This question has arisen from my reading of ‘The Great Famine’, by Ciarán Ó Murchadha.
But I have an interest in the question for two additional reasons: I have some
Irish ancestors who would have been affected by the great famine; and in the
course of my work as an economist I have developed a great deal of respect for 19th Century political economics.
I found Ó Muchadha’s book to be enlightening in explaining why
a substantial proportion of the Irish population were heavily dependent on
potatoes and highly vulnerable when crops were destroyed by a fungal disease in
most of the years from 1845 to 1849. Prior to the famine, about one-third of the
population was completely dependent on potatoes because no other crop could
provide as much nutritional value from small plots of land. Over 600,000 households
subsisted without tenure rights on small plots of land under the conacre system,
which gave them access to land in exchange for their labour. A further 300, 000
cottier households had a more formal tenancy relationship which entailed
working for set wages, which were offset against the rent for their plots. Many
tenants on small holdings paid their rents in cash rather than by providing
labour, but were also completely dependent on potatoes for subsistence.
In the decades leading up to 1845, access to land for
potato-growing was becoming more difficult, partly because of an increasing
tendency for landowners to consolidate holdings for grazing purposes. In their
struggle to obtain access to land it had apparently become common for poor
people to offer more rent than they could possibly pay, in the hope that once
possession was obtained it would be less bothersome for landlords to reduce
rents than to initiate eviction proceedings. The transactions costs associated
with evictions were often substantial. Tenants had a set of ‘tradition-sanctioned’
modes of proceeding under cover of darkness against people whom they believed
to be perpetrators of injustice.
Such secret society activity did not persist after 1847,
however. By that time, those who would
have been likely to exact retribution for evictions were apparently ‘for the
most part dead, in the workhouses, in prison or had departed overseas as
emigrants or as transported felons’. The famine added impetus to the number of
evictions, not just because many tenants were unable to pay rent, but also
because landlords anticipated that their rates would rise dramatically to pay for
relief under the Poor Law. Evictions would have substantially increased the
death toll from the famine, but from a landlord’s perspective, consolidation of
holdings was necessary in order to avoid bankruptcy.
The relief provided by voluntary contributions and the British
government was not sufficient to prevent over a million deaths occurring during
the famine period. The British Treasury spent about £8 million on famine relief
in Ireland, much of which consisted of advances that were intended to be
repaid. The government’s contribution was relatively small by comparison, for
example, with the £69 million spent on the Crimean War of 1854-1856. The government
could have done more to help the Irish without causing much hardship within
Britain.
So, why didn’t the British government provide more help to
the victims of the Irish famine? The explanation offered by the author is as
follows:
‘Political economy … combined with ‘providentialist’ and
‘moralist’ views, provided the assumptions underlying the decision-making of
the small London-based political elite whose views translated into legislation
for Ireland, and none of whom ever witnessed its effects first hand’ (page 194).
However, that doesn’t line up well with what I know about
the views of prominent 19th Century political economists. For
example, in discussing the limits of laissez faire in his book ‘Principles of Political Economy’, published
in 1948, J S Mill wrote:
‘Apart from any metaphysical considerations respecting the
foundation of morals or of the social union, it will be admitted to be right
that human beings should help one another; and the more so, in proportion to
the urgency of the need: and none needs help so urgently as one who is
starving. The claim to help, therefore, created by destitution, is one of the
strongest which can exist; and there is prima facie the amplest reason for
making the relief of so extreme an exigency as certain to those who require it,
as by any arrangements of society it can be made.’
Ciarán Ó Murchadha implies that his view is based on
research by Peter Gray, which demonstrates
‘that the ideological
framework was part of a wider set of beliefs shared across the British
political spectrum, including the conviction that the Famine had been sent by
providence, and that it furnished the British state with both the opportunity
and the moral authority to reform Ireland thoroughly’.
A paper by Peter Gray has explained British policies towards
the Irish in terms of
‘a readiness to attribute mass famine mortality in Ireland
to the wilful immorality of the Irish, and to insist on the implementation of
the penal mechanism of the poor law on all social classes’.
Immediately afterwards, Gray adds:
‘This, rather than any unthinking adherence to “laissez
faire” is what informed the doctrine of “natural causes” in the latter stages
of the Irish famine’ (IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 123).
It seems to me that British views relating to providence and
morality might have been advanced by English people to avoid acknowledging that
they did not feel much sympathy for starving people in Ireland. In his book, ‘Why Ireland Starved’ (1983) Joel Mokyr
suggests:
‘It is not unreasonable to surmise that had anything like the famine occurred in England
or Wales, the British government would have overcome its theoretical scruples and would
have come to the rescue of the starving at a much larger scale. Ireland was not considered
part of the British community. Had it been, its income per capita may not have been
much higher, perhaps, but mass starvation due to a subsistence crisis would have been
averted …’ (p 292).
Even though Britain and Ireland were part of a political union,
there are strong historical reasons why many British and Irish people did not
see each other as members of the same community. There is evidence that British
political economists, including J S Mill, shared the prejudices against the
Irish of many other British people. But the principles of political economy espoused
by 19th Century political economists did not require the British
government to allow large numbers of people to die during the Irish famine.