Can the rise of populism be explained as a reaction to the rule of experts?

 

In an essay written over 15 years ago I observed that we were beginning to see a populist reaction to the rule of experts in the United States and (to a lesser extent) in Australia. In more recent essays, however, I have tended to see populism as a manifestation of interest group politics. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, but it may be useful to consider how the rule of experts and populism are both entangled with interest group politics.

My 2010 essay

The essay was entitled: Does Australia also have a ruling class? It was prompted by an article by Angelo Codevilla which suggested that Democrat and Republican office-holders in recent governments in the United States had shown “a similar presumption to dominate and fewer differences in tastes, habits and opinions ... than between both and the rest of the community”. He claimed: “They think, look, and act like a class.”

Codevilla discussed several characteristics of this “ruling class”. For example, he suggested that they believe themselves to be “the best and brightest while the rest of Americans are retrograde, racist, and dysfunctional unless properly constrained”. They view the common people’s words as “like grunts, mere signs of pain, pleasure and frustration”.

I concluded that while Australia also had a self-appointed ruling class which could be identified with the public service and the political left, I didn’t think the conservative side of Australian politics was as closely identified with that ruling class as in the United States. That explains why populist politicians were not particularly popular in Australia at that time.

In retrospect, however, I think I also displayed some “ruling class” attitudes in my essay:

“In my view the words of non-experts on complex economic issues do have little more value than a grunt. Whether we are talking about economic policy, brain surgery or plumbing, I think it should be self-evident that the views of experts count for more than those of non-experts.”

I still think that the views of experts should count for more than those of non-experts, although these days I try to avoid being offensive. Apart from the tone of my comment, I should have made clear that there are reasons to doubt that some of those who claim economic expertise know what they are talking about. The claims that some economists make about the potential to regulate complex market systems to produce better outcomes deserve no more respect than the similar claims of non-experts.

In his book, Expert Failure, published in 2018, Roger Koppl brings an economic perspective to “the problem of experts”. I will briefly consider Koppl’s line of argument in the following section.

Expert Failure

Koppl acknowledges that we must rely on experts even though experts may not be completely reliable and trustworthy sources of the advice we require from them.

 He defines an “expert” as anyone paid to give an opinion. That definition leaves open the question of whether experts are reliable or unreliable.

 Koppl adopts the Hayekian view that knowledge is generally emergent from practice, often tacit, and embodied in our norms, habits, practices, and traditions. His comparative institutional approach leads to the conclusion that expert error and abuse are more likely when experts have monopoly power, and less likely in a “competitive” market for expert opinion.

I expect most economists would view that as commonsense, but it is far removed from standard practice in many fields which rely on expert knowledge. Based on his study of the use of expert witnesses in law, Koppl observes that it is common to encounter the view that it is scandalous for the opinions of men of science to be challenged, even by other scientists. It is often held that the knowledge of expert witnesses is or should be uniform, unambiguous and certain. Experts are often encouraged to come to a common understanding rather than to offer competing views.

Koppl observes that the division of knowledge makes it impossible for anyone to avoid a limited and partial perspective, which implies a parochial bias in our perceptions and judgments. That kind of bias cannot be eliminated by blinding protocols – such as the double-blind requirements used in testing of pharmaceuticals.  It can only be mitigated by multiplying the number of experts and putting them in positions of genuine rivalry.

The book contains an interesting discussion of epistemic systems design in an experimental economics laboratory. In that setting, the experimenter is in the god-like position of defining unambiguously what the truth is and examining how close experimental subjects come to it in different institutional settings. The knowledge gained of which institutional structures promote the discovery and elimination of error is relevant to the real world. Experimental systems design studies offer opportunities to test the role of network structure in producing reliable knowledge in scientific fields.

Koppl comments:

“Rather than attempting to instruct people in how to form true opinions, we might reform our social institutions in ways that tend to induce people to find and speak the truth.”

However, at the end of the next chapter, after considering the problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion in government -  referred to as the rule of experts or the entangled deep state - the author suggests that the experimental approach of “piecemeal institutional reform (which is mostly borrowed from Vernon Smith) does not have an obvious application to the entangled deep state.”  He concludes:

“If my diagnosis of the deep state is at all correct, reform is urgently required. I freely confess, however, that I have no specific ideas on how we might attempt to roll back the deep state with a reasonable prospect of success.”

Nevertheless, Koppl offers useful insights into the nature of the problem arising from the rule of experts. His conclusion that the problem of experts “mostly boils down to the question of knowledge imposition” is highly relevant to consideration of institutional approaches to determination of public policies.

In the introductory chapter to his book Koppl explains that he values pluralistic democracy and is as much opposed to populism as to the rule of experts.  He argues for pluralism on the grounds that each of us has at best a partial view of the truth:

“In a pluralist democracy, competing partial perspectives on the truth have at least a chance to be heard and to influence political choices. Decisions in a political system – be it populist, elitist, or something else – that override or ignore plural perspectives will be based on knowledge that is at best limited, partial, biased.”

In the process of developing that view Koppl refers to an article by Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Accetti (“Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements?” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 20(2), 2015) which describes populism and technocracy as two organizing poles of politics which are both opposed to “party democracy”. I will now discuss that article because it raises the question in my mind of whether party democracy has more in common with interest group politics than with pluralism.

Party democracy, interest group politics and pluralism

 Bickerton and Accetti argue that whilst populism and technocracy are usually assumed to be opposed to each other, there is also an important element of complementarity between them. Both populism and technocracy are predicated on an implicit critique of party democracy. The authors suggest that “if we accept the idea that politics is increasingly structured in terms of this conflict between populism and technocracy, then we find that even the very possibility of articulating a defense of party democracy is excluded from the political spectrum”.

I have no difficulty agreeing with Bickerton and Accetti if they are just using different words to say that both populism and the rule of experts are opposed to pluralistic democracy. Technocracy seems to correspond closely with rule of experts, but “party democracy”, as the authors describe it, seems to me to corresponds more closely to interest group politics than to the role of encompassing political groups in a two-party pluralistic democracy.

The authors define party democracy as a political regime based on two key features: the mediation of political conflicts through the institution of political parties; and the idea that the specific conception of the common good that ought to prevail and therefore be translated into public policy is the one that is constructed through the democratic procedures of parliamentary deliberation and electoral competition. The role of political parties in “mediation of political conflicts” is the focus of my concern.

