I have now finished reading “The Pursuit of Unhappiness” by Dan Haybron and haven’t modified my view that it usually does people good to take responsibility for running their own lives. (See earlier posts relating to this book: here and here.)
What is more surprising, however, is that I find that the author’s position is in some respects fairly close to my own view. Why am I surprised? I think it is because I originally thought that Haybron’s foreshadowed attack on liberal optimism was shaping up to be an attack on classical liberalism. In the final chapter of the book, however, he defines liberal optimism more specifically as the presumption that a person’s well-being will increase if she/he has more options to choose from. (I think that is the essence of what he is getting at in his lengthy definition on pages 256-8.) In the end it turns out that Haybron’s main target is actually atomistic (or rationalistic) individualism rather than classical liberalism.
Haybron’s conclusion is that the balance of evidence may favour both “liberal sobriety” and “contextualism”. Liberal sobriety initially brought to my mind thoughts about the desirability of respecting the rights of others by being temperate in one’s consumption of alcohol - but it is actually the view that although people should not be presumed to fare better if they have more options to choose from, they usually do fare better under those circumstances (p 263). Contextualism is the view that well-being is better served when individuals’ lives are shaped by an obliging context, i.e. communities, cultures etc. conducive to human flourishing.
Haybron writes: “We should take neither liberal optimism nor individualism for granted. Indeed, perhaps the pursuit of happiness will prove to be mainly a societal matter: our prospects for flourishing may depend less on personal wisdom than on living in the right kind of setting, with the right sorts of people” (p 267). The main problem I see with that statement is that in the modern world a person usually needs considerable wisdom to choose to live in the right kind of setting with the right kind of people. (Haybron implies that there is also another problem, namely that people who consider that they are living in the right kind of community may not be able to prevent economic development that will damage the lifestyle that they value. I will discuss this in my next post.)
Dan Haybron’s position regarding liberal sobriety and contextualism seems close to that of Friedrich Hayek (and Adam Smith). This might deserve some explanation, since there has been a tendency - including by some politicians who should know better - to confuse Hayek’s views about individualism with those of Gordon Gekko.
Hayek supported the classical liberal view that humans are very irrational and fallible beings. In supporting the views of Adam Smith he wrote: “It would scarcely be too much to claim that the main merit of the individualism that he and his contemporaries advocated is that it is a system under which bad men can do least harm. It is a social system that does not depend for its functioning on our finding good men for running it, or on all men becoming better than they are, but which makes use of men in all their given variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad, sometimes intelligent and more often stupid. Their aim was a system in which it should be possible to grant freedom to all ...”.
Hayek noted that the classical liberal view affirms the value of the family, community groups, voluntary associations and conventions that have evolved for the mutual benefit of community members. He argued that voluntary cooperation enables coercion to be kept to a minimum. He condemned “false individualism which wants to dissolve all these smaller groups into atoms which have no cohesion other than the coercive rules imposed by the state ...”. He even suggested: “It must remain an open question whether a free or individualistic society can be worked successfully if people are too ‘individualistic’ in the false sense, if they are too unwilling voluntarily to conform to traditions and conventions, and if they refuse to recognize anything which is not consciously designed or which cannot be demonstrated as rational to every individual”. (The quotes are from: ‘Individualism: True and False’, a paper written in the 1940s and published in various places including: C Nishiyama and K Leube (eds.), “The Essence of Hayek”, 1984.)
I’m not sure whether Dan Haybron would appreciate any further attempts on my part to associate his views with those of Friedrich Hayek. So, I will end this post with a quote from Haybron’s book:
“Accepting contextualism does not require us to follow communitarians in rejecting liberalism. Contextualists might insist that governments promote substantive goods only when doing so enjoys sufficient popular support, and that they not infringe on individual rights in doing so” (p 265-6).
Friday, February 13, 2009
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
How close is the relationship between life satisfaction and happiness?
