Showing posts with label Frames and beliefs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Frames and beliefs. Show all posts

Saturday, December 13, 2025

Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?

 



This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including an essay reviewing books by David L. Norton, which was published here in January, a review of Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s book “Total Freedom” published  here in July, and an essay entitled, “How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?”, published here in October.

I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to publish Ed’s latest essay at this time. I recently concluded a series of essays on political entrepreneurship by suggesting:

“If we want institutions that are more supportive of freedom and flourishing to become entrenched, we will need more supportive citizens engaged in discursive processes at all levels of society …”. 

It is difficult to have useful discourse with people expressing opposing views if we focus exclusively on categorizing their positions according to the political groupings or ideological tribes that seem to provide their talking points. It can be more interesting, and is sometimes more productive, to seek to understand the motivational systems, parenting models, and moral foundations underlying the positions they adopt.

Ed Younkins writes:

 The intense polarization characterizing contemporary political discourse has prompted several influential scholars to explore the deeper psychological and moral foundations underpinning our ideological divisions. Three particularly significant contributions to this understanding include Ronnie Janoff-Bulman's The Two Moralities: Conservatives, Liberals, and the Roots of Our Political Divide, George Lakoff's Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think, and Jonathan Haidt's The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Each of these works approaches the political divide through different disciplinary lenses—social psychology, cognitive linguistics, and moral psychology respectively—yet arrives at a similar fundamental conclusion: that political differences reflect much deeper differences in moral intuitions and conceptual frameworks rather than merely calculated disagreements about specific policies. Together, these works provide complementary frameworks for understanding why political arguments often seem so intractable and why each side frequently views the other as not merely mistaken but morally deficient. This essay will first provide a short summary and review of each of these three influential works before exploring how libertarian thinking, particularly through the lens of neo-Aristotelian flourishing and the "Individualistic Perfectionism" of Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, might provide a compelling framework for appealing to both liberal and conservative moral concerns while protecting the space necessary for human flourishing.

 

The Two Moralities by Ronnie Janoff-Bulman


In her 2023 work The Two Moralities, social psychologist Ronnie Janoff-Bulman presents a framework for understanding political differences rooted in the most fundamental motivational distinction in psychology: approach and avoidance. She argues that these basic motivational systems give rise to two distinct moralities: a proscriptive morality that defends against negative outcomes and focuses on what we should not do, and a prescriptive morality that moves us toward positive outcomes and focuses on what we should do. The former can be viewed as a morality of justice that emphasizes rules, impartiality, law, order, universal principles, retributive justice, and equality of opportunity whereas the latter can be viewed as a morality of care that is rooted in empathy, connection, compassion, responsiveness, safety nets, and equality of outcomes.

At the individual and interpersonal levels, Janoff-Bulman notes that both liberals and conservatives value both moral dimensions—not harming others (proscriptive) and helping others (prescriptive). The critical divergence occurs at the collective level, where these moralities translate into distinct political worldviews. Conservatism is rooted in a proscriptive "Social Order" morality focused on protecting against threats—both external and internal—and maintaining societal stability. Liberalism, conversely, is founded on a prescriptive "Social Justice" morality focused on providing for the well-being of the nation's constituents.

The book also develops a distinction between moral mandates (absolutes rooted in moral identity) and moral preferences (values open to negotiation). She notes that moral mandates, typical of proscriptive morality, tend to produce rigid moral judgments, resistance to compromise, and belief that moral transgressors deserve blame or punishment. Prescriptive morality, however, tends to moralize less about violations and more about failures to promote positive ends.

This framework leads to predictable differences in policy preferences. Liberals, with their Social Justice morality, focus on the economic domain where resource distribution is managed, supporting regulation of markets, entitlements, and expenditures for health, education, and social safety nets. Conservatives, with their Social Order morality, focus primarily on the social domain (e.g., abortion and same-sex marriage), where traditional roles and strict norms are regarded as bulwarks against personal gratification believed to threaten societal stability. Importantly, each side favors limited government in precisely the domain where the other favors intervention—liberals support freedom in the social domain while conservatives support liberty in the economic domain.

 

Moral Politics by George Lakoff 


First published in 1996, cognitive linguist George Lakoff's Moral Politics introduces perhaps the most famous metaphorical framework for understanding political differences. Lakoff argues that people's political reasoning is determined to a large extent by unconscious metaphors, with the central metaphor being the nation as a family. According to Lakoff, the political views of Americans on both ends of the political spectrum derive from this foundational metaphor, but they are informed by two very different conceptual models of the ideal family.

The conservative worldview centers on what Lakoff terms the "strict father" model. This model emphasizes the traditional nuclear family with the father having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the authority to set and enforce strict rules for children's behavior. In this worldview, self-discipline, self-reliance, personal responsibility, hard work, and respect for legitimate authority are crucial qualities children must learn, typically through a system of reward and punishment. This model assumes the world is dangerous and competitive, and that children need strict moral guidance to develop the discipline necessary to succeed. This worldview supports a strong military, low taxes, free markets, and strict law-and-order.

