to measure differing opportunities for people to have positive relationships with others (Bates, 2021, pp. 68-9).

I discussed the complex relationships between economic growth and opportunities to live in harmony with nature (Bates, 2021, pp. 70-73).

Subjective data (WHR life evaluation) was used to indicate differing opportunities for people to enjoy psychological wellbeing (Bates, 2021, pp. 74-5).

Other researchers have also seen merit in using a mixture of subjective and objective indicators in making international comparisons of opportunities to flourish. The OECD’s Better Life Index is an example of a composite index that incorporates both objective and subjective components.

Conclusion

The scatter chart that opens this essay poses a genuine puzzle: why do country rankings of the Global Flourishing Study and World Happiness Report diverge so sharply? This essay has argued that the divergence reflects real limitations in both instruments rather than a straightforward vindication of either. Subjective survey data is susceptible to comparison-basis problems — the implicit standards people use when evaluating their lives vary by culture, context, and the framing of preceding questions — and these problems are considerably more serious for international comparisons than for within-country research. The Cantril ladder's self-anchoring design offers some protection against the imposition of culturally specific conceptions of flourishing, and its results have reasonable face validity when set alongside objective indicators of living standards and liberty. But whether people in different countries anchor the ladder's endpoints in comparable ways remains an open empirical question.

The more fundamental difficulty is philosophical. Both the GFS and the WHR treat subjective self-assessment as the primary evidence of flourishing. Aristotle, whose conception of eudaimonia inspired modern flourishing research, would have been skeptical of this. Flourishing in the Aristotelian sense is not simply a matter of feeling satisfied with one's life; it requires the exercise of practical wisdom — the intelligent, well-informed management of one's life in pursuit of genuine goods. People's perceptions of the quality of their choices are often unreliable guides to whether they are actually exercising such wisdom. This is not a limitation that better survey design can overcome; it reflects something important about the nature of flourishing itself.

These considerations point toward a more modest and pluralistic approach to international comparisons. Objective indicators — of liberty, healthy life expectancy, trust, and material security — can identify the opportunities available to people in different countries to lead flourishing lives. Subjective data retains value, particularly for tracking trends within countries over time. What neither approach can do is measure the quality of the choices individuals make within the opportunities available to them. That, in the end, is for individuals themselves to determine — which is precisely why the central policy implication of an Aristotelian perspective is not the promotion of flourishing by governments, but the protection and expansion of the conditions under which people can flourish for themselves.

References

Bates, Winton Russell, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing (Hamilton Books, 2021).

Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Douglas B. Rasmussen, The Perfectionist Turn (Edinburgh University Press, 2016).

Kim, Eric S. et. al. “Mapping demographic variations in sense of mastery across the world a cross-national analysis of 22 countries in the global flourishing study”, Scientific Reports, 15 (2025).

Lomas, T. et. al. “Exploring associations of three evaluative subjective wellbeing measures (Cantril's ladder, life satisfaction, happiness) with 15 childhood and demographic factors across 22 countries”, Scientific Reports, 16, (2026).

VanderWeele, T. J. et. al. “The Global Flourishing Study: Study profile and initial results on flourishing”, Nature Mental Health, 3(6) (2025) pp. 636–653.

How can we live seasonally and in tune with the natural world?

 Leah Goldrick answers the question posed above in this guest essay.

Leah lives in the United States. She is a librarian and author with a background in history and philosophy. Some other essays by Leah have previously been published on “Freedom and Flourishing”:

How can we overcome confirmation bias?

How can you develop the personality traits needed to resist social pressure?

Why did Aristotle view leisure as a fundamental aspect of a well-lived life?

As with the essays listed above, the following essay was first published on Common Sense Ethics, Leah’s blog.

The essay was first published last September, during the fall season in the USA. However, when I read the essay again a few days ago it struck me that many of the activities suggested are also suitable for early winter in many parts of the southern hemisphere, and for early summer in many parts of the northern hemisphere.

I asked Grok to provide me the image of a young Aristotle walking in nature that accompanies the essay. Leah writes:

 

Summer is almost over, and we are headed for cooler nights and autumnal days where brilliant colors abound. It's easy to spend far too much time indoors doom scrolling and never touching grass. But with the changing seasons and more moderate temperatures coming, I'm always looking for ways to get outside and enjoy nature before winter.

Building on the previous post's theme of Aristotelian leisure, here, I suggest some easy ways to live more seasonally, creatively, and in-tune with nature: 
​

1. Nature Journal or Sketchbook

Keeping a nature journal or sketchbook is rewarding even if you aren't a particularly good artist. Drawing is excellent for working the right brain, and we Westerners are too often stuck in left brain, rational, linear thought, while neglecting the creative and holistic aspects of the right brain.

