Are "policy makers" responsible for our happiness?

“Societies need subjective indicators of well-being to aid policy makers and ordinary citizens in making decisions.” This is the opening line of the recently published book, “Well-being for Public Policy” by Ed Diener, Richard Lucas, Ulrich Schimmack and John Helliwell. The first three authors are psychologists (Diener has played a leading role in the field of happiness research) and Helliwell is an economist.

The final sentence of the first paragraph explains: “Overall, accounts of subjective indicators of well-being will help policy makers make wiser decisions regarding policy alternatives and help citizens be better educated about the choices that affect their lives”.

I am in favour of research to enable people to become better informed about the choices that affect their lives. I hope that what the authors mean by “help citizens to be better educated” doesn’t involve anything more sinister than publication of research findings.

While reading the book I became irritated by what seems to me to be a naive view it presents of the policy making process. Although the nature of policy making is largely incidental to the purpose of the book, I will devote the remained of this comment to policy making. I promise to focus on the substance of the book in a later post.

According to the “public interest” view presented in the book, public policies are made by “policy makers” who would make wise decisions if only they knew what policies would improve the well-being of citizens. In reality, however, the policy making process is a messy business which involves politicians seeking votes and hoping to further their careers, civil servants seeking to expand and protect empires, voters who have little interest in most policy issues and even less incentive to understand likely consequences of the proposals being considered, interest groups seeking to further the interests of the people they represent and electoral rules that may give disproportionate power to particular groups. The process also attracts ideologues of various kinds who wish to advance their particular views of the good society.

In my view, rather than attempting to persuade us that more information on the subjective well-being of citizens would help some hypothetical “policy maker” to make better decisions, it would have been better if the authors had sought to persuade us that this information would enable policy processes to produce better outcomes.

Would this have made any difference to the book? Although the basic arguments about the validity of subjective well-being measures and their potential usefulness would have been unchanged, I think this change of focus would have made some difference. In particular, it seems to me is that the authors would have had less difficulty convincing readers that they “do not advocate the idea that governments should intervene strongly to move society towards a primary goal of increased well-being” (p209). When most of the book seems to be devoted to telling “policy makers” how they can use subjective information to improve the well-being of citizens it is natural enough to expect readers to be concerned that some “policy makers” might act paternalistically in using this information. Some readers might not be entirely reassured that paternalistic “policy makers” would have regard to the findings of happiness research which show that humans tend to feel most satisfied when they perceive that they have freedom to choose how to live their lives.

The problem of how paternalistic interventionists might like to use research findings is placed in perspective once it is recognized that competing interests are involved in policy-making through discussions in a range of different forums. These discussions are about various things, but the matters discussed by vast majority of participants usually relate in some way to the effects of different policies on the well-being of people.

The important issue is whether measures of subjective well-being can make useful contributions to the discussion of policy issues.

What are the rules of the game of human flourishing?

Human flourishing, it seems to me, is a game that can only be played by people who are free to decide how they will live their lives and willing to accept the consequences of their decisions. There is no limit to the number of players. The game becomes more enjoyable as the number of players increases.

The aim of the game is for each player to "flourish". The game differs from most other games played by humans because the number of points scored by any one player does not necessarily diminish the number of points that can be scored by other players. Players may score additional points by helping other players.

The game commences when players agree to respect the lives and property of the other players. Each player inherits some cards and is dealt additional cards as the game progresses. Points scored depend also on the skills that the players develop as the game progresses and the opportunities available to them to benefit from cooperation with other players.

Players who trust each other can score many additional points by engaging in mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation. This cooperation can take a variety of forms including the formation of families and community groups which help people to live as they choose and to share gains and losses with relatives and friends. It also includes the creation of business ventures and the development of market institutions that enable players to benefit from specialisation and exchange.

Players can also score additional points by introducing new players. As well as providing additional opportunities for gains from trade this tends to reduce losses from theft by outsiders. The introduction of new players has some risks, however, because existing players do not know to what extent the new players can be trusted.

Players make up the rules of the game as they go along according to voting rules that they agree upon. Players usually make arrangements for provision of some public goods, including appointment of guardians who are permitted to use force to protect players from outsiders and cheaters. The appointment of guardians poses additional problems, however, in devising political rules that will discourage the guardians from plundering the players.

Unhappy players are permitted to voice their concerns and to form associations to lobby for changes to the rules. If players are unable to agree on rule changes, the political dice is rolled to determine the outcome.

Human flourishing is a relatively new game and is rarely played well. The biggest challenge for people who enjoy playing the game is to avoid rule changes that will convert it into a different game such as “serfdom” or “struggle for survival”.

To what extent are perceptions of freedom based on objective factors?

The Gallup World Poll has asked people in a large number of countries: “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?” Recent research has shown that, even after controlling for other relevant variables, people tend to be more satisfied with their lives in countries in which a relatively high proportion of the population are satisfied with their freedom to choose. (See: John Helliwell, Christopher Barrington-Leigh, Anthony Harris and Haifang Huang, ‘International Evidence on the Social Context of Well-being’, Working paper 14720, NBER, 2009.)

This is hardly surprising. People who feel relatively satisfied with their lives could generally be expected to be satisfied with their freedom to choose what they do with their lives. Do the results have more profound implications? Is the proportion of people who are satisfied with their lives related to economic freedom (encompassing personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter and compete in markets and protection of persons and their property from aggression by others) and civil liberties? Alternatively, is satisfaction with freedom an emotional state that is unrelated to objective circumstances?

The Figure below has been obtained by matching the Gallup data on satisfaction with freedom with the Fraser Institute’s data on economic freedom and Freedom House’s data on civil liberties for 121 countries, and then ranking countries according to the percentage of people who are satisfied with their freedom to choose what to do with their lives. The results suggest that economic freedom and civil liberties tend to be substantially greater in countries where people are more satisfied with their freedom to choose.





Regression analysis suggests that economic freedom and civil liberties have a positive influence on the degree of satisfaction with freedom in different countries but only explain a modest proportion of the variation in this variable. In some countries (including China) the degree of satisfaction with freedom is much higher than predicted and in some countries (including Hungary) it is much lower than predicted.

In order to test whether there is a link between satisfaction with freedom and emotional states, another data set has been constructed which incorporates data on inner freedom (percentages who feel they have a great deal of choice and control over their lives) from the World Values Survey. Unfortunately the inner freedom data was collected for a smaller number of countries, so the matched data set only covers 70 countries. (Another problem with the inner freedom data is that it does not match very well in terms of the time at which it was collected. It was collected around 2000, substantially earlier than the other data.)

The second Figure, including inner freedom, provides a similar picture to the first one. Countries in which relatively high proportions are satisfied with the amount of freedom in their lives tend to have relatively high proportions who feel a great deal of inner freedom.



Inclusion of the additional variable in the regression analysis results in a substantial increase in the proportion of variation in the degree of satisfaction with freedom explained by the model, but reduces the coefficients on the other variables. This is not surprising in view of the apparent links between economic freedom and inner freedom discussed in an earlier post.

This simple analysis does not enable me to conclude to what extent perceptions of freedom are based on objective factors. The important point that emerges is that all four varieties of freedom tend to go together.

Is the quality of life in New Zealand over-rated?

Some New Zealanders might say that this is a question that only an Australian could ask, but it seems to me to be a good way to raise the issue that I want to discuss. (I hope that when I look back on this in a few days time it will still seem like a good idea!)

The ratings that I am writing about are the ladder of life ratings from the Gallup World Poll – the top step of the ladder represents the best possible life and the bottom step represents the worst possible life. But I could be referring to any of a range of surveys that ask people to place a numerical rating on how happy they are or on how satisfied they are with their lives.

I do not intend to argue that New Zealanders have a peculiar propensity to over-rate their satisfaction with their lives. The issue I want to discuss is what it means when surveys show that New Zealanders are just as satisfied with their lives as people in the U.S. even though average incomes in NZ are only about two-thirds of the U.S. level. I propose to compare the impact of income differences and other factors on the survey measures of subjective well-being in order to enable readers to consider whether the impacts attributable to income differences provide an accurate measure of its impact on the quality of lives.

It is now possible to make fairly accurate comparisons of the impact of income and other factors on average ratings of subjective well-being at a national level. Recent research by John Helliwell, Christopher Barrington-Leigh, Anthony Harris and Haifang Huang has shown that a high proportion of differences in average life evaluations between countries can be explained statistically by differences in a relatively small number of variables reflecting social, institutional and economic circumstances of life (See Table 3, ‘International Evidence on the Social Context of Well-being’, Working paper 14720, NBER, 2009). The most important variables are income (log of per capita GDP), friends (the proportion of survey participants who have relatives or friends they can count on for help when they are in trouble), freedom (the proportion who satisfied with their freedom to choose what they do with their lives) and corruption ( responses to questions relating to whether corruption is widespread throughout government and business).