The authors suggest that an important function performed by political parties is that of “integrating a plurality of particular interests” and moulding them into “an overarching conception of the common good”. When political parties aim to do such things, it seems to me that they end up cobbling together coalitions of interest groups which seek to obtain benefits for themselves at the expense of others. That is essentially what interest group politics is about.

In my view, better outcomes are produced when political parties take on the role of encompassing political groups in two-party pluralistic democracies. In discussing the importance of encompassing political groups in a two-party system of government, Mancur Olson asserted that the leader of a party “whose clients comprise half or more of the society naturally is concerned about the efficiency and welfare of the society as a whole” because this affects the party’s electoral prospects.  (See further discussion and reference here.)

 As I have explained elsewhere (for example in a recent essay on the consequences of path dependence) the growth of interest group politics has tended to contract economic freedom, constrain economic growth and increase public debt levels. As a result, voters have tended to become increasingly disenchanted with conventional politics.

It seems to me that as party politics has increasingly focused on pandering to particular interest groups it has helped to bring about a situation where more people have become more willing to listen to populists who tell them that they are being disadvantaged by the policies of conventional political leaders. Unfortunately, most of those populist leaders advance policies that are likely to produce even worse economic and social outcomes.

The ubiquity of populism, rule of experts, and interest group politics

Looking at recent politics in the United Sates, it might seem appropriate to identify the Democratic Party with rule of experts and the Republican Party with populism. However, that assignment understates the extent of populism in the Democratic Party, which tends to seek popular support by attributing economic woes to the wealthy 1% of the population in much the same way as economic nationalists in the Republican Party attribute economic woes to import competition and immigration. It also understates the extent to which the current Administration relies on commercial expertise – dealmaking – in running the government. It seems that the rule of one group of experts has been replaced by rule of another group with different expertise. The problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion have changed their character but have not disappeared.

Roger Koppl’s reference to the “entangled deep state” reflects his awareness that the rule of experts is not immune to interest group politics. He notes that participants in the American deep state “have a variety of competing and parochial interests”. More generally, interest group politics is strongly associated with the entanglement of entrepreneurs and interests in private and public sectors.

Interest group politics seems to have attended to the pleas of increasingly narrow groups in recent years. As well as seeking support of broad economic groups such as unions, industry groups, and groups with differing social and environmental attitudes, political parties have increasingly sought the support of narrow interest groups by engaging in identity politics. The progressive side of politics has favoured groups that have previously been disadvantaged by ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation. The conservative side of politics has pushed back against what they label as wokeness, while seeking support from some groups, e.g. young men, who perceive themselves to be disadvantage by it.

Another interesting development in interest group politics in the United States is the emergence of an alliance between conservative populists and the high-tech community. It is not easy to comprehend how populists who claim to be concerned about economic and social impacts of competition from imports and immigration could be complacent about the economic and social impacts of AI. Action by the U.S. government to facilitate rapid development of AI has been accompanied by a change in the economic nationalist narrative away from its populist roots to emphasize the importance of retaining technological leadership in AI in the face of increasing competition from China.

The warning of President Eisenhower, quoted in the epigraph, might now be relevant for reasons that he could not have foreseen. Public policy is not only at risk of becoming the captive of a scientific-technological elite supported by the administrative state, it is also at risk of becoming the captive of a scientific-technological elite controlling the development of powerful AI models.

However, I don’t think we should assume that a future in which AI models will have an increasing influence on social and economic outcomes will necessarily be worse than a future in which the entangled deep state retains its current influence.  It is possible that rivalry between different AI models will ensure that their social and economic impacts are relatively benign and consistent with pluralistic democracy. Even now, greater use of truth-seeking bots has potential to lessen the problem of rational ignorance, and thus to reduce the susceptibility of voters to populists peddling false narratives.

Conclusions

The rise of populism in the Western liberal democracies can be explained to some degree as a reaction to the “ruling class” attitudes of experts within governments.  I have recently tended to see populism as a manifestation of interest group politics, but it is worth considering how the rule of experts and populism are entangled with interest group politics.

The essay has outlined the views presented by Roger Koppl in his book, Expert Failure. Koppl offers the useful insight that the main problem arising from the rule of experts is knowledge imposition. Expert error and abuse are more likely when experts have monopoly power and are less likely when experts are placed in positions of genuine rivalry. Koppl argues that pluralist democracy is superior to both the rule of experts and populism because it enables competing partial perspectives on the truth to have a chance to be heard.

I have also considered the view of Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Accetti that both populism and technocracy are predicated on an implicit critique of party democracy. I suggested that party democracy, as the authors described it, seemed to have more in common with interest group politics than with pluralistic democracy. In my view, interest group politics is largely to blame for the poor economic and social outcomes that have encouraged the growth of populism.

My main conclusion is that the rule of experts, populism, and interest group politics are currently ubiquitous on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics. Populism is certainly not confined to one side of politics and populist governments don’t eliminate problems arising from the monopoly of expert opinion. In the U.S. a populist executive has continued to discourage rival views, while attempting to substitute expertise in commercial deal-making for expertise in statecraft.

The emergence of an alliance between the current U.S. Administration and the high-tech community poses a risk that public policy may become captive to a scientific-technological elite controlling the development of powerful AI models.  We should not assume, however, that a future in which AI models have an increasing influence on social and economic outcomes will necessarily be worse than one in which the entangled deep state retains its current influence. Rivalry between AI models may even have potential to produce better outcomes.

Part IV: What incentives are political entrepreneurs faced with?

This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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The most obvious difference between economic and political entrepreneurship is that the former is largely about creating wealth and the latter is largely about obtaining political power. It is possible, of course, for individuals to seek political power to enhance their own wealth or that of a nation, but I will leave to the following essay a discussion of the differing motives that political entrepreneurs may have for obtaining power.

This essay focuses on the choices that political entrepreneurs are faced with in considering how to obtain power, given the peculiarities of politics as a form of business. I will briefly outline the nature of these peculiarities before considering the incentives they create for political entrepreneurship.

Peculiarities of political activities

The most important peculiarities of political activities arise from differences between voting and other choices, differences between triadic and dyadic relationships, and differences in deal-making in public and private sectors.

