The reason
I am thinking about selfishness has to do with Ayn Rand. It has little to do
with her attitude toward Christmas, but I was pleasantly surprised to discover
the sentiment expressed in the quote above (written by Ayn Rand in the December
1976 entry in The Objectivist Calendar). I had previously wondered whether
Rand might have been one of those people who say “Bah Humbug!” at this time of
the year.
I have been
prompted to think about Rand’s view of selfishness by a discussion that has
been taking place on The Savvy Street. Ed Younkins wrote an essay, Objectivism and Individual
Perfectionism: A Comparison, which has induced Roger Bissell to write a two-part response.
Bissell’s responses have been published under the title: Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Decoded:
Replies to Recent Criticisms of the Objectivist Ethics. (Part 2 is here.)
Before I
discuss those contributions, it is relevant to mention my previous attempts to
understand Ayn Rand’s view of selfishness. Before you finish reading the essay
you will understand why that is relevant.
My previous musings
I was
brought up to believe that selfishness is a sin. In Australia, it is common for
parents tell children not to be selfish, for example, if they attempt to take
more than a fair share of a delicacy at mealtimes. What the parents mean is
that such opportunistic behavior shows no regard for others. People of goodwill
would not do such things.
Perhaps
that understanding of the meaning of selfishness was reinforced by Australia’s
“fair go” culture. Dictionary definitions of selfishness suggest, however, that
it is also common for selfishness to be viewed similarly in Britain and the
United States.
I can’t
remember when I first became aware that Ayn Rand viewed selfishness as a
virtue, and had written a book entitled The Virtue of Selfishness. During
the 1990s, I was certainly aware that most the small number of Australians who
were knew of Rand’s existence were of the opinion that she and her followers
were ethically challenged and encouraged narcissism. That view was later
expounded in a book by Anne Manne, which I commented upon here.
In a post
on this blog in 2009 I asked myself: Did Ayn Rand regard selfishness as a
virtue? I knew she
did, but I pondered the question because the heroes of Atlas Shrugged did
not seem to me to be selfish. I noted that Rand’s view that selfishness
is a virtue followed from a narrow definition of selfishness as “concern with
one’s own interests”, and speculated that Rand had used that definition to draw
attention to her opposition to the view that self-sacrifice is a virtue.
A few
months later, I wrote on the topic, How far can Ayn Rand’s ethical
egoism be defended?
That post was an attempt to summarize some of the views of participants in a
Cato symposium on ‘What’s living and dead in Ayn Rand’s moral and
political thought’. One of the aspects I focused on was the question of whether
Rand, like Aristotle, viewed virtue – including regard for others - as a
constitutive part of the agent’s own interest, or as an instrumental strategy
for attaining that interest. Although the participants in the discussion were
all scholars familiar with Rand’s writings, they were unable to agree on that
point.
The other aspect I focused on was the question of whether it
was defensible for Rand to argue that what is objectively good and right for
one individual cannot conflict with what is objectively good and right for
another individual. Most, but not all, of the
participants viewed that argument as indefensible.
Younkins’s contribution
In his essay, Ed Younkins seeks to compare the ideas of Ayn
Rand with those of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl (the Dougs).
Younkins’s purpose is mainly descriptive and explanatory, but Roger Bissell has
seen his contribution to be critical of Rand.
The summary table published at the end of Younkins’s essay
is reproduced below.
Younkins's Summary Table
Younkin’s summary table doesn’t mention Rand’s view of
selfishness explicitly, but it is lurking in the background in his discussion of
morality, the virtues and conflicts of interest.
Bissell’s response
Roger Bissell doesn’t accept that Rand’s primary concern in
respect of normative morality was that the agent should always be the
beneficiary of his actions. He notes that in the introduction of The Virtue
of Selfishness, Rand states that ego vs altruism is not the
fundamental issue in ethics. He claims that “under all the ‘selfishness’ window
dressing”, Rand is “actually just another individualistic perfectionist”. Perhaps
Bissell is correct, but if so I am left wondering again, as in 2009, what
purpose Rand saw in the selfishness window dressing.
With regard to the virtues, Bissell objects to the
implication that Rand did not regard them as constitutive of a person’s
flourishing. That difference of opinion takes me back to the Cato symposium
referred to earlier, where several scholars were unable to agree on that point.
