Is the 'great big new carbon tax' a good idea?

I am using that emotive description of the new tax because I have previously suggested on this blog that a great big new carbon tax might not be a bad idea if it replaced other taxes that are having adverse effects on economic incentives. So, how good is the carbon tax package announced by the prime minister yesterday?


The first point that needs to be recognized in assessing the package is that it only makes sense if it is viewed as a signalling exercise. By itself this package will have a small impact on carbon dioxide emissions in Australia, a tiny impact on the world-wide emissions and an almost negligible impact on the stock of global emissions and global climate. Its impact depends almost entirely on the extent to which it may help to encourage people in other countries to take similar action to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions. If there is sufficient action by other countries more investors may come to expect that development of more efficient alternative technologies is likely to become a profitable venture.

The incentives that the tax provides for development of more efficient alternative technologies are the critical factor in whole exercise. If the world community ever gets serious about making substantial reductions in global emissions, the economic cost will be massive unless low-cost technologies are developed for energy generation and/ or removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Unfortunately, the proposed tax is unlikely to induce many people to rush into investing in development of new technology.

The tax cannot credibly be claimed to be anything other than a modest step by a small country. The longer term promises about the extent of reductions in emissions that are aimed for have little credibility. At best, the proposed carbon tax provides a weak signal of Australia’s willingness to participate in global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The signal would be stronger if there was bipartisan support for the tax – but even if it is introduced and remains in place it will not amount to much in a global context.

Why don’t we hear the government arguing that ordinary people should be prepared suffer some pain in order to save the world from a climate disaster? The government is not talking about pain. It seems to have reasoned that since it will be obvious to almost everyone that the contribution of the tax to saving the world will be extremely modest and contingent on similar action by other countries, the tax can only be justified to Labor’s traditional voters if they suffer no pain. The package is being sold to the government’s traditional supporters as a redistribution measure that will actually improve their lot at the expense of the big polluters. And it is all being done in the name of ‘tax reform’!

Could anyone object to a new tax being used to fund reforms that will make the overall tax system more efficient? I imagine that such a proposal would have widespread support. The question that must be asked, however, is whether the proposed increase in the tax-free threshold should be viewed as a reform.

My concern is that the proposed tax relief will do very little to improve the work incentives faced by people with low incomes because it will leave effective marginal tax rates largely unchanged. The government has missed an opportunity to undertake some meaningful tax reform that might raise productivity. If this carbon tax package can be sold as economic reform, then the meaning of economic reform has changed beyond recognition and new words will have to be found to describe policy actions that will raise productivity.

Postscript:
In proposing to raise the tax threshold the government can claim to have followed a recommendation of the Henry review.
However, there is a strong case that greater tapering of welfare benefits would be a better way to tackle poverty traps.The relative merits of increases in the tax free threshold and greater tapering of welfare benefits as means of reducing poverty traps was discussed by David Ingles in a paper for the Australia Institute last year. Ingles suggested:  'In general, the recommendations of the Henry Tax Review are a slight improvement on the current situation but they do not address really fundamental issues and lack a coherent underlying rationale'.
In my view, Ingless goes too far in suggesting that the recommendations of the Henry review lack a coherent underlying rationale, but I can't see a coherent rationale in the way the government is cherry picking the recommendations of that review.

Why not think up a new political system?

Shona has a suggestion for a new project for me. Regular readers of this blog will remember Shona as the person who wrote some guest posts about volunteering. Shona suggests that I should invent a new political system.


This is what Shona wrote:

I just had my meeting with our local MP. Actually, Bruce was a ‘no show’ so he asked his minion to talk to me. I wouldn’t have minded talking to the minion if that is what Bruce had asked me to do originally. I was surprised that Bruce had asked me to talk, although I did write a very long email to him a few months ago. The appointment was set up 5 or 6 weeks ago and clearly his schedule has been overrun with his new responsibilities.


Bruce’s new responsibilities involve looking at social policy. His focus is on social issues that have become institutionalized (with groups representing them) and not the broader picture. That is a big mistake in my opinion.


In my discussion with said minion, I suggested that it didn’t matter what party was in power, we have people who don’t know anything about a subject leading policy. And there is no long term strategic thinking.


It makes me wonder whether this political system we have ever satisfies anyone. Are there any good examples of political systems anywhere in the world? Our political system is based on the British system which is hundreds of years old. If we were to start from scratch, what sort of system would we establish? It also strikes me as very bizarre that a head of a government agency has to be qualified to do that job, but a politician who directs and takes responsibility for the agency doesn’t have to have any qualifications! Shouldn’t there be some sort of competency system for politicians?


I am appalled by current politics. I don’t want to be forced to choose between existing political parties or leaders. Maybe you could invent a new political system from scratch for discussion – a system to perpetuate our happiness, and then perhaps compare it with what we have now. You could write thoughts on everything from competency criteria for politicians to voting systems. We could come up for a great name for it - the Winton System rather than the Westminster?

My immediate response was to start thinking up reasons why it is not a good idea to start from scratch in thinking about what kind of political system we should have. I don’t think it is possible for anyone (not even me) to understand how some political system that they thought up from scratch would work in practice. It is difficult to predict how politicians, judges, the media, interest groups and the public might respond to the incentives we might seek to incorporate in a new system until we actually see how they respond. Many people may tend to be less self-interested in their role as citizens than in normal market behaviour, but few are angelic. It is probably much easier to predict how people would respond to changes to a system in which norms of behaviour have already been established.

The suggestion of looking around the world to borrow ideas that work is sensible. I understand that is what the Americans did when they had the opportunity to start from scratch to invent a new political system. Australians did the same thing in developing a new constitution at the time of federation.

My starting point in thinking about political reform is to acknowledge that the Westminster system has one very good feature – it usually enables governments to be held accountable for their actions and to be voted out of office if they become unpopular. I think some of the argy-bargy that many people dislike about politics is an inevitable result of the role of the opposition and media in holding governments accountable. But the system does not reward politicians who are seen to offer unfair criticism. Politicians run the risk of losing votes if they are seen to be excessively negative or unnecessarily destructive

Added to the normal argy-bargy, some of the bad odour associated with federal politics in Australia at the moment seems to me to stem from the unusual situation in which we find ourselves. It is difficult for voters to hold the government accountable for the policies it is adopting because there was no clear winner after the last election. That means that the policies that the government has been implementing are the result of negotiations with minor parties and independents, rather than policies that it took to the people at the last election, or even policies that it can honestly claim to be in the interests of the community as a whole.

My next point is that in thinking about political reform we need to recognize that politics has inherent limitations as a way of getting things done. A lot of the disappointment about outcomes in a wide range of areas seems to me to stem from attempts to achieve things through the political process that would be better left to the private sector or voluntary co-operation. Why take money from people in order to provide them with services when they could obtain better value for money by buying them privately? The only answer that makes any sense is to make the distribution of services fairer – but governments do not need to be involved in actual provision of services in order to do that. As far as I can see there is no more reason to think that governments would be good at running schools or hospitals than farms, shopping malls or chook raffles.

A major problem inherent in politics as a way of getting anything done is that it involves giving some people the power to push other people around. People don’t mind when the pushing is obviously justified. There are not many people who mind being required to obey laws to respect lives and property of others, or being required to pay taxes to defend the country against potential foreign aggression. Politics becomes particularly objectionable when people get pushed around in order to provide benefits for some group that happens to be politically powerful.