In the Figure below I have used these research results to show reasons why average survey measures of subjective well-being in several countries differ from the U.S. ratings.



The net differences from U.S. ratings are shown next to the label for each country. If you focus on New Zealand you can see that the perception of NZers that their country is relatively free of corruption outweighs the negative impact on survey responses of the fact that average incomes in NZ are substantially lower than the U.S. average.

If you consider that corruption is as big a problem in the U.S as, for example, in Greece, you might think that this provides an accurate depiction of the relative impacts of income differences and corruption on the quality of life in New Zealand and the U.S. However, when I look at the expert ratings of corruption levels in Transparency International’s corruption index, the U.S. doesn’t look too bad. The rating of the U.S. in this index (7.3) is lower than Denmark and NZ (both on 9.3) and Australia (8.7) but well above Italy (4.8) and Greece (4.7). (It is also interesting that Greeks do not perceive that their corruption problem to be any worse than that in he U.S. and that NZers do not perceive themselves to be as free of corruption as the Danes).

The point is that the influence of various factors on the survey ratings of quality of life depends on the way they are perceived. The ratings are more like emotional responses than dispassionate evaluations. It seems to me that self-reports of how people feel about their lives tell us about their emotional states - which are an important component of well-being but do not tell the whole story.

One way to test survey ratings is to ask ourselves to what extent we would be prepared to rely on them in making decisions affecting our own well-being. It seems to me that income may be more important to people when they make decisions affecting their well-being than when they answer questionnaires about the quality of their lives. If you were in Europe contemplating a choice between moving your family to either the U.S. or NZ, would you consider the importance of differences in average income levels to be adequately reflected in survey ratings of the quality of life?

Postscript:
Survey ratings can also be tested by comparing them with actual migration patterns where free migration is allowed - as between New Zealand and Australia. Migration statistics for New Zealand show that in recent years permanent and long-term departures to Australia have exceeded arrivals from Australia by a factor of more than 3:1.

Does contagion explain the clustering of happiness among friends?

A few months ago a couple of researchers - James Fowler and Nicholas Christakis -published some findings that were reported around the world in the popular media under the headline: “Happiness is contagious”. At the same time another article cast doubt on these findings by claiming that similar social network effects could be detected for acne, height and headaches.

Having thought about it, the headline “Happiness is contagious” seems to me to have about the same news content as “Influenza is contagious”. We don’t need research to tell us that we obtain pleasure from associating with happy people. But once the headline has grabbed our attention we may feel a desire to read on to find out why the item was considered newsworthy.

Why is there controversy over the research finding that happiness is contagious? The study (‘Dynamic spread of happiness in a large social network’, BMJ, 338, Jan ’09) actually claims to be providing evidence for something more substantial than the emotional contagion in which the mood of one person fleetingly influences the mood of others. The results, based on surveys of a large social network (the Framingham heart study), suggests that if you have a friend who lives within a mile who becomes happier, this increases the probability that you will also become happier. Similar effects were also noted with regard to spouses, siblings and next door neighbours.

The authors claim that their results show that “changes in individual happiness can ripple through social networks and generate large scale structure in the network, giving rise to clusters of happy and unhappy individuals” (p338).

However, in his comment on the Freakonomics blog, Justin Wolfers suggested the most likely reason a person might become happier when a friend becomes happier isn’t because happiness is contagious, but because friends tend to share similar interests and to be influenced by similar things.

Justin Wolfers is right a lot of the time and he might be right about this. It seems to me, though, that the observed tendency for the happiness of friends to increase at the same time could be attributable to more complex processes than either direct emotional contagion or the influence of some factor that is independent of their own actions – such as the football team they support in the national league winning more frequently. It is possible, for example, that their increase in happiness could be an outcome of their involvement in some voluntary community activity.

Recent research on empathy and collective action may be relevant to the clustering of happiness of people involved in social networks. An important characteristic of voluntary collective action is the need to place trust in volunteers who promise to participate for motives other than personal reward for effort. Research by Paul Zak, using the trust game (explained in detail here), indicates that a sense of being trusted results in release of oxytocin (OT) and that increased OT results in more trustworthy behavior. In a recent paper (“Empathy and collective action”) Paul Zak and Jorge Barraza note that release of OT potentiates the release of dopamine (making prosocial behavior more rewarding) and causes synaptic serotonin to rise (reducing anxiety and helping people to sustain altruistic collective action over an extended period of time).

Zak and Barraza suggest that this brain circuit promoting altruistic collective action is stimulated when volunteers do things like spending time together to build empathy, exchanging gifts, sharing meals and sharing adventures. They also cite evidence that people who volunteer to help others report higher levels of happiness.

What determines whether we have successful lives?

Your chances of success in life depend on your intelligence, your family background and your temperament, don’t they? Yes, to some extent. But over the last few days I have read about research findings which suggest that beyond a threshold IQ doesn’t make much difference, the important aspects of family background are only superficially related to wealth and the predictive importance of childhood temperament tends to diminish over time.

In “Outliers” Malcolm Gladwell tells the story of research conducted by Lewis Terman who identified 1,470 Californian children with very high IQs (over 130) in the 1920s. Terman believed initially that members of this group were destined to be among the future elite of the U.S. When they grew up, however, the majority had careers that could only be considered ordinary. It turns out that the relationship between IQ and success works only up to a point. Additional points of IQ beyond about 120 (remember the population average equals 100) don’t seem to have much impact on success.

Further analysis divided these genius subjects into three groups and looked for reasons for differences between the achievements of the most successful and least successful groups. The main difference seemed to be that the most successful performers came from the middle and upper class – the most successful group contained almost none of the children from the lowest socioeconomic class. Later in his book Gladwell points to evidence which suggests that the link to socioeconomic class has little to do with things that are directly associated with wealth or even with the quality of schooling. Research by Karl Alexander shows, for example, that the main difference between reading scores between elementary school children emerge during the summer vacation period while they are not at school. The wealthier parents tend to cultivate the interests of their children in reading etc. even during the summer vacation period. The difference seems to have more to do with culture than with income.

Gladwell’s main point is that it is impossible for superstars in any field to look down from their lofty perches and say with truthfulness, “I did this all by myself”. Gladwell argues: “They are the products of history and community, of opportunity and legacy. Their success is not exceptional or mysterious. ... The outlier, in the end, is not an outlier at all” (p 285).

Something else I have read recently that relates to the determinants of successful lives is Joshua Wolf Shenk’s article “What Makes Us Happy” (The Atlantic Online, June 2009). Shenk’s article discusses George Vaillant’s research, based on the Harvard Study of Adult Development. This study of healthy, well-adjusted Harvard students began in 1937 and followed its subjects for more than 70 years. As with Terman’s study, the leading researcher originally involved in the Harvard study thought he would be studying a group of people who would have successful lives. Many did in fact achieve dramatic success, but by age 50 almost a third of the subjects had at one time or another met Vaillant’s criteria for mental illness.

One of Vaillant’s findings is that the predictive importance of childhood temperament diminishes over time: shy, anxious kids tend to do poorly in young adulthood, but by age 70 they are just as likely as the outgoing kids to be happy and well. One of the factors that he found to predict healthy aging is “employing mature adaptations” to life’s troubles. Mature adaptations include altruism, humour, anticipation (planning for future discomfort) and delaying attention to an impulse or conflict. The second most important factor that he found to predict healthy aging was the quality of relationships, including with siblings, friends and mentors.

Will Wilkinson comments on his blog: “What I liked so much about this essay, and about Vaillant, is the recognition that the complexity of human psychology, the complexity of coping and adapting to the challenges life throws up, makes relationships or “social aptitude” no simple thing.” I agree.

This brings me back to Gladwell’s book. One of the things from “Outliers” that will stick in my mind is Gladwell’s account of the Roseto mystery. In brief, in the 1950s the inhabitants of Roseto (Pennsylvania), whose ancestors came from a town of the same name in Italy, had a very low incidence of heart disease and their death rate from all causes was 30 to 35 percent lower than expected. Researchers ruled out all the obvious causes such as diet, exercise, genes and location. Their explanation was that Rosetans had created a powerful, protective social structure capable of insulating them from the pressures of the modern world. In Gladwell’s words, it was about “the mysterious and magical benefits of people stopping to talk to one another on the street and of having three generations under one roof” (p 10).

