How could J.S. Mill have reconciled his views on liberty and indoctrination of morals?

In “John Stuart Mill, Victorian Firebrand” Richard Reeves suggests that the question of whether Mill’s essay, “Utilitarianism”, can be reconciled with his more famous essay, “On Liberty”, is one that “will keep scholars engaged for the foreseeable future” (p. 330). That is probably correct, but I don’t think Mill would have had a huge problem in reconciling his views in the two essays if he had felt inclined to do so.

What is it that needs to be reconciled? In “On Liberty”, Mill argues that human flourishing requires the exercise of individual choice: “The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice. He who does anything because it is the custom, makes no choice. He gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best. The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by being used” (Ch. 3).

In “Utilitarianism”, written about the same time, Mill argues that people should be indoctrinated with a version of utilitarian morality: “To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence (Ch 2).

Different people have different views about the tension between Mill’s emphasis on the importance of individual choice and his proposals for indoctrination of an indissoluble association between individual happiness and the good of the whole. For example, Linda Raeder writes: “A deep immersion in Mill’s thought leaves one with the decided impression that his aspirations for human beings were not for the flowering of their unique individuality but for their conformity to his personal ideal of value and service” (“John Stuart Mill and the Religion of Humanity”, 2002). Richard Reeves adopts a more conventional view of Mill’s aspirations: “The animating idea at the heart of Mill’s life and work is individual liberty. His image of a good society was one in which every man (and, he would add, every woman) can shape the course of their own life. ... Mill wanted our lives to be free, but he also wanted them to be good ” (p. 6).

Mill’s view on the importance of diversity in education seem to me to provide an example of the way in which it would have been possible for him to reconcile his desire for us to be free with his desire for us to be good. He wrote: “All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An education established and controlled by the State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence” “On Liberty”, Ch 5.

Mill also emphasised the value of experimentation at a more general level:
“It will not be denied by anybody, that originality is a valuable element in human affairs. There is always need of persons not only to discover new truths, and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices, and set the example of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life” (“On Liberty”, Ch 3).

In his “Autobiography” Mill noted that he viewed “On Liberty” as “a kind of philosophic text-book of a single truth, which the changes progressively taking place in modern society tend to bring out into ever stronger relief: the importance, to man and society of a large variety in types of character, and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions” (Ch 7).

It seems to me that it would have been possible for Mill to reconcile his views on liberty and ethics by making the case that recognition of the right of individuals to experiment in living as seems best to themselves is of over-riding importance to society. Not only does this open the possibility of discovering new truths, it also opens the possibility that people can learn from the mistakes of others. As Friedrich Hayek wrote: “It is whenever man reaches beyond his present self, where the new emerges and assessment lies in the future, that liberty ultimately shows its value” (“Constitution of Liberty”, p. 394).

If Mill had argued more explicitly that the right of individuals to live as seems best to themselves is of over-riding importance it would have been clearer that he did not intend that his personal values should be imposed on people who do not desire them.

Postscript:
I should have noted that Hayek explicitly made the point that "the existence of individuals and groups simultaneously observing partially different rules provides the opportunity for the selection of the more effective ones" ("Constitution of Liberty", p.63).

How silly were J.S. Mill's views about income distribution?

J S Mill wrote: “The laws and conditions of the Production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them. ... It is not so with the Distribution of wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely. The things once there, mankind, individually or collectively, can do with them as they like. They can place them at the disposal of whomsoever they please, and on whatever terms” (Principles of Political Economy, 1848, II,1.1).

In 1983, Friedrich Hayek commented that this view of J S Mill “is really an incredible stupidity, showing a complete unawareness of the crucial guide function of prices ...” Hayek explains: “We must face the truth that it is not the magnitude of a given aggregate product which allows us to decide what to do with it, but rather the other way around: that a process which tells us how to reward the several contributions to this product is also the indispensable source of information for the individuals, telling them where they can make the aggregate product as large as possible” (Conference paper published in Nishiyama and Leube, “The Essence of Hayek”, p 323). This must have been one of the most intemperate remarks that Hayek ever made about anyone.

One of the things I have learned from Richard Reeves book, “John Stuart Mill, Victorian Firebrand” is that Karl Marx was also unimpressed by Mill’s attempt to separate the laws of production and distribution. Marx viewed this as “a shallow syncretism” (Reeves, p 210). He thought Mill was attempting to reconcile irreconcilables.

How silly were Mill’s views about distribution? In order to answer this question I think we need to understand Mill’s views about property and inheritance.

I see a lot of merit in much of what Mill wrote about property. For example: “The institution of property, when limited to its essential elements, consists in the recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have produced by their own exertions, or received either by gift or by fair agreement, without force or fraud, from those who produced it” (“Principles of Political Economy”, II, 2.2).

It is when Mill writes about “landed property” that I begin to see problems: “When the "sacredness of property" is talked of, it should always be remembered, that any such sacredness does not belong in the same degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species. Its appropriation is wholly a question of general expediency” (“Principles of Political Economy”, II,2.26). Given that land can be exchanged for other goods I don’t see how it is possible to argue that rights to ownership should not be recognized as the same for land as for other goods.

The problem that Mill had with “landed property” seems to be associated with the potential for a relatively small number of families to have a disproportionate amount of wealth and to exercise disproportionate political power. He was against the inheritance of “enormous fortunes which no one needs for any personal purpose but ostentation or improper power”. Richard Reeves points out that Mill was particularly concerned to distinguish between “earned” and “unearned” income. Mill viewed inheritances as “unearned” and argued that it would be socially beneficial to impose a limit on the amount any person could inherit.

Mill’s views about redistributive taxation were also influenced by his aversion to inherited wealth: “To tax the larger incomes at a higher percentage than the smaller is to lay a tax on industry and economy; to impose a penalty on people for having worked harder and saved more than their neighbours. It is not the fortunes which are earned, but those which are unearned, that it is for the public good to place under limitation. ...I conceive that inheritances and legacies, exceeding a certain amount, are highly proper subjects for taxation: and that the revenue from them should be as great as it can be made without giving rise to evasions ... such as it would be impossible adequately to check” (“Principles of Political Economy”, V, 2.14).

It seems to me that Mill’s claim that distribution of wealth should be viewed as entirely separate from production was silly – and contradicted by his own views about the adverse consequences of progressive taxation. Mill’s idea for an upper limit on the amount that anyone could inherit also seems extremely silly. I can see some wisdom in his views about taxation of inheritances, but even here it seems to me that he was fooling himself if he thought that inheritance taxes would impose no disincentives to working and saving. Despite all this silliness, however, Mill still had many sensible things to say about property rights and taxation.

Does our Nicole worsen income inequality in the United States?

In his recent paper, “Thinking clearly about economic inequality”, Will Wilkinson – a research fellow at the Cato Institute in the U.S. (and prominent blogger)- mentions some reasons why Nicole Kidman is wealthy. He states: “Nicole Kidman is fabulously wealthy because millions of individuals have chosen to see a movie with Nicole Kidman in it instead of a non-Kidman movie, or instead of going bowling”. He uses Nicole as an example to illustrate how the pattern of incomes “emerges from billions upon billions of individual choices and transactions” (p 14).

I think Wilkinson is making a good point. People often talk about income distribution as though government is actually distributing national income among the citizens - like a mother deciding how large a slice of a cake to give to each of her children. If we want the cake metaphor to reflect the real world, however, we have to accommodate the fact that mother doesn’t actually bake the cake, the children do. And distribution is the result of mutually beneficial process in which individuals earn cake by contributing to its production.

Wilkinson’s mention of Nicole Kidman is also relevant to a somewhat different point that he is making, although he doesn’t make the link specifically. Nicole Kidman has dual citizenship between the U.S. and Australia. If she is viewed as a U.S. citizen for the purposes of considering the distribution of income that makes the distribution of income in the U.S. look more unequal. If she is viewed as an Australian citizen that makes Australia’s income distribution look more unequal. Who cares?

