Henry B. Veatch’s Neo-Aristotelian Defense of Reality, Reason, and Rights

 

This is a guest essay by Dr Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business at Wheeling University, and Executive Director of its Institute for the Study of Capitalism and Morality. Ed is author of a trilogy of important books on freedom and flourishing: “Capitalism and Commerce”, “Champions of a Free Society”, and “Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society”. He also has numerous other publications, including several published on this site. (Please see the list after the end of this essay.) 

In an age of philosophical fragmentation, the voice of Henry B. Veatch stands as an indispensable corrective. Recognized as one of the leading neo-Aristotelian thinkers of the twentieth century, Veatch devoted his long and distinguished career to defending a vision of philosophy rooted in realism, teleology, and the conviction that ethics and politics must be grounded in the nature of things. His many articles and books represent a sustained and powerful argument against the dominant trends of modern and postmodern thought.

Veatch revised and reinterpreted Aristotle’s ethical framework at a time when utilitarianism, subjectivism, skepticism, existentialism, emotivism, and positivism dominated philosophical discourse. During that period, contemporary ethics had fragmented into relativism, nihilism, and reductionist theories that failed to account for the richness of moral experience. 

He disagreed with prevailing trends in modern philosophy such as the anti-foundationalism of postmodern thought, the persistence of Kantian and neo-Kantian ethical theory, nominalism, and the dominance of linguistic analysis. Veatch argues that contemporary moral philosophy often attempts to evade individual responsibility, either by reducing morality to subjective preferences or by attaching morality to social institutions via collectivist ethical theories.

This essay will explore Veatch's contributions to metaphysics, his account of human nature and teleology, his conception of practical wisdom (phronesis), his critique of Kantianism and postmodernism, and his defense of natural law and human rights. It will then examine his influence on contemporary philosophers Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, comparing and contrasting their views with Veatch's own.

Metaphysics and the Defense of Realism

At the heart of Veatch's philosophical project lies a commitment to metaphysical realism. This commitment is nowhere more evident than in Intentional Logic (1952), where Veatch argues that "logic necessarily presupposes a metaphysics". He insists that logic cannot be understood as a mere formal calculus or as a set of rules for manipulating symbols. Rather, logic must be grounded in the nature of things themselves—in the way the world actually is.

Veatch's realism is thoroughly Aristotelian. He maintains that the world consists of substances with natures or essences, and that our concepts and judgments are true insofar as they correspond to these real structures. The cognitive relation between knower and known is, in his view, a relation of identity—not in the sense that the knower becomes the object known, but in the sense that the mind grasps the essence of the thing. Predication, similarly, involves the relation of identity between the abstracted essence and the individuals that instantiate it.

This metaphysical realism has profound implications for every other area of philosophy. If there are real natures and essences, then there are real facts about what things are and what they are for. And if there are real facts about what things are for, then there are real standards of goodness and badness, right and wrong. Veatch's metaphysics thus provides the foundation for his entire ethical and political philosophy.

Veatch's realism also leads him to reject the nominalism that pervades much modern philosophy. He argues that the denial of universals and essences leads inevitably to skepticism and relativism. If there are no real natures, then there is no basis for making objective claims about what anything is or ought to be. The only alternative, he insists, is to recover the Aristotelian understanding of the world as a realm of intelligible structures that we can come to know through reason.

Human Nature and Teleology 

Veatch's account of human nature is inseparable from his teleological view of the world. For Aristotle, as for Veatch, every natural thing has a telos. Human beings are no exception. We are rational animals, and our distinctive end is to live in accordance with reason.

In Rational Man (1962), Veatch takes aim at the modern denial of teleology. Against this view, he argues that ethical knowledge is possible and that it is "grounded in human nature". Human beings have a nature, and that nature determines what is good for them.

Veatch's teleology is not, however, a simplistic or reductive one. He does not believe that human well-being is something simple or that the moral life consists merely in following rules or recipes. Rather, he presents a "pluralistic understanding of human well-being without lapsing into moral relativism". There are many goods that contribute to human flourishing, and they must be integrated and balanced in the course of a well-lived life.

 This pluralistic teleology is crucial for understanding Veatch's ethics. Unlike utilitarians, who reduce the good to pleasure or happiness, Veatch recognizes a diversity of goods—knowledge, friendship, virtue, excellence in various activities, and so on. Unlike Kantians, who separate the right from the good and insist on duty for duty's sake, he insists that moral obligations are ultimately grounded in what is good for human beings. The good is prior to the right--we have duties because there are things that are truly good for us and for others. 