The liberal worldview centers on the "nurturant parent" model, which stresses empathy, nurturance, fair distribution, and restitution. The primal experience behind this model is one of being cared for and cared about, with children's obedience coming from love and respect for their parents rather than fear of punishment. This model views the world as potentially cooperative and believes children develop best through explanation and mutual understanding rather than strict punishment. This worldview stresses empathy, social responsibility, cooperation, equality of outcome, protection of the vulnerable, safety nets, environmental protection, government regulation, and progressive taxation. 

Lakoff uses these models to explain why certain political positions cluster together. For instance, he explains how conservatives can be "pro-life" when it comes to abortion yet support the death penalty—both positions reflect the strict father emphasis on reward and punishment for moral behavior. Similarly, he explains why liberals might support economic regulation but oppose social regulation, as this reflects the nurturant parent's emphasis on protection and care without authoritarian control.

An important aspect of Lakoff's analysis is his contention that conservatives have been more effective than liberals at understanding and leveraging these deep moral metaphors in political discourse. He notes that while he personally favors the nurturant parent model, recognizing the metaphorical nature of our political thinking is crucial for productive political dialogue.

 

The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt


Jonathan Haidt's 2012 work The Righteous Mind represents perhaps the most comprehensive empirical investigation into the moral foundations of political differences. Haidt's work is structured around three central principles: (1) Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second; (2) There's more to morality than harm and fairness; and (3) Morality binds and blinds. 

Haidt's first principle challenges the traditional view of human beings as rational actors who deliberate carefully about moral questions. Instead, he proposes the analogy of the rider (conscious reasoning) and the elephant (intuitive emotions), suggesting that moral reasoning is largely a post-hoc process used to justify intuitive moral judgments. This insight explains why simply presenting facts in political arguments rarely changes minds—the elephant of intuition largely determines where we end up, with the rider mainly serving as a public relations agent. 

Haidt's second principle introduces his influential Moral Foundations Theory, which initially identified five (later six) foundational, innate, and psychological moral systems that combine to form human moral matrices. These foundations are:

  • Care/harm: Sensitivity to suffering and need
  • Fairness/cheating: Concerns about unfair treatment and cheating
  • Loyalty/betrayal: Group cohesion and tribal identity.                                                       
  • Authority/subversion: Respect for hierarchy and tradition
  • Sanctity/degradation: Concepts of purity and the sacred
  • Liberty/oppression: Reactance to domination and tyranny (added later). 

Haidt's research indicates that political differences reflect different weightings of these moral foundations. Liberals tend to prioritize care, fairness, and liberty almost exclusively, while conservatives value all six foundations more evenly. This difference, Haidt argues, gives conservatives a rhetorical advantage because they can appeal to a broader range of moral intuitions.

Haidt's third principle—that "morality binds and blinds"—explains how moral matrices help form cohesive groups while simultaneously making it difficult to understand those outside our moral communities. This insight helps explain the intense polarization in contemporary politics—as moral groups form, they naturally create boundaries that heighten distinction from others.

A Libertarian Synthesis: Neo-Aristotelian Flourishing


Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen

The philosophical framework developed by Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen —termed Individualistic Perfectionism —provides a promising foundation for bridging the moral divide between liberal and conservative worldviews. This approach integrates Aristotelian ethical foundations with a political commitment to individual liberty, arguing that a society that protects individual rights through what they call "metanormative principles" creates the essential conditions for diverse forms of human flourishing to be pursued without social conflict.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl's central insight recognizes that human flourishing is individually realized yet socially contextual—that while we achieve our good through our own actions and choices, we do so within communities and relationships that provide the necessary context for that flourishing. This nuanced understanding respects the conservative emphasis on tradition, community, and moral order while simultaneously upholding the liberal commitment to personal autonomy, social progress, and individual rights. 

A libertarian framework grounded in neo-Aristotelian flourishing possesses unique potential to resonate with foundational moral concerns across the political spectrum. By examining this potential through the moral frameworks identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt, we can see how such an approach might bridge seemingly irreconcilable moral divides:

Addressing Both Approach and Avoidance Moralities: Janoff-Bulman's distinction between prescriptive and proscriptive moralities finds synthesis in the concept of individual flourishing. The protection of negative rights (the right not to be aggressed against) addresses the conservative proscriptive concern with protection from harm, while the positive pursuit of excellence through self-direction addresses the liberal prescriptive concern with providing for human well-being. A society that protects liberty creates the conditions for both freedom from interference and freedom to pursue excellence.

Transcending the Family Metaphor: Lakoff's strict father and nurturant parent models both find accommodation within a framework that allows different conceptions of the good to coexist. Rather than imposing a single vision of the good life (whether strict or nurturant), the libertarian framework provides the metanormative space for both approaches—and countless others—to be pursued without social conflict. This respects the conservative emphasis on parental authority in raising children according to their values while upholding the liberal commitment to diverse lifestyles and family structures.