The point is, of course, that there is something peculiar about viewing income inequality as a cause for concern at a national level, when this can change just because people move across national borders. When people talk about the effects of migration on income distribution in countries like the United States and Australia they are more likely to be thinking of the migrants who make income distribution less equal by occupying the lowest rungs of the economic ladder than those who make it less equal by occupying the highest rungs on the ladder. But the questions raised about the relevance of income distribution to well-being are the same in both cases.

Wilkinson makes the point: “If you focus only on the shifting pattern of incomes among legal residents within the statistics-keeping jurisdiction ... you can easily lose track of the real story of human welfare ...” (p 14). He comments as follows on the effects of the migration of unskilled migration on economic inequality in the U.S.: ‘If were to assume a natural and mundane moral perspective, from which all people involved are taken into account and assumed to have equal worth ... what we would see is a profound reduction in both poverty and economic inequality. If the question is “What happened to the people in this scenario?” then the answer is “The poorest people became considerably wealthier, narrowing the economic gap between them and the rest”.’ (p 15).

It seems to me that this reasoning is relevant to Australia as well as to the U.S. If we are interested in the well-being of people we should be interested in the opportunities that are available to them. When you look at it carefully the concept of income inequality doesn’t have much relevance to well-being.

How can a conservative favour centralization of power?

One of my reasons for reading Tony Abbott’s recent book, “Battlelines”, was to remind myself why I am not a conservative. The more serious reason was to find our how a politician who proudly wears the conservative label would attempt to justify proposing an amendment to the Australian constitution that would remove current restrictions on the policy areas in which the federal government has power to make laws.

In writing this book Tony Abbott, a former minister in the Howard Government who is now on the opposition front bench in the federal parliament, seems to have taken on the role of defining where the battlelines should be drawn in the approach to the next election.

One of the things Abbott is clearly trying to do in this book is to identify enduring values that will continue to bind the Liberal Party together. In the process he does a reasonably good job of minimizing the differences between Hayekian liberals and Burkean conservatives. At one point he writes: “Following Adam Smith, Liberals tend to think that government is necessary to keep the peace but otherwise should let people make mutually beneficial arrangements with each other” (p 82). If I believed that was a statement of conservative philosophy, I would not mind being called a conservative. In other places in the book, however, Abbott displays the contempt for personal freedom that is associated with traditional conservative values. For example: “The basic problem is that most Western countries have privatised the next generation. Having children tends to be regarded as a personal choice rather than a social good” (p 97).

Having now reminded myself why I am not a conservative, let me turn to Abbott’s views on federalism. The essence of his argument is as follows:

• When nothing else seems to solve problems, voters always expect the central government to ‘do something’.
• After more than 50 years of increasing federal government involvement in matters that were formerly the exclusive responsibility of the states, the federation has become dysfunctional. “There are few problems in contemporary Australia that a dysfunctional federation doesn’t make worse”.
• Current attempts to end the “blame game” between different levels of government are not going to work. Someone has to have the legal power to take responsibility.
• The only credible way to fix the problem is to give the central government the legal power to call the shots i.e. to over-ride the states.
• The argument that the states form a bulwark against the potential tyranny of the national government is “far-fetched”. Australia has states because this was the price of becoming a nation, not because the fathers of federation thought that an intermediate level of government was necessary to avoid tyranny.

I agree, more or less, with the first three points, but disagree with the last two. What reason do we have for thinking that a government attempting to run schools and hospitals out of Canberra would do a better job than one trying to run them from some office in a state capital? Absolutely none! And I think that Tony Abbott agrees with me. What he has in mind is that if the federal government was able to over-ride the states on health and education the most likely result would be for public hospital and school services to be “provided on a contestable basis by a range of independent and autonomous organisations as well as by state-government instrumentalities” (p 129). That sounds to me like a move in the right direction, but we can’t be sure that some control freak in charge of the central government would not attempt to intervene more directly in the management of hospitals and schools if he/she had the power to do so.

As I see it, the main problem of the federation arise from the stupidity of the central government in its choice of forms of intervention. The basic problem in both hospitals and schools prior to federal intervention was that people were unhappy with the services that state governments were providing from tax revenues. Instead of giving state governments more money to waste, the central government should have given people back some of the money they had paid in taxes so that they could purchase alternative services.

The central government does not need additional power in order to achieve contestable service provision. It just needs to stop propping up inefficient state bureaucracies and give power back to the people.

In concluding I would like to commend Tony Abbott for presenting his views in a forthright manner. It is nice to be able to disagree with quite a lot of the things he has written and yet still feel that, as politicians go, Tony Abbott is not a bad bloke.

Postscript: August 2018

Nine years on it is obvious that the defining characteristic of Tony Abbott’s policy stance hasn’t been centralism, Hayekian liberalism or Burkean conservatism. The defining characteristic has been his attitude to climate change.

It is possible to point to some differences between his current approach to climate change, the approach he adopted when prime minister and the approach adopted in Battlelines. However, I see reasonable consistency in his position on this issue. In Battlelines he wrote:

“It sounds like common sense to minimise human impact on the environment and to reduce the human contribution to increased atmospheric gas concentrations. It doesn’t make much sense, though, to impose certain and substantial costs on the economy now in order to avoid unknown and perhaps even benign changes in the future”.

In a recent speech Abbott said:

“I have never thought that reducing emissions should be a fundamental goal of policy, just something that’s worth doing if the cost is modest.

I have never thought that climate change was, to quote Kevin Rudd, the ‘great moral challenge of our generation’.

It was an issue, that’s all, and – at least on the actual changes we’ve so far seen – not a very significant one compared to man’s inhumanity to man; maintaining and improving living standards; and even to many other environmental issues such as degraded bush and waterways, particulate pollution, water quality in the third world, deforestation, and urban overcrowding.”

In my view Tony Abbott has shown too little recognition of the risks associated with climate change. He would be on firmer ground to argue that emissions reduction targets do little to mitigate those risks.

As politicians go, Abbott seems to have been fairly consistent in his views. However, I have revised my view that he is “not a bad bloke”. His recent behaviour in destabilizing the leadership of the Liberal Party has been appalling.

In Battlelines Abbott posed the question: “How can Australians, individually and collectively come closer to being their ‘best selves’ and what can the Liberal Party do to bring this about?” Abbott should think more about his own contribution in that regard. He hasn’t even been able to avoid doing harm to the electoral prospects of the Liberal Party. If Abbott’s recent failure to be his best self assists a Labor government to come to power in the near future we are likely to see not only deeper cuts in carbon emissions and higher energy prices, but also the adoption of policies that will make citizens increasingly subject to government regulation in many aspects of their lives.

How can consciousness be explained?

Before reading “Out of Our Heads”, a recently published book by the philosopher Alva Noё’, I would not have questioned Francis Crick’s claim that “you, your joys and sorrows, your memories and ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” (quoted by Noё on p 5).

If someone had asked me how I felt about that statement before I read this book I would probably have shrugged my shoulders and said that it was just one of those things we have to accept whether we like it or not. I might have added, however, that I thought that Friedrich Hayek made a good point over 50 years ago (in “The Sensory Order”) when he said that the type of explanation that the physical sciences aim for is not applicable to “mental events”. Hayek argued that human decisions are the result of the whole of the human mind (or personality) and we cannot reduce them to something else.

Alva Noё goes further than Hayek in casting doubt on the capacity of neuroscience to explain consciousness. He claims: It is misguided to search for neural correlates of consciousness – at least if these are understood, as they sometimes are, to be neural structures or processes that are alone sufficient for consciousness. There are no such neural structures. How could there be? (p 185).

Noё suggests: “To understand the sources of experience we need to see those neural processes in the context of the conscious being’s active relation to the world around it. ... Consciousness of the world around us is something that we do: we enact it, with the world’s help, in our dynamic living activities. It is not something that happens in us” (p 64).

He further explains: “The brain does not generate consciousness the way a stove generates heat. A better comparison would be with a musical instrument. Instruments don’t make music or generate sounds on their own. They enable people to make music or produce sounds” (p 64).

This is obviously a very different explanation of consciousness than that provided by Francis Crick. Noё doesn’t discuss the views of other neuroscientists, such as Antonio Damasio, that seem to me to be more similar to his own view. For example, Damasio writes: “The secret of making consciousness may well be this: that the plotting of a relationship between any object and the organism becomes the feeling of a feeling” (“The Feeling of What Happens”, p 313).