In order to enjoy politics you have to either enjoy pushing other people around or enjoy pushing back. I think our main priority should be to contain politics to those aspects of life where it is actually necessary – so the pushing and shoving doesn’t intrude into aspects of life where it is unnecessary.

So, rather than start with a blank piece of paper I think it is probably better to look at the political system we have and to consider how it could be improved. The competency of politicians might be a good question to consider first. Should politicians be required to meet competency standards?

Does economic growth help people to thrive?

Yes! The proportion of people who are thriving tends to be higher in countries that have experienced greatest economic growth over the longer term. It may take several decades, however, for economic growth to be fully reflected in subjective measures of well-being. The proportion of people who are suffering also tends to be lower in countries that have experienced greatest economic growth, but there are quite a few countries that do not fit that pattern.


These observations are based on the definitions of ‘thriving’ and ‘suffering’ used in the Gallup World Poll. Gallup classifies respondents as "thriving," "struggling," or "suffering," according to how they rate their current and future lives on a ladder scale, based on the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale, where the bottom rating is ‘the worst possible life’ and the top rating is ‘the best possible life’. Further information on the survey and classification method is available here.

The following charts show the percentages of people who are thriving or suffering in 122 countries relative to per capita GDP levels in those countries. It is clear that the percentages thriving tend to be higher and the percentages suffering to be lower, in countries with relatively high per capita incomes i.e. those which have experienced greatest economic growth in the past.

The countries that do not fit the general pattern are interesting. Several former communist bloc countries are outliers in terms of lower percentages of the population thriving and a higher percentages suffering than would be expected on the basis of per capita income levels. Some African countries have much better outcomes and some much worse than would be expected on the basis of income levels. The outcomes that are worse than expected can be explained by factors such as civil unrest. Better than expected outcomes for African and Latin American countries in studies such as this are often attributed to national characteristics, such as a positive outlook on life (but that is not necessarily irrelevant to emotional well-being). The lower than expected percentages of people thriving in China, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan might also be attributable to some extent to a more reserved outlook on life by Chinese people.

Another factor relevant to considering China, Singapore etc. is the rapid economic growth of these countries. As discussed in my last post, to the extent that well-being is affected by wealth (reflected in quality of housing, financial assets, human capital, public infrastructure, social capital etc.) as well as current income, countries with relatively high growth rates could be expected to have lower levels of well-being than other countries with similar per capita incomes. Regression analysis, comparable to that reported in my last post, suggests that growth prior to 1970 makes a substantially greater contribution to the percentage of people thriving than does growth in the periods 1970 to 1990 and 1990 to 2009. The results provide support for the view that is that it takes time for economic growth to be translated into forms of wealth that enhance well-being, rather than for the ‘unhappy growth’ hypothesis which I have discussed previously. The unhappy growth hypothesis implies that the estimated coefficients on growth in the most recent period could be expected to be negative, but I found the estimated coefficients on growth to be positive in respect of all periods. (The estimated coefficient for 1990 to 2009 is not significantly greater than zero at the 95% significance level, but the standard error is smaller than the estimate. Anyone who would like to see the results is welcome to email me.)

It would be appropriate to round off this discussion with a profound statement stressing the importance of economic growth to reducing human suffering and allowing more people to thrive, while acknowledging that wealth does not guarantee that anyone will thrive. However, I’m not in the right mood for writing profound statements.

How long does it take for GDP growth to be reflected in higher well-being?

In a paper written while he was at the World Bank, William Easterly found that changes in quality of life are surprisingly uneven as per capita income grows, despite the fact that a remarkable diversity of indicators shows quality of life across nations to be positively associated with per capita income. This finding might deserve to be called Easterly’s puzzle. (Bill Easterly is probably better known for his observation that foreign aid frequently fails to promote economic growth – but I don’t think that qualifies as a puzzle.)


One possible explanation, discussed briefly by Easterly, is that there may be ‘long and variable lags’ in the relationship between quality of life and economic growth. A related possibility, that is supported by some simple analysis I have undertaken for OECD countries, is that well-being is affected by wealth (reflected in quality of housing, financial assets, human capital, public infrastructure, social capital etc.) as well as current income. In this post I want to explore this possibility for a wider range of countries using the Legatum prosperity index. As noted in my last post, the Legatum prosperity index is highly correlated with the OECD’s well-being index.

To the extent that well-being is affected by wealth rather than current income, countries which have experienced rapid economic growth in recent decades could be expected to have lower well-being levels than those with similar income levels which have a longer history of relatively high per capita incomes. The following table provides results of regressions in which the Legatum prosperity index and various components of this index are explained by the log of per capita GDP in 1970, and the change in log per capita GDP from 1970 to 1990 and from 1990 to 2009. If the component of current income reflecting relatively recent growth has a similar coefficient to that reflecting income in 1970, it would be reasonable to conclude that capital stocks are not relevant to current well-being. (There are 92 observations in the regressions; 18 former Soviet block countries had to be omitted because of lack of lack of comparable per capita income data. Per capita GDP data is from Penn World Tables – the rgdpl measure.)

The results are consistent with the view that well-being is affected by wealth as well as current income. For the index as a whole, the estimated coefficient on the variable reflecting relatively recent growth is substantially lower than that on the variables reflecting past growth experience. The results for some components of the index also support that interpretation.

Economy: The estimated coefficient on relatively recent growth is actually higher than that on the variables reflecting previous growth experience. That result is to be expected because the economy variable is derived from a range of indicators of recent economic performance.

Entrepreneurship and opportunity: The low estimated coefficient on relatively recent growth is to be expected because an entrepreneurial culture takes time to develop. I usually think of causation running in the opposite direction – from an entrepreneurial culture to economic growth – but success often breeds success.

Governance: It may not appear to make a lot of sense to view low levels of corruption as a consequence of economic growth, rather than vice versa, but some of the indicators covered (e.g. political rights and regime stability) could reflect a build-up of institutional capital that has been fostered by economic success.

Education: As expected, the estimated coefficient on relatively recent growth is lower than on previous growth experience, reflecting the time it takes for improved education of young people to be reflected in the stock of human capital. Some of the indicators covered in the education variable reflect current enrolments rather than education levels of the population.

Health: Reasons for the low estimated coefficient on relatively recent growth would include investment required to improve sanitation and water quality, and the time required for training of health professionals.

Safety and security: As expected, countries with a long history of relatively high per capita incomes tend to have less violence. Low violence is conducive to economic activity and economic opportunities reduce the incentive to engage in criminal activities. The relatively low estimated coefficient on the recent growth variable suggests that economic growth has a greater positive impact on safety and security when it is sustained over a couple of decades.

Personal Freedom: Civil liberties, satisfaction with freedom and tolerant attitudes are strongly associated with a history of relatively high per capita incomes. The results do not shed much light on the effects of more recent growth experience.

Social Capital: Again, relevant indicators such as trust and perceptions of social support are associated with a history of relatively high per capita incomes, with greater ambiguity in respect of recent growth experience.

The regression results also indicate that the relevance of per capita income to explanation of the various components of the index varies considerably. Income history seems to be much more relevant to education and health outcomes than to personal freedom and social capital. Performance in relation to factors such as social capital helps to explain why some countries (e.g. New Zealand) have higher overall index scores while other countries (e.g. Greece) have lower overall index scores than would be predicted on the basis of income history.

Finally, to answer the original question, the results reported here suggest that it can take two or three decades for GDP growth to be fully reflected in higher well-being levels.