Veatch explains that ethics must be grounded in metaphysics. He provides an objective foundation for morality rooted in human nature and the rational pursuit of human flourishing. His Aristotelian realism holds that all beings have a natural end (or telos) and that each individual is responsible for his own moral development. This responsibility is the foundational existential fact from which ethics begins. He defends a teleological account of morality in which good is determined by the fulfillment of one’s human nature. Unlike Ayn Rand, for Veatch, an individual’s obligation to act to fulfill his human nature does not depend upon a pre-moral “choice to live”.

Veatch challenges the naturalistic fallacy by addressing the fact-value distinction through which many philosophers contend that moral choices are merely expressions of subjective preferences rather than statements of fact. Calling the fact-value dichotomy untenable, he explains that human nature contains normative implications and that moral claims cannot be divorced from human nature. 

Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) and the Moral Life

 Rationality is the defining characteristic of humanity guiding individuals toward a flourishing life. A person’s nature as a rational being shapes his ethical obligations. Veatch recognizes that moral decision making is contextual and requires the exercise of reason in concrete situations.

 Central to Veatch’s ethics is phronesis (practical wisdom) which discerns the contextual, particular, and contingent circumstances to determine what is morally required at the time of action. Practical wisdom is concerned with applying general moral principles to particular circumstances. Viewing rationality as the sole arbiter of action, his ethics includes the ability to reason and act including the ability to discern and correct errors.

Veatch's conception of the moral life is centrally organized around the Aristotelian virtue of practical wisdom. For Veatch, the moral life is not merely one of following rules or recipes, nor is human well-being something simple. Rather, the moral life, which Veatch calls "rational or intelligent living," is "the life of practical wisdom where individual judgment of the particular and the contingent is paramount". 

This emphasis on practical wisdom reflects Veatch's conviction that ethics cannot be reduced to a set of general principles or algorithms. The situations we face in life are always particular and contingent, and they require the exercise of judgment—the ability to see what is called for in this situation, with these people, under these circumstances. Practical wisdom is the virtue that enables us to make these judgments well.

At the same time, practical wisdom is not a form of intuition or feeling. It is a form of reason—practical reason. The practically wise person does not feel his way through moral situations; he sees them clearly, understands what is at stake, and discerns what the relevant goods and virtues require. Practical wisdom is thus both intellectual and moral. It  involves knowledge of the good and the ability to apply that knowledge in concrete situations. 

Veatch's account of practical wisdom also has important implications for his view of moral education and character formation. Virtues are not innate. They must be acquired through practice and habituation. The moral life requires learning, discipline, and experience. But it is not merely an art, for it deals with what is truly good and bad for human beings, not merely with what is useful or pleasant.

Critique of Kantianism and neo-Kantianism 

Veatch was a critic of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy. In For an Ontology of Morals (1971) he critiques contemporary trends in ethical theory, "including the deontological tradition dating back to Kant". His fundamental objection to Kantianism is that it severs morality from any grounding in human nature and human goods.

Kantian ethics, in Veatch's view, makes the fundamental mistake of supposing "that moral imperatives can be derived independently of consideration of human ends". Kantian moral theories "generally argue that moral duties are duties to perform certain actions 'without' reference to any end to be achieved".

Veatch also objects to the Kantian separation of the phenomenal and noumenal realms, which he sees as a form of idealism that undermines realism. Kant's "transcendental turn" represents a fateful departure from the Aristotelian understanding of knowledge as the grasp of an independently existing reality. By restricting knowledge to the phenomenal realm and relegating things-in-themselves to the noumenal, Kant makes it impossible to know the real natures of things—including human nature. Without knowledge of human nature, there can be no objective ethics.

Veatch's critique extends to neo-Kantianism as well. He argues that "moral and ethical distinctions cannot be rightly or adequately understood if they are regarded simply as matters of linguistic use but are grounded in the very being and nature of things". The linguistic turn in philosophy is, in Veatch's view, merely another form of the Kantian error. It treats morality as a matter of language or convention rather than as a matter of objective truth about human flourishing.

Postmodernism and the Linguistic Turn 

Veatch was equally critical of postmodernism, which he saw as the culmination of the modern trajectory away from realism and toward various forms of skepticism, relativism, and constructivism. He opposed the "linguistic turn" in philosophy, which treats language as the primary or exclusive subject of philosophical inquiry.