This is very interesting and very complex. I find myself reacting in three different ways. First, in statistical terms “outliers” are chance events; before getting too excited about sociological implications we should establish whether there is evidence that other communities which share similar characteristics to Roseto in the 1950s have similar health outcomes. Second, leaving aside the “mysterious and magical” factors, the most useful place to look for an explanation would be in the links between happiness (emotional health) and physical health. Third, perhaps it is time I had a closer look at the research findings behind those headlines a few months ago which claimed that scientists now have evidence that happiness is contagious.

Where will the productivity growth come from?

In the Australian federal budget delivered earlier this week, forward estimates of revenue and spending were based on Treasury projections of economic growth rates in excess of 4 percent coming out of the current recession. This projection has attracted attention because the projected growth rates are higher than those experienced in Australia during recent boom years.

It seems reasonable to me to suppose that growth rates might be somewhat above trend when an economy comes out of a recession. An economy that is not limited by capacity constraints obviously has potential to grow more rapidly than one approaching full employment.

However, the Treasury’s optimism about future economic growth prospects in Australia seems to me to sit oddly with their more guarded views about prospects for the world economy. In discussing the outlook for the world economy Treasury states: “Even when growth returns, the recession will leave a legacy of significant policy challenges across the world. The extraordinary measures being taken to combat the current crisis will have to be unwound carefully.” Governments will not find it easy to unwind these extraordinary measures. This means that commodity exporting countries like Australia should expect the world economy to give them a fairly bumpy ride in the years ahead.

Why is Treasury so optimistic about Australia’s growth prospects? The Treasury forecasters base their optimism on the growth rates experienced in Australia following recessions in the 1980s and 1990s. Their projected growth rate is about the same as that following the 1990s recession.

Even if it is reasonable to expect world economic growth in the 2010s to be as robust as in the 1990s, is it reasonable to expect that Australia’s productivity growth in the 2010s to be as high as in the 1990s? The 1990s was a period in which multifactor productivity growth in Australia was more than double the rate experienced in recent years. High rates of productivity growth in the 1990s stemmed to a large extent from productivity improvements in the services sector, which were associated with micro-economic reforms (neo-liberalism in the terminology favoured by Australia’s current Prime Minister).

Where will comparable productivity improvements come from during the 2010s? Perhaps the government has plans for extensive microeconomic reforms that it has yet to announce. But I wouldn’t bet on it!

How much prudential regulation do we need?

It was a few weeks since I had seen Jim, so I made the mistake of asking him what he had been doing. He replied that he had been thinking about bankruptcy.

I said that I didn’t know his financial situation was that bad. Jim replied that he wasn’t having too much trouble paying his own bills at this stage, but he had been thinking about bankruptcy as an institution and about the role of government in bankruptcy. While he was saying that I was thinking that Jim was not the kind of person who would ever have too much trouble paying his bills. I heard him ask: “What do you think about bankruptcy?”

I said that I thought modern bankruptcy laws that wiped the slate clean when debtors had no hope of meeting their obligations were a huge advance on traditional practices such as virtual enslavement or imprisonment of people who could not pay their debts. I added that in my view there had to be a role for government in this process because you can’t allow people to hire muscle to pressure people to pay their debts. Since we have to rely ultimately on the coercive power of government to enforce contracts then we have to rely on government to devise rules about the conditions under which contracts cannot be enforced.

Jim nodded. He then asked: “What do you think about limited liability?” I said that I thought the contribution of limited liability to economic growth was often overstated because liability insurance could have arisen to serve a similar purpose in enabling individual investors to limit their liability when in investing in companies. I added, however, that I couldn’t see a problem in the owners of a firm declaring that their liability was limited to the amounts they had invested. In my view transparency is the important issue: people who lend money to the firm or provide good on credit should be aware that if the firm goes bust the liability of the owners is limited.

Jim said: “Hmm, so you are saying that if I form a company to engage in speculation there should be no limit on the amount of debt that the company can incur? Are you saying that I should be allowed to gamble with other people’s money secure in the knowledge that if the gamble doesn’t pay off then my own liability is limited to the extent of my own investment in the company?” I insisted that transparency was the important issue. If people are prepared to take the risks involved in lending money to speculators, good luck to them.

Jim said: “People who take those risks need all the luck they can get. What about systemic risks? It is one thing to accept that a few people will lose their life savings whenever some highly leveraged property speculator goes bust, but isn’t it something quite different when confidence in the whole financial system is threatened because of excessive leverage in major financial institutions?” I did my best to put the argument that the current financial crisis arose at the end of last year because central banks in major economies hadn’t established a credible commitment to maintaining a stable rate of nominal GDP growth. I suggested that the best way to deal with the deleveraging and associated decline in the velocity of circulation would have been by maintaining a monetary policy that would promote expectations of a stable rate of growth in nominal GDP.

I could see Jim’s eyes glaze over as I spoke. He said: “If you were making government policy decisions in the aftermath of the current financial crisis wouldn’t you be looking to see what could be done to avoid re-emergence of systemic risk in major financial institutions? I had to admit that if I was making government policy decisions I would probably be looking for policy levers relating to capital adequacy and things like that.

Jim said: “Ah, you sound just like one of those neo-socialists who advocates more financial regulation in order to save the capitalist system. Rather than interfering in the financial management of healthy companies, wouldn’t it be better for governments to focus on improving laws to minimize the adverse effects on the wider economy that can occur when some companies become insolvent. For example, why can’t the ownership of insolvent companies be quickly transferred to creditors?”

Jim seems to like asking me questions that I can’t answer.

Is money a message as well as a medium?

Money is the medium of exchange as well as the unit of account and store of value. As the medium of exchange money makes life easy because we don’t have to spend a lot of time trying to find someone who is prepared to trade the goods we want to buy for the goods we want to sell. I have never been able to understand what Marshal McLuhan was talking about when he said “the medium is the message”, but the question I want to consider is whether we behave differently when we have money on our minds.

The idea that people may behave differently when they have money on their minds has a long history. Everyone has heard the biblical claim: “the love of money is the root of all evil”. What does this mean? This is not really an assertion that it is evil to collect coins, is it? It seems to me that the statement was not really about money at all but about the love of the worldly goods that money can buy.

The question of whether people behave differently when they have money on their minds also comes up in discussing when it is or is not appropriate to attempt to motivate other people using money. Tyler Cowen, for example, has used several parables to discuss this question, including the dirty dishes parable. Is paying one of your children a good way to ensure that the dishes are washed? Probably not. Children may feel less obligation to do their share of family chores if a voluntary exchange relationship is established in which the parent becomes an employer providing money in exchange for work, rather than a family leader “who is due some amount of obedience in his or her own right” (“Discover your Inner Economist”, p 14).

Is the payment of money intrinsic to this parable? I think that many economists would tend to say that the parable would apply in the same way if the child is paid in kind, e.g. in tickets to rock concerts, rather than in money. In the minds of many economists the issue would appear to be whether strict reciprocity is appropriate to the circumstances rather than about the method of payment that is used. Economists often say that money is a veil.

However, I am not sure that many parents would rule out all forms of bartering as being inappropriate as a means of motivating a child to do his or her share of family chores. It seems to me that bartering could be appropriate if it is about the things that parents do for their children that are beyond what might be generally considered to be the core responsibilities of a parent. For example, like many other parents, while my kids were in their teens I used a substantial part of my leisure time providing an unpaid taxi service to ferry them and their friends to and from various sporting and entertainment activities. Would it be inappropriate for a parent to suggest to a child that it would be unfair to expect provision of such services unless he or she does an appropriate share of family chores without having to be constantly reminded?

This raises the question of whether responses to provision of incentives have more to do with perceptions of the appropriateness of particular incentives than with concepts such as the strictness of reciprocity or the money value of the incentives provided. There is some evidence that actions that merely remind people of money can have a significant effect on behavior. For example, Kathleen Vohs, Nicole Meade and Miranda Goode report an experiment in which participants were primed by sitting at a desk facing posters showing various denominations of currency or posters showing either a seascape or a flower garden. The participants were then presented with a nine-item questionnaire in which each question asked them to choose between two leisure activities – an experience that only one person could enjoy and an experience that two or more people could enjoy together. Participants primed with the money poster tended to chose more individually focused experiences. The authors report similar results for eight other experiments (‘The psychological consequences of money’, Science, 318 (5802), 2006).

So what if responses to incentives are strongly influenced by perceptions of the form in which the incentive is provided and the language used when the offer is made? The most obvious implication is that a lot of care is required in selecting incentives that are perceived to be appropriate and in presenting them in an appropriate way to achieve the desired effect. There are quite different implications in relation to prevention of corruption. The ethics of accepting a bribe do not change merely because the incentive offered is more subtle than a bundle of notes in a brown paper bag.