Differences between voting and other choices

It has often been observed that when people vote they have less incentive to make well-informed choices than in the other decisions that they make. Joseph Schumpeter argued that a typical citizen who makes rational decisions in daily life at home and in business “drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field” (Schumpeter 2011, pp.261-62). He argued that citizens are prone to “irrational prejudice and impulse” in political matters and that this makes them particularly vulnerable to influence by interest groups (Schumpeter 2011, pp.262-64). As I have noted elsewhere, Schumpeter developed those views before the public choice literature enabled concepts such as rational ignorance and rational irrationality to be explored more fully (Bates 2021, pp.114-116). 

Bryan Caplan points out that for an individual voter, the cost of clinging to irrational political beliefs is negligible because there is a miniscule probability that one vote will be decisive in changing the result of an election. Caplan suggests that although citizens often talk about voting options as if they were ordering dinner from a menu, their actions tell a different tale: “They expect to be served the same meal no matter what they order” (Caplan 2007, p. 132). Few individuals take the trouble to assess relevant evidence before they form strong opinions on political issues. They have no incentive to do so. If they cling to irrational beliefs about items on a dinner menu they may experience adverse consequences because of their choices, but when they vote there is no direct connection between the individual elector’s choice and the outcome obtained.

The absence of a direct connection between individual choice and outcome, Richard Wagner argues, is the reason sentiment tends to play a larger role, relative to reason, in political competition (Wagner 2016, p.158). He notes Vilfredo Pareto’s view that ideological articulation can even induce people to support measures that they might have opposed in a market setting. Voters generally embrace policies that enable them to feel good about themselves (Wagner 2016, p.198).

Caplan has assembled evidence that widely held beliefs among the public show a systematic anti-market and anti-foreign bias (Caplan 2007, pp. 30-39, 146).

Competition for leadership

Joseph Schumpeter viewed democracy, as actually practiced, as a competition for leadership. He ended up defining democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 2011, p.269). That view of democracy has become increasingly relevant as party leaders have come to dominate legislatures, and decisions are increasingly made by executive order and other forms of regulation that are primarily under executive control.

Triadic versus dyadic relationships

Wagner argues that the main difference between political entrepreneurship and market entrepreneurship has to do with the difference between dyadic and triadic relationships. Dyadic relationships involve two people; triadic relationships involve three. Wagner observes that market relationships can be reduced mostly to a set of dyadic relationships where both parties benefit. Political catallactics “typically requires a set of triadic relationships” where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support. (Wagner 2016, p. 122).

Use of the word “typically” is appropriate in the context of government activities but is less appropriate in a broader context, if political catallactics encompasses voluntary activity that doesn’t involve government. For example, whenever a group of people band together to buy a service that is of mutual benefit, it seems to me that they are engaging in a dyadic political activity.

It also seems inappropriate to label much of the political entrepreneurship that occurs at the local government level as triadic. The group of people who are using the service in that context may not differ much from the group who are paying for it. As discussed by Paul Aligica and Peter Boettke, in a context where people can exercise both voice and exit, “public” entrepreneurship can lead not only to better services at lower cost but also new and better forms of organization (Aligica and Boettke 2009, p.48).

Wagner illustrates the nature of triadic relationships by reference to decisions that are made about which roads to repair and which channels to dredge when roads and harbours are publicly owned. In that situation a triadic relationship is involved because the agencies responsible for road repair and dredging do not receive revenues directly from sales to the public. Those who benefit from the activities concerned have an incentive to undertake costly action, e.g., making donations to political parties to improve their positions in the queues (Wagner 2016,pp. 214-30).

Making deals

Wagner argues that little substantive work is accomplished through elections and political campaigns. He observes that while puffery is an understandable part of market competition, “electoral competition is mostly about puffery” (Wagner 2016, p.197).

The substantive work of policy choice takes place “outside electoral politics and entails the interactive elements necessary for constructing and maintaining deals” (Wagner 2016, p.198). He suggests a parliamentary assembly can be viewed as an “investment bank” because it is “a hub for making deals” involving selection and funding of projects (Wagner 2016, p.232). Wagner observes:

“Entrepreneurs are thus competing among themselves to seize the future. Successful entrepreneurship offers both fame and fortune” (Wagner 2016, p.279).

One important difference between the deal-making of political entrepreneurs and economic entrepreneurs is that the success of the latter can be measured by profit, which is usually a reliable indicator that the product meets consumers’ expectations. There is no similar indicator to enable political entrepreneurs to be held to account for the failure of policies to meet their purported objectives, let alone for any broader negative impacts on opportunities for human flourishing.

 Implications for entrepreneurial choices

Power-seeking political entrepreneurs have an obvious incentive to pander to the misconceptions and irrational preferences of voters by offering populist policies that are more closely aligned to those preferences. In my opinion, the response of some political entrepreneurs (from both conservative and progressive sides of politics) to reinforce false narratives is posing an increasing threat to economic freedom and prosperity in democracies. For example, a myth about the “hollowing out of American manufacturing” is currently supporting restrictions on economic freedom in the United States through imposition of higher import barriers. Phil Gramm and Donald Boudreaux have thoroughly debunked that false narrative (Gramm and Boudreaux 2025, pp.81-117).

There is also an incentive for political entrepreneurs to advance policies which increase the extent to which economic activity becomes subject to triadic relationships. The aim of such policies is to deliver benefits to politically powerful interest groups at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.

Observations about the prevalence of triadic relationships in politics bring to mind the definition of democracy as “two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch” (sometimes attributed to Benjamin Franklin without any supporting citation).

It is sometimes possible for political entrepreneurs to take advantage of triadic relationships and the willingness of voters to cling to irrational beliefs to pursue objectives that voters would not otherwise support. Wagner provides an outline of the process in his description of electoral competition:

“Within the triadic relationships associated with electoral competition … a political entrepreneur can construct a supporting coalition by crafting a transactional structure that entails gainers and losers, while at the same time generating a supporting ideological cover that softens and conceals the redistributive character of the transaction” (Wagner 2016, p.196).

The conceptual framework developed by Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik illustrates how such deceptive conduct can occur. Within that framework, political entrepreneurs discover identity and policy ‘memes’ (narratives, cues, framing) that shift beliefs about how the world works or a person’s beliefs about their identity and interests. Worldview politics and identity politics can complement and reinforce each other. In some instances, political entrepreneurs may induce a lobby group to push a particular policy because it has shaped their understanding of where their interests lie, rather than because the group has a vested interest in that policy (Mukand and Rodrik 2018).