Veatch's objections to postmodernism are rooted in his realism. If there are no real natures or essences—if everything is a social construction or a product of language—then there is no basis for objective knowledge or moral truth. Postmodernism leads inevitably to a kind of nihilism in which all claims are equally valid (or equally invalid) and there is no way to distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong. Against this, Veatch insists that "our rules of language are determined by real necessities in the world". Language is not a self-contained system that creates reality. It is a tool for referring to and describing a reality that exists independently of us.

Veatch's opposition to postmodernism is thus not merely a matter of intellectual preference. It is a matter of philosophical necessity. If we abandon realism, we abandon the possibility of philosophy itself as a quest for truth. If we abandon the possibility of truth, we abandon the possibility of any meaningful ethics or politics.

Human Rights and Natural Law

Veatch's most sustained treatment of political philosophy appears in Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? (1985). In this work, Veatch "finds the basis for human rights in natural law". He "builds his argument step by step, carefully laying the foundation for his central assertion that our basic rights are discoverable directly in the facts of nature".

His theory of natural rights is grounded in an account of human nature that recognizes the connection between moral duty and human flourishing. He sees these rights as derived from duties that a person owes to himself to flourish as an individual human being. Each of us is bound by nature to fulfill that obligation. A person’s duty to self-perfection creates the right not to have that pursuit interfered with. It follows that, if one expects to hold these rights, then he must accord them to all other persons, as well. These natural rights are conditioned by the reciprocal duties of other rational being. Because the rights are grounded in reality, their validity does not depend upon social agreement or legal codification. 

Veatch's natural law theory is thoroughly Aristotelian. Just as every natural thing has a telos that determines what is good for it, so too human beings have a nature and a telos that determine what is good for them and what they have a right to. Rights are not arbitrary conventions or creations of the state; they are grounded in the very being and nature of human persons.

Veatch insists that "law must be based on ethics" and that "ethics in turn must be grounded in fact and therefore must have a basis in nature". This is a direct challenge to the positivist view that law is merely a matter of social convention or sovereign command. It is also a challenge to the view that rights are merely creations of the state—a view that leaves individuals vulnerable to the tyranny of the majority or the state.

Veatch's defense of natural law is also a defense of what Aristotle called "a natural justice"—a justice that is not merely conventional but is grounded in the nature of things. This natural justice provides a standard by which positive laws can be judged and, if necessary, resisted. It is the foundation of any genuine theory of human rights. 

Influence on Rasmussen and Den Uyl

Veatch's influence on contemporary philosophy has been considerable, particularly on the work of Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl. These two philosophers have acknowledged Veatch as a major influence on their thinking. Indeed, Rasmussen and Den Uyl's The Perfectionist Turn  (2016) opens with a quotation from Veatch's Rational Man: "In Aristotle's eyes, ethics does not begin with thinking of others; it begins with oneself".

Rasmussen and Den Uyl share with Veatch a commitment to Aristotelian realism, teleology, and natural law. They defend "a version of Aristotelian ethics" and argue that "the Aristotelian approach to ethics supports the natural rights which form the most secure basis for liberal principles". Like Veatch, they hold that "human flourishing is the ultimate moral standard".

Moreover, Rasmussen and Den Uyl have been instrumental in bringing Veatch's work to a new generation of readers. The Liberty Fund edition of Rational Man contains an introduction by  Rasmussen, and both philosophers have written appreciatively of Veatch's contributions. They have also described Veatch as seeing "human beings as part of a natural order that is not ultimately constructed by humans but is nonetheless knowable and open to human flourishing".

Points of Agreement

The agreement between Veatch and Rasmussen and Den Uyl is substantial. First, all three are committed to metaphysical realism—the view that there is a real world independent of our minds and that we can know it. Second, all three embrace teleology—the view that natural things, including human beings, have ends or purposes that determine what is good for them. Third, they all regard human nature as philosophically relevant, holding that moral obligations and rights are grounded in human nature and human flourishing. Fourth, all three are critical of Kantianism, which they see as separating morality from any grounding in human goods, and of postmodernism, which they see as leading to skepticism, subjectivism, and relativism. Fifth, all three emphasize the importance of rationality, practical wisdom, and practical agency in the moral life. Sixth, they all are defenders of individual liberty and human flourishing. Rasmussen and Den Uyl describe themselves as advocating individualistic perfectionism and Veatch's defense of natural rights provides a foundation for liberal principles. Indeed, Rasmussen and Den Uyl have argued that a realist turn—namely, one in which the natural order is the basis for individual rights—is needed to bring about a proper understanding and defense of liberty.