It will be interesting to see whether Noё’s view becomes widely accepted. Daniel Dennett’s comment (on the dust jacket) suggests that those with different views may consider this book to be a worthy challenge: “Those of us who disagree with its main conclusions have our work cut out for us”. In “Freedom Evolves” Dennett takes as his starting point that we are “each made of mindless robots and nothing else” (roughly a hundred trillion cells) and sets himself the task of explaining the evolution of human consciousness. Dennett’s explanation is that human consciousness evolved for sharing ideas i.e. it is associated with the development of language and the enhanced survival capacity of groups in which reflective agents accepted responsibility for their actions.

Noё has a very different view of when consciousness began. He views life as the lower bound of consciousness: “once you see the organism as a unity, as more than just a process, you are, in effect, recognizing its primitive agency, its possession of interests, needs, and a point of view. That is, you are recognizing its at least incipient mindfulness” (p 41).

That is the part of Noё’s view of consciousness that I have most difficulty accepting. Attempting to explain the capacity of humans to reflect upon their own actions is a different project than attempting to explain the incipient mindfulness shown by a bacterium – even accepting that both forms of behaviour are enacted with the world’s help by organisms engaged in dynamic living activities.

Finally, how would I respond now if asked how I feel about the quote from Francis Crick at the beginning of this post? I would say that Alva Noё has persuaded me that Francis Crick’s claim is as misguided as attributing music solely to the components of musical instruments.

What is diaphysics?

Some readers might be wondering whether diaphysics has something to do with the views of L. Ron Hubbard. It doesn’t. If you thought it did you were probably confusing it with dianetics.

Diaphysics is the title of a book by Troy Camplin, an interdisciplinary scholar, poet and short story writer, who maintains the blog, Interdisciplinary World. The book was published recently by University Press of America. (I bought my copy from Amazon.)

Troy defines diaphysics as “a set of natural laws that manifest themselves in different ways at different levels of complexity, which then give rise to new levels of complexity” (p vi).

So, what does that mean? The levels of complexity are levels of reality (or perhaps stages in the evolution of reality). The first level is pure energy. This gives rise to the second level, quantum physics, which gives rise to chemistry. From this level we get the emergence of biology and the evolutionary processes that result eventually in various levels of human thinking (276 -278). The higher levels of reality are more complex than the lower levels of reality. “With emergence into each new level, those new levels are able to use more and different kinds of information and energy not available to the levels below them” (99).

Troy’s theory is that “a common thread” runs through the emergence from each level of complexity to the greater level of complexity that follows it. He is proposing “a mechanism for creation of more objects, and more complex objects and emergent orders of complexity ...”. “Evolution occurs such that the fitness landscapes evolve towards increasing smoothness ... . Once smoothness, or a new symmetry, is reached, a new set of fitness landscapes emerge with the emergence of the new, more complex level from the far-from-equilibrium state” (267).

The passage quoted above seems to be at the heart of the theory, but I don’t understand it. The author seems to be saying that there is a natural law at work such that as the fitness landscape becomes smoother a new fitness landscape must emerge. I don’t see a common mechanism by which smoothness of the fitness landscape always results in the emergence of a more complex level, but that may just reflect the limits of my cognitive capacities. The nature of the common mechanism that Troy is attempting to describe remains a mystery to me.

It would be nice to think that there might be a common thread, that is not beyond my understanding, that could explain the evolution of complexity from the big bang to modern civilization. I am content enough, however, to be able to understand what Friedrich Hayek wrote about the relatively recent evolution of modern society:

“It is because it was not dependent on organisation but grew up as a spontaneous order that the structure of modern society has attained that degree of complexity which it possesses and which far exceeds any that could have been achieved by deliberate organization. In fact, of course, the rules which made the growth of the complex order possible were initially not designed in expectation of that result; but those people who happened to adopt suitable rules developed a complex civilization which then often spread to others” LLL, Vol. I, p 50.

Before I end this review I must commend Troy Camplin for the many nicely written passages in his book. For example: “ ... in a region of phase transition, in an edge-of- chaos regime, we have complex interactions, swirls and eddies, a combination of the predictable and unpredictable. In other words it is like a good story, which can be neither purely ordered and predictable nor disordered and unpredictable, but must have elements of both in order to be enjoyed” (272).

Troy’s book is not just an attempt to identify a common thread in our past. He also speculates about the future direction of human development. Diaphysics is probably the most ambitious book I have ever attempted to read.

What makes a planet happy?

I find it hard to take seriously the concept of a happy planet. Is Earth happier than Mars? How would we know? It seems to me that only sentient beings can be happy, but that might just reflect the limited perspective of a sentient being. For all I know a rock might have a completely different perspective.

The happy planet index constructed by the New Economics Foundation (nef) doesn’t actually attempt to compare the happiness of different planets. What it attempts to do is to assess how happy our planet is with what is happening in different countries. I hope that makes you smile because if you take the happy planet index too seriously I think you are at risk of becoming unhappy – and that might make the planet unhappy!

The countries that are given the highest ratings in nef’s index are Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guatemala and Vietnam. These places don’t seem to me to offer the ideal of a good life for the people who live in them, even though many of these people say they are satisfied with their lives.

The authors claim that the results show that a good life is possible without “costing the earth”. Andrew Norton has pointed out that the results do not support this conclusion. Average happiness levels are relatively low in several countries that are ranked among the top 50 in the happy planet index.

As defined by the nef the happy planet index is a productivity measure. The numerator (or output measure) is happy life years, measured by multiplying average life satisfaction levels by average life expectancy. The denominator (or input measure) is a linear function of the average “ecological footprint”, which is a measure of the total amount of land required to provide all resource requirements plus the amount of vegetated land required to absorb CO2 emissions.

The basic idea seems to be that “the planet” becomes happier when people in a particular country become happier without using more “land” or when people maintain their current happiness level while using less “land”.

How do we know that this is what makes the planet happier? How do we know that the planet cares whether or not humans are happy?

My point is that the happiness of the planet only exists in the mind of the human who thought up the idea of the happy planet index. There is nothing wrong with trying to imagine what it would be like to be a planet that has feelings, but this is a game that anyone can play. Some people could imagine, for example, that the happiness of the planet will rise if more CO2 is produced. After all, CO2 is food for plants and planets like plants. Don’t they?

It would be possible for everyone on earth to have their own happy planet index that takes account of the things that they imagine that the planet might value. It would probably be preferable, however, to come down to earth and acknowledge that there is potential for everyone on the planet to vary in the extent to which they value various things that are important to them.

If nef’s happy planet index serves a useful purpose I think it is to remind us that surveys that measure our subjective well-being do not necessarily take into account all the things that are important to us. When we report how satisfied we are with life we take account of the things that are most salient to us at the time. We don’t necessarily take into account our own future well-being and the well-being of future generations of family members, let alone the well-being of other relatives and friends, the well-being of other humans, the well-being of animal pets, the well-being of other living things, or other matters that might be important to us.

Is there an issue of respect involved in climbing Uluru?

When I visited Uluru for the first time about 10 days ago I learned a little about its significance to the Anangu (western desert people) who are the traditional owners. A few days later, while we were driving home to New South Wales, the board of management of the Uluru - Kata Tjuta National Park released a draft management plan for 2009-2019 which raises, among other things, the question of whether visitors should continue to be allowed to climb the rock. The board was seeking comments from the public.

Before we got home, however, Kevin Rudd, Australia’s prime minister, had weighed in with the view that it would be “sad” if people were banned from climbing the rock. While citizen Rudd is entitled to express his views on anything and everything (as he does incessantly) I think it will be sad if his intervention closes off further discussion of this issue.

The significance of Uluru to Anangu is reasonably clear. They believe that as direct descendants of the ancestral beings who created the landscape at the beginning of time they are responsible for its protection and appropriate management. They also believe that they have a responsibility to safeguard visitors to their land. The main reason that traditional owners have given to discourage visitors from climbing the rock is the danger involved: “We feel great sadness when a person dies or is hurt on our land”. The draft management plan suggests, however, that an issue of respect may also be involved. It quotes Tony Tjamiwa: “That rock is really important and sacred. You shouldn’t climb it! Climbing is not a proper tradition for this place” (p 86).

