Do major cities create unhappy Australians?

Sydney's eastern suburbs

“Major cities create unhappy Australians”. That headline jumped out at me when I was doing an internet search recently. The source was The Melbourne Newsroom – a media unit at the University of Melbourne. The news release tells us that Australians who live in rural locations or towns of less than 1,000 residents “have significantly higher life satisfaction than those living in major cities”. (Major cities have more than 100,000 residents.)

The news release is linked to a recent publication based on the highly regarded HILDA survey undertaken by Melbourne University. The survey results suggest a boost to average life satisfaction (on the 11 point scale from 0 to 10) of 0.127 points for females and 0.108 points for males from living in a rural location or town rather than a major city. That might seem small, but it appears to imply that living in a major city has an adverse impact on life satisfaction of similar magnitude to being unemployed or divorced.

The authors of the HILDA publication conclude:

“other things being equal, the major cities are the least desirable places to live”.

The qualification in that statement is important. The authors go on to point out that the undesirability of living in cities is somewhat counteracted by the fact that the major cities contain areas of greatest socio-economic advantage.  Life satisfaction is influenced by the effects of the relative socio-economic advantage or disadvantage of the area in which an individual lives.

The main reason I was sceptical when I read the headline “Major cities create unhappy Australians” was because earlier in the day I had read a paper by Arthur Grimes and Marc Reinhardt which found that the differences between life satisfaction in rural and urban areas in other high-income OECD countries disappeared in a model controlling for other variables. The other variables controlled for were own income and reference income (mean income within a country of individuals of the same gender, age and employment status).

A study examining differences between life satisfaction of rural and urban residents of Victoria, undertaken a decade ago by Dianne Vella-Brodrick et al, also found that the significance of rurality disappeared when other variables were controlled for. The other variables in the model included satisfaction with community and perceived level of satisfaction with distance from services.

In a post I wrote on this blog a few years ago I considered the differences at a regional level between the stories told by a range of wellbeing indicators in Victoria. The (rural) local government areas (LGAs) with higher average subjective well-being (SWB) also tended to have higher ratings in terms of satisfaction with being part of the community, social support (ability to get help from friends), citizen engagement (e.g. attending town meetings, writing to politicians), safety (e.g. feeling safe walking in the local area at night) and volunteering. However, those LGAs tended to have lower household income, lower satisfaction with work-life balance and less acceptance of diverse cultures. The latter variables tended to have higher values in Melbourne and in LGAs close to Melbourne.

Do those results suggest major cities create unhappy Australians? I don’t think so. As discussed in a more recent post, major cities in Australia are ranked among the most liveable in the world. People who choose to live in major cities may well do so for good reasons, in full knowledge that they are making choices that are likely to reduce their life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is important, but it is not the only argument in individuals’ utility functions. For example, it can be rational for people to sacrifice some life satisfaction now to obtain more life satisfaction later (e.g. by accumulating wealth to fund their retirement in a more pleasant location). There is also some evidence that many people are prepared to sacrifice their own happiness in making location choices in order to provide better opportunities for their children.

How close is the relationship between freedom and life satisfaction?

I would be happy to declare myself a fan of the OECD’s Better Life index if it included an appropriate indicator of freedom. Perhaps the authors might argue that freedom is adequately covered by “civic engagement”. However, that seems like arguing that it is not possible for people to suffer persecution from government when they have the right to vote. I don’t think J S Mill would have been impressed:

“The limitation … of the power of government over individuals, loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein” (On Liberty, Chapter I).

Perhaps the authors of the index see freedom as a characteristic of the social environment that people desire because it enables them to have greater life satisfaction, rather than as one that contributes directly to the quality of life. I don’t buy that argument. Humans have a passion to control their own lives (even though many have no qualms in voting to have governments restrict the freedom of others). I predict that many users of the Better Life index would give a higher weight to individual freedom than to many of the other items included in the index, if they were given the opportunity to do so. (One of the features of the Better Life index is the ability of users to assign whatever weights they choose to the variables that are included in the index.)

