Difficult questions Part III: Can identity economics help us to understand teenage drug use?

This post continues the discussion in some previous posts about understanding teenage drug use. In the first post Ruth, a nurse who has worked in psych wards and prisons, illustrated the nature of the problem by telling the sad story of a man who has been suffering from drug induced psychosis (DIP) over a long period following an incident just before his 18th birthday. In the second post we explored whether viewing drug taking as a rational choice helped us to understand the problem. I concluded that it tended to put the problem back into the too hard basket.

I think the best way to try to understand complex issues is to begin by asking naive questions that help to define the problem. (The down-side of this approach is that it reveals my ignorance.) What kind of problem is this? Is it primarily genetic/neurological, psychological, sociological or economic?

Some papers suggest that genetics and neurology may be important. DIP is linked to childhood experience of attention deficit/ hyperactivity disorder and a family history of psychiatric illness. Ruth’s response on the basis of her experience in psych wards is that there is no family history of mental illness for the great majority of those with DIP.

I think there are also problems with both psychological and sociological explanations of why some teenagers are take the risks associated with drug use. It is reasonably clear that psychological issues e.g. self esteem are often involved. Yet, some kids who get involved seem to popular among their peers and achieve to a high level academically or on the sporting field.

Similarly, while incidence of drug abuse is higher among some socio-economic groups, some kids don’t adopt the culture of the socio-economic groups to which they belong. In any case, it isn’t very enlightening to answer questions about why individuals behave the way by saying, ‘Well, how would you expect someone with that cultural or environmental background to behave’. If we are attempting to explain individual behaviour we need to recognize that individuals make choices.

That brings us back to economics. The field of economics that seems to me to be most relevant is identity economics, which has recently developed by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (who have recently written a book about it). The basic idea is that individuals gain satisfaction when their actions conform to the norms and ideals of their identity as well as from their consumption of goods and services. Identity can be considered as an objective social category (e.g. gender, race, social class, age group) but in this instance I think it makes more sense to view it as a subjective identification with a particular group (e.g. insiders or outsiders; conformists or non-conformists) or with a particular set of attitudes. (I have previously written about identity economics in different contexts, here and here.)

So, if you want to understand why people behave the way the do it may help to know how this behaviour relates to the way they think of themselves. Kids who engage in particularly risky thrill-seeking or escapist behaviour possibly obtain some satisfaction from thinking of themselves as the kinds of people who do that kind of thing.

Ruth has responded with some encouraging comments about the potential for identity economics to help in exploring the drug-using phenomenon. Her response is in the following post.

Is free choice an illusion?

I am sometimes asked questions like: What is so wonderful about the free market? My answer is that the free market is about choice. You choose what you want to buy. The choices you make send signals through the market to huge numbers of people involved in retailing, manufacturing and production of raw materials. A lot of these people live in different parts of the world. They don’t even know each other – they are just responding to market opportunities. It is inspiring to think that this whole system responds to individual choice.

However, some people argue that free choice is just an illusion. These people include some famous economists, such a J K Galbraith, who wrote ‘The Affluent Society’ in the 1950s. He argued that your choices are manipulated by advertisers, who sell you things that you may not really need. Others argue that modern economies are geared to selling things that are bad for us – food full of fat and sugar; fuel guzzling cars; new fashions in clothes that serve no obvious purpose – often funded with credit that consumers have difficulty repaying.

How has the economics profession responded to this challenge? Over most of the last 50 or so years I think it is fair to say that the profession has largely ignored the challenge. That was easy to do because there was never any serious suggestion that advertising should be banned. Advertising of some addictive products that are harmful to health has been restricted and there has been some regulation to shield children from exposure. Everyone agrees, however, that it would be silly to discourage informational advertising about store locations, products sold and prices. As for more subtle forms of advertising, it is difficult to define activities that should be discouraged without infringing the rights of individuals to engage in persuasive communication with each other.

Much of the economic research that has been undertaken on the effects of advertising has suggested that they are small and do not last long. However, such findings raise more questions than they have answered. Why would firms spend large amounts on advertising if it has little effect on sales?

The findings of some recent studies on the evolution of brand preferences are consistent with Israel Kirzner’s view that it is the entrepreneur’s function not only to make the product available, but also to ensure that the consumer’s attention is attracted to the opportunities that the product provides (‘Perception, Opportunity and Profit’, 1983, p 10). These studies have shown that:
• brand loyalty tends to be a very important factor - many people prefer to buy a leading brand product, even though a less expensive product is indistinguishable when packaging is not visible;
• the first brand that becomes established in a market tends to maintain a substantial advantage over those that come later; and
• this advantage is greatest for products that are heavily advertised.
(For example, see “The marmite effect’, ‘The Economist’, Sept. 23 2010 and Bart Bronnenburg, Jean-Pierre Dubé and Matthew Gentzkow, ‘The evolution of brand preferences’, NBER Working Paper 16267.)

