Part IV: What incentives are political entrepreneurs faced with?

This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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The most obvious difference between economic and political entrepreneurship is that the former is largely about creating wealth and the latter is largely about obtaining political power. It is possible, of course, for individuals to seek political power to enhance their own wealth or that of a nation, but I will leave to the following essay a discussion of the differing motives that political entrepreneurs may have for obtaining power.

This essay focuses on the choices that political entrepreneurs are faced with in considering how to obtain power, given the peculiarities of politics as a form of business. I will briefly outline the nature of these peculiarities before considering the incentives they create for political entrepreneurship.

Peculiarities of political activities

The most important peculiarities of political activities arise from differences between voting and other choices, differences between triadic and dyadic relationships, and differences in deal-making in public and private sectors.

Differences between voting and other choices

It has often been observed that when people vote they have less incentive to make well-informed choices than in the other decisions that they make. Joseph Schumpeter argued that a typical citizen who makes rational decisions in daily life at home and in business “drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field” (Schumpeter 2011, pp.261-62). He argued that citizens are prone to “irrational prejudice and impulse” in political matters and that this makes them particularly vulnerable to influence by interest groups (Schumpeter 2011, pp.262-64). As I have noted elsewhere, Schumpeter developed those views before the public choice literature enabled concepts such as rational ignorance and rational irrationality to be explored more fully (Bates 2021, pp.114-116). 

Bryan Caplan points out that for an individual voter, the cost of clinging to irrational political beliefs is negligible because there is a miniscule probability that one vote will be decisive in changing the result of an election. Caplan suggests that although citizens often talk about voting options as if they were ordering dinner from a menu, their actions tell a different tale: “They expect to be served the same meal no matter what they order” (Caplan 2007, p. 132). Few individuals take the trouble to assess relevant evidence before they form strong opinions on political issues. They have no incentive to do so. If they cling to irrational beliefs about items on a dinner menu they may experience adverse consequences because of their choices, but when they vote there is no direct connection between the individual elector’s choice and the outcome obtained.

The absence of a direct connection between individual choice and outcome, Richard Wagner argues, is the reason sentiment tends to play a larger role, relative to reason, in political competition (Wagner 2016, p.158). He notes Vilfredo Pareto’s view that ideological articulation can even induce people to support measures that they might have opposed in a market setting. Voters generally embrace policies that enable them to feel good about themselves (Wagner 2016, p.198).

Caplan has assembled evidence that widely held beliefs among the public show a systematic anti-market and anti-foreign bias (Caplan 2007, pp. 30-39, 146).

Competition for leadership

Joseph Schumpeter viewed democracy, as actually practiced, as a competition for leadership. He ended up defining democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 2011, p.269). That view of democracy has become increasingly relevant as party leaders have come to dominate legislatures, and decisions are increasingly made by executive order and other forms of regulation that are primarily under executive control.

Triadic versus dyadic relationships

Wagner argues that the main difference between political entrepreneurship and market entrepreneurship has to do with the difference between dyadic and triadic relationships. Dyadic relationships involve two people; triadic relationships involve three. Wagner observes that market relationships can be reduced mostly to a set of dyadic relationships where both parties benefit. Political catallactics “typically requires a set of triadic relationships” where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support. (Wagner 2016, p. 122).

Use of the word “typically” is appropriate in the context of government activities but is less appropriate in a broader context, if political catallactics encompasses voluntary activity that doesn’t involve government. For example, whenever a group of people band together to buy a service that is of mutual benefit, it seems to me that they are engaging in a dyadic political activity.

It also seems inappropriate to label much of the political entrepreneurship that occurs at the local government level as triadic. The group of people who are using the service in that context may not differ much from the group who are paying for it. As discussed by Paul Aligica and Peter Boettke, in a context where people can exercise both voice and exit, “public” entrepreneurship can lead not only to better services at lower cost but also new and better forms of organization (Aligica and Boettke 2009, p.48).

Wagner illustrates the nature of triadic relationships by reference to decisions that are made about which roads to repair and which channels to dredge when roads and harbours are publicly owned. In that situation a triadic relationship is involved because the agencies responsible for road repair and dredging do not receive revenues directly from sales to the public. Those who benefit from the activities concerned have an incentive to undertake costly action, e.g., making donations to political parties to improve their positions in the queues (Wagner 2016,pp. 214-30).

Making deals

Wagner argues that little substantive work is accomplished through elections and political campaigns. He observes that while puffery is an understandable part of market competition, “electoral competition is mostly about puffery” (Wagner 2016, p.197).

The substantive work of policy choice takes place “outside electoral politics and entails the interactive elements necessary for constructing and maintaining deals” (Wagner 2016, p.198). He suggests a parliamentary assembly can be viewed as an “investment bank” because it is “a hub for making deals” involving selection and funding of projects (Wagner 2016, p.232). Wagner observes:

“Entrepreneurs are thus competing among themselves to seize the future. Successful entrepreneurship offers both fame and fortune” (Wagner 2016, p.279).

One important difference between the deal-making of political entrepreneurs and economic entrepreneurs is that the success of the latter can be measured by profit, which is usually a reliable indicator that the product meets consumers’ expectations. There is no similar indicator to enable political entrepreneurs to be held to account for the failure of policies to meet their purported objectives, let alone for any broader negative impacts on opportunities for human flourishing.

 Implications for entrepreneurial choices

Power-seeking political entrepreneurs have an obvious incentive to pander to the misconceptions and irrational preferences of voters by offering populist policies that are more closely aligned to those preferences. In my opinion, the response of some political entrepreneurs (from both conservative and progressive sides of politics) to reinforce false narratives is posing an increasing threat to economic freedom and prosperity in democracies. For example, a myth about the “hollowing out of American manufacturing” is currently supporting restrictions on economic freedom in the United States through imposition of higher import barriers. Phil Gramm and Donald Boudreaux have thoroughly debunked that false narrative (Gramm and Boudreaux 2025, pp.81-117).

There is also an incentive for political entrepreneurs to advance policies which increase the extent to which economic activity becomes subject to triadic relationships. The aim of such policies is to deliver benefits to politically powerful interest groups at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.

Observations about the prevalence of triadic relationships in politics bring to mind the definition of democracy as “two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch” (sometimes attributed to Benjamin Franklin without any supporting citation).

It is sometimes possible for political entrepreneurs to take advantage of triadic relationships and the willingness of voters to cling to irrational beliefs to pursue objectives that voters would not otherwise support. Wagner provides an outline of the process in his description of electoral competition:

“Within the triadic relationships associated with electoral competition … a political entrepreneur can construct a supporting coalition by crafting a transactional structure that entails gainers and losers, while at the same time generating a supporting ideological cover that softens and conceals the redistributive character of the transaction” (Wagner 2016, p.196).