Engaging Multiple Moral Foundations: Haidt's moral foundations theory reveals why libertarianism has struggled politically—by focusing predominantly on the liberty/oppression foundation—but also suggests its potential for broader appeal. A neo-Aristotelian libertarianism naturally engages:

(1) the care/harm foundation by minimizing state violence and allowing voluntary compassion flourish;

(2) the fairness/cheating foundation through consistent application of rules and opposition to cronyism;

(3) the loyalty/betrayal foundation by allowing authentic communities to form voluntarily;

(4) the authority/subversion foundation through respect for legitimate authority in appropriate spheres;

(5 the sanctity/degradation foundation by protecting the inviolability of the person; and

(6) the liberty/oppression foundation as its central political commitment.

A neo-Aristotelian libertarian framework provides a compelling account of moral development that incorporates insights from both traditional conservatism and progressivism. The concept of self-directedness—central to Rasmussen and Den Uyl's conception of flourishing—acknowledges the conservative insight that discipline and character are essential for human excellence while simultaneously affirming the liberal commitment to personal autonomy and self-determination. 

This approach recognizes that virtue cannot be coerced but must be chosen—that moral responsibility emerges from the opportunity to make genuine choices and experience their consequences. The conservative emphasis on moral order is respected not through state enforcement but through the recognition that certain virtues (honesty, integrity, courage, temperance) are naturally conducive to flourishing across most conceptions of the good life. Meanwhile, the liberal emphasis on social progress is honored through the understanding that different individuals and communities may discover different aspects of human excellence through experimentation and learning.

Contrary to the caricature of libertarianism as atomistic individualism, a neo-Aristotelian framework recognizes that human flourishing is inherently relational. Rasmussen and Den Uyl's work emphasizes that self-direction—the capacity to shape one's life according to one's values—necessarily occurs within social contexts and depends on relationships with others for its full actualization. 

This understanding allows a libertarian framework to honor the conservative emphasis on family, community, and tradition as essential contexts for moral development while simultaneously protecting the liberal commitment to diverse forms of relationship and association. By creating a framework of rights that allows multiple forms of community to flourish, this approach enables what Rasmussen and Den Uyl term "the possibility of diversity in human flourishing"—recognizing that different individuals may require different social contexts and relationships to achieve their particular forms of excellence.

A crucial psychological insight connecting moral foundations to political structures involves the relationship between threat sensitivity and political preferences. Research noted by Janoff-Bulman indicates that conservatives generally demonstrate higher sensitivity to threats—a finding consistent with their emphasis on social order and protection. A libertarian approach addresses this concern not through state control but through the protective functions of just institutions—what classical liberals called "the constitution of liberty." 

Similarly, the liberal emphasis on openness to experience and social progress finds expression in the innovative potential of free societies. A framework that protects individual liberty creates space for both the cautious and the bold, the traditional and the innovative, to coexist and learn from one another through voluntary exchange and cooperation rather than political imposition.

The bipolar frameworks explored by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt show why liberals and conservatives misunderstand each other. Yet Rasmussen and Den Uyl’s Individualistic Perfectionism offers a framework that resonates with both moral cultures. Their neo-Aristotelian ethics argues that human flourishing (eudaimonia) is the proper moral standard: an objective but individualized ideal grounded in rational self-direction, virtue, and meaningful activity. 

Their key innovation is distinguishing personal moral norms (virtues) from political norms (rights). Rights are metanormative principles that secure the social space for individuals to pursue flourishing without coercion. Government’s purpose is not to impose virtue but to protect the conditions under which virtue can be chosen.

This appeals to liberals by protecting autonomy, diversity, and opportunities for self-development. It appeals to conservatives by emphasizing responsibility, character, and self-reliance. Both gain a coherent justification for a free society grounded in human nature and moral psychology.

A free (libertarian) society that protects rights is therefore the best context for human flourishing. It avoids paternalism, respects individuality, and encourages voluntary cooperation. It offers a unified moral language that transcends ideological tribes and affirms the dignity of rational, self-directing persons.

Neo-Aristotelian flourishing is social at its core: friendship, love, family, and associational ties are essential for living well, but these cannot be legislated from above. Voluntariness and consent ensure relationships are authentic, nurturing the liberal desire for care and the conservative requirement for loyalty and order.

Moreover, the psychological diversity identified by Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt becomes an asset, not a threat, in a libertarian context—each person is free to pursue the forms of life and virtue most suited to their traits, goals, and allegiances.

Conclusion: Toward a Moral Politics of Liberty

The works of Janoff-Bulman, Lakoff, and Haidt collectively demonstrate that our political differences run deep—to the very foundations of how we conceptualize morality, family, and society. Yet within their frameworks we can also discern the possibility of a politics that honors the legitimate moral concerns of both left and right while transcending the limitations of each.