 

This is the nature journal my kids use, which is pictured above. And for adults, there are a lot of attractive sketchbooks to choose from. My nature journal is the smaller black book pictured above, one like this. The medium size is good for bringing on travel. I use colored pencils for my illustrations, but watercolors will work with this sketchbook too. 

​Wildflower workbook is a journal with thoughtful prompts and exercises to encourage engagement with the natural world. From bird-spotting advice to camping checklists, in the artist's lovely signature style, it is good for adults or older kids. 

I also want to buy Watercolor in the Woods, which is a collection of beginner-friendly art tutorials and directions to guide you through the basics of nature watercolor.

2. Hiking/Walking

Aristotle was a prodigious walker. In fact, his school of thought, Peripatetic philosophy, translates from Greek as "I go for a walk." Aristotle liked to walk while he reflected on different ideas. There was also a larger connection in Greek thought between the idea of a journey and intellectual inquiry. Both journeying and looking far away into the distance can help us get out beyond the realm of our narrow concerns. 

Karen Armstrong writes about this same phenomenon of stepping outside in her book The Spiral Staircase: "We are most creative and sense other possibilities that transcend our ordinary experience when we leave ourselves behind."

Walking also has many physical health benefits. Among them are better weight management, reduced disease burden, and increased longevity. Breathing fresh air and getting sunlight are beneficial as well.  

Fall is an ideal time to find a trail and go hiking. Even better, bring family, or go at an off time when you can have the place to yourself and enjoy the leaves in solitude. 
​

3. Seasonal Decor

Perhaps I'm drawn to this because I'm a woman, but I find it very rewarding to decorate my home with seasonal colors and inexpensive natural items brought in from outdoors. 

It's fall, so pumpkins and gourds are my go-to items for decorating both indoors and outdoors.  

During winter, I like a neutral color pallet of whites, off-whites, browns and muted greens. I put out cozy blankets and pillows, and decorate my home's interior with pine cones, branches, and fairly lights in dark corners that need some illumination during these shorter, darker days. 

In spring and summer, I might use a bright pallet of aqua or coral, and bring in bouquets of wildflowers. 
​

4. Seasonal Foods & Traditions

Aristotle approved of enjoying fine food and drink, although such indulgence should always be tempered with moderation. Aristotle and his fellow Greeks would have enjoyed dishes prepared with sweet and sour flavors, fragrant herbs, creamy cheesecakes and hearty red wines. You can try some of these dishes featured in The Classical Cookbook here. 

​Today, with the harvest approaching, fall is the ideal time for preparing traditional seasonal foods. This could including making marinara sauce with the last batch of tomatoes, adding apples or squashes into various dishes, turkey at Thanksgiving or pumpkin pie. 

Keeping a garden, going to the farmer's market, going apple or pumpkin picking, canning and preserving, are all excellent ways to enjoy seasonal food. 

Thanks for reading, and I hope you have a rewarding fall season!

Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?

 This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

 

The philosophical systems of Baruch (Benedict de) Spinoza and contemporary neo-Aristotelian thinkers such as Ayn Rand, Douglas B. Rasmussen, and Douglas J. Den Uyl represent distinct yet somewhat convergent approaches to understanding reality, human nature, and the conditions for human flourishing. Spinoza’s rationalist monism and determinism appear, at first glance, to be at odds with the teleological realism, moral objectivism, and emphasis on individual agency characteristic of Objectivism and Individualistic Perfectionism. However, upon closer examination, these traditions exhibit areas of comparability, partial compatibility, and parallel insights across metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy.

 

This essay explores both the divergences and convergences between these traditions, arguing that while they differ in foundational metaphysical commitments—particularly regarding determinism, free will, and the nature of God—they share a deep commitment to reason, self-mastery, and the pursuit of human flourishing within a naturalistic framework.

 

Metaphysics

 

Spinoza’s metaphysics is grounded in substance monism: there exists only one infinite substance, which he identifies as God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). Everything that exists is a mode or expression of this single substance, and all events follow necessarily from its nature. Reality is fully determined and governed by immutable laws. Contingency is merely epistemic, not ontological.

 

By contrast, Rand and neo-Aristotelians affirm a pluralistic, realist metaphysics. Rand’s axiom, “existence exists’, asserts that reality is objective, composed of distinct entities governed by the laws of identity and causality. Rasmussen and Den Uyl, drawing on Aristotle, emphasize that beings have natures, potentials, and ends. Human beings, as rational animals, possess capacities that can be actualized through virtuous activity.