How close is the correlation between the Legatum 'prosperity' index and the OECD's 'better life' index?

The Legatum prosperity index provides an assessment of wealth and well-being in 110 countries. The authors suggest that it ‘produces rankings based upon the very foundations of prosperity’. (I am allergic to that kind of spin, but I am quoting the words here as penance for the unwarranted doubts I expressed on this blog in November 2009 about how much substance might lie behind this index. I eventually found the technical appendix I was looking for and satisfied myself that there is substance behind the ‘incredibly smooth’ presentation). The indicators incorporated in the study are factors that are known to be determinants of wealth and life satisfaction.


I have discussed the OECD’s better life index in several posts (most recently here).

There is some difference between the factors incorporated in the Legatum and OECD indexes. The factors included in the Legatum index are: economy, entrepreneurship and opportunity, governance, education, health, safety and security, personal freedom and social capital. The factors included in the OECD index are: housing, income, jobs, community, education, environment, governance, health, life satisfaction, safety and work-life balance.

The two indexes are highly correlated. The simple correlation coefficient relating the averages of the factors included in the two indexes for OECD countries (excluding Luxembourg) is 0.95. (The Legatum index is not available for Luxembourg.) The correlation between the Legatum index and my modified version of the OECD index is 0.97.

The similarity of the two indexes is also apparent when they are graphed against per capita GDP. The chart below showing the Legatum prosperity index can be compared to a similar chart showing the modified OECD well-being index in the preceding post.

New Zealand and Greece are outliers in both charts. The Legatum index has New Zealand ahead of Greece on all criteria, with the greatest difference in social capital, governance and entrepreneurship and opportunity. The OECD index has New Zealand substantially ahead in terms of community, jobs, life satisfaction and housing.

Although the OECD and Legatum indexes appear to be quite different, they tell a similar story about well-being in OECD countries. An important advantage of the Legatum index is that it is available for a much larger number of countries.

How closely is well-being related to per capita GDP?

The relationship between a composite well-being index and per capita GDP in OECD countries is shown in the chart below. The well-being index has been derived by modifying and combining OECD indicators as described in previous posts (here and here). As might be expected, the chart suggests that well-being is generally higher in countries with high per capita GDP. For most countries, including the United States and Australia, there is not much difference between the well-being index and the picture of well-being presented by per capita GDP. There are some countries, however, in which well-being seems to be higher than would be expected (most notably New Zealand) and some in which well-being seems to be lower than would be expected (e.g. Luxembourg, Greece and Korea). In this post I want to explore whether some of those apparent anomalies may be attributable to the past income history or the countries concerned.

Note to the chart: Per capita GDP data is from Penn World Tables (rgdpl). The per capita income data is presented in log form because previous studies have suggested that this is appropriate in considering the relationship between well-being and income (for example, Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008).

Why might past income matter for current well-being? Past income is relevant because well-being is affected by wealth as well as current income. Some components of wealth are incorporated in the well-being index (e.g. the quality of housing) and others e.g. public infrastructure could affect several well-being indicators. Wealth may also provide peace of mind to individuals as a cushion against loss of income - for example as a result of ill health or unemployment. A study by Bruce Headey and Mark Wooden has shown, using Australian data, that wealth is at least as important to subjective well-being as is income (IZA Discussion Paper 1032, Feb. 2004).

In order to assess the extent to which past incomes matter I have used regression analysis to explain the well-being index in terms of two components of current per capita incomes: per capita incomes in 1970 and the growth in per capita income from 1970 to 2009. If income history is irrelevant to current well-being the estimated coefficients on the two components of income would be expected to be similar. In fact, the estimated coefficient on per capita income in 1970 is much higher (more than 1.8 times) the estimated coefficient on the growth component. (The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are fairly low and the difference between them is statistically significant at the 95% level. The regression explains about 76% of the variation in the well-being index. Anyone who wants further information on the regression results is welcome to contact me.)

The regression results have been used to decompose the well-being index in order to prepare the following chart.

The story that a comparison of the two charts tells me is that a past history of relatively high incomes helps to explain why New Zealanders score relatively highly on the well-being index. A past history of relatively low incomes also helps explain why Korea has a relatively low well-being score. However, the size of the relevant residuals suggests that past history doesn’t help explain the disparity between well-being and per capita GDP levels for Luxembourg and Greece.

The general picture that emerges is that the well-being index and per capita GDP generally convey similar information about relative well-being levels in OECD countries. In some of the countries where this is not so, the disparity can be attributed largely to income history. There do not appear to be any OECD countries with high levels of well-being that do not have either high current per capita GDP levels or a history of relatively high per capita GDP levels about 40 years ago. This suggests to me that over the longer term there can be no escaping the links between wealth creation and progress in improvement of well-being.

Perhaps we seek wealth to enjoy autonomy?

‘The question was whether it is more important to provide individuals with money or with autonomy. Our results suggest that providing individuals in nations with autonomy has overall a larger and more consistent effect on well-being than money. Money leads to autonomy (Welzel et al., 2003; Welzel & Inglehart, 2010), but it does not add to well-being or happiness.’

That is from the concluding paragraph of an article by Ronald Fischer and Diana Boer, ‘What is more important for national well-being: Money or autonomy?’, recently published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.

The question of whether it is more important to provide individuals with money or autonomy strikes me as odd. Who has the power to choose whether individuals should be provided with money or autonomy? Governments don’t normally have that power.

I suppose it is possible to imagine a powerful paternalistic ruler contemplating whether to give his serfs a monetary bonus or to give them autonomy. It is clear from their article that when the authors refer to autonomy they are talking about a situation where individuals ‘can make their own choices in life’ rather than, for example, just choose what hobbies to pursue in their spare time. If our paternalistic ruler is contemplating giving his serfs the power to make their own choices in life, what he has in mind must involve economic freedom and opportunities for wealth creation.

When individuals have the opportunity to do so, they tend to use their own labour, skills and property for purposes that they value. Those purposes include cooperating with others for mutual advantage e.g. through specialization and exchange, and developing better products and more efficient technologies. Recognition of individual autonomy thus underpins the specialization, exchange and innovation that are integral to wealth creation.

The quoted passage refers to an article by Welzel and Inglehart in support of the proposition that ‘money leads to autonomy’. As discussed in my last post, one of the points made in that article is that in countries with higher levels of economic development (i.e. countries with higher self-expression values) people tend to achieve higher life satisfaction to a greater extent through activities that enhance autonomy (feelings of agency). Economic freedom leads to wealth and wealth leads to greater enjoyment of autonomy through pursuit of objectives further up the hierarchy of needs than survival and financial security.

The finding by Fischer and Boer that ‘money does not add to well-being’ doesn’t actually mean that income or wealth makes no contribution to well-being. It seems to me that what the finding means is that the contribution of income to well-being is encompassed in the contribution of income to individualism (self-expression values).

The authors’ research involved constructing indexes to compare negative psychological well-being, anxiety and burnout in different countries by combining the results of a large number of studies throughout the world. Statistical analysis was then undertaken to determine the extent to which these indexes could be explained by income levels or an indicator of individualism. When income and individualism were included separately in some of the analyses both of these variables were statistically significant, but when they were included together income became statistically insignificant. This suggests that the effects of income on well-being tend to be incorporated in the individualism (self-expression) variable.

