In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1723 -1790)
famously wrote that when all systems of government
He went on to explain what this system of natural liberty
entails:
‘Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of
justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest in his own way, and
to bring forth both his industry and capital into competition with those of any
other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty
[for which] no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of
superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the
employments most suitable to the interest of the society’. (WN, IV.ix.51).
Smith’s use of the value-laden term, ‘natural liberty’, seems
to have been intended to convey that it is good for everyone to be free to
pursue their individual interests, even in the absence of more tangible mutual benefits.
That ethical connotation is even stronger in other passages in Wealth of
Nations (WN) where Smith refers to violations of natural liberty as unjust.
Jerry Muller suggests that “the display” of the ‘system of
natural liberty’ contributes to the great persuasive power of the WN, but
might “lead many readers to overlook the complexity of Smith’s conception of
the moral life and to conclude that liberty, in itself, was always a good
thing” (The Mind and the Market, 2002, p 83).
In my view, it is likely that Smith would have been pleased to
have readers accept his vision of natural liberty and limited government as
unambiguously good. I think he would have wanted people to recognise that it was
an unjust infringement of natural liberty for the powers of government to be used
to assist some economic groups at the expense of others.
Nevertheless, as Nicholas Phillipson highlights in his
biography, Smith’s political prescriptions for market liberalisation were
pragmatic. He recognised the need for a gradual approach to the removal of
obstructions to avoid provoking dangerous opposition from opposing interests (Adam Smith, An enlightened life, 2010, p 230-31).
The authors of the introduction to the 1976 edition of The
Theory of Moral Sentiments suggest that Smith’s reference to “the obvious
and simple system of natural liberty” in WN reflects the influence on
him of the Stoic concept of natural harmony. (The editors D. D. Raphael and A.
L. Macfie acknowledge help from Walter Eckstein in writing the introduction.)
Smith’s reference to natural liberty could also reflect the
influence of more recent philosophers, including Francis Hutcheson (1694 –
1746), who taught Smith moral philosophy at Glasgow university. Hutcheson’s
philosophical interests included the nature of virtue, the meaning of
sociability and natural rights. His teaching and writings were deeply respected
in radical Whig circles in Britain and the American colonies.
Smith’s ideal of everyone being free to pursue their own
interests in their own way seems to echo Hutcheson’s explanation of the right
to natural liberty in terms of pursuit of happiness:
“As nature has implanted in each man a desire of his own
happiness, and many tender affections toward others in some nearer relations of
life, and granted to each one some understanding and active powers, with a
natural impulse to exercise them for the purposes of these natural affections;
'tis plain each one has a natural right to exert his powers, according to his
own judgment and inclination, for these purposes, in all such industry, labour,
or amusements, as are not hurtful to others in their persons or goods, while no
more public interest necessarily requires his labours, or requires that his
actions should be under the direction of others. This right we call natural
liberty.”
Smith and his followers would want to redraft that a little to
define the meaning of what is hurtful to others in terms of fair play, or
respect for their rights. There is also the question of how to define the
“public interest” that apparently has priority over private interests.
Hutchison goes on to
assert:
“Every man has a sense of this right, and a sense of the
evil of cruelty in interrupting this joyful liberty of others, without
necessity for some more general good. Those who judge well about their own
innocent interests will use their liberty virtuously and honourably; such as
have less wisdom will employ it in meaner pursuits, and perhaps in what may be justly
censured as vicious.”
Smith doubted that everyone is born with such moral instincts. He argued that individuals gained the perspective of an impartial
spectator to judge their own actions via a socialisation process.
Hutcheson argues that people resent infringements of
liberty:
“the sense of natural liberty is so strong, and the loss of
it so deeply resented by human nature, that it would generally create more misery
to deprive men of it because of their imprudence, than what is to be feared
from their imprudent use of it."
Hutcheson doesn’t see any problem with persuasion:
“Let men instruct, teach, and convince their fellows as far
as they can about the proper use of their natural powers, or persuade them to submit
voluntarily to some wise plans of civil power where their important interests shall
be secured.”
Francis Hutcheson sums up:
“This right of natural liberty is not only suggested by the selfish
parts of our constitution, but by many generous affections, and by our moral sense,
which represents our own voluntary actions as the grand dignity and perfection
of our nature.”
(The quoted passages by Francis Hutcheson are from A System of Moral Philosophy, published posthumously in 1755, pp 293-5.)
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