Who is Steve Keen? What is the NAR? And why am I wondering
whether or not I agree with Steve Keen?
Steve Keen is an Australian economics professor, author of a
book entitled ‘Debunking Economics’. His blog, ‘Steve Keen’s Debtwatch’, is
dedicated to analysing ‘the collapse of the global debt bubble’. The NAR refers
to the North Atlantic Recession, sometimes referred to as the Great Recession,
that followed the GFC. I am wondering whether or not I agree with Steve Keen because
of a comment on Jim Belshaw’s blog last Sunday. Jim wrote:
‘The second part of Winton's post focused on Irving Fisher's
views is, if I interpret the argument correctly, very similar to views
expressed by Professor Keen. Essentially, a key part of the problem was the
combination of levels of private debt with income and price variations.’
Jim was referring to a post on this blog a couple of weeks
ago: ‘Should the GFC be viewed as a 'balance sheet' recession of the kind Irving Fisher wrote about in the 1930s?’
My immediate response was to question whether it might be
possible that I could express views similar to those of Professor Keen. While my
views on economics have strayed somewhat from neoclassical orthodoxy in recent
years, I still consider that the concept of equilibrium provides a useful
starting point for economic analysis. Steve rejects all conventional neoclassical economics.
If my understanding is correct, there are two main elements
involved in Steve’s views about the causes of the GFC and the following
recession: Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis; and the concept of
endogenous money creation.
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis involves the idea
that a growing economy is inherently unstable. Investments are initially conservatively
financed, but it gradually becomes evident to managers and bankers that greater
profits can be made by increasing leverage. Investors and bankers come to
regard the previously accepted risk premium as excessive and to evaluate
projects using less conservative estimates of prospective cash flows. The decline
in risk aversion sets off growth in debt, growth in investment and growth in
the price of assets. The euphoria is eventually brought to an end as rising
interest rates and increasing debt to asset ratios affect the viability of many
business activities. Holders of illiquid assets attempt to sell them in return
for liquidity. The asset market becomes flooded, panic ensues, the boom becomes
a slump and the cycle starts all over again. (That is an abridged version,
excluding Ponzi elements, of a summary which Steve provides in his paper: ‘A monetary Minsky model of the Great Moderation and the Great Recession’).
The concept of endogenous monetary creation involves the idea
that banks create credit in response to demand. If a bank lends me money, my
spending power goes up without reducing anybody else’s. So, bank lending creates
new money, and adds to demand when it is spent. From this perspective, ‘aggregate
demand is income plus the change in debt’. (My training in economics and
national income accounting makes it difficult for me to understand why or how
that can be so. Nevertheless, let us proceed.) If my understanding is correct,
Steve is arguing that quantitative easing does not increase the money supply, because
banks don’t increase lending when central banks purchase bonds from them. (See Steve’s article: ‘Is QE quantitatively irrelevant?’).
My objection to the first element arises because I don’t
understand why a growing economy should necessarily be unstable. In my
view, it is necessary to introduce into the analysis a ‘too big to fail’
policy, or something similar, to explain why banks have a tendency to take
excessive risks. I have attempted to outline the regulatory issues involved in a previous post:
‘Governments seem to have managed somehow to get us into a
vicious cycle where fears of contagion have led them to encourage major
financial institutions in the believe that they were too big to fail, while the
belief that governments would bail them out has led major financial
institutions to take excessive risks. If we can't let big financial
institutions fail when they become insolvent, perhaps the next best option is
to find the least cost way of regulating them to make it less likely that they
will become insolvent’.
My objection to the concept of endogenous monetary creation
is that it flies in the face of the reality that monetary policy can increase
and reduce the rate of growth in nominal GDP (aggregate demand). It would make more sense to explain the fact that money creation through quantitative
easing did not result in an immediate increase in bank lending in terms of
funds being used to meet demands for liquidity (or repair balance sheets) than
to redefine the concept of money in order to claim that the money was not
created.
In my view Scott Sumner is on the right track in arguing
that nominal GDP level targeting (along a 5% growth rate) in the United States
before 2008 would have helped greatly reduce the severity of the Great
Recession:
‘One reason asset prices crashed in late 2008 is market
participants (correctly) saw that the Fed had no plan to bring the US economy
back to the old nominal GDP trend line’ (See: ‘A New View of the Great
Recession’, Policy, Winter 2013. The
article is gated, but Scott has expressed similar views on his blog.)
The idea of targeting nominal GDP, to bring it back to the old
trend line seems to me to be similar to Irving Fisher’s advocacy of reflation,
as discussed in my post about balance sheet recessions.
So, coming back to the original question, I agree with Steve
Keen that debt is important in explaining the GFC and the NAR, even though I have
a very different view about the way economic systems work.