This post is a continuation of discussion of issues raised in Dan Haybron’s book, “The Pursuit of Unhappiness”, and my last post, ‘What is happiness?’
I ended my last post suggesting that Dan Haybron overstates the difference between positive emotional states and being satisfied with one’s life.
My objection relates specifically to an example in which Haybron attempts to separate a person’s emotional condition from her dissatisfaction with her life in order to show that if you take away the former it is not clear that the latter involves unhappiness.
Haybron writes: “Consider a small-town resident, impressed by television depictions of city life, who believes her environs dull and unsophisticated. Dissatisfied with her life she wants to get out. Later, having done so, she realizes that her old life was actually rich and fulfilling with none of the anxiety and loneliness of urban life. She might conclude that, while she had indeed been dissatisfied in her former life, she was nonetheless happy” (p 150).
It seems to me that this attempt to separate the person’s dissatisfaction with life from her emotional state doesn’t work. It seems to me that she was clearly not happy in her former life because she thought she had the option of living a happier life in the city. Her problem was that the comparative judgement that led her to feel dissatisfied with small-town life was made on the basis of inadequate information. If she had followed Dan Gilbert’s advice (“Stumbling on Happiness”) and talked to some of her friends who had moved to the city, she would have been in a better position to know how she would feel after she moved. In possession of this better information it is reasonable to suppose that she would make a more favourable judgement about small-town life and feel happier.
Is it ever possible for individuals to make the judgement that they are satisfied or dissatisfied with life without referring to their emotional states? Perhaps it would be possible for some individuals to judge themselves to be satisfied with life from a purely intellectual point of view, without being happy. But would such people actually feel satisfied with life? I don’t think so.
This still leaves doubt about the relationship between life satisfaction judgements and happiness. Does it make sense to define happiness as “lasting and justified satisfaction with life as a whole”? (Charles Murray adopts this as his working definition of happiness in what I have previously described as the best book about pursuit of happiness and good government). It seems to me, however, that this definition encompasses factors that contribute to human well-being and flourishing that are additional to the positive emotional states involved in Haybron’s definition of happiness.
Perhaps “lasting and justified satisfaction with life as a whole” should be viewed as a definition of well-being rather than as a definition of happiness. Haybron might be right that life satisfaction is a dubious candidate for a major life goal because it is “too easy to come by” (p 99), but I think the requirement for justification meets this objection. The requirement for justification also has the virtue of recognising that human well-being requires the exercise of practical wisdom.
I ended my last post suggesting that Dan Haybron overstates the difference between positive emotional states and being satisfied with one’s life.
My objection relates specifically to an example in which Haybron attempts to separate a person’s emotional condition from her dissatisfaction with her life in order to show that if you take away the former it is not clear that the latter involves unhappiness.
Haybron writes: “Consider a small-town resident, impressed by television depictions of city life, who believes her environs dull and unsophisticated. Dissatisfied with her life she wants to get out. Later, having done so, she realizes that her old life was actually rich and fulfilling with none of the anxiety and loneliness of urban life. She might conclude that, while she had indeed been dissatisfied in her former life, she was nonetheless happy” (p 150).
It seems to me that this attempt to separate the person’s dissatisfaction with life from her emotional state doesn’t work. It seems to me that she was clearly not happy in her former life because she thought she had the option of living a happier life in the city. Her problem was that the comparative judgement that led her to feel dissatisfied with small-town life was made on the basis of inadequate information. If she had followed Dan Gilbert’s advice (“Stumbling on Happiness”) and talked to some of her friends who had moved to the city, she would have been in a better position to know how she would feel after she moved. In possession of this better information it is reasonable to suppose that she would make a more favourable judgement about small-town life and feel happier.
Is it ever possible for individuals to make the judgement that they are satisfied or dissatisfied with life without referring to their emotional states? Perhaps it would be possible for some individuals to judge themselves to be satisfied with life from a purely intellectual point of view, without being happy. But would such people actually feel satisfied with life? I don’t think so.
