When I read the sentence quoted in the epigraph above,
the thought crossed my mind that Aristotle would have agreed with it. Aristotle
based his philosophy on his observation of human nature. The reason why Aristotle
came to mind will become apparent as you read the essay.
The quoted sentence written by Gerry Gaus is from the
Preface of
The
Open Society and its Complexities (p.x). I have
previously written about this book in an essay entitled: What
does Gerry Gaus tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for political
entrepreneurship?
I have three objectives in writing this essay:
- The first is to outline Gaus’s discussion of the social
evolution of human nature and how that provides a basis for his normative
conclusions about the desirability of an Open Society.
- The second is to consider what we need to know about
human nature to reach normative conclusions about the desirability of an Open
Society.
- The third is to consider whether Gaus’s approach helps
us to defend the intuition that natural rights exist.
The evolution of human nature
Gaus argues that human nature has been shaped by
evolution, including cultural evolution. Humans are a norm-guided species. Social
norms are predominantly a cultural phenomenon – a product of cultural
evolution. The norms associated with different types of social order differentially
encourage some aspects of human nature while discouraging others. Gaus suggests
that “the truly outstanding feature of our evolved moral psychology is our
ability to follow a wide variety of sharing and fairness norms in different
circumstances and cultures”. (p.86)
Gaus suggests that the common view that publicly
justified moral rules are a modern Western invention fails to appreciate that public
justification has been a fundamental feature of moral life from the beginning:
“From the very beginning, human morality has
relied on public justification: the rules of the group must
be such that the members’ personal normative convictions and interests align
with them.” (p.50)
Gaus is critical of the “tribal collectivist” view
that humans “are simply, at bottom, natural egalitarian collectivists”. He begins
his evolutionary story with conjectures about the complex social life of
ancestral Pan – the posited common ancestor of humans, chimps and bonobos. Concern
for personal autonomy may have its roots in a social life where individuals displayed
a keen sense of self-interest in competition for alpha status, and in rebelling
to avoid dominance.
Gaus acknowledges that Late Pleistocene (LPA) hunter-gather
societies engaged in egalitarian meat-sharing. That was a means of reducing the
variance in food intake, but it also reflects successful efforts by
subordinates to control would-be bullies and upstarts. Under that interpretation,
the egalitarian ethos of LPA societies was not inherently collectivist. LPA
societies “appear characterized by a near-obsession with resisting the
authority of would-be dominators”. LPA societies also exerted immense social
pressure against innovators who sought to introduce new techniques to improve
their own lot. This may have been an effective way to protect distributive
shares.
People in LPA societies had a strong ethic of
reciprocation – they engaged in the conditional cooperation that enables
markets to function. Social support was more readily available to those who had
a reputation for being willing to assist others.
Social norms developed in LPA societies as some moral
rules became internalized because large majorities developed an emotional
attachment to them and willingly complied with them. The exercise of self-control
in conforming to social rules was a highly prized virtue in many small hunter
groups.
About 17,000 years ago, there was a rise in inequality
brought about by the development of forager clans, leading to creation of hierarchical
states. The state’s organization gave it a decisive military advantage over
more egalitarian groups. Grain-based monoculture may be the creation of
hierarchical states rather than a cause of it.
Gaus presumably adopts F. A. Hayek’s view of the Open
Society (or Great Society) as a society in which coercion of some by others has
been reduced as far as possible and individuals are free to use their own
knowledge for their own purposes. He argues that the morality of the Open
Society scales up the norms of reciprocity and fairness while incorporating the
ancient concern with autonomy and personal freedom: “the core rights of person
and property become universal”. (p.133)
The recent emergence of WEIRD morality (the morality
of Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democracies) may have occurred as a
consequence of teachings of the Catholic Church opposed to incest, which was once
defined so broadly that it led to the breakup of kin- and clan-based morality. Gaus
notes Jonathan Haidt’s data (The Righteous Mind, 2012) indicating that the
moral reasoning of WEIRD populations is largely focused on individuals and
centres on the dimensions of liberty-oppression, care-harm, and
fairness-cheating. In contrast, most
other moral systems, including those of conservatives in WEIRD societies give
greater emphasis to loyalty-betrayal, authority-subversion, and
sanctity-degradation.