The framework developed by Valentina Ausserladscheider also emphasizes that the strategies of political entrepreneurs are not determined solely by voters’ ideological positions. Innovative political entrepreneurs don’t offer the same policies as their competitors. They advance their political ambitions by focusing on niches in the marketplace of ideas that established parties do not satisfy, and on winning support by emphasizing the problem-solving capacities of their ideas. For example, the entrepreneurial strategy of “far-right parties” is linked to their “nationalist and nativist core ideology”, leading to policies such as immigration restrictions that are claimed to solve a range of problems. (Ausserladscheider 2022).

Ausserladscheider uses that framework to consider reasons for the political success of Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, during the 1990s. Haider’s approach, based on a mix of authoritarian policies and policies to promote greater economic freedom, was particularly successful during a time of economic turmoil and uncertainty.

Political entrepreneurs seeking fame and fortune seem to be particularly attracted to deal making which expands public funding and regulation of infrastructure provision. The lack of clear measures of success in deal making in the political arena also makes also makes it easier for shysters and purveyors of inferior products to operate successfully in that arena.

This discussion of the incentives of political entrepreneurs to exploit voter misconceptions, promote triadic relationships, engage in deceptive conduct and participate in uneconomic deal making might cause some readers to wonder why democratic political systems have been as resilient as they have been. How is it that economic and political catastrophes have so far been largely averted in liberal democracies, given that political entrepreneurs have obvious incentives to engage in behaviour that could be expected to “kill the goose that lays the golden eggs”?

An obvious answer to that question is that political entrepreneurs often meet resistance when they seek to exploit the peculiarities of politics discussed above. Caplan has noted that established political leaders and parties have an incentive to think twice before caving in to popular misconceptions about the desirability of policies such as tariff protection because this poses the risk that they may become scapegoats for poor economic performance (Caplan 2007, pp.159-60). When voters have faith in political leaders, that allows leaders who are somewhat well-intentioned and less irrational some slack to circumvent their supporter’s misconceptions (Caplan 2007, p.181).

Mancur Olson provided an explanation by reference to the importance of encompassing political groups in a two-party system of government. He asserts that the leader of a party “whose clients comprise half or more of the society naturally is concerned about the efficiency and welfare of the society as a whole, particularly in comparison with lobbies for special-interest groups and congressmen accountable only to small districts” (Olson 1982, p.51). Party leaders certainly have an incentive to constrain deal-making that they consider is likely to have adverse impacts the party’s electoral prospects.

The next essay in this series, focuses on political entrepreneurship that occurs in liberal democracies in pursuit of economic and social objectives that have broad community support. It suggests that information constraints pose a challenge to successful pursuit of such objectives.

The adverse economic consequences of political entrepreneurship that seeks to exploit the peculiarities of politics as a form of business can also lead eventually to emergence of political entrepreneurs who propose reforms which aim to restore free markets. The scope for that to happen is explored in later essays in this series.

References

Aligica, Paul Dragos and Peter J. Boettke, Challenging Institutional Analysis and Development: The Bloomington School (Routledge, 2009).

Ausserladscheider, Valentina, “The Haider Phenomenon and the Rise of Austrian Neoliberalism,” in Culture, Sociality, and Morality : New Applications of Mainline Political Economy edited by Paul Dragos Aligica, Ginny Seung Choi, and Virgil Henry Storr (Rowman & Littlefield, 2022).

Bates, Winton, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing (Hamilton Books, 2021).

Caplan, Bryan. The Myth of the Rational Voter (Princeton University Press, 2007).

Gramm, Phil, and Donald J. Boudreaux, The Triumph of Economic Freedom: Debunking the Seven Great Myths of American Capitalism (Rowman & Littlefield, 2025).

Mukand, Sharun and Dani Rodrik, “The Political Economy of Ideas: On Ideas Versus Interests in Policymaking” NBER Working Paper No. 24467 (2018).

Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations (Yale University Press: 1982).

Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Second Edition (Martino Publishing, 2011).

Wagner, Richard E., Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016). 

How does Entangled Political Economy help us to understand political entrepreneurship?

 

After I finished reading Richard E. Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, the thought crossed my mind that I should encourage people to read what I was about to write about it before reading the other essays I have recently written about political entrepreneurship. The titles of the other essays are:

Can the concept of political entrepreneurship help us to understand authoritarianism?

What role does political entrepreneurship play in institutional change?

Should we expect our political leaders to be great and good?

I have been writing essays about political entrepreneurship to improve my understanding of the topic. In the process I have felt like that a blind man trying to build up a picture of an elephant in his mind by approaching it from different angles. After I finish writing this essay, I might be able to turn my mind to considering how best to present my understanding of the concept and its relevance to liberty and human flourishing.

Entangled Political Economy

The full title of Richard E. Wagner’s book is Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).  

Wagner refers to the ancient Indian parable of the blind men and the elephant in suggesting that political economy is best approached from the standpoint of plausible reasoning rather than demonstrative reasoning.

Plausible reasoning starts from the standpoint that the object of inquiry cannot be known in full detail to the inquirer.

By contrast, demonstrative reasoning begins with a set of assumptions about human behavior, and then analyses the implications of those assumptions. The conventional welfare economics approach to the role of government - with its assumption that government acts like an omniscient and benevolent dictator attempting to maximize the well-being of citizens by correcting externalities and providing public goods – provides a relevant example of demonstrative reasoning.

The analytical framework of Entangled Political Economy recognises that both “polity and economy are areas of practical action that operate in similar but not identical fashion.”

The author suggests that human nature has “a bi-polarity about it that generates both polity and economy.” The political side of human nature entails recognition that we are social creatures who live in close proximity and engage in cooperation and conflict. The economic side entails recognition that we need “to make a livelihood” and desire “to be self-directed as against being conscripts in someone’s army”.

I am not persuaded that “bi-polarity” is the best way to capture the idea that humans are “political animals” whose interactions with other members of the species are not always motivated by personal benefit. It seems to me that human nature inclines individuals to seek to flourish by making wise and well-informed choices about all aspects of their lives that they are able to influence, including their interactions with others. 