Are we born to be good?

In arguing that we are born to be good, psychologist Dacher Keltner has in mind a particular definition of what it means to be good. In his book “Born to be Good” he views goodness as synonymous with the Confucian concept of jen: a person of jen “brings the good things in others to completion and does not bring the bad things of others to completion” (p. 4).

The author’s aim is to enable the reader to see human behavior in a new light. He presents evidence supporting his view that we have been wired by seven million years of hominid evolution to practice emotions like compassion, gratitude, amusement and wonder that are associated with bringing the good in others to completion. “We have neuropeptides that enable trust and devotion, and a branch of nerves that connects the brain, the voice and the heart that enables caretaking. Our capacity for awe has given us art, a sense of the sacred. We have genes, neurotransmitters, and regions of the brain that serve these emotions as we serve others. These emotions are the substance of jen” (p 269).

Keltner does not deny that we are also wired to pursue self-interest. His claim is that this is “half the story” (p 11). His research suggests that rather than just one reward circuit in the brain that is activated in response to any kind of pleasure, different neural circuits are involved in different kinds of positive emotions such as sensory pleasure, pride, compassion and awe (pp 265-267). He suggests that in our search for happiness many of us have tended to focus excessively on sensory pleasure and to lose sight of the emotions associated with, for example, “subtle cues of embarrassment, playful vocalisations, the visceral feelings of compassion, the sense of gratitude in another’s touch to your shoulder” (p 15).

The main reservation I have about the book relates to the author’s tendency to equate self-interest solely with pursuit of sensory pleasure and to contrast this with the other positive emotions associated with bringing good things in others to completion. At one point he writes: “Ironically enough, compassion may be a prerequisite to the pursuit of self-interested happiness” (p 249). It seems to me that this is only ironical if one takes a very narrow view of self-interest – a much narrower view than that taken, for example, by neoclassical economists who incorporate the happiness of others in the utility functions they use in their theoretical work.

As discussed in an earlier post, it seems to me that there is a lot of good involved in self-actualization that does not necessarily involve bringing the good in others to completion. Being good also involves such things as the human capacity to distinguish between wanting and liking and to defer gratification that are also the result of evolution. In addition, Gregory Burns seems to me to make a strong case that evolution has also wired humans to meet personal challenges: “The sense of satisfaction after you’ve successfully handled unexpected tasks or sought out unfamiliar, physically and emotionally demanding activities is your brain’s signal that you’re doing what nature designed you to do” (“Satisfaction”, p xiv).

The book omits what seems to me to be the strongest argument that can be advanced in favour of the view that humans have evolved to be good, namely the evolution of the concept of self. As philosopher Daniel Dennett has pointed out, evolutionary processes have supported the evolution of minds powerful enough to capture the reasons for things and make them our reasons: “ We are not perfectly rational agents, but the social arena we live in sustains processes of dynamic interaction that both require and permit the renewal of our reasons, making us into agents that can take responsibility for our acts” (“Freedom Evolves”, p 287).

Despite these reservations and my critical comments in earlier posts about Dacher Keltner’s portrayal of Adam Smith’s views and his apparent attempt to argue that social cooperation cannot emerge from self-interest, I found this book to be highly informative. I am not competent to judge the quality of the author’s research findings, but he is obviously an authority in his field. The book makes a strong case that humans have been wired by evolution to experience positive emotions when they seek to bring the good in others to completion.

Does tit-for-tat prioritize the gains of others over those of the self?

The essential feature of a tit-for-tat strategy is reciprocity – rewarding cooperation and punishing defection. In his book, “Born to be Good”, Dacher Keltner claims that “tit-for-tat instantiates the principle of cost-benefit reversal”. He argues that a set of mechanisms that reverse the cost-benefit analysis of giving is built into the human organism. He suggests: “These mechanisms might prioritize the gains of others over those of the self, and transform others’ gains into one’s own” (p. 71).

Keltner bases his claim that tit-for-tat involved cost-benefit reversal on three observations:

• When cooperation is the default setting, tit-for-tat favours mutually beneficial cooperation.
  
• Tit-for-tat is not envious – the strategy doesn’t change as a partner’s benefits mount.
  
• Tit-for-tat is a forgiving strategy – cooperation is resumed following the first cooperative action of a defector.
  

It seems to me, however, that none of these features of tit-for-tat necessarily involves prioritizing the gains of others over those of the self. It is possible for a tit-for-tat strategy to be adopted purely out of self interest. Robert Axelrod recognised this in “The Evolution of Cooperation” (p 173-4) , in his discussion of the experiments that Keltner uses as the basis for his discussion of tit-for-tat.

A tit-for-tat strategy based on self-interest provides a plausible explanation for the emergence of cooperation among strangers who have no reason to trust each other. For example, consider a situation where strangers are considering the initiation of trade in the absence of third party (e.g. government) protection against opportunistic use of force and fraud. From the perspective of each party the possible outcomes would be: a) a potential gain from trade; b) a potential loss resulting from opportunism by the other party – i.e. theft of the goods offered for trade; c) a potential gain from opportunism – theft of goods offered for trade by the other party; d) a stand-off.

If trade occurs in this situation, is it likely to be because one party places higher priority on the potential gains to the other party than on the potential gains to the self? I think it is more likely to occur because both parties consider that, in view of the likely responses of each other, they have more to gain from a series of mutually beneficial exchanges that they would gain from attempting to steal from each other.

If both parties adopt a consistent tit-for-tat strategy, then trade is likely to continue and they may come to trust each other. It is possible to envisage that the relationship could even develop to a point where they each gain some satisfaction from the benefit that they bestow upon each other through the exchange of goods. But this trust and affection is the outgrowth of mutually beneficial cooperation rather than a pre-condition for it.

I don’t understand why Dacher Keltner seeks to denigrate those who see self interest as a motivating force (see: How high was Adam Smith’s jen ratio?) and seeks to eliminate self-interest from the evolution of social cooperation. Perhaps he identifies the self-interest motive with opportunism, greed and selfishness to such an extent that he cannot see that it is good to desire to avoid being a burden on others, to help family members and other loved ones, and to accumulate the means to contribute generously to worthwhile causes. Perhaps he is uncomfortable with the idea that an invisible hand involved in voluntary exchange processes could enable people to benefit from cooperation with each other without actually intending to benefit each other.

How high was Adam Smith's jen ratio?

Jen is apparently the central idea in the teachings of Confucius. In his book, “Born to be Good”, Dacher Keltner tells us that the numerator in the jen ratio is actions that bring the good in others to completion and the denominator is actions that bring the bad in others to completion. For example, if a writer misrepresents the views of others he would tend to lower the jen ratio.

I have been looking forward to reading “Born to be Good”. I have previously considered on this blog the question of whether the inner nature of humans is good and I want to explore this topic further.

However, after reading a few pages I began to wonder whether reading this book will do much to improve my jen ratio. The problem is that it seems to me that Keltner’s discussion of the views of Adam Smith is uncharitable. Keltner claims that Smith portrayed Homo economicus as some kind of ideal of human evolution who was designed to maximize self-interest in the form of experienced pleasure and advances in advances in material wealth ( p 8).

Smith had a realistic view of human nature. I don’t think he saw humans as rational maximisers of anything, but it is true that he did make some famous observations about self interest as a motivating force. Smith stated: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (“Wealth of Nations”, I.ii.2). It seems to me that this is an observation about the way the world works rather than a statement advocating selfishness.

I think the closest Smith got to advocating selfishness is his claim that by pursuing his own interests an individual frequently promotes that of society: “I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the publick good” (W.N., IV, ii, 9).
It is arguable that Smith was being too cynical at that point. It is possible to think of examples of a great deal of good being done by not-for-profit organisations e.g. in running schools and hospitals.

Anyone who had an interest in presenting a fair picture of Smith’s views of human nature, however, would also take account of the views he presented in “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”. For example: “The virtues of prudence, justice, and beneficence, have no tendency to produce any but the most agreeable effects. ... In our approbation of all these virtues , our sense of their agreeable effects , of their utility, either to the person who exercises them , or to some other persons, joins with our sense of their propriety, and constitutes always a considerable, frequently the greater part of that approbation” (TMS IV, iii, 59).

It is not fair to portray Adam Smith as promoting an “ideology about human nature ... with a jen ratio trending toward zero”.

What is the role of animal spirits in the political sphere in producing economic crises?