The conceptual framework developed by Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik illustrates how such deceptive conduct can occur. Within that framework, political entrepreneurs discover identity and policy ‘memes’ (narratives, cues, framing) that shift beliefs about how the world works or a person’s beliefs about their identity and interests. Worldview politics and identity politics can complement and reinforce each other. In some instances, political entrepreneurs may induce a lobby group to push a particular policy because it has shaped their understanding of where their interests lie, rather than because the group has a vested interest in that policy (Mukand and Rodrik 2018).

The framework developed by Valentina Ausserladscheider also emphasizes that the strategies of political entrepreneurs are not determined solely by voters’ ideological positions. Innovative political entrepreneurs don’t offer the same policies as their competitors. They advance their political ambitions by focusing on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties do not satisfy, and on winning support by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas. For example, the entrepreneurial strategy of “far-right parties” is linked to their “nationalist and nativist core ideology”, leading to policies such as immigration restrictions that are claimed to solve a range of problems. (Ausserladscheider 2022).

Ausserladscheider uses that framework to consider reasons for the political success of Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, during the 1990s. Haider’s approach, based on a mix of authoritarian policies and policies to promote greater economic freedom, was particularly successful during a time of economic turmoil and uncertainty.

Political entrepreneurs seeking fame and fortune seem to be particularly attracted to deal making which expands public funding and regulation of infrastructure provision. The lack of clear measures of success in deal making in the political arena also makes also makes it easier for shysters and purveyors of inferior products to operate successfully in that arena.

This discussion of the incentives of political entrepreneurs to exploit voter misconceptions, promote triadic relationships, engage in deceptive conduct and participate in uneconomic deal making might cause some readers to wonder why democratic political systems have been as resilient as they have been. How is it that economic and political catastrophes have so far been largely averted in liberal democracies, given that political entrepreneurs have obvious incentives to engage in behaviour that could be expected to “kill the goose that lays the golden eggs”?

An obvious answer to that question is that political entrepreneurs often meet resistance when they seek to exploit the peculiarities of politics discussed above. Caplan has noted that established political leaders and parties have an incentive to think twice before caving in to popular misconceptions about the desirability of policies such as tariff protection because this poses the risk that they may become scapegoats for poor economic performance (Caplan 2007, pp.159-60). When voters have faith in political leaders, that allows leaders who are somewhat well-intentioned and less irrational some slack to circumvent their supporter’s misconceptions (Caplan 2007, p.181).

Mancur Olson provided an explanation by reference to the importance of encompassing political groups in a two-party system of government. He asserts that the leader of a party “whose clients comprise half or more of the society naturally is concerned about the efficiency and welfare of the society as a whole, particularly in comparison with lobbies for special-interest groups and congressmen accountable only to small districts” (Olson 1982, p.51). Party leaders certainly have an incentive to constrain deal-making that they consider is likely to have adverse impacts the party’s electoral prospects.

The next essay in this series, focuses on political entrepreneurship that occurs in liberal democracies in pursuit of economic and social objectives that have broad community support. It suggests that information constraints pose a challenge to successful pursuit of such objectives.

The adverse economic consequences of political entrepreneurship that seeks to exploit the peculiarities of politics as a form of business can also lead eventually to emergence of political entrepreneurs who propose reforms which aim to restore free markets. The scope for that to happen is explored in later essays in this series.

References

Aligica, Paul Dragos and Peter J. Boettke, Challenging Institutional Analysis and Development: The Bloomington School (Routledge, 2009).

Ausserladscheider, Valentina, “The Haider Phenomenon and the Rise of Austrian Neoliberalism,” in Culture, Sociality, and Morality : New Applications of Mainline Political Economy edited by Paul Dragos Aligica, Ginny Seung Choi, and Virgil Henry Storr (Rowman & Littlefield, 2022).

Bates, Winton, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing (Hamilton Books, 2021).

Caplan, Bryan. The Myth of the Rational Voter (Princeton University Press, 2007).

Gramm, Phil, and Donald J. Boudreaux, The Triumph of Economic Freedom: Debunking the Seven Great Myths of American Capitalism (Rowman & Littlefield, 2025).

Mukand, Sharun and Dani Rodrik, “The Political Economy of Ideas: On Ideas Versus Interests in Policymaking” NBER Working Paper No. 24467 (2018).

Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale University Press: 1982).

Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Second Edition (Martino Publishing, 2011).

Wagner, Richard E., Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016). 

How does Entangled Political Economy help us to understand political entrepreneurship?

 

After I finished reading Richard E. Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, the thought crossed my mind that I should encourage people to read what I was about to write about it before reading the other essays I have recently written about political entrepreneurship. The titles of the other essays are:

Can the concept of political entrepreneurship help us to understand authoritarianism?

What role does political entrepreneurship play in institutional change?

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good?

I have been writing essays about political entrepreneurship to improve my understanding of the topic. In the process I have felt like that a blind man trying to build up a picture of an elephant in his mind by approaching it from different angles. After I finish writing this essay, I might be able to turn my mind to considering how best to present my understanding of the concept and its relevance to liberty and human flourishing.

Entangled Political Economy

The full title of Richard E. Wagner’s book is Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).  

Wagner refers to the ancient Indian parable of the blind men and the elephant in suggesting that political economy is best approached from the standpoint of plausible reasoning rather than demonstrative reasoning.

Plausible reasoning starts from the standpoint that the object of inquiry cannot be known in full detail to the inquirer.

By contrast, demonstrative reasoning begins with a set of assumptions about human behavior, and then analyses the implications of those assumptions. The conventional welfare economics approach to the role of government - with its assumption that government acts like an omniscient and benevolent dictator attempting to maximize the well-being of citizens by correcting externalities and providing public goods – provides a relevant example of demonstrative reasoning.

The analytical framework of Entangled Political Economy recognises that both “polity and economy are areas of practical action that operate in similar but not identical fashion.”

The author suggests that human nature has “a bi-polarity about it that generates both polity and economy.” The political side of human nature entails recognition that we are social creatures who live in close proximity and engage in cooperation and conflict. The economic side entails recognition that we need “to make a livelihood” and desire “to be self-directed as against being conscripts in someone’s army”.

I am not persuaded that “bi-polarity” is the best way to capture the idea that humans are “political animals” whose interactions with other members of the species are not always motivated by personal benefit. It seems to me that human nature inclines individuals to seek to flourish by making wise and well-informed choices about all aspects of their lives that they are able to influence, including their interactions with others. 