A libertarian approach grounded in neo-Aristotelian flourishing and informed by the Individualistic Perfectionism of Rasmussen and Den Uyl offers the promise of such a politics. By creating the metanormative conditions for diverse forms of human excellence to be pursued without social conflict, such a framework respects the conservative emphasis on moral order while upholding the liberal commitment to social progress. It acknowledges the importance of both reason and emotion in moral motivation, recognizes the social nature of human flourishing, and provides the institutional framework for both stability and innovation to coexist. Such an approach provides a common vocabulary for both sides to agree that a free society that protects the necessary moral space for self-directedness and self-determination is the best system for individuals to potentially fulfill their highest human potential.

Such an approach will not satisfy those who seek political victory for their particular moral vision. However, for those who seek a society in which different moral visions can coexist peacefully—where both the strict father and nurturant parent, both the social order and social justice advocate, can live according to their values without imposing them on others—it offers the most promising path forward. In recognizing that human flourishing is inherently pluralistic—that there are many forms of excellence and no single template for the good life—we can begin to build a politics that protects the space for that diversity rather than attempting to eliminate it through political power.

The promise of a free society is not that it will produce uniform agreement on moral questions, but that it will allow people with different moral intuitions to live together in peace, learning from one another through voluntary interaction rather than coercive imposition. In this respect, a thoughtfully articulated libertarianism may represent not just another political position, but the necessary framework for moving beyond our current political impasse toward a more inclusive and morally sophisticated politics.

Ultimately, society best enables flourishing not by dictating the good life but by protecting the conditions that make countless good lives possible. This vision honors the depth, dignity, and complexity of persons, uniting liberals’ and conservatives’ highest aspirations under the banner of freedom and flourishing.

Recommended Reading

 Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Rasmussen, Douglas B. (2016). The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh University Press.

Haidt, Jonathan. (2012).  The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by politics and Religion. Vintage.

Janoff-Bulman, Ronnie. (2023). The Two Moralities: Conservatives, Liberals, and the roots of the Political Divide.

Lakoff, George (1996 and 2002).  Moral Politics: How liberals and Conservatives Think.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Rasmussen, Douglas B.  and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2005). Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. Penn State University Press.

Rasmussen, Douglas B.  and Den Uyl, Douglas J. (2020). The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Palgrave Macmillan.



Thursday, November 20, 2025

Part VII: What kind of political entrepreneurship is required?

 This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

-----

Can strong political leadership bring about institutional change leading to greater economic and personal freedom?  That idea is easy to challenge. It recalls the oft quoted passage by Lord Acton:

Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority” (Acton 1887). 

Yet, powerful leadership has attractions to many citizens. I don’t think the question of whether strong political leadership could be consistent with greater economic and personal freedom should be dismissed out of hand.

Restoring order

The attraction of strong leadership is most understandable in chaotic situations where social order has broken down and lives, liberty and property are threatened by groups that have resorted to violence to pursue nefarious ends. Under such circumstances there may be grounds to hope that a strong leader will be able to restore order and protect the rights of individuals.

As Vincent Ostrom pointed out, the ubiquity of coercion means that order and organization in human societies depends upon a Faustian bargain involving use of organized force (Ostrom 1997, p.121). As explained by Paul Aligica and Peter Boettke:

“The implication is that social order and its institutional dynamics are perceived as shaped by and operating under the shadow of the ongoing tension between the threat of chaos and the threat of tyranny” (Aligica and Boettke 2009, p.61).

Benevolent despotism

Some of the best advice for despots who wish to promote freedom and flourishing was provided by Lao Tzu:

“Govern the state by being straight forward; wage war by being crafty; but win the empire by not being meddlesome” (Tzu 1963, LVII p.64).

Aristotle’s politics is somewhat more challenging to libertarians, but Fred D. Miller makes a strong case that it is not anachronistic to attribute to Aristotle a concept of individual rights and support for a moderate degree of liberalism. (Miller 1995, pp.373-378).

Robert Faulkner observes that Aristotle ranks greatness of soul as the "crown" needed to perfect all the virtues, including justice. He writes:

 “Aristotle calls greatness of soul a kosmos. It is an ornament of good character that is also an exalting order: an ordering heightened by an awareness of the grand activities such a soul calls for and is owed” (Faulkner 2007, loc. 250/3375). 

According to Faulkner:

“Aristotle's diagnosis comes to this: the great-souled man is at once drawn above humanity and drawn to humanity. He exhibits his superiority by aiding his fellows, and yet his wish is less to aid them than to avoid being or appearing dependent on them” (Faulkner 2007, loc. 565/3375).

Faulkner suggests that while Nicomachean Ethics seems to imply that greatness of the soul is a desirable attribute of political leaders, Aristotle moderates that view elsewhere in his writings. In Ethics, Aristotle suggests that greatness, especially great power, is overrated: “it is possible for one who is not a ruler of land and sea to perform noble action” (Faulkner 2007, loc. 692/3375).