“Conventional economic theories exclude the changing thought patterns and modes of doing business that bring on a crisis. They even exclude the loss of trust and confidence. They exclude the sense of fairness that inhibits the wage and price flexibility that could possibly stabilize an economy. They exclude the role of corruption and the sale of bad products in booms, and the role of their revelation when the bubbles burst. They also exclude the role of stories that interpret the economy. All of these exclusions from conventional explanations of how the economy behaves were responsible for the suspension of disbelief that led up to the current crisis” (George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, “Animal Spirits”, 2009, p 167).

I don’t have many problems with the argument of Akerlof and Shiller (A & S) that animal spirits play an important role in economic crises. I think they attempt to carry their argument too far; it seems to me that the economic system tends to be self-equilibrating despite notions of fairness and money illusion. But I accept that when there is high leverage in the system (i.e. high levels of debt relative to equity) it is a lot more vulnerable to economic crises than when there is low leverage. I also accept that changes in confidence help explain why leverage fluctuates. Stories that interpret the economy seem to have a big role in determining confidence. A few years ago it was common to hear the story that the risks involved in lending on housing were minimal – even “as safe as houses”. Now the story we hear is that investment in government-backed securities offers “a safe harbour”.

The main problem I have with this book is its failure to recognize that animal spirits also play a role in politics. In fact, as Arnold Kling and Clive Crook have pointed out, A & S fail to mention public choice theory. Instead, their model of government is what Kling describes as the “shockingly naive metaphor of a parent”. In their preface, A & S write:

“The proper role of the government, like the proper role of the advice-book parent, is to...give full rein to the creativity of capitalism. But it should also countervail the excesses that occur because of our animal spirits.”

Crook writes: “This is an unappealing analogy. I would sooner take up arms against a government that saw me as a child than vote for it.”

It seems to me that the most important animal spirit that Akerlof and Shiller fail to mention is the anti-market bias, stemming from an excessive desire for security and stability, which comes to the surface whenever a financial crisis threatens to occur. Rather than allowing the normal process of liquidation to occur when large financial institutions fail, the animal spirits that rule the political domain say that everything must be done to “keep the first domino from falling” (as A & S advocate on page 85).

When viewed in isolation, the bail-out of each institution seems like cheap insurance to government policy advisors. The problem is that a series of bail-outs tends to generate excessive confidence in central banks and governments. If you are lending money to a company that you expect to be backed by government, then you are not going to be too worried if the salary packages of the executives of that company give them incentives to take excessive risks. Creditors might not be surprised if the company gets into financial difficulty, but they will be shocked if it isn’t rescued by government.

From the A & S perspective the current crisis occurred not because parents encouraged the kids to act unwisely by incurring gambling debts , but because the parents decided to let one of their wayward children file for bankruptcy. That unsettled the creditors, so the parents lost their nerve and decided to pay all the kids’ debts. At this stage the lesson that the parents seem to have learned from this is that the kids need more parental supervision to make sure that their animal spirits don’t ever get out of control again. How will the kids respond? Will they leave home to get away from this parental supervision? Or will their animal spirits lead them to pretend to be good for a while in order to re-establish cosy relationships with their parents?

What is your inner economist?

As I was reading Tyler Cowen’s book “Discover Your Inner Economist” I wished that I had read it sooner.

The cover of the book and the table of contents did not give me good reasons to buy the book. The cover invites potential readers to use incentives to fall in love, survive their next meeting and motivate their dentist. The contents page suggests that the book is about things like how to control the world, possess all the great art ever made and practice the art of self-deception. Since I do not aspire to be a master of the universe I have given higher priority to reading other books, such as Tim Harford’s book about the economic logic of life and Dan Ariely’s book about hidden forces that can tend to make decisions predictably irrational (discussed here).

If I had read some reviews of Tyler’s book I would have discovered that it is really about how your inner economist can help you to live a good life. I would also have discovered that Tyler’s inner economist does not try to apply market place logic to all aspects of life. The book is full of parables drawn from every day life and suggestions about how to live well - including suggestions on how to make visits to art galleries and museums more rewarding and how to eat well on a limited budget.

If someone had asked me to describe my inner economist before I had read this book I would probably have said that it was the inner voice that kept telling me things like: incentives matter; resources are scarce; don’t forget about opportunity costs; sunk costs are irrelevant to current decisions; and human behavior is motivated by self interest. I would probably have mentioned that, like any other sensible human, any sensible economist also has other inner voices (e.g. the voices of ethicists, psychologists and sociologists) questioning whether the advice of the inner economist is appropriate to the circumstances. I might also have said that there is always potential for an inner voice of reason to preside over this inner babble and say things like “on the one hand ...” and “on the other hand ...” and for an inner executive to conclude “on balance, it seems to me ...”.

One obvious problem with my initial perception of the inner economist is that economists have a well deserved reputation for saying “on the one hand” and “on the other hand”. Good economics takes account of insights from other disciplines where they are relevant – it involves more than just an exploration of what might happen if people behave in the way economists have often assumed that they will behave in simple models of market behaviour.

Tyler sets up pattern recognition as the most important function of the inner economist: “Your Inner Economist sees patterns that you might not be seeing at first glance” (p 8). He argues against the view promoted by some economists that monetary incentives, markets and property rights should be applied to all aspects of life, including family life. “Our Inner Economist knows that money cannot buy love, respect or peace of mind” (p 3). But our inner economist can recognize the circumstances in which monetary incentives will work well (e.g. where performance is highly responsive to extra effort or where intrinsic motivation is weak).

Tyler identifies a major drawback of rewards and penalties as follows: “We use them to influence the behavior of other people. And this is precisely what makes those people feel a lack of control and a lack of freedom” (p 33).

If aspiring masters of the universe were the intended audience for this book, I hope a lot of them have bought it. However, I doubt whether many of them would have enjoyed reading it as much as I did.

Are the economic rationalists in Canberra losing their marbles?

When Jim asked me whether I was an economic rationalist I thought he was just stirring. The term “economic rationalist” has been used mainly in Australia and doesn’t seem to be used much anywhere these days. I don’t think there were ever many people in Canberra who called themselves economic rationalists. Those of us advocating economically rational policies just thought of ourselves as economists doing what economists should be doing. We knew that when people referred to us as economic rationalists they were probably intending to be offensive, just as most of those who refer to classical liberals as neo-liberals are intending to be offensive. But I don’t think the label worried us much. When people referred to me as an economic rationalist I knew that I was among good company.

I admitted to Jim that people had sometimes referred to me as an economic rationalist. Jim then asked me if I thought John Smith (name changed to protect Jim) would be an economic rationalist. I don’t know that I have ever met Smith but he has the reputation of being a good economist, having held senior positions in the Treasury as well as other government departments at a time when major economic reforms were being undertaken. I told Jim that I thought that Smith could be relied on to provide good public policy advice.

Jim then seemed to change the topic of conversation. He asked: “Do you think economic considerations should be taken into account in quarantine policy?” I replied that economic considerations were obviously relevant. For example, it doesn’t make economic sense to implement policies that will raise consumer prices by a huge amount in order to protect a tiny domestic industry, even if scientific evidence suggests a high probability that diseased imports will damage this industry.

Jim said: “So, are you suggesting that quarantine decisions should all be subject to a full blown 100-page cost benefit analysis?” I acknowledged that a full-blown analysis would be too expensive to do every time and is not necessary in most cases because the answer that such a study would come up with was usually obvious. I suggested that the legislation should incorporate a national interest test and require that the economic advice used to apply that test should be made public when decisions are made.

Jim replied: “But wouldn’t that make it difficult for politicians to take account of things like impacts that are concentrated in particular electorates, their concerns that voters might attribute damage to industries from highly improbable events to their mismanagement - and other irrationality that people exhibit on risk.” I said: “So what! If you are designing public policy rules in the interests of the whole community then you want the rules to make life difficult for populist politicians who pander to such concerns”.

Jim said: “I thought you might say that. But John Smith tried to sell me a very different line when I spoke to him in Canberra recently. He said that it would be important for the analysis of quarantine matters by the advisory economist to place higher weights on extreme events and on things with concentrated impacts and to make other adjustments to account for the irrationality that people exhibit on risk.”

I was stunned. All I could say at the time was that I could now understand why Jim had asked me whether John Smith was an economic rationalist.

Jim’s story makes me wonder how many other Canberra people who once advocated economically rational policies have lost their marbles by getting too close to politicians.