However, as public choice theorists have noted, most people lack sufficient motivation to allocate the time and effort required to make well-informed choices in relation to national politics because their individual choices are unlikely to have much impact on national outcomes. Wagner’s view of entangled political economy draws on that public choice literature.

I certainly agree that political economy should focus on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. As Wagner notes, that perspective has important implications for social change:

“The framework of entangled political economy accommodates recognition that societies change only through individual action inside those societies, and with those actions spreading within the society according to the receptivity of other members of that society to those changes.”

Although Entangled Political Economy is based on a description of different kinds of interactions among individuals in the real world, it represents a departure from the way many economists have previously thought about the interaction between politics and economics. Wagner reminds readers that it has been customary to “envision a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas what is denoted as economy.” He points out that discussion is usually in terms of “additive political economy” in which polity and economy are denoted as independent entities and polity intervenes in economy to correct “market failure”. He argues:

“The Progressivist vision of political presence and dominance throughout society is abetted by the vision of additive political economy because that vision provides rationalization for unlimited political action.”

Political entrepreneurship

 Wagner argues that it makes sense to view politics as a peculiar form of business because it has many characteristics in common with business. Both are sources of livelihood for people, entail competition, and are supported by administrative educational organisations. Both must attract investors to provide capital. Both involve entrepreneurship.

The main difference between political entrepreneurship and market entrepreneurship arises because of the difference between dyadic and triadic relationships. Dyadic relationships involve two people; triadic relationships involve three. Wagner observes that market relationships can be reduced mostly to a set of dyadic relationships where both parties benefit. Political relationships typically require a set of triadic relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

Wagner explains:

“Within the triadic relationships associated with electoral competition … a political entrepreneur can construct a supporting coalition by crafting a transactional structure that entails gainers and losers, while at the same time generating a supporting ideological cover that softens and conceals the redistributive character of the transaction.”

The difference between market and political competition has implications for the qualities required for successful entrepreneurship in different contexts. Wagner suggests that while puffery is an understandable part of market competition, “electoral competition is mostly about puffery”. Systemic lying is a feature of political competition. Sentiment tends to play a larger role, relative to reason, in political competition because of the absence of a direct connection between the individual elector’s choice and the outcome obtained. Voting is like ordering a meal at a restaurant and being served the same meal as everyone else, irrespective of what you ordered. Wagner notes Vilfredo Pareto’s view that ideological articulation can induce people to support measures that they might have opposed in a market setting. Voters generally embrace policies that enable them to feel good about themselves.

Wagner argues that little substantive work is accomplished through elections and political campaigns. The substantive work of policy choice takes place “outside electoral politics and entails the interactive elements necessary for constructing and maintaining deals.” He suggests a parliamentary assembly can be viewed as an “investment bank” because it is “a hub for making deals” involving selection and funding of projects. In that context:

“Entrepreneurs are thus competing among themselves to seize the future. Successful entrepreneurship offers both fame and fortune.”

In reading Wagner’s account of political entrepreneurship, it occurred to me that the significance of electoral competition in the United States is greater than he portrays it to be. That perception is based partly on my (somewhat cursory) observation of the presidential election in 2024 and the performance of the Trump administration in its first 100 days in office.

The 2024 U.S. election and its aftermath may be atypical, but similar political entrepreneurship has been on display in some European elections.  As discussed in a previous essay, political entrepreneurs tend to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas. They seek to attract support from people who are discontented with current economic and social outcomes by emphasizing alleged problem-solving capacities of their ideas. Their success in attracting a loyal support base of customers who are willing to help them to sell their narrative depends to a large extent on the strength of competition from politicians selling different narratives, and on the extent of resistance by journalists and members of the public who consider their narratives to be incorrect, or that their policy proposals are unworkable, unconstitutional, unethical, or otherwise unhelpful.

I also observed that the discussion of entangled political economy in Politics as a Peculiar Business seemed more relevant to countries with parliamentary systems of government than to those with presidential systems, where much business seems to be done via “executive orders”. However, that is not intended as criticism. It may reflect the greater role of “executive orders” in the U.S. in the years since the book was published.

How can entanglement be contained?

One of Wagner’s aims in writing the book was “to explain how an entangled political economy can generate its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control”. He refers to the credit market as providing an example of how this occurs. Private ordering of credit markets is vulnerable to entanglement for two reasons. On the demand side are market participants who are dissatisfied with how they fare in privately ordered credit markets. On the supply side are “political figures who want to catapult themselves from background to foreground in the cosmic drama that is human society”.

Another example relates to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which provides for just compensation when the government takes private property for public use. However, Wagner observes that “history over the past century or so has increasingly run in the direction of governments taking property for what are private uses and paying only partial or token compensation”. A clear constitutional provision is not necessarily “sufficiently strong to deter rapacious interest groups from using government as an instrument of predation”.

Wagner refers to Vincent Ostrom’s observation that government involves a Faustian bargain: “instruments of evil – power over other people – are to be employed because of the good they might do, recognizing that evil might also result.” 

How can we minimize the potential for evil to result? Wagner suggests that the alternatives are “parchment” and “guns”.

“Parchment” refers to constitutional rules. Constitutional rules may remain effective if supported by public morality – sufficient numbers of people being willing to refrain from use of the powers of the state to enrich themselves at the expense of others. This approach relies on education and related processes to cultivate virtue and wisdom.

“Guns” refers to an approach that looks primarily to “a kind of opposition of interests to limit government predation”. Wagner suggests that “guns” may complement “parchment”. He writes:

“The basic principle behind this approach is for governmental action to require some concurrence among different participants with opposed interests.”

Wagner suggests that when it becomes habitual for people to use politics in a predatory manner that may “promote alternative beliefs as to what comprises just conduct”. He concludes that “parchment and guns … would seem to be nonseparable ingredients of constitutional order in the final analysis.”

Wagner tells us that his reference to guns is metaphorical, so what he has in mind may not necessarily be violent. For example, those who believe themselves to be victims of predation have an incentive to form associations to protect their interests in the courts and may be able to exert countervailing power the political arena.

While I believe that entangled political economy offers important insights about interactions between participants in politics and markets, I would have liked the author to explore more fully the macroeconomic consequences of increasing entanglement. Perhaps that would have led to a more optimistic conclusion.

In Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing I suggested that although most liberal democracies are heading for major economic crises in the years ahead there are reasons to be optimistic “that governments will eventually introduce institutional reforms to enable the drivers of progress to restore growth of opportunities.” (See Chapter 6, particularly p. 120)

My optimism presupposes the emergence of political entrepreneurs who understand the nature of the problems that need to be addressed and can marshal the political support required to carry out appropriate institutional reforms to correct those problems.