It is possible, however, that freedom makes little difference to country rankings. That might happen if freedom indexes are highly correlated with life satisfaction. I am focusing attention here on the relationship between freedom and life satisfaction because most of the 11 components of the OECD’s Better Life Index are correlated with life satisfaction. Civic engagement is one of the exceptions. The others are education, safety and work-life balance.

The freedom indexes I have chosen to consider are the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom and personal freedom indexes. Both of those indexes are highly correlated with life satisfaction (r = 0.73 for personal freedom and r = 0.61) in OECD countries. A regression analysis shows both variables to have a positive (significantly greater than zero) influence on life satisfaction, together explaining 68% of the variation in life satisfaction among OECD countries. (The data and results are available from the author.)

The relationships between life satisfaction and the two freedom indexes are shown in the charts below.

There seems to have been a fairly strong tendency for people who argue that government policies should be directed toward raising average life satisfaction to advocate policies involving restrictions on freedom. Such people have been barking up the wrong tree. The countries with highest average life satisfaction are those with the least restrictions on economic and personal freedom.

Postscript: 
 I neglected to refer to a recent article by Boris Nikolaev entitled "Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life". This article provides a fairly extensive discussion of the relationship between economic freedom and the quality of life at a national level. 

  

Which countries have the greatest personal and economic freedom these days?

The results of the latest Human Freedom Index by Ian Vásquez and Tanja Porčnik (published by the Fraser Institute and several other policy think tanks) have surprised some people.

Among the social media comments was one from a person who had lived in several different parts of the world who was surprised that Scandinavian countries ranked so highly in terms of personal freedom. (Sorry, I can’t find the link.) I wasn’t surprised to see Hong Kong in first place in the overall freedom ranking, since the methodology gives equal weight to economic freedom and personal freedom and does not include voting rights as a component of personal freedom. It was a surprise, however, to see the United States ranked so lowly, in 20^th place overall and in 31st place in terms of personal freedom.

In order to better comprehend the rankings of particular countries I have used conditional formatting  to prepare the table below showing the components of personal freedom and economic freedom ratings for the 50 countries assessed to have the highest overall freedom ratings. For each component index green denotes a relatively high rating, yellow a moderate rating and red a relatively low rating.

It seems that the US has a relatively low rating on rule of law and freedom of movement.  The US ratings on the three components of the rule of law index - procedural justice, civil justice and criminal justice – are all rated as more than 20% below the world’s best practice. (Data are from the World Justice Project, an independent non-profit organization, originally founded in 2006 as a presidential initiative of the American Bar Association.) The US’s low rating on freedom of movement is attributable to restrictions on foreign movement i.e. freedom of citizens to leave and return to their country. (Data are from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project.)

Another surprising item highlighted in the table is the relatively low rating of New Zealand on freedom of religion. This low rating apparently reflects some kind of restriction on freedom to establish religious organisations.

The relationship between economic freedom and personal freedom is interesting. The chart shown below suggests a fairly strong correlation, but there are some interesting outliers.  

It seems to me that economic freedom and personal freedom are so strongly linked that it is inherently difficult to maintain high economic freedom without high personal freedom and vice versa. It is reasonable to predict that Singapore’s high level of economic freedom will continue to support relatively high economic growth, which in turn will support the development of emancipative values and greater personal freedom in the decades ahead. In the case of Slovenia and Italy I am not sure whether we are more likely to see a rise in economic freedom or a decline in personal freedom.  

Will future technological advances provide widespread opportunities for human flourishing?

A range of issues related to this question have been discussed in a recent series of posts on this blog. My conclusions are summarised below.

Recent trends in productivity growth do not provide persuasive evidence that the rate of technological advancement is slowing.

On the one hand, we have techno-pessimists such as Robert Gordon who argues that technological progress is slowing down.  On the other hand, we have techno-optimists such as Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee who argue that the global economy is on the cusp of a dramatic growth spurt driven by smart machines taking advantage of advances in computer processing, artificial intelligence, networked communication etc.