Gaus
suggests:
“Extending
core morality beyond kin-based networks may have been the critical development
of WEIRD morality, but WEIRD morality too manifests a push toward expansion of
the impartial network and pulling back by kin and ethnic markers and the power
of social proximity. Human social life is defined by this constant tension
between the push to wider moral relations and the pulling back of familiarity
and social proximity. To describe human morality as either tribalistic or an
ever-expanding circle is evocative but fundamentally distorting.” (p. 90)
Gaus goes on
to suggest that although cultural evolution does not render humans unfit for
the Open Society, they may well be unfit for Millean liberalism (and by
implication, WEIRD morality). He argues that Millean progressivism “is a recipe
for drastically reducing social learning (aka imitation), throwing us back on
our cognitive capacities. That, however, is in turn a recipe for undermining
ultra-social cooperation, and would probably make any significant system of
social rules dysfunctional”. (p.102)
The Open
Society is characterized by self-organized social morality, entailing moral
rules that lead toward extended cooperation rather than conflict and division. Diversity of moral perspectives is
fundamental to the moral life of the Open Society. Thus, the existence of
increasingly diverse moral perspectives can enhance justification of the Open
Society and public justifications of those moral rules must be as accommodating
to diversity as possible. (pp. 164-167)
Gaus concludes:
“a variety of different moral perspectives can,
counterintuitively, enhance the ability of a society to secure public
justification of shared moral rules. Each has his own opinion of the point and
value of these rules, yet each can particulate in, and indeed enhance a social
process that can generate a self-organized social morality.” (p. 167)
That description
of an important characteristic of an Open Society seems to be as close as Gaus
comes to reaching a normative conclusion about the desirability of an Open
Society.
What
do we need to know about human nature to reach normative conclusions supporting
an Open Society?
I don’t
think we need an evolutionary account of the shaping of human nature to reach
normative conclusions supporting an Open Society. Gerry Gaus could have argued
that humans have a variety of different moral perspectives by merely referring
to evidence such as that presented by Jonathan Haidt. He didn’t need his interesting
account of the evolution of human nature to make the point that moral rules can
only secure “public justification” if they are as accommodating to diversity as
possible.
That is not intended
as a criticism. Gaus made clear that his primary intention in providing the
evolutionary account was to counter the view (attributed to Hayek among
others) that our evolved moral sentiments constantly cause us to rebel against
the Open Society and resort to a “tribal” moral outlook.
Gaus’s discussion
of the evolution of moral norms helped him to focus on some aspects of human
nature that are relevant to assessment of politico-legal orders. However, it
seems to me that Gaus overlooked other relevant aspects of human nature such as
the importance to individual flourishing of the exercise of practical wisdom
and self-direction. The relevance of those aspects might have been given more
prominence if Gaus had considered some studies with an individualistic focus on
virtues and values.
The study by Martin Seligman and Christopher Petersen of
virtues that are ubiquitous and valued in every culture is relevant in this
context. By reading the basic writings of all the major religious and
philosophical traditions, the researchers found that six virtues were endorsed
by “almost every single one” of these traditions: wisdom and knowledge,
courage, love and humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. That list
incorporates the ancient cardinal virtues of practical wisdom, courage,
temperance, and justice and the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. Seligman
and Petersen identified 24 character strengths that they viewed as the routes
by which the virtues can be achieved. One aim of the study was to assist people
to identify their own character strengths. The study recognizes that individuals
who have different character strengths have potential to flourish in different
ways. (The study is described in Martin Seligman, Authentic
Happiness, 2012, pp. 125-161.)
Another relevant approach is Shalom Schwartz’s theory
of basic values. The findings of his surveys suggest that the value priorities in
82 countries exhibit a similar hierarchical order, despite substantial
differences in the value priorities of individuals within those countries. The
10 basic values identified in that study were self-direction, universalism, benevolence,
conformity, tradition, security, power, achievement, hedonism, and stimulation.
(See: Schwatz,
S.H., 2012, ‘An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values’, Online
Readings in Psychology and Culture.)
There are no doubt other empirical studies that
identify the importance of practical wisdom and self-direction to individual
flourishing.
However, as Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl (often
referred to as the Dougs) have pointed out, “the character of human flourishing
is not discovered solely by a scientific study of human nature. Considerations
of the requirements and conditions for human volition and action, cultural and
social practices, and commonsense observations are part of the process”. The Dougs
add: “The point of entry for such reflection most often occurs when we examine
our lives as a whole and wonder what they are for”. (Norms
of Liberty, 2005, p.116).
The Dougs present a Neo-Aristotelian account of human
flourishing in which the human good is explained to be objective, inclusive,
individualized, agent-relative, self-directed and social. After providing that
explanation, the authors conclude:
“Regardless of whether or not the forgoing outline of human
flourishing meshes with Aristotle’s, it clear that human flourishing is, for
our theory of individualistic perfectionism, something plural and complex, not
monistic and simple. As we have noted, this view of human flourishing amounts
to a version of moral pluralism because there are many goods that help to
define human flourishing. Further, there is no single good or virtue that
dominates all others and reduces them to mere instrumental values.” (p.143)
The Dougs do not refrain from declaring that human
flourishing is good. Flourishing occurs when individuals actualize their
natural potential to be good humans. (p.122)
The Dougs note that the individualized and
agent-relative character of human flourishing poses the problem of how it can
be possible for individuals to flourish in different ways without the
flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference
over that of others. They explain that recognition of individual rights solves
that problem because it enables individuals to flourish in different ways
provided that they do not interfere with the rights of others. (pp. 76-96)
I hope that this brief outline of Douglas Rasmussen
and Douglas Den Uyl’s discussion of human flourishing provides sufficient
evidence that their normative conclusions in political philosophy are based on their
study of human nature.