Conclusions

The discussion of entangled political economy in Richard Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, is helpful to an understanding of the context in which political entrepreneurship occurs in the liberal democracies.

Entangled political economy focuses on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. It emphasizes that societal change occurs only through individual actions. Entangled political economy represents a departure from the view of those economists (and governments) who have envisioned a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas an economy.  

Wagner argues that politics has many characteristics in common with private business, but it is characterized by triadic relationships rather than dyadic relationships. Market relationships can be reduced mainly to sets of relationships between two people, both of whom benefit. Politics typically requires sets of relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

The author suggests that the main work of political entrepreneurs – interactions to construct deals - takes place outside electoral politics. He suggests that parliaments can be viewed as kinds of investment banks because they are hubs for making deals involving selection and funding of projects.

In my view the significance of electoral politics and deal-making by executive arms of governments is greater than Wagner portrays it to be. However, my view has been strongly influenced by events since 2016, when his book was published.

Wagner argues that entangled political economy generates its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control. He is pessimistic about the prospect for entanglement to be contained via constitutional rules and moral conduct. He suggests that habitual use of politics in a predatory manner promotes an alternative view of what constitutes just conduct.

In my view, Wagner might have come to a more optimistic conclusion if he had more fully explored the macro-economic consequences of increasing use of the powers of the state for predatory purposes. Economic crises may eventually bring about appropriate institutional reforms if political entrepreneurs emerge who can marshal the political support required to implement them.  

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.

Do clinical delusions have anything in common with a mythology mindset?

 

In my discussion of Steven Pinker’s book, Rationality, I referred to his observation that people tend to have a reality mindset in the world of immediate experience and a mythology mindset when discussing issues in the public sphere. Although that is an accurate observation about a general tendency, delusions are also fairly common in the world of immediate experience.

The delusions that most of us experience are fairly harmless. For example, it may not do you much harm to believe that you are happier than average, even if you aren’t. That common delusion may help to explain why so many people walk around with smiles on their faces.

For some unfortunate people, however, the world of immediate experience includes delusional beliefs that are symptomatic of mental ill-health. These are referred to as clinical delusions.

The question I ask above has been prompted by my reading of Lisa Bortolotti’s recent book, Why Delusions Matter. Lisa Bortolotti is a philosopher who specializes in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences, including issues relating to mental illness. She observes that there is a strong overlap between clinical and non-clinical delusional beliefs. The non-clinical delusional beliefs that she discusses include beliefs that Pinker would associate with a mythology mindset.

A conversation context

Bortolotti notes that in any discussion between two people, you have a speaker and an interpreter swapping roles as the conversation proceeds. The speaker says something and the interpreter listens, making inferences about the speaker’s beliefs, desires, feelings, hopes and intentions on the basis of the speaker’s words, facial expression, tone of voice, previous behaviour and so on.

Interpretation becomes challenging when the interpreter suspects that the speaker may be delusional. The interpreter rarely has the information needed to assess that the speaker’s beliefs are false, so falsity cannot be a necessary condition for attribution of delusionality.

Three elements are often involved when the interpreter judges the speaker to be delusional:

• Implausibility: The interpreter finds the speaker’s beliefs to be implausible.
• Unshakeability: Speakers do not give up their beliefs in the face of counterarguments and counterevidence.
• Identity: The beliefs seem important to the image that speakers have of themselves.

Clinical delusions

Bortolotti offers what she describes as an “agency-in-context” model to explain clinical delusions. She explains:

“The adoption and maintenance of delusional beliefs are due to many factors combining aspects of who you are and what your story is (your genes, reasoning biases, personality, lack of scientific literacy, etc.) and aspects of how epistemic practices operate in the society where you live.”

The epistemic practices she refers to include what we learn at school about knowledge acquisition, and the stigma that makes it difficult for people with delusional beliefs to participate fully in public life.

There is no doubt that persecutory delusions are harmful to the speaker and others. They undermine the ability of speakers to respond appropriately to events, and often erode their relationships with others.

However, Lisa Bortolotti suggests that it is important for interpreters to understand that most delusions offer some benefits for speakers. Delusions “let speakers see the world as they want the world to be; make speakers feel important and interesting; or give meaning to speakers’ lives, configuring exciting missions for them to accomplish”.

Interpreters also need to understand that the underlying problems of speakers don’t disappear when they obtain insight about their delusions. They may become depressed when they approach reality without the filter of their delusional beliefs.

There is not much to be gained by attempting to reason with people whose beliefs are unshakeable. Bortolotti suggests that it is probably more productive for the interpreter and speaker to share stories rather than exchanging reasons for beliefs. Exchanging stories can show how delusional beliefs emerged as reactions to situations that were difficult to manage. While sharing stories, interpreters have opportunities “to practice curiosity and empathy in finding out more” about underlying problems.

Conspiracy delusions

From an interpreter’s viewpoint, a speaker’s beliefs about the existence of conspiracies often have similar characteristics to clinical delusions. They are implausible, unshakeable, and closely tied to the speaker’s self-image.

Bortolotti emphasizes that those who hold conspiracy delusions often claim to have special knowledge of events – they claim to be experts, or to know who the real experts are. Identifying as a member of a group is often also important. Non-members often refer to members of such groups in a derogatory way e.g. QAnon supporters and anti-vaxxers. However, people are often attracted to conspiracy delusions promoted by like-minded people whom they trust. The act of sharing a delusional story can be a signal of commitment to a particular group.

Comments

Lisa Bortolotti’s book has improved my understanding of delusions in a couple of different ways. First, it has given me a better appreciation that delusions offer some benefits to the people who hold them, and those benefits help to explain the unshakeability of delusional beliefs.

Second, viewing delusions within the context of a conversation between a speaker and an interpreter is helpful in drawing attention to the value judgements involved in assessing whether the speaker’s beliefs are delusional.

My main criticism of the book is that the author seems to me to be biased in favour of “the official version” of events, even though she acknowledges that contrary beliefs are sometimes vindicated. The most obvious example bias is her apparent reluctance to give credence to the possibility that Covid19 may have originated in a lab in Wuhan.

I am pleased that my reading of the book did not leave me with the impression that the author believes that it is delusional to have an unshakeable belief in the importance of the search for truth. In emphasizing that value judgements are involved in assessing whether beliefs are delusional, Lisa Bortolotti seems to me to be providing readers with a better understanding of the meaning attached to the concept of delusion in clinical and non-clinical settings, rather than casting doubt on the existence of reality.

What's wrong with people?

 

This question is posed in the title of Chapter 10 of Steven Pinker’s book, Rationality: What it is, Why it Seems Scarce, Why it Matters.