In more recent times, Max Weber’s argument that effective leaders must have charisma may be relevant in considering the potential role of leaders in restoring liberty. Weber argued that effective leaders must have a charismatic form of authority because that is the only form of authority capable of overcoming the constraints of organisation, legality and tradition:

“Devotion to the charisma of the prophet, or the leader in war, or to the great demagogue in the ecclesia or in parliament, means that the leader is personally recognized as the innerly 'called' leader of men. Men do not obey him by virtue of tradition or statute, but because they believe in him” (Weber 1946, p.79).

Weber argued that charismatic authority is required for leaders to be effective in their struggle against the impersonal forces of bureaucratization. It tends to appear in moments of crisis, when the leader performs a ‘miracle’ for a group that feels otherwise impotent and deeply threatened. Xavier Márquez suggests that Weber's conception of charismatic authority allows some demagogues to play a genuinely democratic role in modern societies when viewed through contemporary theories of representation (Márquez 2024).

Thus far, the discussion suggests that it is not possible to rule out the possibility that a benevolent despot could promote freedom and flourishing if he or she wished to establish supportive institutions and had appropriate leadership qualities. However, that seems unlikely to be a frequent occurrence.

 Does autocracy support economic freedom?

The point was made earlier in this series (Part II) that it is easier to identify individual political leaders who have contributed to low or falling freedom levels than those who have contributed to high or rising freedom levels. That is because political entrepreneurship tends to be less focused on individual leaders in countries where governments have greater regard for individual liberty. 

Nevertheless, the idea that autocrats have sometimes helped produce better outcomes may not be entirely fanciful. There may be some substance lying behind folklore that attributes improvements in economic freedom to autocrats such as Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Park Chung Hee in South Korea, Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and Augusto Pinochet in Chile.

However, even if it can be shown that in some instances autocrats have fostered greater economic freedom, and that this has been followed by improvements in personal freedom, it does not necessarily follow that a period of autocracy was necessary or justified. People in the countries concerned are better placed than foreign observers to make judgements about the use of force by autocrats in particular circumstances, but the idea that autocrats are more likely to make positive contributions to economic growth than democratic leaders does not stand up to scrutiny. William Easterly tested the proposition by relating economic growth outcomes to the periods during which autocratic and other leaders were in office. He found that “leaders matter very little” (Easterly 2013, pp. 308-26).

There is also strong empirical evidence that democracy, and the personal freedom associated with it, is compatible with high levels of economic freedom.

Which democracies are supporting economic freedom?

Vincent Geloso and Alex Tabarrok have assembled evidence that democracy and economic freedom are highly correlated. Except for Singapore and Hong Kong there are no jurisdictions with high levels of economic freedom that are not also democracies (Geloso and Tabarrok 2025, p.116). Countries which have experienced the greatest democratization (Peru, Taiwan, Portugal, Spain, and Greece) have also experienced improvements in economic freedom. There have also been substantial improvements in economic freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe which experienced democratization following the collapse of communism in 1989 (Geloso and Tabarrok 2025, pp. 125-8). Geloso and Tabarrok provide some strong arguments to explain the correlation between democracy and economic freedom that they observe.

It seems to me, however, that none of the explanations offered for the observed correlation between democracy and economic freedom provide grounds to allay concerns, discussed in the preceding essay, about the future of economic freedom in the long-standing democracies.

Economic freedom levels are beginning to slip in some of the long-standing democracies. While many of the newer democracies have been experiencing increased dynamism, the increasing entanglement of government, industry and community organisations in the long-standing democracies has been associated with a decline in dynamism.

There is not much evidence that either the progressive or conservative sides of politics in the long-standing democracies are currently offering policies to advance economic freedom. The progressive side of politics is tending to pursue social and environmental agendas without regard for their impact on economic freedom, or growth in productivity or incomes. The conservative side of politics is tending to pursue economic nationalist agendas without regard for their impact on economic freedom, or growth in productivity of incomes.

Experience suggests that substantial political support for economic freedom will return only after economic crises threaten to cause widespread misery. That raises the issue of what kind of political entrepreneurship might help to make economic freedom more secure in the long-established democracies.

Learning from previous reform experience

Some prominent political leaders in democracies have been able to pursue reforms directed toward expansion of economic freedom. During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan pursued such reforms in the USA, as Margaret Thatcher did in Britain. The reforms currently being pursued by Javier Milei in Argentina seem to be similarly motivated, but at the time of writing it is too soon to judge how highly Milei’s reforms will rate in terms of broad libertarian criteria. The economic problems confronting the United States and Britain in the 1970s and 80s provided the context in which political leaders could initiate substantial changes in the direction of economic and social policies. That is even more true of the economic circumstances in Argentina prior to Milei’s election.