Postscript:
A friend and former work colleague has responded by suggesting that it is normal for people providing economic advice within the bureaucracy to advise Ministers on the distributional effects of policy initiatives. I think my friend has missed the point.
As I understand it, John Smith is considering what rules should apply in assessing future quarantine cases. The issues involved take this outside of normal bureaucratic policy advice. There are interest groups who will see quarantine as a way to obtain protection from import competition by the back door i.e. through a non-transparent process. Ideally, the issues involved should be subject to some kind of public inquiry to assess national economic benefits and costs through a transparent process. The fact that this is not practicable in every case doesn't mean that we have to resort to normal processes for bureacratic advice to Ministers. As I understand it what is proposed is legislation that would require an assessment to be made of the relative economic costs and benefits of proposed quarantine action. John Smith seems to be proposing to muddy the waters.

What can the G20 do about protectionism?

“We have got to be absolutely clear that protectionism offers no solution. It’s the road to ruin. It protects no-one in the long run at all and we are for a free trade world where we remove barriers rather than create barriers, no matter what the temptation is at this particular point in time for individual countries.” Gordon Brown, U.K. Prime Minister, talking about his hopes for the G20 summit.

I have no doubt that the G20 will make a strong statement in opposition to protectionism. After the G20 leaders have agreed that protectionism is the road to ruin and have lined up for the group photo, they will then go home and continue to increase assistance to domestic industries at the expense of imports. The most we can hope for is that the threat of retaliation will prevent the most overt kinds of protectionism that could result in escalation of retaliatory protectionism. If we are lucky the world economy will begin to pick up before protectionism gets out of control.

Why am I pessimistic about the effectiveness of the anti-protectionist pronouncements that seem likely to come out of the G20? It is because decisions by governments about industry assistance are made primarily in response to domestic political pressures and because prevailing perceptions about domestic economic impacts will cause governments to take most notice of the narrow interests that stand to gain from protectionism.

The prevailing perceptions I am writing about include the belief that during a recession it is possible to protect jobs in one industry without any adverse effects elsewhere in the economy, unless there is foreign retaliation. It is easy to see why this is economic nonsense. Import restrictions cause consumers to buy higher-priced domestic production rather than imports – they work in the same way as a tax on consumption of a good that is used to finance a subsidy to producers. The result is that consumers have less income to spend on other goods. Jobs are saved in one industry at the expense of jobs elsewhere in the economy.

Some readers might be thinking that this reasoning doesn’t apply to industry assistance that is funded from government spending because the increased spending just goes to increase the fiscal deficit and government debt. Some government leaders who increase budgetary assistance to industry might even think they have reason to expect to be patted on the head by leaders of other governments for doing something to stimulate the world economy. The truth is, however, that such covert protectionism is unlikely to even stimulate the domestic economy since private investors are likely to be forced to pay higher interest rates in order to fund their investments, and domestic taxpayers are likely to increase precautionary savings in anticipation of having to pay higher taxes in the years ahead.

Is there anything that the G20 countries could do that would help governments to deal with the domestic political pressures that result in increased protection during recessions? The least they could do is to compare notes about how they cope with such pressures in their own countries. Australia’s prime minister, Kevin Rudd, is probably too modest to trumpet the success of the Hawke government in dealing with protectionism in the 1980s with the help of domestic transparency arrangements. It might be possible, however, for leaders of other governments who have an interest in this matter to prevail upon our Kevin to provide them with some helpful information on this topic.

Postscript:
Readers who wonder what I am talking about might be interested in this.

Does fractional reserve banking have to be a scam?

“To some extent, commercial bankers lend out their own capital and money acquired by CDs (certificates of deposit). But most commercial banking is "deposit banking" based on a gigantic scam: the idea, which most depositors believe, that their money is down at the bank, ready to be redeemed in cash at any time. If Jim has a checking account of $1,000 at a local bank, Jim knows that this is a "demand deposit," that is, that the bank pledges to pay him $1,000 in cash, on demand, anytime he wishes to "get his money out." Naturally, the Jims of this world are convinced that their money is safely there, in the bank, for them to take out at any time.” Murray N Rothbard, ‘Fractional Reserve Banking’.

When my friend Jim asked my reaction to this quote, I said that I didn’t know that he knew Murray Rothbard. Jim replied: “I didn’t know that he knew me, but I think he is making a good point.”

I asked Jim whether he thought most people really believed that banks were like warehouses that kept the money deposited with them until people wanted to withdraw it. Jim said: “Most people know that banks lend the funds deposited with them to other people, but the point is that banks do promise to repay deposits on demand. They know that they can’t keep this promise if everyone wants their money back at the same time. Banks shouldn’t be allowed to make promises they can’t keep.”

I tried to argue that the financial system generally works well even though exceptional circumstances can arise where financial intermediaries make promises that they cannot keep. I suggested that it is very rare for situations to arise when a high proportion of borrowers do not meet their commitments and the value of the security held by banks falls below the value of loans outstanding.

Jim said: “Look, you can’t pretend that these situations where banks can’t keep their promises occur so infrequently that they should be ignored. Democratic governments don’t just look the other way when banks go bust. Do you think that the best solution for this problem is for governments to get involved by offering deposit insurance, guarantees that banks will not be allowed to fail and close supervision and regulation to ensure that such guarantee do not result in irresponsible behaviour? Don’t you see that this government intervention has arisen because banks are allowed to make promises that they can’t keep.”

I asked Jim whether he was suggesting that instead of promising to repay deposits on demand, banks should convert themselves into unit trusts. That would mean that the amount that investors could get back on demand would vary according to the market value of the financial institution’s loan portfolio.

Jim replied: “I don’t think many people would view that system as a good substitute for conventional bank deposits that are repayable on demand. What I have in mind is that a bank would specify in its agreement with depositors that in the event that it could not meet its promise to repay deposits in full within, say, a month of the request being made, then equity holdings in the bank would immediately be cancelled and re-issued to depositors in proportion to the nominal value of their deposits. The former depositors could decide whether they wanted to liquidate these equity holdings immediately by selling them on the stock market, or to hold on in the hope that the bank’s financial situation would improve.”

I have been thinking about Jim’s proposal. I do not imagine that the conversion of deposits in a troubled bank into equity holdings would be as quick and simple as Jim envisages. Nevertheless his proposal seems to me to be preferable to the current shambles that has arisen as government regulators have sought to substitute their assurances for dodgy promises that financial institutions are not able to keep.

What is the best analogy to help us understand the financial crisis?

In attempting to understand the current financial crisis I don’t have the benefit of a great deal of knowledge of macroeconomics. Nevertheless, I can understand only too well what many macroeconomists are saying about fiscal stimulus and multipliers because they are using Keynesian language that I learned in my first year at university 45 years ago.

During the 1970s nearly all macroeconomists seemed to abandon the crude Keynesianism that I learned about at university. Why have so many reverted to it at this time? The answer might have more to do with the desire for a comfort blanket in times of uncertainty than with the merits of Keynes’ approach. The Keynesian remedy does not seem to me to be much more relevant to the current situation than it was to the stagflation of the 1970s. It suggests that when you wake up with a debt-induced hangover, then you will soon feel better if you get the government to take on some more debt on your behalf. That doesn’t sound to me like a recipe for a more healthy world economy.

So I have been looking for articles which will help me to understand why the world is in recession and what can be done about it. The best aid to understanding that I have found so far is John Cochrane’s refinery analogy:

“Imagine by analogy that several major refineries had blown up. There would be tankers full of oil sitting in the harbor, and oil prices would be low, yet little gasoline would be available and gas prices would be high. Stimulating people to drive around would not revive gas sales. Borrowing gasoline and using it on infrastructure projects would be worse. The right policy action would obviously be to run whatever government or military refineries could be cobbled together on short notice at full speed, and focus on rebuilding the private ones.” John H Cochrane, ‘Fiscal Stimulus, Fiscal Inflation or Fiscal Fallacies’.

The “major refineries” correspond to the banks that have loaded themselves with toxic assets. The oil tankers sitting in the harbour correspond to the savings that are going to government securities paying low interest rates and the high gas prices correspond to the high price of credit to businesses and consumers (in many countries). The running of government and military refineries at full speed corresponds to the government raising funds by issuing debt and lending it to businesses and consumers.

Cochrane recognizes that this analogy does not give a complete picture of the current situation. He explains that if we just had a shock to the supply of credit (blown up refineries) we would expect to see stagflation – lower quantities of goods and services sold, but upward pressure on prices. Instead we are seeing lower quantities sold and lower inflation. So, we are also seeing a demand shock as a result of people becoming much more averse to holding risks. (The refinery analogy could possibly be stretched to accommodate this. If several major refineries were blown up then investors could be expected to seek to reduce the exposure of their portfolios to other firms that might also be at risk of “blowing up”.)