Marketing experts have a great deal to say about how brand loyalty is established. Conventional branding models assume that the purpose of advertising is to influence consumer perceptions about the brand (e.g., associations tied to quality, benefits, personality, and aspirational user imagery). In cultural branding, however, advertisers seek to establish a story about the kind of people who buy the product they are selling and how it fits into their lives. The product is simply a conduit through which customers can experience the stories that the brand tells. (see: Douglas Holt, ‘How Brands Become Icons’, chapter 2). Some people identify strongly with the brand’s story, some may see it as saying something relevant to themselves, others see it as irrelevant.

One of the most interesting marketing exercises in Australia is the advertising of Victoria Bitter. For a long time the story was about ‘Vic’ as a reward for a hard days work - the ‘hard-earned thirst’. It was the working man’s beer. Over the last couple of years the advertising has moved up market. Last year, the story suggested that VB was every man’s beer. The most recent advertising seems to be aimed at young men who sees themselves as a ‘authentic Aussie blokes’. (The latest ad is here). If you buy the story, you may buy the product and make a statement about how you see yourself and how you want to be seen by others.

How can an understanding of the role of story-telling in marketing be incorporated into economics? There is a relatively new brand of economics developed by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton that is helpful. Identity economics recognizes that people gain satisfaction from acting in accordance with their identity – how they perceive themselves – as well from the goods and services they consume. This explains why some people would prefer to buy the branded product they usually buy rather another product that is a lot cheaper and is indistinguishable in all respects when taken out of its packaging. They get satisfaction from being the kinds of people who use that brand. The satisfaction they get from acting in accordance with their identity – the story associated with the brand – may exceed the satisfaction they would get from paying a lower price.

Summing up then, advertising does not make consumer choice an illusion. Advertisers are often trying to sell you a story. If you don’t identify with the story they are telling, you don’t buy their product. It’s your choice.

Note: This post is based on a speech I gave recently at Nowra Toastmasters.

Why don't the anti-Collingwood mob lighten up?

I’m not a football fanatic. I watch a game on TV now and then during the season, but I don’t really get interested until the finals are on.


After watching both the AFL and Rugby League grand finals this weekend I couldn’t help notice that the losers of both contests looked as though they were about to go to the gallows. Perhaps they were worried about how their fans would react. Why don’t they – the players and fans - just lighten up? After all, football is only a game!

There is research suggesting that a lot of fans take losing very seriously. Researchers discovered that fans of a men’s basket ball team were more depressed after a loss than happy after a win. Compared to the winners, those who watched their team lose had darker moods, they were more pessimistic when rating their mental ability; and they predicted that an attractive person would be more likely to reject them.

I can’t help feeling a bit sorry for the St Kilda and Roosters supporters who had high hopes for the victory of their teams. But I admit to some schadenfreude about the other people who wanted Collingwood to lose. This year supporters of Collingwood’s traditional rivals, Carlton and Essendon, seem to have been joined by a motley crew of supporters of other clubs to form an ABC (Anyone But Collingwood) brigade, consisting of people who have nothing in common except their desire for Collingwood to lose the grand final.

One example of the attitude I am writing about will suffice. For reasons best known to herself, Judith Sloan began an otherwise sensible article published on Saturday in ‘The Australian’ about the ABC (Australian Broadcasting Commission) by suggesting that Collingwood supporters have a psychopathology which causes them to be one-eyed, irrational and rabid. Perhaps she thought that all Collingwood supporters had already cancelled their subscriptions to ‘The Australian’ after reading the attempt at humour at Collingwood’s expense in the lead article on page one the previous Saturday.

I find it difficult to understand why Collingwood supporters arouse so much antipathy. It can’t be because we win too often. After all, our last premiership was 20 years ago. Perhaps it has to do with the ability of supporters to remain enthusiastic despite all the defeats of the past couple of decades. But who could resist being enthusiastic about a young team that plays as though they really want possession of the ball and whose hand-passing leaves opponents flat-footed.

Winners are grinners. Photo by Sebastian Costanzo published in ‘The Age’, here.