I doubt whether that result would surprise many economists. First, it is well known that as incomes rise people tend to place a higher value on leisure (the income elasticity of demand for leisure is positive). Second as leisure increases, an increasing proportion of income tends to be spent on goods that are complementary to leisure (e.g. holiday packages). Third, goods that account for an increasing proportion of spending (goods with high income elasticity of demand) tend to be more strongly related to individual self-expression than to survival. Finally, increased wealth is valued for the options it provides as well as for the goods that are purchased with it. There are precautionary motives for accumulation of wealth e.g. as insurance against unemployment or ill health. People also value the option to be able to take advantage of opportunities (e.g. the holiday adventure of a lifetime) that may arise in future.

As I see it, the greater happiness of people in high-income countries can probably be attributed to greater satisfaction of fundamental human needs related to autonomy, relatedness and competence in those countries. When individual agency has been recognized, people have tended to use their autonomy for good purposes, establish better relations with others, become more competent and create wealth. The wealth is important only to the extent that it helps individuals to pursue purposes that they value – and to enjoy autonomy, good relations with others and a sense of achievement.

Is economic development and increased 'inner freedom' leading to greater selfishness?

‘As an evolutionary shaped capacity, agency is a particularly ‘human’ capacity. It is indeed a defining characteristic of our species … . ‘Human’ development is hence any development that promotes the most human trait—agency … . In the life course of individuals, human development is the maturation of a person’s agentic traits. Applying the same logic to the trajectory of societies, all changes that bring a larger number of people in the situation to more fully realize their agentic traits, is to be characterized as ‘human’ development’: Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, ‘Agency, Values and Well-Being: A human development model’, Soc. Indic. Res. (2010).

Some explanation is required to relate that quote to the question I wish to discuss. ‘Inner freedom’ refers to feelings of individual agency. Individual agency involves the capacity of an individual to act purposefully to his or her own advantage. Individuals have feelings of agency when they feel that what they do has an effect on how their lives turn out. The quoted passage is suggesting that the level of human development is greatest in societies where a high proportion of the population feel that what they do as individuals has a substantial effect on how their lives turn out. That seems to me to be a very important point, but some people claim that there is a dark side to this freedom – namely greater selfishness.

What do we mean by selfishness? Noble behaviour that an individual perceives to be a constitutive part of his or her own interests (acting in accordance with perceived identity) is sometime referred to as selfishness (e.g. by Ayn Rand). I think that what the critics of freedom have in mind when they talk about selfishness is atomistic individualism - a situation in which individuals make choices without regard to social norms or to the effects of their behaviour on anyone else. I accept that definition for the purposes of this post.

What is the basis for the view that feelings of individual agency tend to spread and become more widespread with economic development? Welzel and Inglehart provide substantial evidence in support of this view in the article cited above. They establish that:

• Self-expression values are stronger in countries with higher levels of economic development (and cognitive mobilization). Self-expression values encompass gender equality, tolerant attitudes toward abortion, homosexuality and divorce; an emphasis on autonomy and imagination in education rather than obedience and faith; and attitudes favouring democracy and freedom of speech. It is more appropriate to attribute this increase in self-expression values to economic development than to westernization.

• As the contribution of greater financial satisfaction to overall life satisfaction has become ‘saturated’ to a greater extent in countries with higher self-expression values, people in those countries tend to achieve higher life satisfaction to a greater extent through activities that enhance feelings of agency. In the authors’ words, there is an increase in the ‘relative strength of agentic life strategy’.

• Average life satisfaction levels tend to be higher in countries in which the relative strength of agentic life strategy is high.

It is worth noting at this point that in countries in which a relatively high proportion of the population have strong feelings of agency, proportion of people who are satisfied with freedom also tends to be relatively high. Such countries also tend to have higher levels of economic freedom as well as more civil liberties. I discussed the links between different indicators of freedom in an earlier post.

The question I posed in the heading of this post stems from the concerns expressed by some critics that individual freedom has a dark side. According to this view, excessive individualism results in a diminished sense of community, a loss of higher purpose and increased risk of mental illness.

In the course of their analysis Welzel and Inglehart found that agency feelings and communion (a composite index combining people’s emphasis on family and friends as important life domains) are not competitive factors. In fact, their results suggest that these factors amplify each other’s impact on life satisfaction.

When I read that I decided to have a look at the data on the web site of the World Values Study in order to get a feel for the data. (This web site has an excellent facility for instant cross-tabulation of data.) I focused on surveys for 2005-07 and on combined data for a group of countries with high self-expression values: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United States. The data show that people with high feelings of agency do tend to place higher importance on family and friends. When I looked further, I found that people with high levels of agency also tend to place higher emphasis on unselfishness as an important quality for children to learn.

In addition, people with high feelings of agency are also more likely to identify with the statement: ‘It is important to help the people nearby’. The pattern of responses is shown in the chart below. (The chart has been constructed so that observations add to 100% on the depth axis.)

Some readers might respond by suggesting that the pressures of life in countries with high self-expression values tend to result in higher incidence of mental illness. That proposition is easier to assert than to test with available information enabling international comparisons of the incidence of mental illness. However, a recent study by Ronald Fischer and Diana Boer has brought together the results of relevant studies in many different countries (‘What is more important for national well-being: Money or autonomy?’, JPSP (2011). The results suggest that the incidence of negative psychological well-being tends to be lower in countries with high levels of ‘individualism’ i.e. countries where people tend to have high self-expression values and greater feelings of agency. The exceptions to the general pattern seem to be a few countries which apparently have relatively good mental health outcomes despite low ‘individualism’ scores (e.g. Nigeria, Pakistan and Indonesia).  I will write more about this study in a subsequent post.               

How could the OECD's well-being indicators be improved?

This is the third post in a series on the OECD’s better life index. In the first post I played with the index to see how different weighting systems might affect the ranking of OECD countries. My conclusion was that different weights have some effect, but Australia comes out fairly well whatever weights you use. In my second post I derived a weighting system which gives higher weight to indicators that are highly correlated with each other. The countries ranked most highly on this basis tended to have a higher probability of exceptionally good performance on most of the indicators and lowly ranked countries tended to have a higher probability of exceptionally poor performance. My conclusion was that well-being indicators tend to tell similar stories.


In this post I consider how the OECD’s well-being indicators could be improved and how much difference the improvements I suggest make to the outcomes derived using the same methodology as in my second post.

In considering how the OECD’s well-being indicators could be improved I think it is important to try to specify what the indicators should be trying to measure. I think the main reason why such indicators are of interest is to provide information about the probability that the ‘average person’ (some person chosen at random) in different countries might have relatively high or relatively low levels of well-being. All the factors that affect individual human well-being – economic and psychological, basic needs and higher needs, individual goods and collective goods, objective factors and subjective factors – are potentially relevant.

People are interested in international comparisons of well-being for a variety of reasons, not just to monitor the effectiveness of government policies. In fact, well-being indicators are not necessarily closely related to government policies. For example, health indicators may be more closely related to cultural influences affecting smoking, alcohol consumption, obesity, exercise etc. than to public health policies. The impact of well-being comparisons on decisions of individuals and community groups might actually be more important than their impact on decisions made by governments.

However, that is no excuse for the OECD to exclude from its well-being indicators one of the most important factors affecting individual well-being that is subject to the influence of government – namely, individual freedom. The importance of perceptions of freedom to well-being has been established in several studies, including those by Paolo Verme (using a large data set drawn from the World and European Values Surveys, ‘Happiness, Freedom and Control’, 2007) and John Helliwell, Christopher Barrington-Leigh, Anthony Harris and Haifang Huang ‘International Evidence on the Social Context of Well-being’, Working paper 14720, NBER, 2009). There is data available from the Gallup World Poll on the variable used by Helliwell et al, the proportion of the population who are satisfied with their freedom to choose what they do with their lives.