What is the significance of Uluru to visitors? Some of the literature about it suggests that it has something to do with the size of the object – it is 9.4 kilometres in circumference and rises about 340 metres above the surrounding plain. That might seem big to those who think of rocks as large stones, but Uluru is actually a remnant of an ancient mountain. It is composed of sedimentary rock that has become heavily eroded over time.

Uluru is a natural object of great beauty. The explorer Ernest Giles described it as “ancient and sublime”. Giles, however, was not the first European to visit the rock. William Gosse got there first, in 1873, and named it Ayers Rock, after Henry Ayers (a South Australian politician who is most remembered these days for having had Uluru named after him).

Tourists have been interested in travelling to Uluru for over 60 years, with the first vehicular track being constructed in 1948 in response to this interest. In the early 1950s several motels and a camping ground were built at the base of Uluru. Increasing tourism resulted, in 1958, in the area that is now the Uluru – Kata Tjuta national park being excised from an aboriginal reserve. Traditional ownership of the park was recognized in 1985 under an agreement in which it was leased back to the federal government for 99 years.

Most visitors to Uluru presumably go there primarily in order to see Australia’s most recognisable natural icon first hand. Although climbing the rock has become something of a tradition, only about one-third of visitors now choose to climb. I imagine that fewer people would climb if it was made clear in the literature distributed to visitors that an issue of respect may be involved as well as concerns about safety.

It seems to me that this is the crux of the issue. Is there a way that it would be possible for visitors to be permitted to climb the rock that would be consistent with appropriate respect for this place?

Do people make good choices between income and leisure?

“What are the applied implications of our findings? In the work area we suggest that a balance between hours of work, social time and leisure will produce the highest well-being, whereas even work that is enjoyable will produce less well-being if carried out for too many hours. Conversely, it would be an error to assume that people would be happiest if all their time were spent in pleasurable leisure activities. ... At the policy level an implication is that too many work hours, without sufficient free time or vacation, will prove less rewarding for most people” (Diener, Weiting Ng and Will Tov, 2008, ‘Balance in life and declining marginal utility of diverse resources’, Applied Research Quality Life).

This quote is from the conclusions of an article which assesses how average happiness levels differ with differing amounts of time spent in various ways (free time, with family and friends, and commuting) as well as with income levels. The findings seem to confirm the predictions of standard economic thinking in this area i.e. as our consumption of any good (including non-market goods such as leisure) rises the marginal utility of adding an additional unit of the good tends to decline.

What does the article tell us about marginal utility? The part of the study that seems most informative uses data from the Gallup World Poll, a representative sample of people almost covering about 95 percent of the world. As its main measure of happiness the study uses affect balance, which measures relative experience of positive feelings (enjoyment, and smiling and laughing) and negative feelings (depression, anger, sadness and worry) for the previous day.

The results suggest that the marginal utility of “free time” and “time with family and friends” is quite high for the first few hours of each activity (in the time category zero to four hours) and then declines to around zero. The marginal utility of additional income rises steeply for incomes up to around $US 40, 000 and then increases moderately, if at all. (The ladder of life indicator shows a similar pattern, but with the marginal utility of income remaining positive at high income levels).

How much additional income would a person need to earn to compensate for the loss of utility associated with the sacrifice of an hour of free time or an hour with family or friends. My rough calculation suggests that the hourly rate of pay required would be around $28 for a person with an income of around $20, 000 per year. (The loss in utility for sacrifice of an hour of leisure equals 0.075. Income on the preceding day would have needed to rise by $28 in order to raise utility by 0.075.)

For people with higher incomes, the hourly wage rate needed to compensate for the loss of an hour of leisure time would be very much higher. At first sight it might appear that with incomes in excess of around $60,000 the hourly rate of pay required to compensate for sacrifice of an hour of leisure would be huge. We need to remember, however, that some of the people earning this additional income might be saving it to spend at times of their lives when their earning capacity is diminished and the marginal utility of additional income is much higher. There are also some people who enjoy their work so much that they would not require any compensation for sacrificing an hour of free time. More research is required before we will have a good understanding of why people make the choices they make between income and leisure.

The quote at the beginning of this article suggests that the choice that individuals make between income and leisure is a government policy issue. Why should it be? The weight of evidence suggests that when governments attempt to regulate how people live their lives they tend to make people more miserable rather than happier. As I see it, the main benefit of research of this kind is that the findings may help individuals to improve their own well-being and that of their families by enabling them to make better choices.

Can we use dollars to compare how much various life events affect well-being?

The life events I propose to discuss here are things like major improvements or worsening in financial situation, getting married or divorced, having a child, serious personal injury, death of a spouse, being made redundant and change of residence. I will focus on subjective well-being, as measured by surveys which ask people for a numerical rating of their satisfaction with life.

One way to compare the impact of life events on well-being is to calculate what change in income would have an equivalent impact after controlling for other factors. Some readers might recall research findings for the U.S. and Britain which suggested that the increased income equivalent of a lasting marriage is around $100,000 and an increase in income of around $60,000 would be required to compensate for the loss in well-being associated with becoming unemployed. (These numbers come from some pioneering research by David Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald published in 2000.)

There are several problems with the methodology of this early research which tend to overstate the income changes equivalent to life events. First, the methodology is based on estimates of the (small) impact that higher incomes have on current well-being without taking account of the impact of higher incomes on future well-being. Higher incomes enable the wealth accumulation (and the redistributions through tax and welfare systems) that make it possible for people to maintain their well-being during periods when earning potential is diminished (e.g. during retirement) or when they incur heavy costs or heavy costs are incurred on their behalf (e.g. education and medical expenses).

Second, the methodology focused on the impact of being in a particular state (e.g. married or unmarried) rather than on the duration or timing of the effects that life events have on well-being. Life events typically have large impacts on life satisfaction for only a relatively short period.

Third, the methodology was unable to distinguish causation. For example, it was unable to assess whether married people are happier than unmarried people because marriage tends to make people happy or because happy people are more likely to get married.

Research in this area has progressed a great deal in recent years, with the use of ongoing surveys that enable changes in the well-being of the same sample of people to be linked over time to life events. The HILDA survey (Australian data) shows that the events with the greatest positive effect on life satisfaction for both males and females included a major financial improvement in the past three months, having been married in the last three months and birth of a child (less than nine months ago). The events with greatest negative effect on life satisfaction included being detained in jail, a major financial worsening at any time in the last year, a recent separation from a spouse or partner and recent death of a relative or family member.

A recent paper by Paul Frijters, David Johnston and Michael Shields estimates the one-off windfall improvement in finances needed to compensate for various life events (‘Happiness dynamics with quarterly life event data’, DP 3604, IZA, July 2008). The windfall approach seems preferable because a comparison of the effects on current well-being of different life events avoids the conceptual and measurement problems of attempting to compare the effects of life events with the effects of differences in income levels.

The authors obtained the following estimates of compensating windfall financial gains for various life events:

Death of spouse/ child: + $178, 300
Serious personal injury or illness: + $ 59,200
Change of residence: - $ 53,000
Birth or adoption of child: - $ 18,300
Marriage - $ 16,500
Separation from spouse or partner: +$ 14,900
Fired or made redundant: + $ 6,900
Victim of property crime: +$ 2,700

(Currency: Australian dollars; $A1 = about $US 0.80. Assumed discount rate = 5% ) .

I should note that these compensating windfall estimates are additive. For example, a person who is fired might become separated from his or her spouse and experience a major financial worsening at the same time.

It seems to me that the magnitude of these estimated compensating windfalls generally make a lot more sense than do the much larger estimates of income-equivalents of life events. Nevertheless, I feel uneasy about the idea that the life satisfaction of people who suffer the death of a spouse or child would be unaffected, on average, if they received a windfall gain of around $A 178,300 at the same time. Can any amount of monetary compensation actually be sufficient to enable life satisfaction to remain unaffected while a person is mourning the loss of a loved one?

Do well-being surveys measure utility?