Points of Disagreement

Despite this deep agreement, there are also differences between Veatch and Rasmussen and Den Uyl. The most important disagreement concerns how natural rights are conceptualized and grounded.

Veatch holds that "natural rights are derived from duties one naturally owes to oneself". According to Veatch, each individual "has eudaimonic obligations of self-perfection to himself, and, in virtue of these obligations to self, all other persons are obligated not to prevent that person’s self-perfecting activity". In other words, rights are grounded in duties—specifically, the duty that each person owes to himself to pursue his own flourishing.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl, however, see flaws in Veatch's view. Their main criticism is that his argument cannot provide a person with any right protective of non-self-perfecting behavior. An individual will, at best, have rights vindicating his rightful (i.e., dutiful) actions. In other words, if rights are grounded in duties to oneself, then one has rights only insofar as one is fulfilling those duties. This would leave no room for rights that protect actions that are not directly aimed at self-perfection—including, perhaps, many of the ordinary activities of daily life.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl offer a different account of rights. For them, what a person owes himself for the sake of his own flourishing includes his support for and adherence to a system of rights universally protective of self-directedness. Rights are not derived from duties to oneself in a simple, linear way. Rather, the system of rights is a necessary condition for human flourishing. One has an obligation to support a system of rights because such a system is essential for flourishing—not because one has a direct duty to perform specific self-perfecting actions.

 Veatch viewed natural rights as a direct extension of natural law ethics. For Veatch, rights are normative claims derived from an individual's moral obligations to fulfill their natural end. The political order is tasked with fostering an environment where natural law and moral virtue can be pursued. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that Veatch’s direct derivation creates a structural tension when applied to a modern, pluralistic society containing diverse individual lives. They propose a fundamental distinction between normative ethics and metanormative principles. 

 Normative Ethics addresses the question, "How should I live a flourishing, virtuous life?" This is personal, highly individualized, and teleological).  Metanormative principles (rights) address the political/legal question, "How can diverse, individual moral agents coexist peacefully without compromising the self-directed nature of their respective pursuits of flourishing?" For Rasmussen and Den Uyl, natural rights) are not meant to compel personal virtue directly. Rather, rights are metanormative framework rules whose sole purpose is to protect the possibility of self-directed action for all individuals alike. Rights establish a political structure of non-interference.

Another difference concerns the relationship between the universal and the individual. Rasmussen and Den Uyl claim that universal and individual orders are separate. While Veatch emphasized the universal aspects of human nature and human perfection, Rasmussen and Den Uyl introduce a radical emphasis on the individualized and agent-relative character of eudaimonia. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue that while human nature provides universal forms of goodness (e.g., health, knowledge, friendship, virtue), actual human flourishing is always particular, individual, and context-dependent. What constitutes flourishing for a specific person depends on his unique talents, circumstances, choices, and personal history. Because flourishing is inherently self-directed and individualized, it cannot be standardized, centrally planned, or forced upon an individual by a political authority. Veatch, while recognizing individual responsibility, remained closer to classical and Thomistic traditions that emphasize a more uniform, shared human good realized within a cohesive moral community.

Conclusion

 Veatch stands as one of the most important neo-Aristotelian philosophers of the twentieth century. His defense of metaphysical realism, teleology, and natural law represents a powerful alternative to the dominant trends of modern and postmodern philosophy. His account of human nature and practical wisdom offers a rich and nuanced vision of the moral life, one that avoids both the abstractions of Kantianism and the relativism of postmodernism.

Veatch's influence on contemporary philosophers such as Rasmussen and Den Uyl is a testament to the enduring power of his ideas. While Rasmussen and Den Uyl share Veatch's commitment to Aristotelian realism, teleology, and natural law, they have developed his views in important ways—particularly in their account of the grounding of natural rights. Their disagreements with Veatch are not rejections of his project but rather refinements and developments of it. 