The reform efforts by Reagan and Thatcher can be viewed as examples of heroic leadership which increased economic freedom. However, heroic leadership of that kind is not solely the prerogative of presidents and prime ministers. Similar reform efforts in New Zealand and Australia were led by government ministers responsible for economic policy, Roger Douglas and Paul Keating respectively, with prime ministers adopting a facilitating role.

Political leaders can rarely claim to be the authors of their reform strategies. Policy development that has led to greater economic freedom has drawn heavily on the ideas of prominent academics including Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, on policy analysis in think tanks and on contributions of a few journalists who understand the issues.

In some instances, advisers within government bureaucracies have also played an important role in policy development. Roger Kerr, who held the position of Executive Director of the New Zealand Business Roundtable following a career in the New Zealand Treasury, provided a highly relevant comment about the need for advisors to focus their advice on their fields of expertise rather than on politics:

“Economists of all people should be conscious that the performance of bureaucrats in trying to pick winners and losers in the policy-advice market is likely to be as unimpressive as in the industrial domain – and for much the same reasons, namely lack of information and incentives. Perceived policy constraints are not always immutable. They can be shifted by reasoned analysis and well-constructed strategies for policy change, developed by interaction between political managers and technical advisers. Second-guessing political reactions can lead to narrowing of policy options and does less than justice, in recent New Zealand circumstances at least, to the intelligence of a number of politicians, on both sides of the political fence, who have been more aware of the gravity of New Zealand’s economic problems and prepared to tell the story like it is than many of their advising bureaucrats” (Kerr 1987, pp. 144-45).

Alf Rattigan is a prime example of a public servant who played a major innovative role in driving economic reforms in Australia.  Rattigan was chairman of Australia’s Tariff Board from 1963 to 1974 when it was replaced by the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC). He stayed on as chairman of the IAC until 1976, when he retired with ill health. Rattigan used his influence in those positions to play a pivotal role in terminating Australia’s long history of industry protection, which in turn, helped open Australia to the global forces that drove further market-based economic reforms. In a lecture presented in 2016, Paul Kelly, Editor-at-Large for The Australian and Australia’s most scholarly journalist, outlined the main elements that contributed to the success of Rattigan’s reform efforts (Kelly 2016). One element of Rattigan’s success was his integrity in taking seriously his legal responsibility as chairman of an independent statutory authority, in the face of opposition from the government of the day which believed that he should “accept the overall tariff policy of the government as given” and work within that framework. Another element was the ability of his professional staff to draw upon the methodology for measurement of effective rates of protection developed by Professor Max Corden. A small group of economically literate journalists played a crucial role in giving publicity to analyses demonstrating the costs of protection. Some groups, including farmers and miners, recognized that their members were disadvantaged by high levels of protection provided to the manufacturing sector and formed a free trade lobby. David Trebeck, an influential figure in the National Farmers Federation, said: “We fired the ‘bullets’ made by the IAC.” More politicians because advocates of free trade and political leaders eventually showed leadership by recognizing that “good policy is good politics”.

Unfortunately, looking back today on the economic reform efforts of the 1980s and 90s, it is apparent that the important reforms in the rules of the game made at that time have not become deeply entrenched. Political leaders obtained sufficient electoral support to implement market-friendly policies, but there does not seem to be much evidence that members of the public improved their understanding of the benefits of free markets in any of the countries in which reforms were undertaken.

Mass movements

The problem of ensuring adoption of government policies that more consistently advance economic and personal freedom is not merely a question of how to elect political entrepreneurs with their hearts in the right place to national leadership positions. Experience has shown that the longevity of reforms cannot be guaranteed even when they are supported by a strong coalition of interest groups and result in more favourable economic opportunities for a large majority of the population.

In recent years, centre-left and centre-right governments which have followed policies that are broadly consistent with relatively high levels of economic and personal freedom have become vulnerable to competition from populist political entrepreneurs who prophesy catastrophic environmental and social consequences if their radical policy proposals are not followed. Populist policy innovators on the left and right sides of politics tend to promote vastly different fears, and to offer vastly different policies. However, one common feature of those populist policy innovators is their attempt to exploit a systematic anti-market bias among electors.

The pertinent question is how the anti-market bias of public opinion can be reduced. History suggests that this has occurred to some extent in the past via complex processes involving, among other things, political entrepreneurship in social movements. For example, Joel Mokyr notes that the move toward free trade in Britain in the first half of the 19th century involved the influence of post-Smithian political economy, the growing political power of the new industrial elite, and debates about income distribution and food supply. He writes:

“The careers of Victorian free-traders such as Richard Cobden and John Bright and the liberal Tories of the post-1815 era represent the kind of mixture of economic interests and liberal ideology that eventually secured victory for free trade” (Mokyr 2009, p. 153).