Economists often think of utility and well-being as the same thing. If a person chooses to buy an additional unit of good A rather than an additional unit of good B, they tend to assert that this “revealed preference” shows that the marginal utility provided by good A exceeds that provided by good B. If asked to explain what this means in simple terms an economist might say that the additional unit of good A increases the person’s well-being by more than an additional unit of good B.

At this point some readers will immediately want to bring in complications like the possibility of irrational behaviour. A branch of economics (behavioral economics) explores this possibility, but I want to put this possibility aside for the moment.

The question I want to focus on is whether well-being surveys that are conducted by asking people questions relating to their personal well-being are measuring the well-being or utility referred to by economists. Some economists assume that it is, but I think they are mistaken.

What is it that the surveys actually measure? They measure a variety of different things. Most commonly they measure happiness or satisfaction with life by asking people to provide numerical evaluations in response to a single question. Some more complex surveys (e.g. the ACQOL survey) measure perceptions of the quality of life by asking questions about satisfaction with various aspects of life such as standard of living, achievements, relationships and health. Others ( e.g. nef’s “National accounts of wellbeing”) incorporate a framework of questions relating to life evaluations, emotional well-being, vitality, resilience and self-esteem, and feelings of autonomy and competence etc.

I think it is fair to say, however, that the surveys measure how people feel about their current lives. (Some do include questions about future security but when this averaged with other factors most weight is given to how people feel about their current lives.) For the purposes of this discussion let us call this “current well-being” and assume that the surveys measure it accurately.

At this point the economists reading this will immediately recognize that the surveys cannot be measuring utility because people often make trade-offs between their current well-being and future well-being. This is most obvious in savings decisions where current consumption may be sacrificed to enable a higher consumption levels to be enjoyed in future. It also occurs, for example, when people decide to put up with working long hours or spending a lot of time commuting in order to make their families more financially secure.

Economists still probably learn at an early stage of their study of the subject how to picture these kinds of choices in their minds, but for the benefit of anyone else who might be reading this I will draw a relevant diagram below. Readers who prefer stories to diagrams might prefer to read an earlier post, entitled “Do good decisions always make us happy?”. For the benefit of any readers who might find an appeal to authority more persuasive I should also mention that Gary Becker and Luis Rayo have suggested that the happiness measured in surveys can be viewed as “a commodity in the utility function in the same way that owning a car and being healthy are” (comment on Stevenson/Wolfers paper, Brookings Papers, Spring 2008: 89).


The possibilities curve in this diagram (shown in red) encompasses the various combinations of “current well-being” and “security” that are attainable by the decision-maker. It can easily be seen that points on this curve are superior to all attainable points closer to the origin.

The indifference curves (shown in blue) reflect the preferences of the decision-maker between current well-being and security. The decision-maker is indifferent between the combinations of “current well-being” and “security” on particular curves. She maximizes her utility at the point of tangency between the possibilities curve and the highest attainable indifference curve.

The point I am trying to make is that as a result of the decision-maker’s preferences she views point A, where current wellbeing is at a maximum, as inferior to point B, the point at which utility is maximized.

The obvious implication is that it is foolish to rush into policy recommendations based solely on consideration of how people can improve their well-being as measured in surveys. If happiness surveys suggest that people are behaving in ways that are contrary to measured well-being we should ask ourselves whether we have an adequate understanding of what is motivating their behavior, rather than assuming that it is a result of ignorance (an information problem) or human frailty (predictable irrationality).

Should governments collect subjective well-being data?

The idea of governments collecting data on our subjective well-being might seem slightly Orwellian to many people. It could bring to mind images of officials from the government statistics office knocking at your front door and telling you that they are from the government and they have come to help you by collecting information about what is going on in your mind.

However I don’t think anyone needs to worry a great deal about the implications for their personal liberty of proposals for government collection of subjective well-being data, such as in the recently published book, “Well-being for Public Policy” by Ed Diener, Richard Lucas, Ulrich Schimmack and John Helliwell. As discussed in an earlier post, such data would be unlikely to increase the influence that paternalistic interventionists may have on the policy making process.

The important issue is whether the collection of this additional information is warranted in terms of its potential contribution to discussion of policy issues.

In their concluding chapter the authors ask themselves whether enough is known about subjective well-being for government agencies “to initiate systematic programs for measuring it”. This is how they summarise their reasons for answering “yes”:
“The measures are sufficient to reveal some of the groups in society that are suffering, and they also tell us which groups are thriving. The measures already provide strong clues about the characteristics of nations that lead to the experience of a satisfying life for citizens, along with those that predict the opposite. The measures give clear clues about the activities and circumstances that tend to lead to ill-being and well-being. And when national accounts of well-being are instituted our understanding of these issues will only grow.”

Do we really need systematic programs for collection of information on subjective well-being to tell us about such matters? The measures of subjective well-being generally tend to confirm what we know already from information on incomes and other objective indicators of the quality of life. It seems to me that the important issue is whether collection of more data on subjective well-being would add reliable information that is not available from other sources.

The book discusses the potential contributions of subjective well-being measures in providing new information that could be relevant to discussion of policy issues relating to externalities, non-market goods, taxation, setting fines and compensation for lost welfare. Some specific examples caught my eye. It is possible that information on the extent of misery caused by different diseases could result in better allocation of public funds for medical research (p 134). Some research findings suggest that effects of airport noise on well-being of people in affected areas may currently be under-stated by its effects on residential land values (p 147). Subjective well-being information may help in assessing the value of public facilities such as parks to residents of cities who have access to such facilities (p 155).

The critical issue in considering the contribution that subjective well-being data can make to public discussion is whether this information is reliable (yields consistent results) and valid (actually measures well-being). My assessment of the relevant literature (in my draft paper on Gross National Happiness) is somewhat less optimistic than the view presented in this book. Despite all the noise in this data, however, I think the authors may be correct that enough randomness washes out in large samples to make the responses to single item questions sufficiently reliable for the purpose of creating national indicators (p74). Multiple item questionnaires such as those suggested by Ed Diener and Robert Biswas-Diener to measure “psychological wealth” (in their recent book, “Happiness”) could provide much more reliable information.

I think the authors make a fairly strong case that the surveys are measuring an aspect of well-being although I think it is an over-statement to claim that “the measures behave as they would be expected to behave given widely accepted ideas about what well-being is” (p 93). For example, the measures show a decline in well-being when people have children, despite the widely accepted idea that having children has something to do with well-being.

There is a risk that subjective well-being measures will cloud public discussion of policies rather than shed additional light on relevant issues if they come to be viewed as definitive measures of overall well-being. In interpreting these measures it is important to bear in mind that it is quite possible for people to make rational decisions to sacrifice some of their current satisfaction with life, in order to improve their own future well-being or that of their families.

Are "policy makers" responsible for our happiness?

“Societies need subjective indicators of well-being to aid policy makers and ordinary citizens in making decisions.” This is the opening line of the recently published book, “Well-being for Public Policy” by Ed Diener, Richard Lucas, Ulrich Schimmack and John Helliwell. The first three authors are psychologists (Diener has played a leading role in the field of happiness research) and Helliwell is an economist.

The final sentence of the first paragraph explains: “Overall, accounts of subjective indicators of well-being will help policy makers make wiser decisions regarding policy alternatives and help citizens be better educated about the choices that affect their lives”.

I am in favour of research to enable people to become better informed about the choices that affect their lives. I hope that what the authors mean by “help citizens to be better educated” doesn’t involve anything more sinister than publication of research findings.

While reading the book I became irritated by what seems to me to be a naive view it presents of the policy making process. Although the nature of policy making is largely incidental to the purpose of the book, I will devote the remained of this comment to policy making. I promise to focus on the substance of the book in a later post.

According to the “public interest” view presented in the book, public policies are made by “policy makers” who would make wise decisions if only they knew what policies would improve the well-being of citizens. In reality, however, the policy making process is a messy business which involves politicians seeking votes and hoping to further their careers, civil servants seeking to expand and protect empires, voters who have little interest in most policy issues and even less incentive to understand likely consequences of the proposals being considered, interest groups seeking to further the interests of the people they represent and electoral rules that may give disproportionate power to particular groups. The process also attracts ideologues of various kinds who wish to advance their particular views of the good society.