Would the situation be resolved if the central banks were to target a specific rate of growth in nominal GDP (as I discussed in an earlier post)? The answer might depend on what assets the central banks purchase from the public in pursuit of this objective. If they buy government bonds this will help satisfy the increased demand for money, but not address the supply shock in the credit market. It is possible that the market could take care of this problem e.g. major firms may be able to by-pass the damaged banks by raising funds directly from the public. However, when central banks buy newly-issued commercial paper and securitized debt they are acting directly in place of the injured banks.

As a stop-gap measure this kind of by-pass intervention has the important merit of being a lot easier to unwind than alternative approaches. If central banks confine their purchases to quality assets they will not have any difficulty selling them when inflation begins to rise and people get tired of holding so much money. The effects of fiscal stimulus involving cash splashes by governments are likely to be much more difficult to unwind without a decade or more of high-tax and low-growth stagflation.

It seems to me that current debates about the effectiveness of stimulus packages in lifting aggregate demand tend to miss a more important point about consequences beyond the immediate short term (i.e. long before Keynes’ long run when we will all be dead). John Cochrane makes the point as follows in relation to the U.S. economy:

“If the resources are not there to unwind our current operations, to quickly retire ... newly created debt, a large inflation will result as people dump government debt. If history is any guide, this outcome will unleash economic dislocations on a scale to make our current troubles look like a pleasant memory.”

Can the perceptions of participants influence market fundamentals?

“Reflexivity can be interpreted as a circularity, or two way feedback loop, between the participants’ views and the actual state of affairs. People base their decisions not on the actual situation that confronts them but on their perception or interpretation of that situation. Their decisions make an impact on the situation ... and changes in the situation are liable to change their perceptions ... . The two functions operate concurrently, not sequentially” (George Soros, “The New Paradigm for Financial Markets”, 2008, p 10).

“Many critics of reflexivity claimed that I was merely belabouring the obvious, namely that the participants’ biased expectations influence market prices. But the crux of the theory of reflexivity is not so obvious; it asserts that market prices can influence the fundamentals. The illusion that markets are always right is caused by their ability to affect the fundamentals that they are supposed to reflect. The change in the fundamentals may then reinforce the biased expectations in an initially self-reinforcing but eventually self-defeating process” (Soros, op cit, p 57-8).

Does George Soros know what he is talking about? The fact that he has operated successfully in financial markets for a long time suggests to me that he might have a few clues about how they work. But I struggle to understand him.

As is the case with many other problems of understanding, I think my problem in this instance relates to definition of terms. What does Soros mean by fundamentals? If a process is eventually self-defeating then it seems to me that this means that it is inconsistent with the fundamentals of the real world – i.e. it is inconsistent with what we know to be true about such things as resource availability, technology or human nature.

When Soros suggests that market prices can influence the fundamentals he may have something less fundamental in mind such as widely accepted perceptions of investors and credit providers about particular markets or the wider economic situation. It seems plausible that a widespread view that housing was a very safe investment, for example, could be reinforced if house prices began to increase more rapidly and if credit providers perceived that this made lending more secure. Under some circumstances that might, perhaps, result in a self-reinforcing process of increases in house prices that would eventually become self-defeating, for example because increasing numbers of people might decide that they would be better off renting rather than owning a house.

If this is what Soros means by reflexivity, does it help to explain the current financial turmoil? In explaining his super-bubble hypothesis Soros writes:

“The belief that markets tend toward equilibrium is directly responsible for the current turmoil; it encouraged the regulators to ... rely on the market mechanism to correct its own excesses. The idea that prices, although they may take random walks, tend to revert to the mean served as the guiding principle for the synthetic financial instruments and investment practices which are currently unravelling” (Soros, op cit, p 102).

It seems to me that the second part of that statement, relating to synthetic financial instruments, may help to explain the current financial turmoil. With the benefit of hindsight it is apparent that the world economy is suffering from, among other things, the development of a self-reinforcing belief system which led many financial firms to over-value synthetic financial instruments.

However, the first part of Soros’ statement doesn’t make sense. Regulators have not relied on the market mechanism to correct its own excesses. The current turmoil is partly a consequence of a history of financial firms being bailed out by regulators on the grounds that they were too big to be allowed to fail. George Soros is on much firmer ground when he recognises that most reflexive processes involve an interplay between market participants and regulators (p77).

Hopefully, the regulatory environment that emerges from the current turmoil will recognise that participants in financial markets are human. It should not surprise anyone that when financiers are given incentives to behave imprudently they tend to act accordingly.

What will it take to get sustainable recovery?

As readers of this blog will know already, Jim often asks me questions that I can’t answer. This morning he asked me how long it will take for the Australian economy to get back on a sustainable growth path. I was not able to answer directly. I suggested that what happens to economic growth in Australia will depend on what happens in the rest of the world. I added that if the U.S. starts to grow again in 2010 then that will have a positive impact on growth prospects for Japan and China and for commodity exporters like Australia.

Jim asked: “How confident are you about the U.S. starting to grow in 2010?” I started making excuses about my lack of knowledge of the U.S. economy and my poor knowledge of short term macroeconomics. That was when Jim said: “You know that political leaders all over the world have been saying that they will do what it takes to restore confidence and get sustainable recovery.” I nodded as Jim went on: “What they seem to be implying is that they will just keep increasing government spending until people become more confident. Does that make you feel confident?”. I shook my head. Jim then asked: “So what will it take to restore investor and consumer confidence and get sustained recovery?”

I told Jim that was a very good question. That only bought me about a second to gather my thoughts. The only sensible answer that I could think of was that restoring confidence was a matter of establishing a general expectation in the U.S. (and other major economies) that GDP would grow at about the same rate as the trend rate of growth in their productive capacity.

Jim interrupted: “That means boosting aggregate demand. Isn’t that what governments are trying to do now?” My response was that our focus should be on establishing the expectation of sustainable growth in the monetary aggregates rather than just a short-term boost in aggregate demand, with the expectation of a subsequent contraction as soon as inflation raises its ugly head again.

Jim interrupted again: “Next you will be telling me that Milton Friedman was right and what we need is a rule requiring the monetary authority to maintain a specified rate of growth in the stock of money.” I admitted that I still thought Friedman was on the right track, but technical difficulties involved in targeting the money supply would make it more sensible to target growth in nominal GDP (i.e. PY rather than M).

Jim said: “So what you are saying is that if the U.S. central bank were to announce a target rate of growth of nominal GDP and start making appropriate adjustments in monetary policy to achieve that target, then this would restore confidence and promote a sustainable recovery.”

I wish I had sufficient confidence to tell Jim that he had hit the nail on the head. Instead I suggested that rather than trying to put words in my mouth he should take a look at Scott Sumner’s blog: TheMoneyIllusion.

Postscript:
I particularly liked the following posts on Sumner's blog: Why did monetary policy fail?; and The Economics Babel.

What are the links between freedom and flourishing?

I think the best way to summarize the links between freedom and flourishing is by trying to answer the following questions.

1. What is the relationship between happiness, well-being and flourishing?
If happiness is viewed as a positive emotional state (involving, for example, peace of mind, optimism, uncompression, exuberance, flow, joy and cheerfulness) then well-being (utility) cannot be the same thing as happiness. (See: What is happiness? and Do good decisions always make us happy?) Well-being (utility) involves several other factors - including personal security and security of property, health and longevity, access to goods and services – as well as a positive emotional state.

Flourishing can be described as authentic well-being. I am attracted to the idea that flourishing involves self-fulfillment as well as to the idea that it involves a meaningful life and actualization of human potential. It seems to me that the highest level of reflection of a flourishing person would be in harmony with his or her emotional nature, and vice versa (but I don’t claim to know a great deal about this ideal frame of mind or meta-state).

2. What is the relationship between freedom, classical liberalism and rationalistic individualism?

Freedom (liberty) is the condition of society in which the coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible. It seems to me that classical liberalism is essentially about the rule of law and the protection of freedom. It is the view that people can live together in peace and to their mutual advantage bound only by abstract rules of conduct that protect the life, liberty and property of each person.

It is important to distinguish between rationalistic individualism and classical liberalism. Whereas rationalistic individualism maintains that a person’s wellbeing always increases when he or she has more options to choose from (liberal optimism), classical liberals have a more sober view of human nature. For example, Adam Smith accepted human fallibility but believed that the desire that individuals to better their own condition would generally prevail over their tendency to be prodigal and imprudent. (See: Liberal sobriety plus contextualism equals classical liberalism? and Is freedom a necessary condition for human flourishing?)

Various attempts have been made to measure freedom. The most relevant for present purposes are economic freedom indexes that measure the extent to which economic policies support private property, personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete etc.