Mikayla Novak has noted the importance of entrepreneurship in propelling social movements to extend the effective domain of freedom. In that context she notes that “people such as William Lloyd Garrison, Emmeline Pankhurst, Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Lech Walesa, and Nelson Mandela” played an important role in “opposing unsatisfactory institutions and situations” although they, themselves, were not necessarily classical liberals by orientation” (Novak 2021, p. 45).

Is it possible that at some time in the future a broad social movement promoting classical liberal views could become sufficiently influential to ensure that children are offered as much tuition about the spontaneous order of the free market as they are currently offered about the workings of ecological systems in the natural environment? If that ever happens it will occur because of the actions of individuals.  As Edward W. Younkins has suggested, the task of building a free society depends on individual advocates of liberty who are “dedicated to preserving and strengthening the ideological and moral foundations of a free society”. Younkins notes that it is especially through the “numerous interactions with individuals” during their everyday lives that advocates of liberty can “transmit the freedom philosophy to the general public” (Younkins 2011, pp. 168-69).

Please see the final part of this series: Summary and Conclusions

References

Acton, Lord (John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton) Acton-Creighton Correspondence (1887) Acton-Creighton Correspondence | Online Library of Liberty

Aligica, Paul Dragos and Peter J. Boettke, Challenging Institutional Analysis and Development: The Bloomington School (Routledge, 2009).

Easterly, William, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (Basic Books, 2013).

Faulkner, Robert, The Case for Greatness: Honorable Ambition and Its Critics (Yale University Press, 2007).

Geloso, Vincent and Alex Tabarrok. “Two Peas in a Pod: Democracy and Capitalism”, in Scott C. Miller and Sidney M. Milkis (eds.) Can Democracy and Capitalism be Reconciled (Oxford University Press, 2025).

Kelly, Paul., “Economic Reform: A lost cause or merely in eclipse”, Alf Rattigan Lecture (The Australian and New Zealand School of Government, 2016).

Kerr, Roger, “Ideas, Interests, Experience and the Economic Adviser”, World Economy, 10, no. 2 (1987) pp. 131-54.

Márquez, Xavier, “Max Weber, demagogy and charismatic representation”, European Journal of Political Theory (2024).

Miller, Fred D., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Clarendon Press, 1995).

Mokyr, Joel, The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain 1700 – 1850 (Yale University Press, 2009).

Novak, Mikayla, Freedom in Contention: Social Movements and Liberal Political Economy (Lexington Books, 2021).

Ostrom, Vincent., The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of Democracies (The University of Michigan Press, 1997).

Tzu, Lao., Tao Te Ching, D.C. Lau translation (Penguin Books, 1963).

Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocation”, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited and translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

Younkins, Edward W. Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society, Towards a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism (University Press of America, 2011).

Part VI: What are the consequences of path dependence?

 This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

———

In 1848, Frédéric Bastiat famously wrote:

“The state is the great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else” (Bastiat 2012, p. 171).

 A couple of years later he noted that now participation in the making of law has become universal, “equilibrium is being sought in universal plunder” (Bastiat 2012, p.189).

He predicted social unrest: “people will be beating on the door of the legislative palace. The conflict will be no less bitter within it" (Bastiat 2012, p.194).

How can we explain why “universal plunder” has taken so long to become a major problem in the long-standing democracies? Part of the explanation lies in the existence of formal institutions that place constraints on legislatures. As noted in an earlier essay in this series, part of the explanation also lies in two-party systems of government in which power is usually exercised by encompassing interest groups which have an interest in promoting widespread opportunities for individuals to flourish.

However, the existence of formal rules and encompassing political parties doesn’t offer a complete explanation. What is it that has hitherto prevented governing parties from being displaced or taken over by political entrepreneurs seeking to modify the rules of the game to advantage favored interest groups?

I think the answer lies in the “path dependence” of social norms. Please recall at this point that (as noted in Part I) institutions include codes of conduct, norms of behavior, conventions, and customs as well as formal rules. As Douglass North explains:

“Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand today’s choices … without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions” (North 1990, p.100).

There was a time when social norms caused people in the long-established democracies to exercise greater restraint in using their democratic “rights” to obtain benefits for themselves at the expense of others. One reason was that inequality under a constitutional order in which the rules of the game were seen as fair didn’t generate tension but was seen as ipso facto also fair. Vincent Geloso and Alex Tabarrok note that James M. Buchanan held that view (Geloso and Tabarrok, 2025).

Buchanan also identified two norms which underpin liberal democracy: that a sufficient proportion of the population can make their own choices and prefer to be autonomous rather than dependent on others; and that a sufficient proportion of the population enter relationships with others based on reciprocity, fair dealing, and mutual respect. (Buchanan 2005, p. 26).

Buchanan asserted:

“Generalized or widespread failure of persons to adhere to these norms, along with widespread recognition that others also disregard the standards, will insure that the liberal order itself must fail, quite independently from any institutional safeguards” (Buchanan 2005, p.28).