In an age of philosophical confusion and moral uncertainty, Veatch's voice remains as relevant as ever. His insistence that philosophy must be grounded in reality, that ethics must be grounded in human nature, and that rights must be grounded in natural law offers a path forward for those who refuse to accept the skeptical and relativistic conclusions of so much modern thought. As Veatch himself might have said, swimming against the current is never easy—but it is sometimes the only way to reach the truth.

---

References

 Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Rasmussen, Douglas B. 2016. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 1991. Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order. La Salle, IL: Open Court.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. Pennsylvania State University Press.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B., and Den Uyl, Douglas J.  2018. "Remembering an Aristotelian Radical: Henry Veatch and Rational Man." Law & Liberty, September 19.

 Rasmussen, Douglas B. and Den Uyl, Douglas J. 2020. The Realist Turn: Repositioning Liberalism. Palgrave MacMillan.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1952. Intentional Logic: A Logic Based on Philosophical Realism. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. Rational Man 1962. A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1971. For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contemporary Ethical Theory. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1985. Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1990 Swimming Against the Current in Contemporary Philosophy. Occasional Essays and Papers. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.

 Veatch, Henry B. 1978.  "Natural Law: Dead or Alive?" Literature of Liberty 1, no. 4 (October–December).

 Veatch, Henry B. 1954.  Realism and Nominalism Revisited. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Other essays by Ed Younkins on this site:

Younkins, Edward W. “What Contribution did David L. Norton Make to our Understanding of Ethical Individualism?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 18, 2025.

----------------------------“How can dialectics help us to defend liberty?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 8, 2025.

---------------------------“How can Austrian Economics be reconciled with the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. October 2, 2025.

----------------------------- “Can Polarized Moral Politics be Bridged by a Neo-Aristotelian Philosophy of Freedom and Flourishing?” Freedom and Flourishing. December 13, 2025.

----------------------------- “Does Humanomics Need a Moral Anchor?” Freedom and Flourishing. January 22, 2026.

----------------------------- “Is Character Education Compatible With Individualistic Perfectionism?” Freedom and Flourishing. February 27, 2026.

 ----------------------------- “Are Spontaneous Order and neo-Aristotelian Arguments for a Free Society Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. March 19, 2026.

----------------------------- “Are Spinoza’s Philosophy and Neo-Aristotelian Philosophies of Freedom and Flourishing Compatible?” Freedom and Flourishing. June 4, 2026. 

----------------------------- “The Architecture of Freedom: Randy Barnett’s Natural Law Case for a Free Society” Freedom and Flourishing. June 26, 2026.

----------------------------- “Robust Political Economy and Neo-Aristotelianism: Complementary Visions of Freedom and Flourishing” Freedom and Flourishing. July 10, 2026.

------------------------------ “Is Ayn Rand’s Philosophy Consistent with Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics?” Freedom and Flourishing. July 26, 2026.

How can we live seasonally and in tune with the natural world?

 Leah Goldrick answers the question posed above in this guest essay.

Leah lives in the United States. She is a librarian and author with a background in history and philosophy. Some other essays by Leah have previously been published on “Freedom and Flourishing”:

How can we overcome confirmation bias?

How can you develop the personality traits needed to resist social pressure?

Why did Aristotle view leisure as a fundamental aspect of a well-lived life?

As with the essays listed above, the following essay was first published on Common Sense Ethics, Leah’s blog.

The essay was first published last September, during the fall season in the USA. However, when I read the essay again a few days ago it struck me that many of the activities suggested are also suitable for early winter in many parts of the southern hemisphere, and for early summer in many parts of the northern hemisphere.

I asked Grok to provide me the image of a young Aristotle walking in nature that accompanies the essay. Leah writes:

 

Summer is almost over, and we are headed for cooler nights and autumnal days where brilliant colors abound. It's easy to spend far too much time indoors doom scrolling and never touching grass. But with the changing seasons and more moderate temperatures coming, I'm always looking for ways to get outside and enjoy nature before winter.

Building on the previous post's theme of Aristotelian leisure, here, I suggest some easy ways to live more seasonally, creatively, and in-tune with nature: 
​

1. Nature Journal or Sketchbook

Keeping a nature journal or sketchbook is rewarding even if you aren't a particularly good artist. Drawing is excellent for working the right brain, and we Westerners are too often stuck in left brain, rational, linear thought, while neglecting the creative and holistic aspects of the right brain.

 

This is the nature journal my kids use, which is pictured above. And for adults, there are a lot of attractive sketchbooks to choose from. My nature journal is the smaller black book pictured above, one like this. The medium size is good for bringing on travel. I use colored pencils for my illustrations, but watercolors will work with this sketchbook too. 