I enjoyed reading the previous 9 chapters but didn’t learn much from them. Those chapters were a painless way to refresh my memory about definitions of rationality, rules of logic, probability, Bayesian reasoning, rational choice, statistical decision theory, game theory, correlation, and regression analysis.

I particularly liked the approach Pinker took in discussing the research of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky which documents many ways in which people are prone to fall short of normative benchmarks of rationality. Pinker makes the point:

“When people’s judgments deviate from a normative model, as they so often do, we have a puzzle to solve. Sometimes the disparity reveals a genuine irrationality: the human brain cannot cope with the complexity of a problem, or it is saddled with a bug that cussedly drives it to the wrong answer time and again.

But in many cases there is a method to people’s madness.”

A prime example is loss aversion: “Our existence depends on a precarious bubble of improbabilities with pain and death just a misstep away”. In Freedom Progress and Human Flourishing, I argued similarly that loss aversion helped our ancestors to survive.

Pinker doesn’t seek to blame the propensity of humans to make logical and statistical fallacies for the prevalence of irrationality in the public sphere. He is not inclined to blame social media either, although he recognises its potential to accelerate the spread of florid fantasies.

The mythology mindset

Pinker argues that reasoning is largely tailored to winning arguments. People don’t like getting on to a train of reasoning if they don’t like where it takes them. That is less of a problem for small groups of people (families, research teams, businesses) who have a common interest in finding the truth than it is in the public sphere.

People tend to have a reality mindset when they are dealing with issues that affect their well-being directly – the world of their immediate experience – but are more inclined to adopt a mythology mindset when they are dealing with issues in the public sphere.

When economists discuss such matters, they may refer to the observation of Joseph Schumpeter that the typical citizen drops to a lower level of mental performance when discussion turns to politics. They reference the concept of rational ignorance attributed to Anthony Downs and Gordon Tulloch. They may also refer to Brian Caplan’s concept of rational irrationality. (For example, see Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, pp 114-115).

Pinker doesn’t refer to those economists’ perspectives but offers interesting insights about factors that might lead people to adopt mythology mindsets. In summary, as a consequence of myside bias, attitudes to the findings of scientific studies often have less to do with scientific literacy than with political affiliation. The opposing “sides” are sometimes akin to “religious sects, which are held together by faith in their moral superiority and contempt for opposing sects”. Within those sects the function of beliefs is to bind the group together and give it moral purpose.

What can we do?

Pinker’s suggestions for combatting irrationality in the public sphere are summed up by his subheading “Re-affirming Rationality”. He advocates openness to evidence, noting the findings of a survey suggesting that most internet users claim to be open to evidence. He suggests that we valorize the norm of rationality by “smiling or frowning on rational and irrational habits”.

Pinker identifies institutions that specialize in creating and sharing knowledge as playing a major role in influencing the beliefs that people hold. Since “no-one can know everything”, we all rely on academia, public and private research units, and the news media for a great deal of the knowledge which forms the basis of our beliefs. Unfortunately, these institutions are often not trustworthy.

In the case of the universities, Pinker suggests that the problem stems from “a suffocating left-wing monoculture, with its punishment of students and professors who question dogmas on gender, race, culture, genetics, colonialism, and sexual identity and orientation”. News and opinion sites have been “played by disingenuous politicians and contribute to post-truth miasmas”.

It is easy to agree with Pinker that it would be wonderful if universities and the news media could become paragons of viewpoint diversity and critical thinking. However, movement toward that goal will require large numbers of individuals to enlist for a ‘long march’ to re-establish norms of rationality in institutions that specialize in creating and sharing knowledge.                                                                    

Does the "Politics of Being" support progress?

 

“Politics of Being” is title of a recently published book by Thomas Legrand. The subtitle is “Wisdom and science for a new development paradigm”. The question I ask myself is whether Legrand’s views support progress as I defined the concept in Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing. Would widespread adoption of Legrand’s views enhance the growth of opportunities for individuals to obtain the basic goods of flourishing humans?

Before I purchased the book, I was aware that the author had shown wisdom by including this quote from Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Lecture:

“A core goal of public policy should be to facilitate the development of institutions that bring out the best in humans.”

That passage is actually quoted several times in the book and is sometimes accompanied by the preceding sentence in which Ostrom distances her approach from that of policy analysts who design institutions “to force (or nudge) entirely self-interested individuals to achieve better outcomes”. The passage I have quoted at the top of this article illustrates Ostrom’s optimistic view of the capacity of individuals to work together to devise solutions to collective action problems without help from governments.

The essence of Legrand’s line of argument is that the world is stuck in an obsolete development path and is in need of a new “wisdom-based approach to politics”.  I will discuss briefly what he perceives to be wrong with the current development path, before discussing some elements of the alternative path he advocates.

Perception of the problem

Legrand believes that the current development path is causing many problems. The world is on track for a climate change catastrophe. Economic development and increased life expectancy are not making people much happier in high-income countries. Many countries seem to be facing mental health crises. There has been a decline in interpersonal trust in many countries. Our current model of development is rooted in a set of values that are causing a civilization crisis. He writes:

“Our economic system not only destroys social ties and the environment but feeds on these destructions that create new market opportunities. It seeks to adapt humans to its own requirements rather than adapting itself to human needs. Based on fundamental misconceptions, this system can only perpetuate itself through ever more propaganda that feeds our disconnection from ourselves, our true needs, and ultimately, our apathy.”

I agree that all is not well with the world and share some of Legrand’s concerns. However, I am more optimistic than he is about climate change, and strongly disagree with his views on economics. Readers who are interested in my views should read Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing.

Being and Interbeing

Legrand argues that the new development model required is essentially spiritual. He views spiritual development as:

“the process by which we come closer to our true nature. From that connection, we naturally tend to manifest the highest qualities: wisdom, love, joy, peace etc., or simply the best or most authentic version of ourselves currently available!”

Legrand’s discussion of spiritual values includes chapters on life, happiness, love, peace, mindfulness, and light.

According to Legrand the new paradigm involves a transition from “having to being, which many believe means interbeing”. So, what is interbeing?

 “Interbeing is a term coined by Zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh, which goes beyond interconnectedness to touch on the very nature of our being. It expresses the nature of reality based on the Buddhist teachings of interdependent co-arising (“that is because this is”), non-self, and impermanence”.

I see no problem accepting that everything is interdependent. Impermanence does seem pervasive (except in respect of fundamental values, virtues, and the highest qualities). But “non-self” poses problems. As I see it, self-awareness is a fundamental characteristic of the kind of thing (entity or system) that an individual human is.  Self-respect arises from self-awareness, and motivates respect for other people, and other living things. Respect is the foundation which makes love possible. By the way, do you know who it was who said “one should not hurt others if one loves oneself”? The answer is here.