The autonomy norm has eroded as more people have become heavily dependent on government for retirement incomes and for services such as health and education. Business and community organisations have also become increasingly willing to forgo their autonomy to pursue social and environmental objectives favored by whatever government happens to be in power and to obtain a more favourable regulatory environment for their activities.

The norm of reciprocity has also eroded considerably in recent decades. Political parties increasingly base their appeal to voters on the supposed benefits a policy might deliver to groups with specific demographic characteristics, rather than pursuing broad community interests. When voters see others declaring their support for political parties which promise additional spending or regulation to benefit specific groups, they are likely to be less inhibited in behaving similarly. As more voters engage in the struggle to obtain benefits, political parties have a greater incentive to compete for the support of narrow interest groups, rather than seeking to appeal to the broader interests of voters in their roles as taxpayers and consumers.

Increasing entanglement of government, industry and community organisations has been associated with inter-related problems of increasing constraints on economic freedom, changes in business culture leading to a decline in dynamism, and rapid growth in public debt levels. Economic freedom levels in countries such as France, Britain and USA are now substantially lower than they were at the turn of the century. Much of this slippage occurred prior to restrictions on freedom imposed during the coronavirus epidemic (Fraser Institute data). Edmund Phelps has noted a decline in economic dynamism associated with corporatism (Phelps 2013, pp. 159-69). Growth of public debt is a predictable consequence of the triadic political relationships discussed earlier. To avoid disappointing current generations by constraining government spending or raising taxes, governments tend to increase public debt, thus transferring the burden to future generations.

My consideration of these matters has led me to expect fiscal crises to become more common in the liberal democracies in the years ahead and that this will lead to consideration of rule changes to raise productivity growth and require governments to live within their means (Bates 2021, pp.117-18).

However, changing the rules of the game to reduce the adverse impact of interest group politics poses a large challenge for reform-minded political entrepreneurs. The problem arises from path dependency. The culture of preferment-seeking and plunder associated with interest group politics took a long time to reach its current state, but it is now entrenched and will be difficult to overcome.

North recognized the role that political entrepreneurs play in institutional change (North 1990, pp. 86-87, 103-4). His analysis implies that their role is to reduce transactions costs associated with institutional change. (North 1990, p.138). The transactions costs of institutional change are high because of the path dependence of institutions. As institutions evolve, ideologies tend to evolve to support them. Organizations and interest groups that have grown up under existing institutions often have a stake in maintaining them (North 1990, pp.91,99). 

In his Nobel lecture, North emphasized that because of path dependence, a change in formal rules may not change economic performance in the manner expected:

“It is the admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement characteristics that shapes economic performance. While the rules may be changed overnight, the informal norms usually change only gradually. Since it is the norms that provide “legitimacy” to a set of rules, revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its supporters desire and performance will be different than anticipated. And economies that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have very different performance characteristics than the first economy because of different informal norms and enforcement.” (North 1993).

The implications of path dependence have been further explored by Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne, and Peter Leeson. These authors contend that the ability of a new institutional arrangement to take hold when it has been transplanted depends on that institution’s status in relations to indigenous agents in the previous time period. They suggest that institutional transplants are unlikely to stick if they are inconsistent with indigenously introduced endogenous institutions (Boettke et al. 2015).

The analytical framework used by Boettke et al. suggests that endogenous political entrepreneurs might be more successful than international agencies in bringing about institutional change. Boettke and Coyne have noted elsewhere that political entrepreneurship entails alertness to the potential for new forms of governance to overcome political and bureaucratic constraints (Boettke and Coyne 2007, pp.130-31).

That raises the question, considered in the following essay, of what other qualities reform-minded political entrepreneurs might require to bring about desirable institutional change.

References

Bastiat, Frédéric, “The Law,” “The State,” and Other Political Writings 1843-1850, ed. Jacques de Guenin (Liberty Fund, 2012).

Bates, Winton, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing (Hamilton Books, 2021).

Boettke, Peter J., Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson, “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics”, Chapter 6 in Culture of Economic Action, ed. Laura E. Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (Edward Elgar, 2015).  

Boettke, Peter J. and Christopher J. Coyne, “Entrepreneurial Behavior and Institutions” in Entrepreneurship: The Engine of Growth, ed. Maria Minniti (Praeger, 2007).

Buchanan, James M. Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative, The normative vision of classical liberalism (Edward Elgar, 2005).

Geloso, Vincent and Alex Tabarrok. “Two Peas in a Pod: Democracy and Capitalism”, in Scott C. Miller and Sidney M. Milkis (eds.) Can Democracy and Capitalism be Reconciled (Oxford University Press, 2025).

North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

North, Douglass C., ‘Economic Performance through Time,’ Nobel Prize Lecture (December 9, 1993) https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1993/north/lecture/

Phelps, Edmund. Mass Flourishing: How grassroots innovation created jobs, challenge and change (Princeton University Press, 2013).