This still leaves doubt about the relationship between life satisfaction judgements and happiness. Does it make sense to define happiness as “lasting and justified satisfaction with life as a whole”? (Charles Murray adopts this as his working definition of happiness in what I have previously described as the best book about pursuit of happiness and good government). It seems to me, however, that this definition encompasses factors that contribute to human well-being and flourishing that are additional to the positive emotional states involved in Haybron’s definition of happiness.
Perhaps “lasting and justified satisfaction with life as a whole” should be viewed as a definition of well-being rather than as a definition of happiness. Haybron might be right that life satisfaction is a dubious candidate for a major life goal because it is “too easy to come by” (p 99), but I think the requirement for justification meets this objection. The requirement for justification also has the virtue of recognising that human well-being requires the exercise of practical wisdom.
What is happiness?
I am currently reading “The Pursuit of Unhappiness” by philosopher, Dan Haybron. My interest in the book was aroused by some quotes in a post on one of Henry Scouteguazza’s blogs, which suggested that Haybron’s book presented a challenge to classical liberal optimism, i.e. optimism about the capacity of individuals to achieve happiness if they have the liberty to pursue it. I had previously read articles by Haybron and was favourably impressed by them, so decided to read the book even though it might cause me to re-think my views yet again (and despite my aversion to the title).
A lot of the material that I have read and commented on in this blog seems to question the case for classical liberal optimism. I think that is because much of modern writing on this topic tends to view individual rationality in setting and pursuing goals as conventional wisdom that should be challenged. Since I began reading in this area I have become a lot more aware of the potential for individuals to fail to pursue happiness effectively. (For example, see posts discussing views of Dan Gilbert, Dan Ariely, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, and Colin Camerer.) I still believe, nevertheless, that not only is it good to respect the liberty of others – to allow them to live as seems good to themselves - but it also usually does people good to take responsibility for the running of their own lives. It is possible that I might modify these views after I have finished reading “The Pursuit of Unhappiness”.
At this stage I have only read the first half of the book, discussing how happiness can most usefully be perceived. Very briefly, Haybron argues in favour of an emotional state view of happiness rather than either the hedonic view or the life satisfaction view. He rejects the hedonic view (that happiness is pleasure) largely on the grounds that pleasure is something that happens to a person (having pleasant experiences) whereas happiness is a deeper psychological condition. He rejects the view that happiness is life satisfaction for two main reasons. First, he argues that the attitudes that people have toward their lives tend to be unstable - influenced by whatever events come to mind. (I think he overstates this point because of evidence I have discussed in an earlier post that life satisfaction judgements can be fairly stable.) Second, he argues that life satisfaction judgements are inherently ethically loaded e.g. our judgement about our lives may be influenced by such factors as whether or not we think it is admirable to count our blessings.
Haybron argues that happiness consists of a person’s overall emotional condition. A happy person’s emotional condition is broadly positive – involving stances of attunement (peace of mind, confidence and inner freedom), engagement (vitality and flow) and endorsement (joy, cheerfulness).
My initial reaction is that Haybron has presented a persuasive argument that the happiness label belongs on the jar containing positive emotional states rather than on the jars containing pleasures or life satisfaction. This does not rule out the possibility that hedonic considerations and life satisfaction may still be important and closely related to happiness even though they are not the same thing as happiness.
However, I have two reservations. First, Haybron’s argument about the nature of happiness will not prevent the continued generic use of the term to cover a variety of influences on well-being as in the phrase “gross national happiness”. Some potential for semantic confusion will remain even if Haybron’s argument is widely accepted by happiness researchers.
My second reservation is that in the process of his labelling exercise I think the author overstates the difference between positive emotional states and life satisfaction. I will explain why in my next post.