 

Despite these differences, an important parallel emerges: they all do not depend upon supernaturalism in the traditional sense. Spinoza’s God is not a transcendent creator but identical with nature, Rand explicitly rejects any form of supernaturalism, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl adopt a naturalistic Aristotelian framework. Their Individualistic Perfectionism is not incompatible with, or does not rule out, theism, but their arguments do not depend upon a theistic foundation. Though compatible with theism, natural moral law does not depend on theology for its account of ethics. Thus, all three perspectives share a commitment to the intelligibility, order, and law-governed structure of reality. Each involves a solid metaphysical realism.

 

However, a key contrast remains. Spinoza’s universe is necessitarian, whereas neo-Aristotelians affirm teleological openness—a world in which potentials may or may not be realized depending on human action.

 

The Nature of the Universe

 

Rand famously defends the idea that the universe is fundamentally benevolent—not in the sense that it guarantees success, but in that it is open to human achievement and does not thwart rational effort. The world is knowable, and success is possible through rational action.

 

Spinoza, by contrast, rejects anthropocentric evaluations of the universe. Nature is neither benevolent nor malevolent; it simply is. Events unfold according to necessity, without regard to human purposes. The perception of good and evil arises from human perspectives, not from nature itself.

 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl adopt a position closer to Rand’s, though more nuanced. The world contains both opportunities for, and obstacles to, flourishing, but human beings can achieve flourishing through rational self-direction within appropriate social conditions.

 

Thus, while Spinoza offers a vision of cosmic neutrality, Rand and neo-Aristotelians emphasize a conditionally benevolent universe—one that rewards rational engagement, though not automatically.

 

Epistemology

 

Spinoza is a paradigmatic rationalist. He distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: imagination (inadequate ideas), reason (adequate ideas), and intuitive knowledge (the highest form). True knowledge involves grasping the necessary relations among things.

 

Rand, by contrast, defends a form of conceptual empiricism. Knowledge begins with perception and is organized through abstraction and logic. Reason is volitional and requires active engagement.

 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl emphasize practical reason, which guides action rather than merely contemplating necessity. Human beings must deliberate about how to live, integrating diverse goods into a coherent life. Despite methodological differences, all share: (1) confidence in reason’s ability to know reality; (2) rejection of skepticism and relativism; and (3) emphasis on knowledge as essential to flourishing. In addition, Spinoza’s “adequate ideas” parallel the neo-Aristotelian emphasis on rational judgment, though the latter is more action-oriented and less geometrically deductive.

 

 Free Will, Determinism, and Human Action

 

Spinoza is a strict determinist. Human beings believe themselves free because they are ignorant of the causes determining their actions. True freedom consists not in indeterminacy but in understanding necessity and acting from reason rather than passive emotions. True freedom is recognition that all things are necessary parts of God/nature, in understanding necessity, and acting from reason rather than passive emotions. Spinoza defines freedom not as free will but as understanding the necessity of nature allowing individuals to act according to reason rather than passions. Spinoza’s truncated version of “free will” (what he calls freedom) appears to hold that a human being can decide not to be controlled by his passions.

 

Rand and other neo-Aristotelians, however, affirm genuine agency. Rand holds that the choice to think or not to think is fundamental and irreducible. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that moral responsibility requires self-direction and the capacity to choose among alternatives.

 

This difference is significant and limits full compatibility. However, a parallel remains: both traditions value rational self-governance. For Spinoza, the “free man” is guided by reason. For neo-Aristotelians, the virtuous person exercises rational choice. Thus, while Spinoza redefines freedom as understanding necessity, neo-Aristotelians retain a more robust notion of freedom as volitional self-direction.

 

 Passions, Emotions, and Virtue

 

Spinoza offers a sophisticated theory of the emotions, distinguishing between passions (passive states caused by external factors) and actions (active states arising from adequate ideas). The goal of ethics is to transform passive emotions into active ones through understanding.

 

Rand similarly argues that emotions are consequences of value judgments and must be guided by reason. Unchecked emotions can lead to irrationality and self-destruction.

 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl, following Aristotle, emphasize that virtues involve the proper integration of reason and emotion. Moral development requires habituation, reflection, and judgment.

 

All three perspectives converge on: (1) the need to regulate emotions through reason; (2) the idea that self-mastery is essential to flourishing; and (3) the rejection of emotionalism as a guide to life. In addition, Spinoza’s concept of increasing one’s “power of acting” parallels the Aristotelian idea of realizing one’s potentials through virtue.

 

 Ethics, Flourishing, and Happiness

 

Spinoza’s ethics is deeply eudaimonistic. The highest good is the intellectual love of God, a rational understanding of the unity and necessity of nature. Happiness consists in this understanding and the peace it brings. True flourishing (conatus) arises from rational understanding which leads to virtues, joy, and a sense of unity with God/nature. Acting according to the dictates of reason aligns oneself with God/nature.