The OECD includes a measure of governance, another factor that is strongly subject to the influence of government. However, the OECD’s indicator reflects only two factors: voter turnout at elections and consultation on rule making. Important factors omitted include corruption and the quality of public administration. I have modified the OECD’s governance indicator by incorporating the World Bank’s governance indicators (with relative weights determined by average correlation with other OECD indicators).

The OECD’s measure of the effect of the environment on well-being includes only one indicator – a measure of air pollution by tiny particulate matter small enough to be inhaled into the deepest part of the lung (PM10). I have modified the OECD’s indicator by incorporating subjective data on ‘satisfaction with efforts to preserve the environment’ from the Gallup World Poll (again with relative weights determined by average correlation with other OECD indicators).

So, how much do these modifications change the overall well-being index? Not much. If you focus on rankings you might get the impression that the change is substantial. For the most part, however, as shown in the chart below, there is little change in well-being levels.

Was the exercise of modifying the indicators worth doing? I think so. I got some satisfaction from confirmation that the freedom indicator is highly correlated with housing, community, life satisfaction and income. It was also pleasing that the modifications to the governance and environment indicators made them more highly correlated with the other indicators. The exercise makes me a little more confident that it is appropriate to view well-being as analogous to a syndrome, with various indicators corresponding to symptoms.

The table with information for each of the modified indexes is shown below. As in the table in my second post, the various indicators are ranked from left to right in terms of the extent that each is correlated with the other well-being indicators. Exceptionally good performance (highlighted in green) is more than one standard deviation above the mean and exceptionally poor performance (highlighted in pink) is more than one standard deviation below the mean.

Hint: Click on the table for a clearer image.

Do well-being indicators all tend to tell similar stories about OECD countries?

In my last post about the OECD’s ‘better life index’ I suggested that although all well-being indicators tend to tell similar stories when wealthy countries are compared with poor countries, they may tell different stories when wealthy countries are compared to each other. If we think of the OECD as a rich nations club we might expect a great deal of variation in the stories conveyed by different well-being indicators. For example, some countries might be expected to put emphasis on health and leisure, and others to put emphasis on income and housing. However, the view of the OECD as a rich nations club is actually difficult to sustain - there is a substantial amount of variation in wealth among the countries that are now members of the OECD. So, do all well-being indicators tend to tell similar stories in OECD countries too?


My first step in looking at this question was to look at the correlation between the various ‘better life’ indicators in the OECD. In the following table the various indicators are ranked from left to right in terms of the extent to which each is correlated with the other well-being indicators. The correlation between housing, community, life satisfaction and income tends to be higher than for the other indicators.

The ranking of countries in the table reflects the performance of each country in terms of a weighted average of indicators, with weights being derived from the average correlation of each indicator with the other indicators. (Anyone requiring further explanation of the methodology is welcome to contact me.)

Does the weighting system used to rank countries in the table have any greater validity than the range of weighting systems that I looked at in my last post? I’m not making strong claims. My attempt to derive weights without making explicit value judgements might have some merit if we view well-being as analogous to a syndrome with various indicators corresponding to symptoms. If an indicator is not highly correlated with the other indicators it may not be an important component of the well-being syndrome. Alternatively, it is possible that indicators that are not correlated with other indicators might not be well constructed. For example, the OECD’s governance indicator seems somewhat lacking by comparison with the World Bank’s governance indicators. The OECD’s governance indicator does not seem to include measures of levels of corruption or quality of public administration.

After ranking countries, the next step was to highlight countries that have exceptionally good or exceptionally poor performance in terms of particular well-being indicators. For the purposes of the table, exceptionally good performance (highlighted in green) is more than one standard deviation above the mean and exceptionally poor performance (highlighted in pink) is more than one standard deviation below the mean.

Hint: Click on the table for a clearer picture.

It is clear that the countries ranked highly in the table tend to have a higher probability of exceptionally good performance on most of the indicators and that countries that are ranked towards the bottom tend to have a higher probability of exceptionally poor performance. Well-being indicators do tend to tell similar stories in OECD countries.

One of the stories that the table doesn’t tell us directly is the difference in past history of the countries with relatively high and relatively low well-being ranking. The incomes of some of the countries with relatively high rankings are not particularly high, but good housing is presumably indicative of their past history of relatively high incomes. This seems to highlight the importance of the distinction between stocks and flows. Current well-being seems to be more closely related to stocks – wealth, human capital, social capital and environmental capital – than to income flows. However, we should not neglect the important role that income (economic growth) plays in the accumulation of wealth and human capital and the important role that stocks of social capital (particularly interpersonal trust) along with institutional capital (economic freedom) play in promoting conditions for ongoing economic and social progress.

Who should read 'The Case for Rational Optimism'?

After I finished reading ‘The Case for Rational Optimism’ by Frank S Robinson, my first thought was that I would not have any problem recommending this book. The next thought was: Who would I recommend should read it? The answer will emerge after I describe the book.

The first point I should make is that Frank Robinson’s book should not be confused with ‘The Rational Optimist’ by Matt Ridley. It is not difficult to confuse the two books because they cover some similar ground and contain similar views.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of Robinson’s book is the breadth of topics it covers. These include: human nature and virtue, the good life, happiness, free will, science and technology, freedom from fear, sex, individualism, the problem of government, America, capitalism, globalization, war and peace, and global warming. That list should be long enough.

Each topic is covered in a chapter of about 10-12 pages and each chapter is more or less self-contained. That seems to me to be both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength because it is possible to read a chapter or two in one sitting and then put the book aside for a few days without fear of losing the thread. It is a weakness because it may be easy to put the book aside for longer than a few days (as I did). While reading it I didn’t get the feeling that the book was building towards a strong conclusion. It is the kind of book I would normally tend to dip into rather than read from cover to cover.

The most valuable characteristic of Robinson’s book is its heavy reliance on leading thinkers in a wide range of areas. I consider myself to have read fairly widely, but Frank Robinson seems to have read every book in the library. And he is adept at explaining and discussing the views expressed in the many books he has read.

Robinson’s politics could probably be described as conservative-libertarian. His views on foreign policy are conservative. His libertarian views are evident in his support for free markets and an attitude of live and let live. He even supports gay marriage. I would have liked to have had the benefit of Robinson’s views on the war on drugs, but unfortunately that is one topic that he does not seem to have covered in this book.

Whatever topic Frank Robinson discusses, he always seems to be able to find a rational case for optimism. In reading the chapter discussing the problems of government, however, I thought for a moment that his optimism might be about to waver. He discusses the problems of holding government accountable, information problems, the law of unintended consequences, bureaucratization, special interest politics and the trend toward bigger and bossier government. Yet he manages to end the chapter on an optimistic note by pointing out that, despite its imperfections, democracy ensures that nothing important can be done against the will of ‘we the people’.

The next chapter, ‘America the Beautiful’, is the one I liked most. Since I am not an American and am actually strongly opposed to American exceptionalism, I have some difficulty explaining my positive response. I found it refreshing to see crazy anti-American views being challenged in a thoughtful manner. But that is only part of the story. Robinson makes it clear that he thinks America is ‘the most noble, most idealistic, most generous nation ever’. That message is not everyone’s cup of tea – and I’m not entirely persuaded that it is actually correct. My normal response to such views is to stop listening, or reading. However, I found Robinson’s non-chauvinistic presentation interesting and persuasive. I don’t think I have seen a stronger case made anywhere else that America still stands for high ideals.