A lot of the material that I have read and commented on in this blog seems to question the case for classical liberal optimism. I think that is because much of modern writing on this topic tends to view individual rationality in setting and pursuing goals as conventional wisdom that should be challenged. Since I began reading in this area I have become a lot more aware of the potential for individuals to fail to pursue happiness effectively. (For example, see posts discussing views of Dan Gilbert, Dan Ariely, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, and Colin Camerer.) I still believe, nevertheless, that not only is it good to respect the liberty of others – to allow them to live as seems good to themselves - but it also usually does people good to take responsibility for the running of their own lives. It is possible that I might modify these views after I have finished reading “The Pursuit of Unhappiness”.
At this stage I have only read the first half of the book, discussing how happiness can most usefully be perceived. Very briefly, Haybron argues in favour of an emotional state view of happiness rather than either the hedonic view or the life satisfaction view. He rejects the hedonic view (that happiness is pleasure) largely on the grounds that pleasure is something that happens to a person (having pleasant experiences) whereas happiness is a deeper psychological condition. He rejects the view that happiness is life satisfaction for two main reasons. First, he argues that the attitudes that people have toward their lives tend to be unstable - influenced by whatever events come to mind. (I think he overstates this point because of evidence I have discussed in an earlier post that life satisfaction judgements can be fairly stable.) Second, he argues that life satisfaction judgements are inherently ethically loaded e.g. our judgement about our lives may be influenced by such factors as whether or not we think it is admirable to count our blessings.
Haybron argues that happiness consists of a person’s overall emotional condition. A happy person’s emotional condition is broadly positive – involving stances of attunement (peace of mind, confidence and inner freedom), engagement (vitality and flow) and endorsement (joy, cheerfulness).
My initial reaction is that Haybron has presented a persuasive argument that the happiness label belongs on the jar containing positive emotional states rather than on the jars containing pleasures or life satisfaction. This does not rule out the possibility that hedonic considerations and life satisfaction may still be important and closely related to happiness even though they are not the same thing as happiness.
However, I have two reservations. First, Haybron’s argument about the nature of happiness will not prevent the continued generic use of the term to cover a variety of influences on well-being as in the phrase “gross national happiness”. Some potential for semantic confusion will remain even if Haybron’s argument is widely accepted by happiness researchers.
My second reservation is that in the process of his labelling exercise I think the author overstates the difference between positive emotional states and life satisfaction. I will explain why in my next post.
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Why is Rudd's essay like toxic debt?
When Jim asked me what I thought of Kevin Rudd’s lengthy essay on the global financial crisis (published in the February 2009 issue of “The Monthly”) I said it was like a CDO. He said: “I agree. Its just a heap of garbage.”
I replied: “No, that’s not what I meant. What Rudd has done in writing this essay is like constructing a CDO. He has taken some reasonable stuff, combined it with some garbage and then dressed it up to look like gold. No-one knows what it is worth.”
Jim interrupted: “We have to pay $7.95 to get a copy. How is that for unrestrained capitalism? We actually have to pay to read the views of our prime minister.”
I ignored Jim’s comment. I continued: “The problem is that I can’t work out whether he is full of crap or just pretending. For example, if we can believe that his praise for the Hawke-Keating governments’ economic liberalisation is sincere, then we can be reasonably confident that his attack on what he describes as “the great neo-liberal experiment” is just a political labelling exercise designed to make Australia’s former government and current opposition look responsible for the world financial crisis. If we can believe that then we don’t have too much to worry about. But what if Janet Albrechtsen is right? What if Rudd’s claim to be a fiscal conservative before the last election was just a charade? What if his social democratic dream all along was to engage in an orgiastic spending spree on borrowed money?” (This is a reference to Janet Albrechtsen’s article ‘PM dumps facade for his ideological dream’, in “The Australian”, 4 February 2009.)