Does Gaus’s evolutionary discussion help us to
defend intuitions that natural rights exist?
In my book, Freedom,
Progress, and Human Flourishing, I noted
that, since ancient times, some philosophers have recognized that there is a
foundation in human nature for intuitions about natural rights. I noted Haidt’s
moral foundations theory and Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution but most of
my discussion focused on Robert Nozick’s discussion of the evolution of norms
and intuitions related to social cooperation for mutual benefit and the ethics
of respect. (pp. 26-28) Nozick’s discussion is in his book, Invariances:
The Structure of the Objective World, published
in 2001.
Gaus’s discussion of cultural evolution overlaps considerably
with Nozick’s, but there are differences of emphasis. As noted above, Gaus’s discussion
emphasizes that public justification has always been a fundamental feature of
moral life of humanity and that some moral rules become internalized as large
majorities developed an emotional attachment to them. I think public
justification is also implied in Nozick’s discussion of the merits of voluntary
cooperation to mutual benefit because voluntary cooperation requires public
justification. (Nozick, p.259)
One difference of emphasis arises because of Nozick’s
interest in the question of why conscious self-awareness was selected for in
evolutionary processes. Nozick suggests that “if the function of conscious
self-awareness was selected for because it makes us capable of ethical
behaviour, then ethics, even the first layer of the ethics of respect, truly is
what makes us human”. (p.300) Gaus is more interested in issues of public
justification of norms and the question of “how we can live without oppression
and subjugation in a complex and deeply divided world”.
I think Gaus’s evolutionary discussion is helpful to
an understanding of why it is common for people to have intuitions that rules that restrain individual action
require public justification to ensure that, as far as is possible, they
are aligned with the personal
normative convictions of community members. Perhaps the intuition
that people have a natural right to public justification of rules that restrain
individual action is just as widespread and as strong as the intuition that
individuals have a natural right to respect for their persons and property.
Conclusions
This essay was prompted by my reading of Gerry Gaus’s
book, The Open Society and its Complexities.
Gaus’s discussion of the evolution of human nature
emphasizes the following points:
- Public
justification of rules and concern for personal autonomy were a fundamental
feature of moral life even before the evolution of modern humans.
- The evolved
moral psychology of humans has allowed a wide variety of fairness norms to be followed
in different circumstances and cultures.
- Human nature
is neither fundamentally tribalistic nor is it characterized by an ever-expanding
circle of moral relationships. There is constant tension between tendencies
toward expansion of moral concerns and pulling back to familiarity and social
proximity.
- The Open
Society is characterized by self-organized social morality and diversity of
moral perspectives.
Gaus argues that diversity can enhance the ability of
a society to secure public justification of shared moral rules.
I think the points that Gaus emphasizes about human
nature are helpful in considering the merits of an Open Society but I would
have liked to have seen him give consideration to the relevance of other aspects
of human nature such as the widespread view that exercise of practical wisdom is
a virtue and the value that people place on self-direction. Consideration of
practical wisdom and self-direction would have required consideration of
studies with an individualistic focus as well as those that focus on social norms.
It is possible
to obtain insights about human nature from commonsense observations, introspection
and reasoning, as well as from scientific research. On the basis of their observations
and reasoning Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl were able to explain (in Norms
of Liberty) that the human good is individualized, agent-relative
and self-directed, as well as social. Their understanding of the nature of
human good and individual flourishing provided a foundation for their normative
conclusion that it is necessary for the politico-legal framework to recognize
individual rights. Rights recognition makes it possible for individuals to
flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or
groups being given structural preference over that of others.
It is appropriate for conclusions about the rights of
individuals to be based on the study of human nature rather than intuitions. Nevertheless,
the intuition that humans have rights that should be respected is an important
factor influencing individual behaviour. That influence could be expected to be
stronger when people believe that individual rights are natural, in the sense
of having a foundation in human nature. It seems to me that evolutionary theory
supports that belief.
Gaus’s book
left me thinking that the intuition that individuals have a natural right to
public justification of the rules that restrain their actions may be as
widespread and as strong as the intuition that they have a natural right to
respect for their persons and property. More generally, it may be that humans
tend to have strong intuitions that natural justice itself is a natural right.
Addendum
Readers might also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.