When I reached the end of the book I found that my feeling that it was not building towards a strong conclusion was not entirely accurate. This passage close to the end seems to me to capture the theme of the book:

‘Progress is not some mystical force pushing us forward. What does drive it is our own efforts in gaining knowledge. That is not cyclical or random, but cumulative: it builds upon itself. It is no coincidence that modernity has seen explosive growth in human understanding, and at the same time huge improvements in the human condition. War and violence have been receding while freedom and human rights are spreading. Society grows not only richer, but more open, tolerant, humane, and fair.’ (p.313).

In my view the people who have most to gain from reading the book will be open to the possibility that such views are accurate, but not yet persuaded that they are accurate. They will be open to the possibility that it is still rational to be optimistic and interested to see whether it is possible to make a strong case in favour of optimism.

Postscript:

Frank Robinson has given me his permission to post this response:

'Winton! Thanks!!

I am really extremely gratified that you read my book and took the trouble to post a generally favorable review.

Regarding your question about the "war on drugs," I had a chapter about that in a previous book (Life, Liberty, and Happiness) that was a precursor of sorts to Optimism, which does actually borrow a lot from it. As you might guess, I think the war on drugs is a totally misguided disaster.

That previous book also had a much more extensive critique of government and statism, which was boiled down into the single chapter of Optimism because I didn't think the topic could be avoided. I'm not sure my optimistic conclusion to that chapter was strong enough. But it was not insincere. I can get pretty cynical about democratic politics. But, heck, look at the alternative -- which humanity had to endure through most of history! I do get misty-eyed when I go to vote.

I particularly appreciate your prefacing your review with a quote from J.S. Mill -- my favorite philosopher. And a right-on quote it is.'

Will NZ Treasury's living standards framework achieve its goals?

Last week the New Zealand Treasury released a paper providing a ‘living standards framework’. Treasury describes it as ‘a descriptive framework of the factors that it considers are essential to national well-being’.


In launching the framework the Treasury Secretary, John Whitehead, certainly did not try to hide the fact that an important objective of the exercise, as he sees it, is to bring about a shift in the way NZ Treasury is perceived externally. He said:

‘Misperceptions of the role Treasury has played since the 1980s have limited our ability to be persuasive when talking about what matters most for living standards. Some have never got beyond believing that we are the root of all New Zealand’s economic evils. Others see us as little more than the defenders of fiscal virtue …’.

I find that baffling. In the 1980s the NZ Treasury played an important role in saving that country from economic ruin. Why is that not more widely understood and appreciated in New Zealand? That is something about New Zealand that may be beyond my understanding. So I think I should confine myself here to looking at the living standards framework in its own terms.

Treasury states what the framework is intended for as follows:

‘The Framework is intended to help Treasury consistently provide Ministers robust, theoretically-grounded and evidenced-based advice that aims to improve the lives of all New Zealanders.’

Yeah, OK, but what is the intended purpose of the framework? Treasury sets the general context by stating its overall goal as being to work for higher living standards for all New Zealanders. Seen in that context the purpose of the framework must be to monitor progress toward higher living standards of New Zealanders. However, I can’t find the purpose stated in such terms in the document. In fact, as I discuss a little later, the concept of progress doesn’t get much attention in the document.

What factors should Treasury look at in monitoring progress toward higher living standards of New Zealanders? The answer given by the framework is to look at a broad range of material and non-material determinants of living standards, including: conventional measures of income and wealth; freedoms, rights and capabilities; and self-assessed subjective measures of wellbeing (as a cross-check). The other two factors to be looked at are: the distribution of living standards across different groups in society; and the sustainability of living standards over time.

It seems to me that the use of sustainability as a major heading puts a rather negative focus on the whole exercise – assuming that I am correct in suggesting that the intended purpose is to monitor progress toward higher living standards. An analyst who is asked to assess whether current living standards are sustainable will consider some important issues, but is unlikely to give much attention to the question of whether living standards are improving to the same extent of those in comparable countries and if not, why not. I can understand that a lot of people in New Zealand would respond favourably to the word ‘sustainability’, but it should be possible to accommodate their legitimate interests within a discussion of factors affecting progress toward higher living standards.

The Treasury’s emphasis on sustainability rather than progress is relevant to concerns I raised in my last post, which was about the OECD’s ‘better life index’. In that post I expressed concern that if well-being indicators suggest that people in a country like New Zealand tend to enjoy living standards substantially higher than other countries with comparable per capita GDP levels, there may be a tendency for the government concerned to become complacent about establishing conditions more favourable to further improvement of living standards. The Treasury’s living standards framework does not dispel that concern.

I don’t have any great concerns about the other factors that the Treasury is planning to monitor. However, there are a couple of omissions that seem to me to be significant. First, in considering subjective well-being, in my view attention should be given to perceived improvements in life over the last five years, which can be calculated from Gallup World Poll data. The concept is discussed briefly in an earlier post on this blog. During the first decade of this century the perception of improvement in life of both New Zealanders and Australians seems to have been somewhat greater than was usual for people in other countries with comparable economic growth rates.

Second, it would be hard to find a better indicator of relative living standards as perceived by New Zealanders and Australians than net emigration to Australia. Net emigration to Australia seems to me to be a highly reliable indicator because the preferences that people show about where they live must be heavily based on their assessments of living standards. Figure 1.2 in the second report of the 2025 Taskforce (p. 16) shows net emigration to Australia has increased broadly in line with the growing income gap between the two countries since the 1970s.

Before finishing I want to comment on the capital stocks and flows approach adopted in the paper. It seems to me that this approach provides an extremely useful framework for considering relevant issues. My overall view is that, despite some shortcomings, NZ Treasury’s living standards framework is generally OK and most of the background material is informative and well-written.

Postscript:
John Whitehead has given his permission for me to publish the following response:

‘I appreciated your article. For the record, I wasn’t saying that many of the attitudes about what we (I definitely include myself) did I the 1980s were necessary correct, just that they existed. (In fact I made the point in a television interview the same week that I thought the steps we took were broadly the right ones, although we certainly learned from both errors and successes on the way through. ) My point – missed in a lot of commentary – is that Treasury has for a long time taken a broader view of living standards than we are usually credited with: the stocks and flows framework etc was an attempt to describe this more explicitly. The media of course has largely ignored this point, claiming instead that it is some kind of (dramatic) shift.’

I had intended to publish that response without comment, but I want to note for the record that on the basis of my own personal experience I support John’s claim that NZ Treasury has for a long time taken a broad view of living standards. When I worked there as an advisor in the early 1990s one of the issues I was asked to work on was factors affecting social cohesion, including widespread opportunity, security and respect for institutions. That work led, indirectly, to my interest in some of the topics that I pursue on this blog.

Does the OECD's 'better life index' sound like fun?

I am not sure the OECD’s better life index is meant to be fun. But I have had some fun playing with it. The index is interactive. The fun comes from giving different weight to 11 different criteria (or topics as they are described by the OECD) and then observing how this affects rankings of well-being of OECD countries.


The criteria used in the index are: housing, income, jobs, community (individuals’ perceptions of the quality of their support networks), education, environment (air pollution by tiny particulate matter), governance (voting and transparency), health, life satisfaction, safety (assaults and homicide) and work-life balance (working mothers, total hours worked and leisure).