In my view, rather than attempting to persuade us that more information on the subjective well-being of citizens would help some hypothetical “policy maker” to make better decisions, it would have been better if the authors had sought to persuade us that this information would enable policy processes to produce better outcomes.

Would this have made any difference to the book? Although the basic arguments about the validity of subjective well-being measures and their potential usefulness would have been unchanged, I think this change of focus would have made some difference. In particular, it seems to me is that the authors would have had less difficulty convincing readers that they “do not advocate the idea that governments should intervene strongly to move society towards a primary goal of increased well-being” (p209). When most of the book seems to be devoted to telling “policy makers” how they can use subjective information to improve the well-being of citizens it is natural enough to expect readers to be concerned that some “policy makers” might act paternalistically in using this information. Some readers might not be entirely reassured that paternalistic “policy makers” would have regard to the findings of happiness research which show that humans tend to feel most satisfied when they perceive that they have freedom to choose how to live their lives.

The problem of how paternalistic interventionists might like to use research findings is placed in perspective once it is recognized that competing interests are involved in policy-making through discussions in a range of different forums. These discussions are about various things, but the matters discussed by vast majority of participants usually relate in some way to the effects of different policies on the well-being of people.

The important issue is whether measures of subjective well-being can make useful contributions to the discussion of policy issues.

What are the rules of the game of human flourishing?

Human flourishing, it seems to me, is a game that can only be played by people who are free to decide how they will live their lives and willing to accept the consequences of their decisions. There is no limit to the number of players. The game becomes more enjoyable as the number of players increases.

The aim of the game is for each player to "flourish". The game differs from most other games played by humans because the number of points scored by any one player does not necessarily diminish the number of points that can be scored by other players. Players may score additional points by helping other players.

The game commences when players agree to respect the lives and property of the other players. Each player inherits some cards and is dealt additional cards as the game progresses. Points scored depend also on the skills that the players develop as the game progresses and the opportunities available to them to benefit from cooperation with other players.

Players who trust each other can score many additional points by engaging in mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation. This cooperation can take a variety of forms including the formation of families and community groups which help people to live as they choose and to share gains and losses with relatives and friends. It also includes the creation of business ventures and the development of market institutions that enable players to benefit from specialisation and exchange.

Players can also score additional points by introducing new players. As well as providing additional opportunities for gains from trade this tends to reduce losses from theft by outsiders. The introduction of new players has some risks, however, because existing players do not know to what extent the new players can be trusted.

Players make up the rules of the game as they go along according to voting rules that they agree upon. Players usually make arrangements for provision of some public goods, including appointment of guardians who are permitted to use force to protect players from outsiders and cheaters. The appointment of guardians poses additional problems, however, in devising political rules that will discourage the guardians from plundering the players.

Unhappy players are permitted to voice their concerns and to form associations to lobby for changes to the rules. If players are unable to agree on rule changes, the political dice is rolled to determine the outcome.

Human flourishing is a relatively new game and is rarely played well. The biggest challenge for people who enjoy playing the game is to avoid rule changes that will convert it into a different game such as “serfdom” or “struggle for survival”.

To what extent are perceptions of freedom based on objective factors?

The Gallup World Poll has asked people in a large number of countries: “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?” Recent research has shown that, even after controlling for other relevant variables, people tend to be more satisfied with their lives in countries in which a relatively high proportion of the population are satisfied with their freedom to choose. (See: John Helliwell, Christopher Barrington-Leigh, Anthony Harris and Haifang Huang, ‘International Evidence on the Social Context of Well-being’, Working paper 14720, NBER, 2009.)

This is hardly surprising. People who feel relatively satisfied with their lives could generally be expected to be satisfied with their freedom to choose what they do with their lives. Do the results have more profound implications? Is the proportion of people who are satisfied with their lives related to economic freedom (encompassing personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter and compete in markets and protection of persons and their property from aggression by others) and civil liberties? Alternatively, is satisfaction with freedom an emotional state that is unrelated to objective circumstances?

The Figure below has been obtained by matching the Gallup data on satisfaction with freedom with the Fraser Institute’s data on economic freedom and Freedom House’s data on civil liberties for 121 countries, and then ranking countries according to the percentage of people who are satisfied with their freedom to choose what to do with their lives. The results suggest that economic freedom and civil liberties tend to be substantially greater in countries where people are more satisfied with their freedom to choose.





Regression analysis suggests that economic freedom and civil liberties have a positive influence on the degree of satisfaction with freedom in different countries but only explain a modest proportion of the variation in this variable. In some countries (including China) the degree of satisfaction with freedom is much higher than predicted and in some countries (including Hungary) it is much lower than predicted.

In order to test whether there is a link between satisfaction with freedom and emotional states, another data set has been constructed which incorporates data on inner freedom (percentages who feel they have a great deal of choice and control over their lives) from the World Values Survey. Unfortunately the inner freedom data was collected for a smaller number of countries, so the matched data set only covers 70 countries. (Another problem with the inner freedom data is that it does not match very well in terms of the time at which it was collected. It was collected around 2000, substantially earlier than the other data.)

The second Figure, including inner freedom, provides a similar picture to the first one. Countries in which relatively high proportions are satisfied with the amount of freedom in their lives tend to have relatively high proportions who feel a great deal of inner freedom.



Inclusion of the additional variable in the regression analysis results in a substantial increase in the proportion of variation in the degree of satisfaction with freedom explained by the model, but reduces the coefficients on the other variables. This is not surprising in view of the apparent links between economic freedom and inner freedom discussed in an earlier post.

This simple analysis does not enable me to conclude to what extent perceptions of freedom are based on objective factors. The important point that emerges is that all four varieties of freedom tend to go together.

Is the quality of life in New Zealand over-rated?

Some New Zealanders might say that this is a question that only an Australian could ask, but it seems to me to be a good way to raise the issue that I want to discuss. (I hope that when I look back on this in a few days time it will still seem like a good idea!)

The ratings that I am writing about are the ladder of life ratings from the Gallup World Poll – the top step of the ladder represents the best possible life and the bottom step represents the worst possible life. But I could be referring to any of a range of surveys that ask people to place a numerical rating on how happy they are or on how satisfied they are with their lives.

I do not intend to argue that New Zealanders have a peculiar propensity to over-rate their satisfaction with their lives. The issue I want to discuss is what it means when surveys show that New Zealanders are just as satisfied with their lives as people in the U.S. even though average incomes in NZ are only about two-thirds of the U.S. level. I propose to compare the impact of income differences and other factors on the survey measures of subjective well-being in order to enable readers to consider whether the impacts attributable to income differences provide an accurate measure of its impact on the quality of lives.

It is now possible to make fairly accurate comparisons of the impact of income and other factors on average ratings of subjective well-being at a national level. Recent research by John Helliwell, Christopher Barrington-Leigh, Anthony Harris and Haifang Huang has shown that a high proportion of differences in average life evaluations between countries can be explained statistically by differences in a relatively small number of variables reflecting social, institutional and economic circumstances of life (See Table 3, ‘International Evidence on the Social Context of Well-being’, Working paper 14720, NBER, 2009). The most important variables are income (log of per capita GDP), friends (the proportion of survey participants who have relatives or friends they can count on for help when they are in trouble), freedom (the proportion who satisfied with their freedom to choose what they do with their lives) and corruption ( responses to questions relating to whether corruption is widespread throughout government and business).

In the Figure below I have used these research results to show reasons why average survey measures of subjective well-being in several countries differ from the U.S. ratings.



The net differences from U.S. ratings are shown next to the label for each country. If you focus on New Zealand you can see that the perception of NZers that their country is relatively free of corruption outweighs the negative impact on survey responses of the fact that average incomes in NZ are substantially lower than the U.S. average.

If you consider that corruption is as big a problem in the U.S as, for example, in Greece, you might think that this provides an accurate depiction of the relative impacts of income differences and corruption on the quality of life in New Zealand and the U.S. However, when I look at the expert ratings of corruption levels in Transparency International’s corruption index, the U.S. doesn’t look too bad. The rating of the U.S. in this index (7.3) is lower than Denmark and NZ (both on 9.3) and Australia (8.7) but well above Italy (4.8) and Greece (4.7). (It is also interesting that Greeks do not perceive that their corruption problem to be any worse than that in he U.S. and that NZers do not perceive themselves to be as free of corruption as the Danes).