My post discussing these issues notes that the evidence does not support the view that there was a general slow-down in productivity growth in high-income countries prior to the global financial crisis and great recession. In only about half of the countries covered by the OECD data was the rate of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth during the 2001 to 2007 lower than that in 1995 to 2001.

It seems likely that the slow-down in measured productivity growth in the US and some other countries may be attributable, in part, to difficulty in measuring the outputs of the information and communications technologies (ICT) industries - particularly free content provided on the internet.  As means are found to require users to pay for more internet content it seems likely that will, of itself, make the productivity numbers for ICT industries look better even though underlying productivity will not have improved.

A post discussing recent OECD research on technological diffusion gaps at firm level suggests that there is a technological diffusion problem rather than a slow-down in technological advances. Productivity growth of global frontier firms has remained relatively robust, despite the slowdown in productivity growth in many OECD countries during the 2000s. A widening technological diffusion gap is particularly evident for service sector firms.

Technological innovation is likely to destroy a substantial proportion of current jobs, but it will not necessarily be more disruptive than it has been in the past.

As discussed in my post ‘Is average over?’ there is strong evidence of job polarization in the US. Research by David Autor shows that the occupations experiencing loss in employment are in the middle of the distribution, with the locus of displacement of middle-skill employment moving over time into higher skilled categories.  The pace of employment gains in low wage, manual task-intensive jobs has been increasing since the 1980s. The growth of high-skill, high wage occupations decelerated markedly in the 2000s, with only a modest recovery between 2007 and 2012. Autor suggests that the deceleration of growth of high pay jobs was associated with macroeconomic events which led to a sharp deceleration in computer investment (the bursting of the dot-com bubble, followed by the collapse of the housing market and the ensuing financial crisis).

Australian research, published in a recent report by CEDA (discussed here) shows a similar pattern of job displacement. The jobs that are disappearing involve routine tasks, not just low-skilled tasks. Researchers estimate that over the next 10 to 15 years about 40% of jobs have a high probability of being susceptible to technological change in Australia.

Growth in labour demand will occur in occupations that tend to involve perception and manipulation, creative intelligence and/or social intelligence. Many jobs will be concerned with the creative application of technology to solving problems.

In recent years enough new jobs have been created in Australia at a rate sufficient to replace those that have disappeared.

Some authors have suggested that the world faces a period of extraordinary economic disruption over the next few decades. My reflection on economic events over the last 40 years (in this post) suggest to me that perceptions of extraordinary disruption are a product of the economic stagnation in many high-income countries during the last decade.

During the 1970s I was under the impression that the pace of change was quickening, but that was an illusion. The economic disruption occurring in the wake of the first oil price shock and the emergence of stagflation certainly involved a quickening in the rate of change relative to the abnormal stability of the 1950s and 60s. Looking back now, however, economic change over the last 40 years seems to have been less about quickening than about fits and starts.

I suspect that when people look back in 40 years’ time they are they are not likely to perceive that the first half of the 21^st century was extraordinarily disruptive. They are more likely to perceive this to have been a period of fairly normal disruption, with the pace of change being similar to that occurring on average since the beginning of the industrial revolution.

There is potential for future technological advances to lift average real wage levels in high-income countries.

At an aggregate level, innovations that raise labour productivity tend to increase the demand for labour because they make labour more productive. International comparisons show that real wage levels are more or less proportional to average productivity levels.

Real wage growth has not been quite proportional to labour productivity growth in high-income countries where labour’s share of national income has fallen over recent decades. As discussed in this post, average real wages in high-income countries have typically been growing at a rate around 0.35% per annum less than the median labour productivity growth of 1.64% per annum.

In most countries the most plausible reason for the failure of real wages to keep pace with the growth of labour productivity is that capital deepening (the growth of capital per unit of labour) has not been sufficient to offset the labour augmenting (or labour saving) bias of technological progress. (See my post discussing the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour.) In other words, investment levels have been too low.