However, as public choice theorists have noted, most people lack sufficient motivation to allocate the time and effort required to make well-informed choices in relation to national politics because their individual choices are unlikely to have much impact on national outcomes. Wagner’s view of entangled political economy draws on that public choice literature.

I certainly agree that political economy should focus on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. As Wagner notes, that perspective has important implications for social change:

“The framework of entangled political economy accommodates recognition that societies change only through individual action inside those societies, and with those actions spreading within the society according to the receptivity of other members of that society to those changes.”

Although Entangled Political Economy is based on a description of different kinds of interactions among individuals in the real world, it represents a departure from the way many economists have previously thought about the interaction between politics and economics. Wagner reminds readers that it has been customary to “envision a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas what is denoted as economy.” He points out that discussion is usually in terms of “additive political economy” in which polity and economy are denoted as independent entities and polity intervenes in economy to correct “market failure”. He argues:

“The Progressivist vision of political presence and dominance throughout society is abetted by the vision of additive political economy because that vision provides rationalization for unlimited political action.”

Political entrepreneurship

 Wagner argues that it makes sense to view politics as a peculiar form of business because it has many characteristics in common with business. Both are sources of livelihood for people, entail competition, and are supported by administrative educational organisations. Both must attract investors to provide capital. Both involve entrepreneurship.

The main difference between political entrepreneurship and market entrepreneurship arises because of the difference between dyadic and triadic relationships. Dyadic relationships involve two people; triadic relationships involve three. Wagner observes that market relationships can be reduced mostly to a set of dyadic relationships where both parties benefit. Political relationships typically require a set of triadic relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

Wagner explains:

“Within the triadic relationships associated with electoral competition … a political entrepreneur can construct a supporting coalition by crafting a transactional structure that entails gainers and losers, while at the same time generating a supporting ideological cover that softens and conceals the redistributive character of the transaction.”

The difference between market and political competition has implications for the qualities required for successful entrepreneurship in different contexts. Wagner suggests that while puffery is an understandable part of market competition, “electoral competition is mostly about puffery”. Systemic lying is a feature of political competition. Sentiment tends to play a larger role, relative to reason, in political competition because of the absence of a direct connection between the individual elector’s choice and the outcome obtained. Voting is like ordering a meal at a restaurant and being served the same meal as everyone else, irrespective of what you ordered. Wagner notes Vilfredo Pareto’s view that ideological articulation can induce people to support measures that they might have opposed in a market setting. Voters generally embrace policies that enable them to feel good about themselves.

Wagner argues that little substantive work is accomplished through elections and political campaigns. The substantive work of policy choice takes place “outside electoral politics and entails the interactive elements necessary for constructing and maintaining deals.” He suggests a parliamentary assembly can be viewed as an “investment bank” because it is “a hub for making deals” involving selection and funding of projects. In that context:

“Entrepreneurs are thus competing among themselves to seize the future. Successful entrepreneurship offers both fame and fortune.”

In reading Wagner’s account of political entrepreneurship, it occurred to me that the significance of electoral competition in the United States is greater than he portrays it to be. That perception is based partly on my (somewhat cursory) observation of the presidential election in 2024 and the performance of the Trump administration in its first 100 days in office.

The 2024 U.S. election and its aftermath may be atypical, but similar political entrepreneurship has been on display in some European elections.  As discussed in a previous essay, political entrepreneurs tend to focus on niches in the marketplace of ideas. They seek to attract support from people who are discontented with current economic and social outcomes by emphasizing alleged problem-solving capacities of their ideas. Their success in attracting a loyal support base of customers who are willing to help them to sell their narrative depends to a large extent on the strength of competition from politicians selling different narratives, and on the extent of resistance by journalists and members of the public who consider their narratives to be incorrect, or that their policy proposals are unworkable, unconstitutional, unethical, or otherwise unhelpful.

I also observed that the discussion of entangled political economy in Politics as a Peculiar Business seemed more relevant to countries with parliamentary systems of government than to those with presidential systems, where much business seems to be done via “executive orders”. However, that is not intended as criticism. It may reflect the greater role of “executive orders” in the U.S. in the years since the book was published.

How can entanglement be contained?

One of Wagner’s aims in writing the book was “to explain how an entangled political economy can generate its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control”. He refers to the credit market as providing an example of how this occurs. Private ordering of credit markets is vulnerable to entanglement for two reasons. On the demand side are market participants who are dissatisfied with how they fare in privately ordered credit markets. On the supply side are “political figures who want to catapult themselves from background to foreground in the cosmic drama that is human society”.

Another example relates to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which provides for just compensation when the government takes private property for public use. However, Wagner observes that “history over the past century or so has increasingly run in the direction of governments taking property for what are private uses and paying only partial or token compensation”. A clear constitutional provision is not necessarily “sufficiently strong to deter rapacious interest groups from using government as an instrument of predation”.

Wagner refers to Vincent Ostrom’s observation that government involves a Faustian bargain: “instruments of evil – power over other people – are to be employed because of the good they might do, recognizing that evil might also result.” 

How can we minimize the potential for evil to result? Wagner suggests that the alternatives are “parchment” and “guns”.

“Parchment” refers to constitutional rules. Constitutional rules may remain effective if supported by public morality – sufficient numbers of people being willing to refrain from use of the powers of the state to enrich themselves at the expense of others. This approach relies on education and related processes to cultivate virtue and wisdom.

“Guns” refers to an approach that looks primarily to “a kind of opposition of interests to limit government predation”. Wagner suggests that “guns” may complement “parchment”. He writes:

“The basic principle behind this approach is for governmental action to require some concurrence among different participants with opposed interests.”

Wagner suggests that when it becomes habitual for people to use politics in a predatory manner that may “promote alternative beliefs as to what comprises just conduct”. He concludes that “parchment and guns … would seem to be nonseparable ingredients of constitutional order in the final analysis.”

Wagner tells us that his reference to guns is metaphorical, so what he has in mind may not necessarily be violent. For example, those who believe themselves to be victims of predation have an incentive to form associations to protect their interests in the courts and may be able to exert countervailing power the political arena.

While I believe that entangled political economy offers important insights about interactions between participants in politics and markets, I would have liked the author to explore more fully the macroeconomic consequences of increasing entanglement. Perhaps that would have led to a more optimistic conclusion.

In Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing I suggested that although most liberal democracies are heading for major economic crises in the years ahead there are reasons to be optimistic “that governments will eventually introduce institutional reforms to enable the drivers of progress to restore growth of opportunities.” (See Chapter 6, particularly p. 120)

My optimism presupposes the emergence of political entrepreneurs who understand the nature of the problems that need to be addressed and can marshal the political support required to carry out appropriate institutional reforms to correct those problems.

Conclusions

The discussion of entangled political economy in Richard Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business, is helpful to an understanding of the context in which political entrepreneurship occurs in the liberal democracies.

Entangled political economy focuses on the full range of interactions among persons and entities within society. It emphasizes that societal change occurs only through individual actions. Entangled political economy represents a departure from the view of those economists (and governments) who have envisioned a polity as a kind of lord of the manor who overseas an economy.  

Wagner argues that politics has many characteristics in common with private business, but it is characterized by triadic relationships rather than dyadic relationships. Market relationships can be reduced mainly to sets of relationships between two people, both of whom benefit. Politics typically requires sets of relationships where two people exchange mutual support and a third is forced to provide financial support.

The author suggests that the main work of political entrepreneurs – interactions to construct deals - takes place outside electoral politics. He suggests that parliaments can be viewed as kinds of investment banks because they are hubs for making deals involving selection and funding of projects.

In my view the significance of electoral politics and deal-making by executive arms of governments is greater than Wagner portrays it to be. However, my view has been strongly influenced by events since 2016, when his book was published.

Wagner argues that entangled political economy generates its own momentum to transform a constitution of liberty into a constitution of control. He is pessimistic about the prospect for entanglement to be contained via constitutional rules and moral conduct. He suggests that habitual use of politics in a predatory manner promotes an alternative view of what constitutes just conduct.

In my view, Wagner might have come to a more optimistic conclusion if he had more fully explored the macro-economic consequences of increasing use of the powers of the state for predatory purposes. Economic crises may eventually bring about appropriate institutional reforms if political entrepreneurs emerge who can marshal the political support required to implement them.  

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.

Do clinical delusions have anything in common with a mythology mindset?

 

In my discussion of Steven Pinker’s book, Rationality, I referred to his observation that people tend to have a reality mindset in the world of immediate experience and a mythology mindset when discussing issues in the public sphere. Although that is an accurate observation about a general tendency, delusions are also fairly common in the world of immediate experience.

The delusions that most of us experience are fairly harmless. For example, it may not do you much harm to believe that you are happier than average, even if you aren’t. That common delusion may help to explain why so many people walk around with smiles on their faces.

For some unfortunate people, however, the world of immediate experience includes delusional beliefs that are symptomatic of mental ill-health. These are referred to as clinical delusions.

The question I ask above has been prompted by my reading of Lisa Bortolotti’s recent book, Why Delusions Matter. Lisa Bortolotti is a philosopher who specializes in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences, including issues relating to mental illness. She observes that there is a strong overlap between clinical and non-clinical delusional beliefs. The non-clinical delusional beliefs that she discusses include beliefs that Pinker would associate with a mythology mindset.

A conversation context

Bortolotti notes that in any discussion between two people, you have a speaker and an interpreter swapping roles as the conversation proceeds. The speaker says something and the interpreter listens, making inferences about the speaker’s beliefs, desires, feelings, hopes and intentions on the basis of the speaker’s words, facial expression, tone of voice, previous behaviour and so on.

Interpretation becomes challenging when the interpreter suspects that the speaker may be delusional. The interpreter rarely has the information needed to assess that the speaker’s beliefs are false, so falsity cannot be a necessary condition for attribution of delusionality.

Three elements are often involved when the interpreter judges the speaker to be delusional:

• Implausibility: The interpreter finds the speaker’s beliefs to be implausible.
• Unshakeability: Speakers do not give up their beliefs in the face of counterarguments and counterevidence.
• Identity: The beliefs seem important to the image that speakers have of themselves.

Clinical delusions

Bortolotti offers what she describes as an “agency-in-context” model to explain clinical delusions. She explains:

“The adoption and maintenance of delusional beliefs are due to many factors combining aspects of who you are and what your story is (your genes, reasoning biases, personality, lack of scientific literacy, etc.) and aspects of how epistemic practices operate in the society where you live.”

The epistemic practices she refers to include what we learn at school about knowledge acquisition, and the stigma that makes it difficult for people with delusional beliefs to participate fully in public life.

There is no doubt that persecutory delusions are harmful to the speaker and others. They undermine the ability of speakers to respond appropriately to events, and often erode their relationships with others.

However, Lisa Bortolotti suggests that it is important for interpreters to understand that most delusions offer some benefits for speakers. Delusions “let speakers see the world as they want the world to be; make speakers feel important and interesting; or give meaning to speakers’ lives, configuring exciting missions for them to accomplish”.

Interpreters also need to understand that the underlying problems of speakers don’t disappear when they obtain insight about their delusions. They may become depressed when they approach reality without the filter of their delusional beliefs.

There is not much to be gained by attempting to reason with people whose beliefs are unshakeable. Bortolotti suggests that it is probably more productive for the interpreter and speaker to share stories rather than exchanging reasons for beliefs. Exchanging stories can show how delusional beliefs emerged as reactions to situations that were difficult to manage. While sharing stories, interpreters have opportunities “to practice curiosity and empathy in finding out more” about underlying problems.

Conspiracy delusions

From an interpreter’s viewpoint, a speaker’s beliefs about the existence of conspiracies often have similar characteristics to clinical delusions. They are implausible, unshakeable, and closely tied to the speaker’s self-image.

Bortolotti emphasizes that those who hold conspiracy delusions often claim to have special knowledge of events – they claim to be experts, or to know who the real experts are. Identifying as a member of a group is often also important. Non-members often refer to members of such groups in a derogatory way e.g. QAnon supporters and anti-vaxxers. However, people are often attracted to conspiracy delusions promoted by like-minded people whom they trust. The act of sharing a delusional story can be a signal of commitment to a particular group.

Comments

Lisa Bortolotti’s book has improved my understanding of delusions in a couple of different ways. First, it has given me a better appreciation that delusions offer some benefits to the people who hold them, and those benefits help to explain the unshakeability of delusional beliefs.

Second, viewing delusions within the context of a conversation between a speaker and an interpreter is helpful in drawing attention to the value judgements involved in assessing whether the speaker’s beliefs are delusional.