The point is that the influence of various factors on the survey ratings of quality of life depends on the way they are perceived. The ratings are more like emotional responses than dispassionate evaluations. It seems to me that self-reports of how people feel about their lives tell us about their emotional states - which are an important component of well-being but do not tell the whole story.

One way to test survey ratings is to ask ourselves to what extent we would be prepared to rely on them in making decisions affecting our own well-being. It seems to me that income may be more important to people when they make decisions affecting their well-being than when they answer questionnaires about the quality of their lives. If you were in Europe contemplating a choice between moving your family to either the U.S. or NZ, would you consider the importance of differences in average income levels to be adequately reflected in survey ratings of the quality of life?

Postscript:
Survey ratings can also be tested by comparing them with actual migration patterns where free migration is allowed - as between New Zealand and Australia. Migration statistics for New Zealand show that in recent years permanent and long-term departures to Australia have exceeded arrivals from Australia by a factor of more than 3:1.

Does contagion explain the clustering of happiness among friends?

A few months ago a couple of researchers - James Fowler and Nicholas Christakis -published some findings that were reported around the world in the popular media under the headline: “Happiness is contagious”. At the same time another article cast doubt on these findings by claiming that similar social network effects could be detected for acne, height and headaches.

Having thought about it, the headline “Happiness is contagious” seems to me to have about the same news content as “Influenza is contagious”. We don’t need research to tell us that we obtain pleasure from associating with happy people. But once the headline has grabbed our attention we may feel a desire to read on to find out why the item was considered newsworthy.

Why is there controversy over the research finding that happiness is contagious? The study (‘Dynamic spread of happiness in a large social network’, BMJ, 338, Jan ’09) actually claims to be providing evidence for something more substantial than the emotional contagion in which the mood of one person fleetingly influences the mood of others. The results, based on surveys of a large social network (the Framingham heart study), suggests that if you have a friend who lives within a mile who becomes happier, this increases the probability that you will also become happier. Similar effects were also noted with regard to spouses, siblings and next door neighbours.

The authors claim that their results show that “changes in individual happiness can ripple through social networks and generate large scale structure in the network, giving rise to clusters of happy and unhappy individuals” (p338).

However, in his comment on the Freakonomics blog, Justin Wolfers suggested the most likely reason a person might become happier when a friend becomes happier isn’t because happiness is contagious, but because friends tend to share similar interests and to be influenced by similar things.

Justin Wolfers is right a lot of the time and he might be right about this. It seems to me, though, that the observed tendency for the happiness of friends to increase at the same time could be attributable to more complex processes than either direct emotional contagion or the influence of some factor that is independent of their own actions – such as the football team they support in the national league winning more frequently. It is possible, for example, that their increase in happiness could be an outcome of their involvement in some voluntary community activity.

Recent research on empathy and collective action may be relevant to the clustering of happiness of people involved in social networks. An important characteristic of voluntary collective action is the need to place trust in volunteers who promise to participate for motives other than personal reward for effort. Research by Paul Zak, using the trust game (explained in detail here), indicates that a sense of being trusted results in release of oxytocin (OT) and that increased OT results in more trustworthy behavior. In a recent paper (“Empathy and collective action”) Paul Zak and Jorge Barraza note that release of OT potentiates the release of dopamine (making prosocial behavior more rewarding) and causes synaptic serotonin to rise (reducing anxiety and helping people to sustain altruistic collective action over an extended period of time).

Zak and Barraza suggest that this brain circuit promoting altruistic collective action is stimulated when volunteers do things like spending time together to build empathy, exchanging gifts, sharing meals and sharing adventures. They also cite evidence that people who volunteer to help others report higher levels of happiness.

What determines whether we have successful lives?

Your chances of success in life depend on your intelligence, your family background and your temperament, don’t they? Yes, to some extent. But over the last few days I have read about research findings which suggest that beyond a threshold IQ doesn’t make much difference, the important aspects of family background are only superficially related to wealth and the predictive importance of childhood temperament tends to diminish over time.

In “Outliers” Malcolm Gladwell tells the story of research conducted by Lewis Terman who identified 1,470 Californian children with very high IQs (over 130) in the 1920s. Terman believed initially that members of this group were destined to be among the future elite of the U.S. When they grew up, however, the majority had careers that could only be considered ordinary. It turns out that the relationship between IQ and success works only up to a point. Additional points of IQ beyond about 120 (remember the population average equals 100) don’t seem to have much impact on success.

Further analysis divided these genius subjects into three groups and looked for reasons for differences between the achievements of the most successful and least successful groups. The main difference seemed to be that the most successful performers came from the middle and upper class – the most successful group contained almost none of the children from the lowest socioeconomic class. Later in his book Gladwell points to evidence which suggests that the link to socioeconomic class has little to do with things that are directly associated with wealth or even with the quality of schooling. Research by Karl Alexander shows, for example, that the main difference between reading scores between elementary school children emerge during the summer vacation period while they are not at school. The wealthier parents tend to cultivate the interests of their children in reading etc. even during the summer vacation period. The difference seems to have more to do with culture than with income.

Gladwell’s main point is that it is impossible for superstars in any field to look down from their lofty perches and say with truthfulness, “I did this all by myself”. Gladwell argues: “They are the products of history and community, of opportunity and legacy. Their success is not exceptional or mysterious. ... The outlier, in the end, is not an outlier at all” (p 285).

Something else I have read recently that relates to the determinants of successful lives is Joshua Wolf Shenk’s article “What Makes Us Happy” (The Atlantic Online, June 2009). Shenk’s article discusses George Vaillant’s research, based on the Harvard Study of Adult Development. This study of healthy, well-adjusted Harvard students began in 1937 and followed its subjects for more than 70 years. As with Terman’s study, the leading researcher originally involved in the Harvard study thought he would be studying a group of people who would have successful lives. Many did in fact achieve dramatic success, but by age 50 almost a third of the subjects had at one time or another met Vaillant’s criteria for mental illness.

One of Vaillant’s findings is that the predictive importance of childhood temperament diminishes over time: shy, anxious kids tend to do poorly in young adulthood, but by age 70 they are just as likely as the outgoing kids to be happy and well. One of the factors that he found to predict healthy aging is “employing mature adaptations” to life’s troubles. Mature adaptations include altruism, humour, anticipation (planning for future discomfort) and delaying attention to an impulse or conflict. The second most important factor that he found to predict healthy aging was the quality of relationships, including with siblings, friends and mentors.

Will Wilkinson comments on his blog: “What I liked so much about this essay, and about Vaillant, is the recognition that the complexity of human psychology, the complexity of coping and adapting to the challenges life throws up, makes relationships or “social aptitude” no simple thing.” I agree.

This brings me back to Gladwell’s book. One of the things from “Outliers” that will stick in my mind is Gladwell’s account of the Roseto mystery. In brief, in the 1950s the inhabitants of Roseto (Pennsylvania), whose ancestors came from a town of the same name in Italy, had a very low incidence of heart disease and their death rate from all causes was 30 to 35 percent lower than expected. Researchers ruled out all the obvious causes such as diet, exercise, genes and location. Their explanation was that Rosetans had created a powerful, protective social structure capable of insulating them from the pressures of the modern world. In Gladwell’s words, it was about “the mysterious and magical benefits of people stopping to talk to one another on the street and of having three generations under one roof” (p 10).

This is very interesting and very complex. I find myself reacting in three different ways. First, in statistical terms “outliers” are chance events; before getting too excited about sociological implications we should establish whether there is evidence that other communities which share similar characteristics to Roseto in the 1950s have similar health outcomes. Second, leaving aside the “mysterious and magical” factors, the most useful place to look for an explanation would be in the links between happiness (emotional health) and physical health. Third, perhaps it is time I had a closer look at the research findings behind those headlines a few months ago which claimed that scientists now have evidence that happiness is contagious.

Where will the productivity growth come from?