Some might suggest that the anti-Collingwood mob don’t like us because they think we like being disliked. Ugh! That doesn’t make sense to me. But Collingwood supporters can sometimes appreciate a joke against themselves. This is probably because we get plenty of practice. The best anti-Collingwood joke I heard this week is this one. Question: ‘What do you call a Collingwood supporter in a suit?’ Answer: the defendant.

Will the elderly poor fare better under pensions means tests?

I ended my last post suggesting that it is absurd to provide pensions that are not subject to means tests because this involves taxing people of working age more heavily in order to add unnecessarily to the incomes of wealthy retirees. This raised the question of whether the elderly poor are likely to fare better in the context of the looming pensions crisis in OECD countries under means tested pensions or universal benefits.

This question is most relevant in countries that have not already adopted some form of pay-as-you-go universal aged pensions. Path dependency is involved. Once a country goes down the universal pensions path there are substantial political difficulties in back-tracking because this system encourages each generation of retirees to expect rewards for the taxes they have paid to support the preceding generations of retirees.

I expect that the political economy of how the elderly poor are likely to fare under alternative systems has been researched previously, but I haven’t yet found any papers that are directly relevant. So I will attempt to sketch out some preliminary ideas, based heavily on Australian experience.

One factor that will influence how the elderly poor fare under alternative pension arrangements will be their own political power as a group. This seems to vary greatly between countries depending on such factors as their use of voting rights. The presence or absence of means-testing could make an additional difference to the political power of this group since it identifies pensioners as a particular group of elderly people who have a common interest in lobbying for higher pensions. In that respect, means testing causes the interests of the elderly poor to differ from those of other elderly people.

Pension levels of the elderly poor are also likely to be influenced by the way the political objectives of other elderly people (and of middle-aged people who are planning for retirement) evolve under different systems. Peter Lindert’s analysis of the political economy of the public pension crisis seems to provide a good starting point to consider this. He summarises as follows:

‘At first, up to the 1980s, the rise of the elderly population gave the elderly more political clout in the industrialized OECD countries. The rise in their political strength was one reason why the relative generosity of pensions rose and budgets switched from fully funded pension systems to pay-as-you-go systems, giving one lucky generation higher pensions paid for in part by the younger generation. By the 1980s, the pressure on government budgets had become acute.

From that point on, the further rise in the elderly share of population began to undermine their political strength. True, pension budgets are not declining and are projected to rise a bit more as a share of GDP. Yet, the level of pension support per elderly person is destined to go on dropping as a percentage of the average income of the whole population’ (‘Growing Public’, Vol. 1: 208).

As the number of retirees rises relative to numbers of people in the workforce, their interests are increasingly aligned with those of the community at large in maintaining incentives for the goose to continue laying golden eggs. If excessive demands by retirees result in higher tax rates the adverse consequences for economic growth will be reflected back in their future pension levels.

The demographic transition stemming from lower birth rates and increased longevity is far more advanced in some countries (e.g. Sweden) than in others (e.g. Australia). Signs that the increase in the elderly share of the population may be beginning to undermine their political strength are only now beginning to appear in Australia, with a foreshadowed increase in the age of eligibility for pensions.

Australian experience suggests that when the aging middle classes have political clout they can exercise it to look after their own interests despite means tests for aged pensions. The relaxation of means tests, combined with tax concessions to encourage investment in private superannuation, has resulted in total government support for retirees being remarkably similar across a wide range of income levels (shown here). This suggests that total government support for retirees would be much the same under a flat rate universal system without incentives for private superannuation. Complicating matters further, however, the government has allowed people to access tax-privileged superannuation funds in lump sums prior to pension age. This has provided an added incentive for people to retire early, splurging lump sums and living off accumulated wealth until they become eligible for the aged pension.

As the increase in proportion of elderly people in the population in Australia reduces the per voter political power of this group, I would expect the per voter political power of the elderly poor to diminish to a smaller extent than that of the much larger group who hope to benefit from the private superannuation tax and pension means test rorts. I expect incentives for early retirement implicit in the superannuation arrangements will be an early casualty as attempts are made to contain government spending on retirees. If a choice has to be made at some time in the future between, say, maintaining the current level of the aged pension in real terms and maintaining superannuation tax concessions, I expect that maintaining the aged pension levels would be likely to win the political debate. Similarly, given a decline in grey power on a per voter basis I doubt whether superannuation tax concession would win the political debate if a choice has to be made at some time in the future between maintaining these tax concessions and an overall lowering in income tax rates to promote economic growth.

I suspect that the elderly poor would be less able to protect their interests under a universal pension because the support arrangements would not enable them to distinguish themselves as a group whose economic interests differ from those of other elderly people.