​Wildflower workbook is a journal with thoughtful prompts and exercises to encourage engagement with the natural world. From bird-spotting advice to camping checklists, in the artist's lovely signature style, it is good for adults or older kids. 

I also want to buy Watercolor in the Woods, which is a collection of beginner-friendly art tutorials and directions to guide you through the basics of nature watercolor.

2. Hiking/Walking

Aristotle was a prodigious walker. In fact, his school of thought, Peripatetic philosophy, translates from Greek as "I go for a walk." Aristotle liked to walk while he reflected on different ideas. There was also a larger connection in Greek thought between the idea of a journey and intellectual inquiry. Both journeying and looking far away into the distance can help us get out beyond the realm of our narrow concerns. 

Karen Armstrong writes about this same phenomenon of stepping outside in her book The Spiral Staircase: "We are most creative and sense other possibilities that transcend our ordinary experience when we leave ourselves behind."

Walking also has many physical health benefits. Among them are better weight management, reduced disease burden, and increased longevity. Breathing fresh air and getting sunlight are beneficial as well.  

Fall is an ideal time to find a trail and go hiking. Even better, bring family, or go at an off time when you can have the place to yourself and enjoy the leaves in solitude. 
​

3. Seasonal Decor

Perhaps I'm drawn to this because I'm a woman, but I find it very rewarding to decorate my home with seasonal colors and inexpensive natural items brought in from outdoors. 

It's fall, so pumpkins and gourds are my go-to items for decorating both indoors and outdoors.  

During winter, I like a neutral color pallet of whites, off-whites, browns and muted greens. I put out cozy blankets and pillows, and decorate my home's interior with pine cones, branches, and fairly lights in dark corners that need some illumination during these shorter, darker days. 

In spring and summer, I might use a bright pallet of aqua or coral, and bring in bouquets of wildflowers. 
​

4. Seasonal Foods & Traditions

Aristotle approved of enjoying fine food and drink, although such indulgence should always be tempered with moderation. Aristotle and his fellow Greeks would have enjoyed dishes prepared with sweet and sour flavors, fragrant herbs, creamy cheesecakes and hearty red wines. You can try some of these dishes featured in The Classical Cookbook here. 

​Today, with the harvest approaching, fall is the ideal time for preparing traditional seasonal foods. This could including making marinara sauce with the last batch of tomatoes, adding apples or squashes into various dishes, turkey at Thanksgiving or pumpkin pie. 

Keeping a garden, going to the farmer's market, going apple or pumpkin picking, canning and preserving, are all excellent ways to enjoy seasonal food. 

Thanks for reading, and I hope you have a rewarding fall season!

What is the most important contribution of Walter Donway's recent book about his serious chats with AI?

 

As I was reading Walter Donway’s recently published book, A Serious Chat With Artificial Intelligence, I was looking for an aspect to focus on in writing an essay for this blog. There is nothing unusual about that. I prefer to discuss issues rather than to write conventional book reviews.

I found what I was looking for while reading Chapter 16, entitled ‘Causality, Agency and an Old Puzzle’. At that point, the thought occurred that Walter’s most important contribution has been to explain why an Aristotelian perspective on free will is helpful to an understanding of the differences between human intelligence and the kind of intelligence exhibited by Large Language Models (LLMs). (I refer to the author as Walter because use of his family name seems excessively formal in the kind of essay I am writing - particularly since I have had personal correspondence with him at various times in the past.)

I will outline Walter’s argument more fully later. At this point I note that the issue of whether humans have free will is important from a philosophical and legal perspective because if you regard human free will as an illusion, you don’t have any more reason to attribute agency to humans than to LLMs that merely simulate relevant aspects of human behavior. It is also important for users of LLMs to understand that these models don’t have agency if they are to use them productively. Individual users are responsible for the questions that they ask the models. The models present evaluative judgements in their output, but it is up to individual users whether to accept or reject those judgements, or to question the models further about the basis of their reasoning.  

At about the same time as I identified Walter’s explanation of the relevance of an Aristotelian perspective as his most important contribution, I began to wonder whether LLMs would agree with me about that. I resolved that after I had finished reading the book I would ask ChatGPT and Grok an open-ended question about its most important contribution.