3. What is the relationship between freedom and happiness?

People generally have a passion for control of their own lives. (See: Does inner freedom link liberty with flourishing?) Most people enjoy exercising competence in the face of the challenges that freedom poses. Exercising such competence is no easy matter; people often become unhappy as a result of the poor choices they make. But people whose life stories that are full of challenges, setbacks and triumphs may be happier than those whose lives are uniformly secure, comfortable and tranquil. (See: Does a challenge make us happy?)

The exercise of freedom can result in economic developments that disrupt communities, cultures and lifestyles, and leave many people unhappy. Such problems can be minimized under appropriate constitutional arrangements that decentralize political decision-making (See: Do we have to choose between lifestyles and liberty?)

Inner freedom – the extent to which people feel in control of their own lives – seems to be closely related to the emotional states involved in happiness. The proportion of the population with high levels of inner freedom tends to be higher in countries with higher levels of economic freedom. (See: Is inner freedom related to economic freedom?)

4. What is the relationship between freedom and well-being?
Freedom (as defined above) is inextricably linked to security of persons and property.

The relationship between economic freedom and other aspects of well-being was discussed in my post: What do objective measures of freedom and flourishing tell us?.

Do we have to choose between lifestyles and liberty?

As noted in my last post, Dan Haybron suggests that our prospects for flourishing may depend importantly on living in the right kind of setting, with the right sorts of people (“The Pursuit of Unhappiness”, p 267) . Haybron is concerned that liberal optimism (the presumption that well-being increases when people have more options to choose from) can result in damage to community attributes that are important to the happiness of many individuals.

One of the examples that Haybron gives has to do with a proposal for intervention in the education of Amish children to give them a wider range of options to choose from in their adult lives. Haybron makes the point that “the Amish are not crazy to fear that such a policy would threaten one of their most cherished values, that of community” (p 266). It seems to me that it would be possible for a classical liberal to take a position on either side of such an issue, depending on the facts of the situation e.g. whether a strong case can be made that the rights of the children are being breached and whether it is likely that government intervention on their behalf would actually improve their chances of having a happy life.

Haybron’s example of the possible harm that could be done to community well-being through economic development of an island is worth considering at greater length. The residents of the island are assumed initially to have relatively low incomes but to enjoy, on average, a high level of happiness, due to strong community bonds and a culture that emphasizes the enjoyment of life. It is possible for any one resident to obtain a substantial net benefit by selling land to developers who wish to develop the tourist potential of the island, since the incremental effect of any one sale on the community lifestyle is minimal. But, taken together, many such sales may have an overall negative effect on the average happiness of the island’s long term residents. Should the development be stopped?

A different example, concerning the views of Justus Moser about the impact of global commerce on local culture, might help to clarify the issues involved. Jerry Muller tells us that Moser was a leading citizen in Osnabruck, a self-governing region in western Germany, in the 18th century (“The Mind and the Market” pp 84-103). Moser, like some modern-day opponents of globalisation, was concerned about the effects of trade on local lifestyles and culture. He condemned the growing taste for new, imported commodities, such as coffee, tea and sugar, especially among the lower ranks. He viewed shopkeepers as the local agents of the new international economy who robbed artisans of their customers and their livelihood. He reserved his greatest condemnation, however, for foreign peddlers who were selling small quantities of imported goods to peasants who were largely outside the market economy. According to Moser, these activities were causing the rural population to be “stimulated, tempted, led astray and deceived”. He argued that the public needed to be protected from the temptation of buying products that they didn’t need like leather gloves, wool stockings, metal buttons, mirrors, cotton caps, knives and needles. Women also needed to be protected from local markets where they would chat and waste money on snacks and pleasantries, while ignoring their household duties. Should trade restrictions be imposed to protect local lifestyles and culture?

What is the main difference between these two examples? It seems to me that it is possible that there could be close to a unanimous view among the long-term residents of Haybron’s island in favour of restricting certain kinds of economic development, but it is unlikely that Justus Moser, and the modern day opponents of globalisation, could persuade many of their fellow citizens that they need to be protected from the temptations of international commerce.

Can the legitimate interests of communities in preserving lifestyles of their members be met without making unacceptable encroachments on liberty? Dan Haybron evidently does not think so. At the end of his book he seems to be suggesting that we have to choose between paternalistic interventions that might, or might not, promote happiness and the individual’s right to pursue unhappiness (like the Savage in Aldous Huxley’s “Brave New World”).

I think that view is too pessimistic. Robert Nozick’s concept of a framework for utopia (briefly discussed here) seems to me to provide a good way to begin thinking more optimistically about these issues. People who want the opportunities that economic growth provides should be able to choose to live in communities that provide those opportunities, while those who value a more simple lifestyle should be able to choose to live in communities in which economic development is restricted in various ways. Do you think that idea is too utopian?

Postscript:
I would like to draw attention to Dan Haybron's comment below.

Liberal sobriety plus contextualism equals classical liberalism?

I have now finished reading “The Pursuit of Unhappiness” by Dan Haybron and haven’t modified my view that it usually does people good to take responsibility for running their own lives. (See earlier posts relating to this book: here and here.)

What is more surprising, however, is that I find that the author’s position is in some respects fairly close to my own view. Why am I surprised? I think it is because I originally thought that Haybron’s foreshadowed attack on liberal optimism was shaping up to be an attack on classical liberalism. In the final chapter of the book, however, he defines liberal optimism more specifically as the presumption that a person’s well-being will increase if she/he has more options to choose from. (I think that is the essence of what he is getting at in his lengthy definition on pages 256-8.) In the end it turns out that Haybron’s main target is actually atomistic (or rationalistic) individualism rather than classical liberalism.

Haybron’s conclusion is that the balance of evidence may favour both “liberal sobriety” and “contextualism”. Liberal sobriety initially brought to my mind thoughts about the desirability of respecting the rights of others by being temperate in one’s consumption of alcohol - but it is actually the view that although people should not be presumed to fare better if they have more options to choose from, they usually do fare better under those circumstances (p 263). Contextualism is the view that well-being is better served when individuals’ lives are shaped by an obliging context, i.e. communities, cultures etc. conducive to human flourishing.

Haybron writes: “We should take neither liberal optimism nor individualism for granted. Indeed, perhaps the pursuit of happiness will prove to be mainly a societal matter: our prospects for flourishing may depend less on personal wisdom than on living in the right kind of setting, with the right sorts of people” (p 267). The main problem I see with that statement is that in the modern world a person usually needs considerable wisdom to choose to live in the right kind of setting with the right kind of people. (Haybron implies that there is also another problem, namely that people who consider that they are living in the right kind of community may not be able to prevent economic development that will damage the lifestyle that they value. I will discuss this in my next post.)

Dan Haybron’s position regarding liberal sobriety and contextualism seems close to that of Friedrich Hayek (and Adam Smith). This might deserve some explanation, since there has been a tendency - including by some politicians who should know better - to confuse Hayek’s views about individualism with those of Gordon Gekko.

Hayek supported the classical liberal view that humans are very irrational and fallible beings. In supporting the views of Adam Smith he wrote: “It would scarcely be too much to claim that the main merit of the individualism that he and his contemporaries advocated is that it is a system under which bad men can do least harm. It is a social system that does not depend for its functioning on our finding good men for running it, or on all men becoming better than they are, but which makes use of men in all their given variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad, sometimes intelligent and more often stupid. Their aim was a system in which it should be possible to grant freedom to all ...”.

Hayek noted that the classical liberal view affirms the value of the family, community groups, voluntary associations and conventions that have evolved for the mutual benefit of community members. He argued that voluntary cooperation enables coercion to be kept to a minimum. He condemned “false individualism which wants to dissolve all these smaller groups into atoms which have no cohesion other than the coercive rules imposed by the state ...”. He even suggested: “It must remain an open question whether a free or individualistic society can be worked successfully if people are too ‘individualistic’ in the false sense, if they are too unwilling voluntarily to conform to traditions and conventions, and if they refuse to recognize anything which is not consciously designed or which cannot be demonstrated as rational to every individual”. (The quotes are from: ‘Individualism: True and False’, a paper written in the 1940s and published in various places including: C Nishiyama and K Leube (eds.), “The Essence of Hayek”, 1984.)

I’m not sure whether Dan Haybron would appreciate any further attempts on my part to associate his views with those of Friedrich Hayek. So, I will end this post with a quote from Haybron’s book:
“Accepting contextualism does not require us to follow communitarians in rejecting liberalism. Contextualists might insist that governments promote substantive goods only when doing so enjoys sufficient popular support, and that they not infringe on individual rights in doing so” (p 265-6).