At various points in the book Legrand recognizes that people have “higher selves” and “true selves”, so he seems to acknowledge that we should aim to purify our egos – to remove the biases, distortions, and attachments that tarnish our perceptions of our individual selves - rather than eliminate self-awareness. He provides a good summary of his view of “being” and of personal development in this passage:

“As a person, there is little chance that I get closer to my authentic being by defining a vision of who I am and trying to actualize it. On the contrary, I can discover who I am by freeing myself from predefined and limiting identities, purifying my intentions, character, and behaviors, and expressing the deepest yearning of my soul. This is a conscious, evolutionary process of emergence, informed but not bounded by the understanding I have of my essence, which is necessarily limited. The same is true for nations.”

The world would be a better place if more people adopted that as their personal development model. However, I was tempted to leave off the last sentence of the quoted passage. The idea that nations have “souls” seems to me to be collectivist nonsense.

Governance

The part of the book providing an agenda for action envisages a larger role for government than I had anticipated. For example, Legrand suggests that government efforts to promote early childhood education should start during pregnancy. He also suggests that governments should actively promote a healthy diet. Even followers of Elinor Ostrom can sometimes find it difficult to remember to avoid adopting an overly pessimistic view of what people can achieve without government guidance.

I agree with Legrand that it is naïve for people to believe that “all it takes to improve our societies is to secure a majority of voters for their ideas, especially when they engender polarization”. Political leaders have no hope of implementing lasting reforms unless they can foster broad community support for them. That usually means avoiding politicization of the issues. (As an aside, one of the inconvenient truths about politics is that Al Gore’s involvement in support of U.S. action to mitigate climate change provided a focus for Republican opposition to such policies.)

The book contains interesting proposals to enact the “politics of being” in political institutions. Legrand suggests that each nation should establish a “wisdom council” to preside over discussions about the nation’s evolution with the government and parliament. The councils would consist of equal representations of four groups: randomly selected citizens, representatives of the “outer” economic, social, and environmental life of the nation, representatives of the “inner” spiritual, cultural, and psychological life of the nation, and “representatives of non-human members of the earth community”.

Legrand also suggests that the Baha’i model of governance should be adopted for lower houses of parliament. In brief, adult community members elect representatives at the local level and are urged not to discuss with others who to vote for. The local representative vote for regional representatives, who in turn vote for national representatives.

It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which politicians would enact such radical changes to existing systems of representative government. However, if the outcomes of the existing systems become increasingly unpalatable, radical alternatives will no doubt be contemplated by an increasing number of citizens. In that context, Legrand’s proposals will have stiff competition from other proposals, including the decentralist approach discussed previously on this blog.

The main problem I see with Legrand’s governance proposals is their potential to infringe individual liberty. Most of the members of the proposed governing council would be likely to advance the interests that they represent by advocating further restriction of individual liberty. The Baha’i model is presumably more responsive to community members than religious and political governance systems in which the hierarchy is self-perpetuating, but people who are indirectly elected to peak positions still have less incentive to have regard for the wishes of members at the grassroots level than if they were directly elected, or selected randomly.

Facilitating progress?

Legrand describes his book as “a drop in the ocean”. I think it may have potential to be more than that. The part of the book dealing with spiritual development has potential to be influential if it finds its way into the hands of sufficient numbers of people who are currently rudderless and yearning for inspiration.

I think contemplation of Legrand’s views on spiritual development has potential to enhance progress, viewed as the growth of opportunities for individuals to obtain the basic goods of flourishing humans. After reading the book, some people might be more inclined to wise and well-informed self-direction, healthy living, improved inter-personal relations, living in harmony with nature, and adoption of behaviors that enhance psychological well-being.

However, Legrand’s attack on “the current development path” invites further restrictions on economic freedom which would impact negatively on growth of productivity and hence on growth of opportunities for human flourishing. As outlined in the following paragraph in Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, I see declining rates of productivity growth as a major threat to growth of opportunities for human flourishing:

“This chapter has focused on the threats posed by climate change, declining productivity growth, and problems with democracy. I do not dismiss the longer-term threat posed by climate change, but in my view, there are stronger reasons for concern about the more immediate threat posed by declining productivity growth. Individuals, firms, and governments are taking action to mitigate climate change, and their efforts seems likely to accelerate before adaptation becomes excessively costly. There are fewer grounds for optimism that governments will deal with emerging economic problems (of their own making) in time to avert the widespread misery that is likely to follow from looming economic crises.”

As explained in my book, my optimism about action to mitigate climate change rests on signs that the polycentric approach, proposed by Elinor Ostrom in 2009, is now being adopted successfully.

I am not greatly troubled by the thought that some readers of Thomas Legrand’s book may be persuaded to adopt economic and political views that are inimical to productivity growth. There is an ocean full of views on public policy that are similar to those which he advocates, so I don’t think his additional drop will have a significant direct impact on policies adopted. Hopefully, his book’s endorsement of Elinor Ostrom’s approach will encourage some readers to explore her views in greater detail.

My bottom line: The net impact of “The Politics of Being” will be to support the growth of opportunities for human flourishing.

Does voting just encourage them?

 

A couple of weeks ago the thought struck me that it was about time I wrote something about the personal ethics of voting. That turned out to be more difficult than I had anticipated.

At first, I thought that I should argue that it is unethical to vote because politics is a dirty business. As a person who often espouses principles of libertarianism and decentralism (see the preceding post on this blog) I see voting as akin to online shopping with known fraudsters – you know that the package of goods they deliver will never be the same as the one you thought you were buying. You should avoid shopping with known fraudsters, and you should avoid voting because whoever you vote for a politician will be elected.

Then I thought of some problems with that analogy. What happens if you really need the goods that the politicians are advertising? Who will mend the potholes in your road if you don’t vote for a politician who promises to get it done? Perhaps you might tell me that you and your neighbours could organise a working bee and do it yourself. Good idea!

However, if you don’t vote, who will restrain government spending? I expect that the more cynical among you will respond that no-one will restrain government spending, irrespective of whether you vote, or who you vote for.

When my reasoning took me to that point, I couldn’t immediately think of an appropriate response. That was when I decided that to bring clarity to my mind I should read again the book, “Don’t Vote – It just encourages the bastards”, by the late, great P J O’Rourke.  My discussion of the book provides only a small sample of the humor and wisdom in it. Despite having been written over 12 years ago, the book contains insightful comments about people who are still on the political stage in America, including Donald Trump. However, that is somewhat tangential to the focus of this article.