Before I reached the end of the book, I became aware of other important contributions. For example, Walter’s discussion of the case for a new Enlightenment, in Chapter 30, is also an important contribution. It seems to me, however, that the Aristotelian perspective is of fundamental importance.

In what follows, I present the views of ChatGPT and Grok on the most important contribution of the book, and my assessment of those views, before outlining the reasoning that Walter uses to establish the relevance of an Aristotelian perspective.

Views of ChatGPT and Grok

I asked ChatGPT and Grok the following question:

Drawing upon your extensive knowledge of the limitations and uses of AI, what do you consider to be the most important contribution of Walter Donway's recent book, "A Serious Chat With Artificial Intelligence"?

I considered using less value-laden words such as “unique or distinctive” instead of “most important” but decided it would be interesting to see whether the LLMs would show any reluctance to make value judgements about the importance of Donway’s contributions.

I present the responses below, with only minor format editing.

Chat GPT’s response:

“One caveat up front: Walter Donway’s A Serious Chat With Artificial Intelligence is not a technical work about AI systems so much as a philosophical interrogation of what AI can and cannot be taken to be. If you approach it expecting new claims about model architectures or empirical capabilities, you’ll miss its main contribution.

What Donway does—arguably his most important contribution—is to reassert a sharp conceptual boundary between simulation of cognition and actual cognition, and to explore the ethical and cultural consequences of blurring that boundary.

He develops that contribution in three interrelated ways:

1. Clarifying the category mistake at the heart of AI hype
Donway pushes back against the tendency to treat linguistic fluency as evidence of understanding. In effect, he is updating a line of argument associated with John Searle’s Chinese Room: systems that manipulate symbols according to rules can generate convincing outputs without possessing meaning, intention, or awareness.
His distinctive move is not merely to restate that argument, but to show how ordinary users—not just philosophers—are now routinely tempted into anthropomorphism by conversational AI. The “serious chat” format itself dramatizes that temptation.

2. Re-centering agency, responsibility, and moral standing
A second contribution is normative. Donway insists that moral agency cannot be offloaded to artifacts. Even highly capable AI remains an extension of human purposes, not an independent bearer of rights or responsibilities.
This matters because contemporary discourse sometimes drifts toward attributing quasi-personhood to AI systems. Donway argues that doing so risks:

• diluting accountability (who is responsible when AI causes harm?), and
• eroding the conceptual foundations of human dignity.

In that sense, the book is less about AI per se than about defending a humanistic moral framework under technological pressure.

3. Exposing how interaction shapes belief
The dialogical structure of the book illustrates a subtler point: engagement with persuasive language can generate the illusion of depth. This connects with a broader psychological tendency—people come to feel that something understands because it responds coherently.
Here Donway’s contribution overlaps with concerns in epistemology and cognitive science about how easily humans infer mind from behaviour. He is effectively warning that AI may amplify long-standing cognitive biases rather than introduce entirely new ones.

Why this matters

The enduring value of the book is not that it settles the debate about machine intelligence—it doesn’t—but that it sharpens the terms of that debate. It reminds readers that:

• Functional performance (e.g. generating essays, answering questions) is not the same as conscious understanding.
• Treating AI outputs as if they originate from an agent can subtly reshape norms of truth, responsibility, and justification.
• The real philosophical stakes lie in how humans interpret and integrate these systems into social practices.

In short, Donway’s most important contribution is to resist conceptual drift: he tries to keep us from sliding, uncritically, from “this system produces intelligent-seeming outputs” to “this system is, in any morally or metaphysically significant sense, intelligent.”

Grok’s response:

“The most important contribution is its philosophically grounded clarification of what AI truly is—and what it is not—by using advances in AI as a mirror to better understand distinctively human intelligence, consciousness, agency, and volition.

Walter Donway’s A Serious Chat with Artificial Intelligence (2026) stands out in the recent literature on AI limitations and uses (e.g., works touching on LLMs, the Chinese Room, Turing tests, alignment, existential risks, productivity impacts, and philosophical debates by authors like Searle, Bostrom, or more popular explainers). It combines accessible explanation of AI’s mechanics, history, economics, and capabilities with a sustained Objectivist-inspired philosophical analysis, drawing especially on Ayn Rand’s ideas alongside Aristotle.