Under the default setting, with all criteria being given equal weight, the countries that come out on top are Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Sweden. If you suppress all criteria other than income, Luxembourg is a long way ahead of the field, followed by the United States and Switzerland. The income measure used in the study (reflecting household financial income and wealth) has Australia in 14th place and New Zealand in 25th place.

The substantial difference between the outcomes of these weighting systems is interesting. In a previous post I observed that all well-being indicators tend to tell similar stories about well-being levels in different countries. The two observations are actually consistent. My research covered a larger number of countries, including many poor countries as well as the wealthy democracies of the OECD. Well-being indicators tend to tell a similar story when wealthy countries are compared with poor countries, but can tell different stories when wealthy countries are compared to each other.

Equal weighting of a range of indicators and a focus on income alone seems to me to be equally arbitrary approaches to well-being comparisons. Well-being is obviously affected by factors other than income, but it would be difficult to argue that all relevant factors are equally important. Value judgements have to be made to determine appropriate weights. An appropriate weighting system might be derived by conducting surveys to obtain weights reflecting the values of people in different countries. Alternatively, surveys could be used to obtain weights reflecting the values of people with different political views in particular countries, or across the whole of the OECD.

In the absence of such survey evidence, I have looked at the rankings for three somewhat extreme political groups drawn from my own imagination: Scrooges, Socioholics and Warm Fuzzies. As I imagine them, all three groups perceive governance and safety as being important to well-being. The Scrooges add income as the only additional factor. The Socioholics add housing, jobs, education and health in addition to income. The Warm Fuzzies exclude income and all the additional factors added by the Socioholics, but replace those factors with community, environment, life satisfaction and work-life balance.

So, which countries come out on top of the welfare rankings according to the values of these three political groups?

Scrooges: The countries that come out on top are Australia, Luxembourg and the United States. New Zealand is placed about 8th, behind Sweden, Austria, Canada and UK.

Socioholics: Australia and Canada come out on top, followed by New Zealand and the United States.

Warm Fuzzies: Australia, Denmark and Sweden are on top, followed by New Zealand, Canada and Norway.

What do I get out of this? My main observation is that Australia seems to come out fairly well, whatever coloured political lenses you use. The well-being of New Zealanders also looks fairly good, particularly if you adopt either a Socioholic or Warm Fuzzy perspective.

Having had some fun, the more serious question that comes to mind is whether a focus on the OECD’s well-being indicators (and other similar constructions) is likely to distract political attention away from much-needed economic reforms to improve the economic strength of some economies. For example, if well-being indicators suggest that people in some lovely country (New Zealand comes to mind) tend to enjoy living standards substantially higher than other countries with comparable per capita GDP levels, there may be a tendency for the government of that country to become complacent about establishing conditions more favourable to further improvement of living standards.

Postscript

Roger Kerr, executive director of the New Zealand Business Roundtable, has commented on the OECD's well-being index here (with a reference to this blog).

My subsequent posts on the OECD's well-being index are:
Do well-being indicators all tend to tell similar stories about OECD countries?
and
How could the OECD's well-being indicators be improved?

I would also like to draw attention to posts by David Giles on his 'Econometrics Beat' blog: here and here.

Has preventative health care become code for paternalism?

‘The Taskforce says that prevention is everyone’s business – and we call on the state, territory and local governments, on non-government and peak organisations, health professionals and practitioners, communities, families and on individuals to contribute towards making Australia the healthiest country by 2020.’ (Extract from ‘Taking Preventative Action’, the federal government’s response to the Report of the National Preventative Health Taskforce).

I find the sentiments in the quoted passage objectionable for two reasons. First, preventative health care is not ‘everyone’s business’. Individual adults have primary responsibility for their own preventative health care because no-one is better able to exercise that responsibility than they are. Individuals who are persuaded that preventative health care is a collective responsibility could be expected to look increasingly to the various levels of government, non-government organisations, health professionals and practitioners, communities and families – everyone except themselves - to accept responsibility for what they eat, drink and inhale.

Second, the goal of making Australia the healthiest country by 2020 is being put forward as though it is self-evidently desirable collective good that should be pursued by any and every means available to everyone. The goal is not self-evidently desirable. Individual health is not a collective good. And the end does not justify the means that are being proposed to pursue it.

If you delve behind the spin about making Australia the healthiest country my 2020, the underlying goal seems to be to raise average life expectancy in Australia to the highest level in the world by reducing the incidence of chronic disease. What does this entail? It would be hard to object to the goal of enabling individual Australians to reduce their risk of chronic disease. The problem is that the government’s strategy is more about achieving national goals than providing better opportunities for individuals - more about behaviour modification than about ‘enabling’ individuals to reduce their health risks.

The government claims that analysis of ‘the drivers of preventable chronic disease demonstrates that a small number of modifiable risk factors are responsible for the greatest share of the burden’. The behavioural risk factors led by obesity, tobacco and alcohol apparently account for nearly one-third of Australia’s total burden of disease and injury. The chronic conditions for which some of these factors are implicated include heart disease, stroke, kidney disease, arthritis, osteoporosis, lung cancer, colorectal cancer, depression and oral health problems.

Since these risk factors stem from individual lifestyles it is obviously desirable for individuals to be aware of them. There may be a role for governments in provision of this information. Perhaps governments should also be involved in helping people in various ways to live more healthy lifestyles. It is questionable how far governments should go down this path, but it is difficult to object to modest efforts by governments to improve opportunities for people to live healthier lifestyles.

However, rather than helping people to help themselves the federal government has chosen the path of Skinnerian behaviour modification. It has chosen to drive changes in behaviour through what it describes as the ‘world’s strongest tobacco crackdown’. (This is one instance when I hope the government doesn’t actually mean what it says – some people in Bhutan have apparently been jailed recently for possession of more than small amounts of tobacco products.) The government’s strategy also involves ‘changing the culture of binge drinking’ and ‘tackling obesity’, but in this post I will focus on smoking.

Some of the tactics being used in the tobacco crackdown involve information and persuasion but there is also an element of punishment involved. The tobacco excise has been increased to over $10 for a packet of 30 cigarettes and legislation is proposed to require cigarettes to be sold in plain packaging. It seems to me that this amounts to persecution of smokers and their families. It will reduce the amount of household budgets available to be spent on other products and encourage some to avoid excise by obtaining tobacco from illegal sources.

As a former smoker, I am probably more strongly against smoking than most people who have never smoked. I encourage other people to quit smoking and discourage young people from taking up the habit. But having given up smoking several times, I know how hard this can be. Governments have no basis on which to judge that people are not in their right mind if they consider that the pleasures they might obtain from additional years of life are not worth the pain of giving up smoking.

In my view this question of whether smokers are capable of judging what is in their own best interests is at the crux of the matter. The politicians and bureaucrats who seek to modify the behaviour of smokers may see themselves as enhancing the capability of these people to have lives that they ‘have reason to value’, in accordance with well-being criteria proposed by Amartya Sen. If so, their attitudes highlight a major problem with Sen’s approach. Governments have no business deciding what kinds of lives individuals have reason to value.

Is Australia's mateship ethic being lost in the big cities?

This question was raised by Shona in a guest post about volunteering in the eastern suburbs of Sydney. I don’t feel qualified to provide an authoritative answer, but that feeling does not always prevent me from providing comments on other matters outside my area of expertise. Perhaps someone will tell me if my comments are wide of the mark.