 

Rand defines happiness as the state resulting from achieving one’s rational values. Flourishing requires productive work, rationality, and integrity.

 

Rasmussen and Den Uyl articulate individualistic perfectionism, in which flourishing is objective but agent-relative. Each person must achieve excellence in a way appropriate to his or her circumstances.

 All of the above reject hedonism, see flourishing as an activity guided by reason, and link happiness to the successful exercise of human capacities. They differ in that Spinoza emphasizes contemplation and understanding, Rand emphasizes production and achievement, and Rasmussen and Den Uyl emphasize plural, individualized excellence.

 

Politics, Rights, and the Nature of the State

 

Spinoza’s non-normative and power-centric political philosophy emphasizes stability, peace, and freedom of thought. He supports democratic governance and argues that individuals retain the right to think freely even under political authority. However, Spinoza does not ground rights in moral principles. Instead, rights are coextensive with power. One has a right to do whatever one has the power to do. His naturalistic ontology of rights holds that rights are expressions of actual capacities. Might makes right as a descriptive (not moral) claim.

 

Political life emerges from interacting self-interested agents seeking survival and flourishing. Political society emerges as a natural development. Spinoza views political society as a dynamic process of interactions. The state is an organic outgrowth of human interactions.

 

In contrast, Rand and Rasmussen/Den Uyl defend natural rights grounded in human nature. For Rand rights protect individual freedom of action. For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, rights are metanormative principles that secure the conditions for self-direction without prescribing specific ways of life. Their concept of metanormativity is crucial. Political institutions should not enforce virtue but should create a framework within which individuals can pursue flourishing. All support freedom of thought and limited government, Spinoza lacks a robust natural rights theory, and the neo-Aristotelians provide a stronger moral justification for liberal institutions.

 

God, Nature, and Ultimate Reality

 

Spinoza’s God is identical with nature—an impersonal, infinite substance. Understanding God is equivalent to understanding reality. Rand rejects God entirely, advocating a fully secular worldview. Rasmussen and Den Uyl also do not rely on theological foundations. Despite differences, all share a naturalistic orientation and do not rely on traditional theism. Spinoza’s God functions more as a metaphysical principle than as a personal being. Despite deep metaphysical differences, several powerful parallels emerge; (1) Primacy of Reason: All view reason as essential to human life; (2) Self-Mastery: Flourishing requires control over passions; (3) Naturalism: Reality is intelligible and law-governed; (4) Freedom of Thought: Intellectual liberty is essential; and (5) Eudaimonism: Happiness is achieved through rational activity.

Still, important differences remain: Determinism vs free will; Monism vs pluralism; and Power-based vs rights-based political theory. These differences limit full philosophical integration but allow for meaningful dialogue and mutual enrichment.

 

 Conclusion

 

The philosophies of Spinoza and contemporary neo-Aristotelians offer complementary insights into the nature of reality, human agency, and flourishing. Spinoza provides a vision of rational harmony within a deterministic universe, emphasizing understanding and intellectual love.  Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s idea that individual rights serve as metanorms echoes the Spinozist importance of self-directed rational activity. Rand and Rasmussen/Den Uyl offer a vision of rational self-direction within a free society, emphasizing choice, virtue, and individual flourishing.

 

While their metaphysical foundations differ significantly, their shared commitment to reason, self-mastery, and human flourishing reveals a philosophical kinship. Together, they illuminate different dimensions of the human condition: our embeddedness in a lawful universe and our capacity for rational self-direction.

 

 

Recommended Reading

 

 Arfa, Orit.  2014 Spinoza & Ayn Rand: How to Reconcile Spinoza’s God with Rand’s Atheism. Route 60 Press.

Den Uyl, Douglas J. 1983. Power, State, and Freedom: An Interpretation of Spinoza’s Political Philosophy. Assen, Neth: Van Gorcum.

Den Uyl, Douglas J.  and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn. Edinburgh University Press.

Spinoza, Baruch. 1677 (1996). Ethics. edited and translated by Edwin Curley. Penguin Classics.

Spinoza, Baruch. 1670. (2007) Theological-Political Treatise. edited by Jonathan Israel. Cambridge University Press.

Rand, Ayn. 1964. The Virtue of Selfishness. New American Library.

Rand, Ayn. 1979.  Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. New American library.

Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  2005. Norms of Liberty. University Park: Penn State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J. The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. 2020. Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan.

 Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 24, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2025) “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

Younkins, Edward W. (2026) “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

Younkins, Edward W. (2026) “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

Younkins, Edward W. (2026) “Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. March 19, 2026.