In the Australian federal budget delivered earlier this week, forward estimates of revenue and spending were based on Treasury projections of economic growth rates in excess of 4 percent coming out of the current recession. This projection has attracted attention because the projected growth rates are higher than those experienced in Australia during recent boom years.

It seems reasonable to me to suppose that growth rates might be somewhat above trend when an economy comes out of a recession. An economy that is not limited by capacity constraints obviously has potential to grow more rapidly than one approaching full employment.

However, the Treasury’s optimism about future economic growth prospects in Australia seems to me to sit oddly with their more guarded views about prospects for the world economy. In discussing the outlook for the world economy Treasury states: “Even when growth returns, the recession will leave a legacy of significant policy challenges across the world. The extraordinary measures being taken to combat the current crisis will have to be unwound carefully.” Governments will not find it easy to unwind these extraordinary measures. This means that commodity exporting countries like Australia should expect the world economy to give them a fairly bumpy ride in the years ahead.

Why is Treasury so optimistic about Australia’s growth prospects? The Treasury forecasters base their optimism on the growth rates experienced in Australia following recessions in the 1980s and 1990s. Their projected growth rate is about the same as that following the 1990s recession.

Even if it is reasonable to expect world economic growth in the 2010s to be as robust as in the 1990s, is it reasonable to expect that Australia’s productivity growth in the 2010s to be as high as in the 1990s? The 1990s was a period in which multifactor productivity growth in Australia was more than double the rate experienced in recent years. High rates of productivity growth in the 1990s stemmed to a large extent from productivity improvements in the services sector, which were associated with micro-economic reforms (neo-liberalism in the terminology favoured by Australia’s current Prime Minister).

Where will comparable productivity improvements come from during the 2010s? Perhaps the government has plans for extensive microeconomic reforms that it has yet to announce. But I wouldn’t bet on it!

How much prudential regulation do we need?

It was a few weeks since I had seen Jim, so I made the mistake of asking him what he had been doing. He replied that he had been thinking about bankruptcy.

I said that I didn’t know his financial situation was that bad. Jim replied that he wasn’t having too much trouble paying his own bills at this stage, but he had been thinking about bankruptcy as an institution and about the role of government in bankruptcy. While he was saying that I was thinking that Jim was not the kind of person who would ever have too much trouble paying his bills. I heard him ask: “What do you think about bankruptcy?”

I said that I thought modern bankruptcy laws that wiped the slate clean when debtors had no hope of meeting their obligations were a huge advance on traditional practices such as virtual enslavement or imprisonment of people who could not pay their debts. I added that in my view there had to be a role for government in this process because you can’t allow people to hire muscle to pressure people to pay their debts. Since we have to rely ultimately on the coercive power of government to enforce contracts then we have to rely on government to devise rules about the conditions under which contracts cannot be enforced.

Jim nodded. He then asked: “What do you think about limited liability?” I said that I thought the contribution of limited liability to economic growth was often overstated because liability insurance could have arisen to serve a similar purpose in enabling individual investors to limit their liability when in investing in companies. I added, however, that I couldn’t see a problem in the owners of a firm declaring that their liability was limited to the amounts they had invested. In my view transparency is the important issue: people who lend money to the firm or provide good on credit should be aware that if the firm goes bust the liability of the owners is limited.

Jim said: “Hmm, so you are saying that if I form a company to engage in speculation there should be no limit on the amount of debt that the company can incur? Are you saying that I should be allowed to gamble with other people’s money secure in the knowledge that if the gamble doesn’t pay off then my own liability is limited to the extent of my own investment in the company?” I insisted that transparency was the important issue. If people are prepared to take the risks involved in lending money to speculators, good luck to them.

Jim said: “People who take those risks need all the luck they can get. What about systemic risks? It is one thing to accept that a few people will lose their life savings whenever some highly leveraged property speculator goes bust, but isn’t it something quite different when confidence in the whole financial system is threatened because of excessive leverage in major financial institutions?” I did my best to put the argument that the current financial crisis arose at the end of last year because central banks in major economies hadn’t established a credible commitment to maintaining a stable rate of nominal GDP growth. I suggested that the best way to deal with the deleveraging and associated decline in the velocity of circulation would have been by maintaining a monetary policy that would promote expectations of a stable rate of growth in nominal GDP.

I could see Jim’s eyes glaze over as I spoke. He said: “If you were making government policy decisions in the aftermath of the current financial crisis wouldn’t you be looking to see what could be done to avoid re-emergence of systemic risk in major financial institutions? I had to admit that if I was making government policy decisions I would probably be looking for policy levers relating to capital adequacy and things like that.

Jim said: “Ah, you sound just like one of those neo-socialists who advocates more financial regulation in order to save the capitalist system. Rather than interfering in the financial management of healthy companies, wouldn’t it be better for governments to focus on improving laws to minimize the adverse effects on the wider economy that can occur when some companies become insolvent. For example, why can’t the ownership of insolvent companies be quickly transferred to creditors?”

Jim seems to like asking me questions that I can’t answer.

Is money a message as well as a medium?

Money is the medium of exchange as well as the unit of account and store of value. As the medium of exchange money makes life easy because we don’t have to spend a lot of time trying to find someone who is prepared to trade the goods we want to buy for the goods we want to sell. I have never been able to understand what Marshal McLuhan was talking about when he said “the medium is the message”, but the question I want to consider is whether we behave differently when we have money on our minds.

The idea that people may behave differently when they have money on their minds has a long history. Everyone has heard the biblical claim: “the love of money is the root of all evil”. What does this mean? This is not really an assertion that it is evil to collect coins, is it? It seems to me that the statement was not really about money at all but about the love of the worldly goods that money can buy.

The question of whether people behave differently when they have money on their minds also comes up in discussing when it is or is not appropriate to attempt to motivate other people using money. Tyler Cowen, for example, has used several parables to discuss this question, including the dirty dishes parable. Is paying one of your children a good way to ensure that the dishes are washed? Probably not. Children may feel less obligation to do their share of family chores if a voluntary exchange relationship is established in which the parent becomes an employer providing money in exchange for work, rather than a family leader “who is due some amount of obedience in his or her own right” (“Discover your Inner Economist”, p 14).

Is the payment of money intrinsic to this parable? I think that many economists would tend to say that the parable would apply in the same way if the child is paid in kind, e.g. in tickets to rock concerts, rather than in money. In the minds of many economists the issue would appear to be whether strict reciprocity is appropriate to the circumstances rather than about the method of payment that is used. Economists often say that money is a veil.

However, I am not sure that many parents would rule out all forms of bartering as being inappropriate as a means of motivating a child to do his or her share of family chores. It seems to me that bartering could be appropriate if it is about the things that parents do for their children that are beyond what might be generally considered to be the core responsibilities of a parent. For example, like many other parents, while my kids were in their teens I used a substantial part of my leisure time providing an unpaid taxi service to ferry them and their friends to and from various sporting and entertainment activities. Would it be inappropriate for a parent to suggest to a child that it would be unfair to expect provision of such services unless he or she does an appropriate share of family chores without having to be constantly reminded?

This raises the question of whether responses to provision of incentives have more to do with perceptions of the appropriateness of particular incentives than with concepts such as the strictness of reciprocity or the money value of the incentives provided. There is some evidence that actions that merely remind people of money can have a significant effect on behavior. For example, Kathleen Vohs, Nicole Meade and Miranda Goode report an experiment in which participants were primed by sitting at a desk facing posters showing various denominations of currency or posters showing either a seascape or a flower garden. The participants were then presented with a nine-item questionnaire in which each question asked them to choose between two leisure activities – an experience that only one person could enjoy and an experience that two or more people could enjoy together. Participants primed with the money poster tended to chose more individually focused experiences. The authors report similar results for eight other experiments (‘The psychological consequences of money’, Science, 318 (5802), 2006).

So what if responses to incentives are strongly influenced by perceptions of the form in which the incentive is provided and the language used when the offer is made? The most obvious implication is that a lot of care is required in selecting incentives that are perceived to be appropriate and in presenting them in an appropriate way to achieve the desired effect. There are quite different implications in relation to prevention of corruption. The ethics of accepting a bribe do not change merely because the incentive offered is more subtle than a bundle of notes in a brown paper bag.