You might think that this book would make a strong case against voting, but the old saying about not judging a book by its cover does seems to apply in this instance. O’Rourke suggests that voting does have a purpose: “We vote to throw the bastards out”.  The problem, as I see it, is that when enough voters manage to persuade each other to vote to throw politicians out of office, that doesn’t establish a regime of peaceful human flourishing without any interfering politicians. Voters throw out one lot of politicians by voting another lot into office.

One of the funniest parts of the book is a listing of the personality characteristics of people who are drawn to politics. The first item on the list is “A pervasive pattern of grandiosity”. After listing 9 other characteristics, O’Rourke acknowledges that he has just quoted from the American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality disorder.

Nevertheless, O’Rourke acknowledges that “individual politicians are, after all, individuals like the rest of us and should be judged individually”:

“It would be wrong—very tempting, but wrong—to think of them all as simply bastards”.

He elaborates:

“I’ve spent some time with politicians. I like politicians. I’m friends with politicians from both sides of the aisle. Politicians are fine until they stick their noses into things they don’t understand, such as most things. Then politicians turn into rachet-jawed purveyors of monkey doodle and baked wind.”

Unfortunately, I must agree. The politicians I have met personally have all been likeable. When you meet them, they seem to be pleasant people (perhaps in the same way that the scammers who seek my friendship on Facebook often seem pleasant). A few politicians I have met even had their hearts and heads in the right places. The one who comes to mind most readily is Bert Kelly, an Australian politician whom I have written about previously.

Sometimes when I see a politician performing on TV, I wonder how a nice person like her, or him, ended up like that – I mean, like a bad actor saying things they don't believe. The fact that their future political careers are at stake is no consolation.

Is there something inherently evil about politics? O’Rourke writes:

“Maybe politics is inherently evil. Maybe politics is so evil that anything we do for it, even attempting to supply it with morality, just feeds the beast. I trust this isn’t true but I can’t say the thought doesn’t trouble me.”

That thought troubles me, too.

In his discussion of morality in politics, O’Rourke introduces (on page 88) the Venn diagram, reproduced at the top of this article. He drew the two circles to intersect, implying that there can be such a thing as moral political behavior.

It seems to me to be appropriate to maintain some optimism about democratic political processes. They don’t do much to protect our liberty and pursuit of happiness, but not many of us would freely choose to live under any of the available alternative forms of government. Many people claimed that democracy could not exist as a permanent form of government because it would not take long for citizens to learn that they could vote themselves largesse out of the public treasury. Indeed, that is largely what democratic politics has been about for as long as it has existed. Yet democracy survives! Perhaps democracy’s secret of success has been the existence of sufficient voters and politicians who have been willing to stop playing politics when crises have become imminent.

I often wish that I could be apolitical, but O’Rourke has persuaded me that is not practicable:

“The democratic political process is like the process of our children going through adolescence. There’s not much we can do to improve it and there’s nothing we can do to stop it. We cannot, however, just declare ourselves to be apolitical any more than we can declare ourselves to be “aparental.” Here are the car keys, son. Dad’s stash is in the nightstand drawer. Why don’t you take my ATM card while you’re at it? See you when you’re thirty.”

It certainly appears that there is not much that we, as individuals, can do to change the outcomes of the political process. The chance that your vote will be decisive is miniscule. But people do talk about politics and influence one another about how they will cast their votes. Paradoxically, even those of us who would like to be apolitical can make a difference if we decide that we don’t like the direction that politics is taking and choose to vote.

Before concluding, I should offer a personal explanation about the relevance of the personal ethics of voting to me, as a person who lives in a country where voting is compulsory. It is possible to choose not to vote in Australia without displaying a great deal of courage. It is possible to attend a polling place, chat with your neighbours, eat a “democracy sausage”, exchange greetings with people offering “how to vote” literature, have your name ticked off on the voting roll, be handed voting papers, and still not cast a valid vote. In a secret ballot, no-one knows what you write on the voting papers before you put them into the ballot boxes.

Conclusion

When I began writing this article, I was not sure whether I would end up persuading myself to vote, or to have nothing to do with the political process. P J O’Rourke helped me to persuade myself that there is such a thing as moral political behavior.

Democratic politics is certainly a dirty business. It doesn’t do much to protect liberty or the pursuit of happiness, but most of us would choose to put up with democratic immorality rather than to live under any of the currently available alternative forms of governance. Paradoxically, the survival of democracies may be attributable to the willingness of sufficient numbers of voters and politicians to refrain from playing politics – to stop raiding the public treasury - when crises become imminent.

Although the chances of an individual vote being decisive are miniscule, individuals do influence one another in how they cast their votes. Individuals who don’t like the way politics is heading are more likely to improve outcomes if they choose to vote and encourage other like-minded people to do likewise, rather than choosing to refrain from having anything to do with the political process.

Is "scout mindset" a worthy objective of personal development?

 

If someone had mentioned “scout mindset” to me a week ago, I would probably have thought they were referring to mottos of the scouting movement such as “Be prepared!” and “Do a good turn every day!”. Since then, I have had the opportunity to read Julia Galef’s book, Scout Mindset, Why some people see things clearly and others don’t, which was published last year.

I think this is a remarkably good book - even though it has left me feeling somewhat more modest about the accuracy of some of my perceptions.

Scout mindset versus soldier mindset

Julia Galef defines scout mindset as ‘wanting your “map” – your perception of yourself and the world – to be as accurate as possible’. The scout aims to form a map of the strategic landscape. The scout mindset is characterized by accuracy motivated reasoning and guided by the question: Is it true?

By contrast, “soldier mindset” is aimed at fighting off threatening evidence. It is directionally motivated reasoning, evaluating ideas through the lenses of “Can I believe it?” and “Must I believe it?”

Galef suggests that soldier mindset is our default setting, and argues that in many, if not all situations we would be better off abandoning it and learning to adopt a scout mindset instead.

I am inclined to the view that intuitive thinking is our default setting, and that there are often good reasons to be reluctant to abandon intuitions and expectations that are based on patterns that have we have observed in the past. Nevertheless, it is probably fair to argue that most of us have a tendency to keep fighting conflicting evidence long after it should have persuaded us to change our minds. That is the soldier mindset. When we adopt a scout mindset, we begin to assimilate the evidence and re-assess our views sooner – perhaps by engaging in reasoning akin to Bayesian updating of probabilities.

Galef explains that there are several reasons why people tend to adopt a soldier mindset. It enables them to avoid unpleasant emotions by denial or by offering comforting narratives. It helps them to feel good about themselves by maintaining illusions. It helps them to motivate themselves by exaggerating their chances of success. It helps them to convince themselves so they can be more successful in convincing others. It enables them to choose beliefs that make them look good. It also helps them to belong to social groups of like-minded people.