My main criticism of the book is that the author seems to me to be biased in favour of “the official version” of events, even though she acknowledges that contrary beliefs are sometimes vindicated. The most obvious example bias is her apparent reluctance to give credence to the possibility that Covid19 may have originated in a lab in Wuhan.

I am pleased that my reading of the book did not leave me with the impression that the author believes that it is delusional to have an unshakeable belief in the importance of the search for truth. In emphasizing that value judgements are involved in assessing whether beliefs are delusional, Lisa Bortolotti seems to me to be providing readers with a better understanding of the meaning attached to the concept of delusion in clinical and non-clinical settings, rather than casting doubt on the existence of reality.

What's wrong with people?

 

This question is posed in the title of Chapter 10 of Steven Pinker’s book, Rationality: What it is, Why it Seems Scarce, Why it Matters.

I enjoyed reading the previous 9 chapters but didn’t learn much from them. Those chapters were a painless way to refresh my memory about definitions of rationality, rules of logic, probability, Bayesian reasoning, rational choice, statistical decision theory, game theory, correlation, and regression analysis.

I particularly liked the approach Pinker took in discussing the research of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky which documents many ways in which people are prone to fall short of normative benchmarks of rationality. Pinker makes the point:

“When people’s judgments deviate from a normative model, as they so often do, we have a puzzle to solve. Sometimes the disparity reveals a genuine irrationality: the human brain cannot cope with the complexity of a problem, or it is saddled with a bug that cussedly drives it to the wrong answer time and again.

But in many cases there is a method to people’s madness.”

A prime example is loss aversion: “Our existence depends on a precarious bubble of improbabilities with pain and death just a misstep away”. In Freedom Progress and Human Flourishing, I argued similarly that loss aversion helped our ancestors to survive.

Pinker doesn’t seek to blame the propensity of humans to make logical and statistical fallacies for the prevalence of irrationality in the public sphere. He is not inclined to blame social media either, although he recognises its potential to accelerate the spread of florid fantasies.

The mythology mindset

Pinker argues that reasoning is largely tailored to winning arguments. People don’t like getting on to a train of reasoning if they don’t like where it takes them. That is less of a problem for small groups of people (families, research teams, businesses) who have a common interest in finding the truth than it is in the public sphere.

People tend to have a reality mindset when they are dealing with issues that affect their well-being directly – the world of their immediate experience – but are more inclined to adopt a mythology mindset when they are dealing with issues in the public sphere.

When economists discuss such matters, they may refer to the observation of Joseph Schumpeter that the typical citizen drops to a lower level of mental performance when discussion turns to politics. They reference the concept of rational ignorance attributed to Anthony Downs and Gordon Tulloch. They may also refer to Brian Caplan’s concept of rational irrationality. (For example, see Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, pp 114-115).

Pinker doesn’t refer to those economists’ perspectives but offers interesting insights about factors that might lead people to adopt mythology mindsets. In summary, as a consequence of myside bias, attitudes to the findings of scientific studies often have less to do with scientific literacy than with political affiliation. The opposing “sides” are sometimes akin to “religious sects, which are held together by faith in their moral superiority and contempt for opposing sects”. Within those sects the function of beliefs is to bind the group together and give it moral purpose.

What can we do?

Pinker’s suggestions for combatting irrationality in the public sphere are summed up by his subheading “Re-affirming Rationality”. He advocates openness to evidence, noting the findings of a survey suggesting that most internet users claim to be open to evidence. He suggests that we valorize the norm of rationality by “smiling or frowning on rational and irrational habits”.

Pinker identifies institutions that specialize in creating and sharing knowledge as playing a major role in influencing the beliefs that people hold. Since “no-one can know everything”, we all rely on academia, public and private research units, and the news media for a great deal of the knowledge which forms the basis of our beliefs. Unfortunately, these institutions are often not trustworthy.

In the case of the universities, Pinker suggests that the problem stems from “a suffocating left-wing monoculture, with its punishment of students and professors who question dogmas on gender, race, culture, genetics, colonialism, and sexual identity and orientation”. News and opinion sites have been “played by disingenuous politicians and contribute to post-truth miasmas”.

It is easy to agree with Pinker that it would be wonderful if universities and the news media could become paragons of viewpoint diversity and critical thinking. However, movement toward that goal will require large numbers of individuals to enlist for a ‘long march’ to re-establish norms of rationality in institutions that specialize in creating and sharing knowledge.                                                                    

Does the "Politics of Being" support progress?

 

“Politics of Being” is title of a recently published book by Thomas Legrand. The subtitle is “Wisdom and science for a new development paradigm”. The question I ask myself is whether Legrand’s views support progress as I defined the concept in Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing. Would widespread adoption of Legrand’s views enhance the growth of opportunities for individuals to obtain the basic goods of flourishing humans?

Before I purchased the book, I was aware that the author had shown wisdom by including this quote from Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel Lecture:

“A core goal of public policy should be to facilitate the development of institutions that bring out the best in humans.”

That passage is actually quoted several times in the book and is sometimes accompanied by the preceding sentence in which Ostrom distances her approach from that of policy analysts who design institutions “to force (or nudge) entirely self-interested individuals to achieve better outcomes”. The passage I have quoted at the top of this article illustrates Ostrom’s optimistic view of the capacity of individuals to work together to devise solutions to collective action problems without help from governments.

The essence of Legrand’s line of argument is that the world is stuck in an obsolete development path and is in need of a new “wisdom-based approach to politics”.  I will discuss briefly what he perceives to be wrong with the current development path, before discussing some elements of the alternative path he advocates.

Perception of the problem

Legrand believes that the current development path is causing many problems. The world is on track for a climate change catastrophe. Economic development and increased life expectancy are not making people much happier in high-income countries. Many countries seem to be facing mental health crises. There has been a decline in interpersonal trust in many countries. Our current model of development is rooted in a set of values that are causing a civilization crisis. He writes:

“Our economic system not only destroys social ties and the environment but feeds on these destructions that create new market opportunities. It seeks to adapt humans to its own requirements rather than adapting itself to human needs. Based on fundamental misconceptions, this system can only perpetuate itself through ever more propaganda that feeds our disconnection from ourselves, our true needs, and ultimately, our apathy.”

I agree that all is not well with the world and share some of Legrand’s concerns. However, I am more optimistic than he is about climate change, and strongly disagree with his views on economics. Readers who are interested in my views should read Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing.