A slowdown in the contribution of investment to GDP growth was evident the United States, Europe and Japan in the period 2000-07 and was accentuated after the global financial crisis.  Investment levels in Australia remained strong until recently, mainly reflecting investment in mining to supply inputs to the construction boom in China.

Investment in natural resource development has had a modest direct impact on demand for labour in Australia, but the impetus it has provided to overall economic growth in Australia had a more profound indirect impact. The impacts on labour demand of the growth of urban centres as hubs of highly innovative activity are similar in some respects.  As discussed in my post on the competitiveness of cities, when cities become attractive places for location of technology-intensive activities that tends to increase demand for many categories of labour including teachers, nurses and building workers.

Technological advances offer the potential for ongoing improvements in the quality of life.

It is sometimes suggested that because most people in high income countries are already highly satisfied with their lives, the additional opportunities provided by technological advances are not worth having. However, the benchmarks that people use when asked to evaluate the quality of their lives tend to change with changes in their perceptions of what might be possible. As noted in an earlier post, survey data indicates that a substantial proportion of people who claim to be completely satisfied with their lives (above 40% in some countries) are in complete agreement with the proposition that “because of science and technology there will be more opportunities for the next generation”.

In my last post I considered whether the disruptions associated with technological innovations cause a great deal of anxiety and unhappiness. There is a great deal of evidence many people who lose their jobs or feel that their jobs are threatened do suffer anxiety and unhappiness. However, these feelings are strongly associated with the state of the economy and the prospects of obtaining alternative employment.

Discussions of technological unemployment tend to focus unduly on potential job losses and to overlook the impact of new technology on economic growth and the associated expansion of employment opportunities. Many people will lose jobs as a result of technological change at some point in their lives. Most will readily find alternative employment, but some people are likely to have their lives severely disrupted by the high levels of unemployment that may persist in some regions where declining industries have been major employers.

If governments want to ensure that technological advances provide widespread opportunities they should stop protecting narrow interests.

Recent OECD research on technology diffusion gaps (discussed here) suggests that the ability of firms to learn from the global frontier is stronger in economies where there is less protection of domestic interests through international trade barriers, product market regulation, employment regulation and bankruptcy laws that that leave people with valuable skills employed in zombie firms. The research also suggests that skill mismatches can be exacerbated by high transactions costs in housing markets (e.g. stamp duties on transfers).

The competitiveness of cities as locations for technology-intensive activities is likely to be adversely affected by powerful interest groups opposed to increases in population density and innovations that have potential to reduce the cost of transport, including congestion costs. (See post on competitiveness of cities.)

There is increasing recognition that excessive regulation to protect intellectual property rights is discouraging the diffusion of new technology and limiting the opportunities created by technological progress. As discussed in a post on this topic, the economic benefits of copyright and patent laws derive from the incentive they provide to authors and inventors to engage in creative activity. If granted appropriately such monopoly rights could therefore be expected to result in more technological progress and higher productivity growth than would otherwise occur. However, in recent decades these regulations have been used to provide monopoly rents to holders of rights far beyond those required to provide incentives for creative activity.

* * *

My general conclusion is that if governments were to do no harm we could be much more confident that future technological advances would provide widespread opportunities. That is probably too much to ask, but it might be reasonable to expect governments to do less harm than at present. For example, if governments want to help unemployed people who live in regions of persistently high unemployment, they should consider welfare measures designed specifically to assist those most affected (including relocation and early retirement). This is likely to be a less costly approach than the alternatives of supporting uncompetitive firms and industries through subsidies, tariffs, anti-dumping measures, government procurement policies etc. or funding uneconomic infrastructure projects. 

This series of posts has focused on likely trends over the next few decades and has not addressed longer term issues that may emerge as robots come to play more important roles in our lives. I might have something to say about those issues after reading and thinking more. One day I might even feel able to write sensibly about the implications of the 'singularity' for individual human flourishing.


Postscript:
I think William Nordhaus may be writing sensibly about the timing of the 'singularity' and its implications for real wages in his paper: "Are We Approaching an Economic Singularity?"