My conclusion is that Rand’s views on that matter cannot have been stated
clearly and consistently.
Roger Bissell’s support of Rand’s view on conflicts on
interest also brings to mind the views expressed in the Cato symposium. I find
it difficult to understand why anyone who recognises the importance of property
rights would seek to defend the proposition that there can be no conflicts of
interest among rational and objective individuals. Nevertheless, Bissell makes
a heroic effort:
“To put it yet another way: whatever conflict two rational
people might have on the level of individual values is subordinate
to and outweighed by the common value they both have in
everyone’s doing their own personal best and letting specific outcomes be
determined within the framework of voluntary choice and peaceful interaction.
They want their specific individual values to be achieved, but not at any
cost—while they want their common higher rational values to be upheld, whatever
the cost.”
Perhaps we could imagine two rational and objective
individuals with conflicting interests – for example, a farmer and a cowman living
on the American prairie in the 19th century – agreeing on rules
about property rights at an authentic constitutional convention, of the kind
suggested by James Buchanan and Gordon Tulloch. However, it should be noted
that the possibility of agreement has less to do with the personal qualities of
the participants than with the imagined institutional context in which participants
are uncertain about the impact that rules under consideration might have on their
interests, and those of their descendants.
The ability of rational and objective individuals to avoid
conflict are greatly enhanced by social, political, and legal orders that enable
individuals to pursue their own ends without interfering with each other. Friedrich
Hayek made the point clearly:
“The
understanding that ‘good fences make good neighbors’, that is, that men can use
their knowledge in the pursuit of their own ends without colliding with each
other only if clear boundaries can be drawn between their respective domains of
free action, is the basis on which all known civilization has grown.” (LLL,
Vol1, 107)
The
metanormative ethics expounded by the Dougs seems to me to be consistent with
that view. Recognition of individual rights provides a context in which
individuals can flourish in different ways without interfering with the
flourishing of others.
Concluding
comments
Ed Younkins concluded his essay by noting that although Ayn
Rand differs from Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl “on how a number of
issues are expressed, they agree on the desirability of a free society and are
among the best-known proponents of capitalism from a neo-Aristotelian
perspective”.
Roger Bissell concludes his response by suggesting that
Younkins’s “descriptions of Rand’s ideas are too often inaccurate and his
explanations too often flow from misunderstanding of those ideas”. I don’t know
enough about Rand’s philosophy to make an independent judgement of the veracity
of Bissell’s claims, but it is clear from contributions to the Cato symposium
that I have mentioned several times that Younkins’s views are shared by other
scholars who are familiar with Rand’s philosophical efforts.
It seems to me that this difference of opinion over the
description of Rand’s ideas should be viewed in the context of ongoing
discussions between those who see Objectivism as a closed system and those who
see it as an open system. Those who see objectivism as a closed system accept
that people should not label themselves as Objectivists unless they agree with
all of Rand’s philosophy. Those who view objectivism as open system believe
that it can be enhanced by incorporating new ideas that are broadly compatible
with Rand’s ideas. (Younkins discusses the different views here).
I have the impression that those who see objectivism as an open system have an interest in minimizing the difference between Individualistic Perfectionism and Rand’s philosophy. As I see it, the Individualistic Perfectionism developed by Rasmussen and Den Uyl has been influenced by Rand, but deserves to be viewed as a coherent body of ideas that differs somewhat from Objectivism.
Addendum
Ed Younkins has provided the following comment.
"It seems to me that the Dougs (Rasmussen and Den Uyl) want to create some distance between Individual Perfectionism (IP) and Objectivism (O). Roger Bissell, on the other hand, appears to be be acting as if IP does not exist as separate from O. He may be viewing the Dougs as open Objectivists (like he appears to be), but who are mistaken in their interpretation of some of what Rand is saying. Younkins, like Winton Bates, is not wedded to either O or IP. Both Younkins and Bates may be Rand influenced (as are the Dougs), but each of them develops his own unique and particular philosophical worldview or paradigm of freedom and flourishing (as do the Dougs). Of course, each of the 5 individuals mentioned (who are all friends) is promoting his own vision and version of a philosophy of human flourishing in a free society. This is how it should be."
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