Being and Interbeing

Legrand argues that the new development model required is essentially spiritual. He views spiritual development as:

“the process by which we come closer to our true nature. From that connection, we naturally tend to manifest the highest qualities: wisdom, love, joy, peace etc., or simply the best or most authentic version of ourselves currently available!”

Legrand’s discussion of spiritual values includes chapters on life, happiness, love, peace, mindfulness, and light.

According to Legrand the new paradigm involves a transition from “having to being, which many believe means interbeing”. So, what is interbeing?

 “Interbeing is a term coined by Zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh, which goes beyond interconnectedness to touch on the very nature of our being. It expresses the nature of reality based on the Buddhist teachings of interdependent co-arising (“that is because this is”), non-self, and impermanence”.

I see no problem accepting that everything is interdependent. Impermanence does seem pervasive (except in respect of fundamental values, virtues, and the highest qualities). But “non-self” poses problems. As I see it, self-awareness is a fundamental characteristic of the kind of thing (entity or system) that an individual human is.  Self-respect arises from self-awareness, and motivates respect for other people, and other living things. Respect is the foundation which makes love possible. By the way, do you know who it was who said “one should not hurt others if one loves oneself”? The answer is here.

At various points in the book Legrand recognizes that people have “higher selves” and “true selves”, so he seems to acknowledge that we should aim to purify our egos – to remove the biases, distortions, and attachments that tarnish our perceptions of our individual selves - rather than eliminate self-awareness. He provides a good summary of his view of “being” and of personal development in this passage:

“As a person, there is little chance that I get closer to my authentic being by defining a vision of who I am and trying to actualize it. On the contrary, I can discover who I am by freeing myself from predefined and limiting identities, purifying my intentions, character, and behaviors, and expressing the deepest yearning of my soul. This is a conscious, evolutionary process of emergence, informed but not bounded by the understanding I have of my essence, which is necessarily limited. The same is true for nations.”

The world would be a better place if more people adopted that as their personal development model. However, I was tempted to leave off the last sentence of the quoted passage. The idea that nations have “souls” seems to me to be collectivist nonsense.

Governance

The part of the book providing an agenda for action envisages a larger role for government than I had anticipated. For example, Legrand suggests that government efforts to promote early childhood education should start during pregnancy. He also suggests that governments should actively promote a healthy diet. Even followers of Elinor Ostrom can sometimes find it difficult to remember to avoid adopting an overly pessimistic view of what people can achieve without government guidance.

I agree with Legrand that it is naïve for people to believe that “all it takes to improve our societies is to secure a majority of voters for their ideas, especially when they engender polarization”. Political leaders have no hope of implementing lasting reforms unless they can foster broad community support for them. That usually means avoiding politicization of the issues. (As an aside, one of the inconvenient truths about politics is that Al Gore’s involvement in support of U.S. action to mitigate climate change provided a focus for Republican opposition to such policies.)

The book contains interesting proposals to enact the “politics of being” in political institutions. Legrand suggests that each nation should establish a “wisdom council” to preside over discussions about the nation’s evolution with the government and parliament. The councils would consist of equal representations of four groups: randomly selected citizens, representatives of the “outer” economic, social, and environmental life of the nation, representatives of the “inner” spiritual, cultural, and psychological life of the nation, and “representatives of non-human members of the earth community”.

Legrand also suggests that the Baha’i model of governance should be adopted for lower houses of parliament. In brief, adult community members elect representatives at the local level and are urged not to discuss with others who to vote for. The local representative vote for regional representatives, who in turn vote for national representatives.

It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which politicians would enact such radical changes to existing systems of representative government. However, if the outcomes of the existing systems become increasingly unpalatable, radical alternatives will no doubt be contemplated by an increasing number of citizens. In that context, Legrand’s proposals will have stiff competition from other proposals, including the decentralist approach discussed previously on this blog.

The main problem I see with Legrand’s governance proposals is their potential to infringe individual liberty. Most of the members of the proposed governing council would be likely to advance the interests that they represent by advocating further restriction of individual liberty. The Baha’i model is presumably more responsive to community members than religious and political governance systems in which the hierarchy is self-perpetuating, but people who are indirectly elected to peak positions still have less incentive to have regard for the wishes of members at the grassroots level than if they were directly elected, or selected randomly.

Facilitating progress?

Legrand describes his book as “a drop in the ocean”. I think it may have potential to be more than that. The part of the book dealing with spiritual development has potential to be influential if it finds its way into the hands of sufficient numbers of people who are currently rudderless and yearning for inspiration.

I think contemplation of Legrand’s views on spiritual development has potential to enhance progress, viewed as the growth of opportunities for individuals to obtain the basic goods of flourishing humans. After reading the book, some people might be more inclined to wise and well-informed self-direction, healthy living, improved inter-personal relations, living in harmony with nature, and adoption of behaviors that enhance psychological well-being.

However, Legrand’s attack on “the current development path” invites further restrictions on economic freedom which would impact negatively on growth of productivity and hence on growth of opportunities for human flourishing. As outlined in the following paragraph in Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, I see declining rates of productivity growth as a major threat to growth of opportunities for human flourishing:

“This chapter has focused on the threats posed by climate change, declining productivity growth, and problems with democracy. I do not dismiss the longer-term threat posed by climate change, but in my view, there are stronger reasons for concern about the more immediate threat posed by declining productivity growth. Individuals, firms, and governments are taking action to mitigate climate change, and their efforts seems likely to accelerate before adaptation becomes excessively costly. There are fewer grounds for optimism that governments will deal with emerging economic problems (of their own making) in time to avert the widespread misery that is likely to follow from looming economic crises.”

As explained in my book, my optimism about action to mitigate climate change rests on signs that the polycentric approach, proposed by Elinor Ostrom in 2009, is now being adopted successfully.

I am not greatly troubled by the thought that some readers of Thomas Legrand’s book may be persuaded to adopt economic and political views that are inimical to productivity growth. There is an ocean full of views on public policy that are similar to those which he advocates, so I don’t think his additional drop will have a significant direct impact on policies adopted. Hopefully, his book’s endorsement of Elinor Ostrom’s approach will encourage some readers to explore her views in greater detail.

My bottom line: The net impact of “The Politics of Being” will be to support the growth of opportunities for human flourishing.