Jim looked puzzled. He said: “I thought the writing was on the wall before the 2007 election that Kevin’07 was no Paul Keating. Did you think his anti-market rhetoric at the time was just labelling? Can you imagine Rudd ever coming clean with the public, like Keating did before the recession in the early 1990s, and telling them that the Australian government can’t spend its way out of a world recession?”
I said: “I thought Rudd’s stuff before the election about not having to choose between Brezhnev and Hayek was just differentiating his product from John Howard’s. I didn’t like his misrepresentation of Hayek, but I thought Rudd was just a kinder and younger version of John Howard.”
Jim replied: “Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. What do you think of Rudd’s latest package of spending measures?”
I picked up my copy of this morning’s Financial Review and said: “I can’t say it any better than this.” I pointed to the following passage in an article by Mark Latham, former leader of the Labor Party:
“In an open economy, Keynesian pump-priming drives down national savings and increases reliance on costly forms of foreign debt. It is a Band-Aid policy that does nothing to enhance long-term demand conditions and productive capacity. Its lasting legacy for Australia will be a return to deficit budgeting, government indebtedness and tax increases to pay for the spending spree” (Australian Financial Review, 5 Feb. ‘09).
After he had finished reading Jim said: “Yeah, Latham had his problems, but if we had to have a Labor government – and couldn’t have Keating as leader – then I would feel a lot more confident about Australia’s economic future if we now had Latham at the helm instead of Rudd.”
I replied: “No, that’s not what I meant. What Rudd has done in writing this essay is like constructing a CDO. He has taken some reasonable stuff, combined it with some garbage and then dressed it up to look like gold. No-one knows what it is worth.”
Jim interrupted: “We have to pay $7.95 to get a copy. How is that for unrestrained capitalism? We actually have to pay to read the views of our prime minister.”
I ignored Jim’s comment. I continued: “The problem is that I can’t work out whether he is full of crap or just pretending. For example, if we can believe that his praise for the Hawke-Keating governments’ economic liberalisation is sincere, then we can be reasonably confident that his attack on what he describes as “the great neo-liberal experiment” is just a political labelling exercise designed to make Australia’s former government and current opposition look responsible for the world financial crisis. If we can believe that then we don’t have too much to worry about. But what if Janet Albrechtsen is right? What if Rudd’s claim to be a fiscal conservative before the last election was just a charade? What if his social democratic dream all along was to engage in an orgiastic spending spree on borrowed money?” (This is a reference to Janet Albrechtsen’s article ‘PM dumps facade for his ideological dream’, in “The Australian”, 4 February 2009.)
Jim looked puzzled. He said: “I thought the writing was on the wall before the 2007 election that Kevin’07 was no Paul Keating. Did you think his anti-market rhetoric at the time was just labelling? Can you imagine Rudd ever coming clean with the public, like Keating did before the recession in the early 1990s, and telling them that the Australian government can’t spend its way out of a world recession?”
I said: “I thought Rudd’s stuff before the election about not having to choose between Brezhnev and Hayek was just differentiating his product from John Howard’s. I didn’t like his misrepresentation of Hayek, but I thought Rudd was just a kinder and younger version of John Howard.”
Jim replied: “Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. What do you think of Rudd’s latest package of spending measures?”
I picked up my copy of this morning’s Financial Review and said: “I can’t say it any better than this.” I pointed to the following passage in an article by Mark Latham, former leader of the Labor Party:
“In an open economy, Keynesian pump-priming drives down national savings and increases reliance on costly forms of foreign debt. It is a Band-Aid policy that does nothing to enhance long-term demand conditions and productive capacity. Its lasting legacy for Australia will be a return to deficit budgeting, government indebtedness and tax increases to pay for the spending spree” (Australian Financial Review, 5 Feb. ‘09).
After he had finished reading Jim said: “Yeah, Latham had his problems, but if we had to have a Labor government – and couldn’t have Keating as leader – then I would feel a lot more confident about Australia’s economic future if we now had Latham at the helm instead of Rudd.”
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)