Mateship was identified by Russel Ward as an important component of the ‘Australian identity’ – the ideas about themselves that Australians tend to identify with - in his book, ‘The Australian Legend’, first published in 1958. Ward suggested that this mateship ethic stemmed mainly from the loneliness of life in the Australian inland. In his later book, ‘Australia’, Ward explained mateship in these terms:

‘In reaction to their loneliness, to the sundering distances and to the harshness of nature, men tended to help and trust each other. This is not to claim of course that Australians are in fact notably more altruistic than other people, but merely that they tend to value collective aid and mutual aid more highly than do, for example, Americans; just as they value less highly rugged individualism’ (1967: 9).

I am not entirely comfortable with those comparisons with America. I agree that Australians probably do tend to place less value on rugged individualism than do Americans. For example, surveys show that the percentage of Australians who consider it to be important to encourage children to develop qualities of both independence and determination is lower than in the US. However, Ward himself claimed that ‘fierce independence’ was a component of Australian identity. Ward also observed in ‘Australia’ that in the third quarter of the 19th century Australian political sentiment was ‘strongly individualistic and not markedly either collectivist or nationalist’ (p 79).

Has the propensity of Australians to form voluntary associations for mutual benefit been any greater than that of Americans? I doubt it. Remember the observations of Alexis de Tocqueville in ‘Democracy in America’ (published in 1835) :

‘Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools’ (II, 2, V).

Ward seems to be on firmer ground in suggesting that the early dominance of large-scale grazing properties in the Australia farm sector (in contrast to the dominance of smaller-holder agriculture in the US frontier until about 1870) led to a situation where much of the work was done by people – shearers, drovers etc. – who did not perceive their interests to be closely aligned with those of property owners (p. 60). This can be linked to the subsequent development of trade unions, major strikes, the rise of the Australian Labor Party and the advance of state collectivism – which tended to displace voluntary associations for mutual benefit.

It is worth noting at this point that mateship has a downside as well as an upside. The downside of mateship is that it can mean ‘looking after your mates’ at the expense of other people. For a long time this aspect of mateship supported racial discrimination, compulsory unionism and abuse of trade union power, high trade barriers protecting some industries at the expense of others, discrimination against women and various forms of corruption. Some aspects of this negative form of mateship are still evident in the activities of some interest groups, as well as some politicians, unionists, businessmen and public servants in the big cities as well as the rest of the country.

At last I think I am now ready to focus on the positive side of the mateship ethic and the specific question of whether it has been lost in the big cities. Volunteering is more common among those living in parts of the states outside the capital cities (38% of those surveyed by the ABS in 2006 versus 32% for the capital cities). When I look more closely, however, the difference is most marked in Victoria and New South Wales and non-existent in Queensland - the state with the highest average rate of volunteering (38%). In both Sydney and Melbourne, 30%, of those surveyed were engaged in volunteering, but in the rest of the two states the proportion was 41% in Victoria and 37% in New South Wales.

There are strong reasons based on self-interest to expect rates of volunteering to be higher in small rural communities than in major capital cities. In a small rural communities people are exposed to greater risk of natural disasters such as bush fires and floods and depend to a larger extent on voluntary help from each other to avoid harm to their families when disaster threatens. In most small communities people who had a reputation for free-riding (sponging on their mates) would probably not be denied help in the event of disaster, but few people would be prepared to take that chance.

Would people in Sydney and Melbourne show a strong spirit of mateship if these cities were threatened by a major disaster? I’m not sure. When a substantial part of Queensland was flooded earlier this year, it was obvious that many people in the rural areas showed great acts of kindness to each other. As the flood waters approached Brisbane I wondered whether this community spirit would be replaced by an attitude of just helping family and close friends. Such concerns were unwarranted. After the flooding many people in Brisbane volunteered spontaneously to help strangers to clean up their properties. This suggests to me that the best aspects of the mateship ethic is still alive and well in Brisbane. I can’t be as confident that people would help each other to the same extent in the event of a disaster in Sydney or Melbourne – but I hope I am being too pessimistic.

Postscript:
I rarely write a postscript so soon after writing an article. However, after checking the World Values Survey data on qualities that parents consider important in children I found that the situation has turned around between 2000 and 2006/7 surveys. In the later survey 64% of Australians identified independence as a desirable child quality versus 54% in the US. The percentages identifying determination/perseverence as desirable were 50% among Australians and 40% among Americans. That suggests to me that Australians might now place a higher value on rugged individualism than US citizens.

A comparison of active membership of voluntary organizations in the US and Australia does not suggest that volunteering is more important in one than the other. Americans are about twice as likely as Australians to be active members of a church, but Australians are about twice as likely as Americans to be active members of a sporting organization. (That lines up with the view that sport is the national religion of Australia). Active membership of 'Arts, music and educational' organizations and charitable organizations is much the same in both countries.

Why are people reluctant to volunteer at playgroups in the eastern suburbs of Sydney?

This post - the 300th on this blog - is a guest post by Shona. This is the fourth post in a series on volunteering. Earlier contributions can be found here, here and here. Shona has provided the following additional comments:

My thoughts continue down the path of not why do people volunteer, but rather, why don’t people volunteer.

I loved your reference to Australian mateship ethic, described by Russel Ward, in your comments on my first contribution. Having recently studied arduously for my citizenship test, I too am familiar with the ideas about the harsh environment bringing people together. Perhaps our playgroup is suffering from the opposite of this. We live in the affluent eastern suburbs of Sydney – a beautiful but densely populated area, hardly a harsh environment to live. As you know more about Ward’s work perhaps you could discuss this aspect further. Has the mateship ethic been lost in the large conurbations?

The dynamics of playgroups are unique in many ways so I’m not sure the theories relevant elsewhere apply. People with young children moving into the area look up the local playgroup and head there straight away – even more so than people who have lived here for years before starting families. People moving into the area see it as the best way to make friends and connect.

Playgroups are a unique form of volunteer community groups – any action of one person has an immediate effect, one that can be benefitted from by that person immediately, but also shared by the free riders. Still, this is perhaps more tangible than other volunteering efforts such as environmental or social work, where someone’s actions don’t necessarily result in direct benefits to the individual. That to my mind is altruistic action and I commend it – if only I had more time! That is when the dynamics of volunteering that you write about are more relevant.

I’ve noticed two breeds of volunteers – obviously I am going to place myself in the more favourable of the two groups. One which selflessly carries out work with little fuss, without taking the task or themselves too seriously (I could go on but I won’t). And the other, where they take the role far too seriously and make it almost political or personal. I had a conversation with a friend at playgroup a few years ago. She had been heavily involved in the local surf club and as a result, was put off from volunteering for any other community organization. When I asked her why, she said that it became all too political. (I have some other great examples, but I don’t want to bore you or embarrass anyone concerned). It only takes one bad experience or story of another’s experience to put someone off.

Back to my original point – I still cannot understand why people don’t volunteer, whether this is for the session they attend, in whatever form, or to a more long-term role. I agree, the timescales of a bigger role may put people off. Maybe some people do such a great job, they think it is a hard job or a hard act to follow (I say that in regard to two day leaders that have just finished an eight month stint and not myself!). I’d be interested to discuss any other barriers. One friend also suggested that people won’t commit (even for a month) if they are thinking of moving out of the area. Given this is an expensive area to live, this could be the reasoning for many attendees. However, at least two of our volunteers last year were both here on a temporary basis (not knowing how long for) and both have moved back overseas.