The author suggests that scout mindset is more useful to us than for our ancestors. I have some reservations about that claim. Scout mindset would have been a useful attribute for our hunter and gatherer ancestors when they were searching for food. Nevertheless, she is persuasive in arguing that, by comparison with your ancestors, “your happiness isn’t nearly as dependent on your ability to accommodate yourself to whatever life, skills, and social groups you happened to be born into”.

In subsequent chapters, Galef proceeds to discuss how to develop self-awareness, thrive without illusions, change your mind, and develop a scout identity. In what follows, my focus is selective. Readers seeking a more comprehensive review should also read Jon Hersey’s article in Quillette, which persuaded me to read the book.

It seems to me that the strongest objection that people raise to having accurate perceptions of themselves is that self-delusion serves them well. The strongest objection to seeking accurate perceptions relating issues of public policy is that it is not worth attempting because the individual voter’s influence on policy outcomes is insignificant. I will look at those objections before discussing scout identity as an objective of personal development.

Does self-delusion serve us well?

A substantial amount of psychological research purports to show that people who deceive themselves are happier than realists. Galef points out that these research findings are based on measures of self-deception that lack any objective standards of reality as a basis for comparison. They use measures of self-deception that conflate positive beliefs with illusions. For example, the measurement methodology assumes that people who claim that they never get angry are deceiving themselves. Similarly, people who claim that they always know why they like things are assumed to be deceiving themselves.

It is not necessary for us to deceive ourselves about the probability of success before embarking on new ventures. Galef refers to Elon Musk as an example of an investor who has proceeded with ventures even though he has a clear-eyed view that they have a low probability of success. When asked why he has said:

“If something is important enough you should try. Even if the probable outcome is failure”.

A gamble can worth taking if the expected payoff (value of each outcome x probability of occurrence) is positive.

There can also be an issue of perspective involved in assessing probability of success. I find it helpful to think in terms of adopting a player mindset rather than a spectator mindset. On the basis of past performance, spectators might be justified in assessing that the player has low probability of success in a particular event. However, a coach who knows a great deal about the player’s capability might have good reasons to suggest to her that the spectators are under-rating her chances. Encouraging the player to adopt a mindset that makes use of her inside knowledge might induce her to take a more positive attitude toward training etc. My point is that adopting a player mindset is an exercise in realistic self-appraisal, rather than self-deception.

Julia Galef is not alone in being critical of empirical research which purports to show that holding positive illusions about oneself tends to promote happiness. As previously noted on this blog Neera Badhwar has also taken that position, and has argued strongly that realistic optimism about oneself and one’s future beats unrealistic optimism. Badhwar also notes that Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers, leaders of the human potential movement, viewed realism as central to mental health and well-being. She notes that in Rogers' view the fully functioning individual is open to experience, distorting neither his perceptions of the world to fit his conception of himself, nor his conception of himself to fit his perceptions of the world. I find this particularly interesting in the light of Rogers’ use of Alfred Korzybski’s notion that “the map is not the territory”. Carl Rogers recognized that our maps do not serve us well if they are not realistic.

Why seek accurate maps of public policy issues?

Readers who are familiar with Chapter 6 of Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing will be aware of my concern that individual voters lack incentive to become well-informed about policy issues. Most voters are either apathetic about politics, or view it in the same way as they view sporting contests. They cheer for their team and jeer at their opponents.

Galef discusses Bryan Caplan’s concept of rational irrationality. In explaining what he means by rational irrationality Caplan suggests:

“In real world political settings, the price of ideological loyalty is close to zero. So we should expect people to ‘satiate’ their demand for political delusion, to believe whatever makes them feel best” (The Myth of the Rational Voter, p 18).

Galef rejects the view that voters are rationally irrational on the grounds that it implies that they are “already striking an optimal balance between scout and soldier”. She seems concerned that if she were to accept that rational irrationality is widespread, she would have to appeal to the desire of the readers of her book to be good citizens, and/ or to love truth, in urging them to adopt a scout mindset.

However, it seems to me that readers of this book who have any interest in politics are more likely to be Vulcans than Hooligans – to use the terminology of Jason Brennan (in Against Democracy, 2016). Vulcans try to avoid bias, while the Hooligans are the rabid sports fans of politics. The Hooligans are so wedded to soldier mentality that their beliefs are determined by the social groups that they identify with. The only hope of persuading these soldiers to modify political beliefs that are at variance with reality rests with the ability of scouts to persuade the generals (opinion leaders they respect) to modify their views.

Galef has little respect for those Vulcans whose reasoning resembles that of Spock in Star Trek, but has plenty of advice for people who really want to avoid bias in beliefs relating to policy issues. For example, she discusses the research of Phil Tetlock, which suggests that people who are willing to make subtle revisions of forecasts of global events in response to new information tend to make more accurate forecasts than academic experts.  

The author also has some interesting advice for people who want to reduce bias in their beliefs by exposing themselves to views outside of their echo chambers. Exposing partisans to the views of their political opponents tends to reinforce their existing views. She suggests:

“To give yourself the best chance of learning from disagreement, you should be listening to people who make it easier to be open to their arguments, not harder. People you like or respect, even if you don’t agree with them.”

Scout identity

Galef notes that identifying with a belief can wreck your ability to think clearly because you feel that you have to defend it, which motivates you to feel that you have to collect evidence in its favour. She suggests that activists are likely to be most successful if they hold their identity lightly enough to be capable of engaging with the views of opponents and making clear-eyed assessments of the best ways to achieve goals.

The author presents several arguments for seeking to adopt scout identity, but suggests that the most inspiring one is “the idea of being intellectually honorable: wanting the truth to win out, and putting that principle above your own ego”.

In reading The Scout Mindset, I was struck by parallels between the argument presented for adoption of scout mindset and the views of Robert Kegan on stages of mental development from a socialized mind, which enables people to be faithful followers and team players, to a self-authoring mind and self-transforming mind. Readers wishing to investigate further might find it helpful to read Immunity to Change, by Robert Kegan and Lisa Lahey. (I discuss the book here.) 

Conclusions

In my view Julia Galef makes a strong case for people to seek to have realistic maps - perceptions of themselves and the world that are as accurate as possible.

The author successfully challenges research findings claiming that self-deception contributes to happiness of individuals, and she provides useful advice to those seeking to make their maps more accurate.

Galef offers particularly useful advice for people seeking better mapping of public policy issues. If you want to become less biased, listen carefully to the views of opponents you respect rather than seeking exposure to opponents you do not respect.

I agree with the author that the most important reason to seek to have realistic maps is because that is intellectually honorable. Scout mindset is a worthy objective of personal development.