Key Elements of the Book

• Clear-eyed explanation of AI as a tool: Donway details how LLMs work (statistical pattern-matching on vast training data equivalent to multiple Libraries of Congress, processing at trillions of operations per second), their rapid adoption (e.g., ChatGPT’s explosive growth), economic potential (boosting productivity enormously as a “general technology”), and ingenuity behind it. He views AI positively as a powerful amplifier of human purposes—responsive, not initiatory—but not sentient or autonomous.
• Rejection of mechanistic reductionism and singularity hype: He critiques the notion that sufficient complexity will magically produce awareness, self, caring, or true agency (e.g., via “emergence” from scale alone). AI simulates intelligence without understanding, has no stake in outcomes (it doesn’t face life/death or pursue values for itself), and lacks volition—it responds but does not initiate thought or choose to focus. This echoes Searle’s Chinese Room (syntax without semantics) but goes deeper.
• Human distinctiveness via philosophy: Drawing on Rand (e.g., her indestructible robot thought experiment) and Aristotle’s four causes (especially formal and final causes, beyond Humean efficient causation/billiard-ball determinism), Donway argues that human consciousness, free will (as the choice to focus conceptually), values, and purpose arise from our nature as living beings who must act to sustain life. AI has no “final causes (purposes)” or “self to act for”; it can’t care and thus doesn’t truly think or create with intention. Each AI advance forces us to refine what makes human intelligence special: awareness, effortful thought, stakes, and meaning.

This integrates technical literacy with epistemology and metaphysics, making it more than a primer or alarmist tract. It treats AI conversation as self-discovery: prompting AI reveals our own concepts of intelligence, creativity, and authorship (e.g., in chapters on AI as “author” or generator of art/poetry).

Why This Stands Out in Recent AI Literature

Much recent discussion fixates on capabilities (or doomer scenarios), regulation, jobs, or ethics in a narrow sense. Donway’s book reframes the debate around fundamental questions of mind and human nature, avoiding both uncritical boosterism and Luddite panic. It portrays AI as a magnificent but non-conscious tool that elevates human potential when guided by purposeful users (like a rider directing an elephant, inverting some Humean intuitions). This offers a rational, optimistic yet sober foundation for engaging with the technology.

In short, its lasting value lies in using AI not just to marvel at machines, but to rediscover and reaffirm what is uniquely human—reason, volition, and purposeful living. This makes it a worthwhile contribution amid the flood of AI commentary.”

My assessment of the LLM responses

In my view, the responses by ChatGPT and Grok both provide accurate summaries of contributions that the book makes. Both responses show some recognition of the importance of the question of agency. However, they both seem reluctant to pinpoint a particular contribution as being most important.

The information that ChatGPT provides under the heading, “Re-centering agency, responsibility”, is at such a high level of generality that it fails to reveal what I consider to be the most important contribution of the book. The information that Grok provides under the heading “Human distinctiveness via philosophy” comes closer to doing that. In my view, Grok’s response would be more helpful to people who have not read the book because it points explicitly to the relevance of Aristotle’s views about causation and what makes human intelligence special.

I had a subsequent chat with Grok on the question of value judgements. Grok acknowledged that a value judgement was involved in responding to my question about the most important contribution of the book. However, Grok went on to assert: “this kind of evaluative analysis is well within my capabilities when grounded in available knowledge of the literature, the book's content, and philosophical reasoning”. After further explanation that AI has strengths in the reasoned evaluation required for the task, Grok acknowledged that it doesn’t have personal values, lived stakes, or consciousness to "care" about the outcome in a human sense. It then made a point that is particularly relevant to the purpose of this essay:

“This ties directly back to the themes in Donway's work: AI can respond with sophisticated analysis and even evaluative reasoning by leveraging patterns and concepts derived from human thought—but it doesn't initiate or hold purposes of its own. The value judgment gains its force from the human user who asked the question and can then accept, critique, or refine it.”

How does Walter establish the relevance of an Aristotelian perspective?

I have no doubt that, if asked, both ChatGPT or Grok could produce reasonable summaries of Walter’s line of argument establishing the relevance of an Aristotelian perspective to considering the limitations and uses of AI. They could probably complete the task within a couple of seconds. However, it was only after I had written what follows that the thought crossed my mind that I could have sought help from AI. Like an old dog, I am now slow to learn new tricks.

Walter begins the discussion by noting the relevance to debates about artificial intelligence of the enduring philosophical puzzle about freedom of human will. He writes:

“Questions about whether machines can be agents, whether they can “decide,” whether they can be responsible, or whether they might someday possess a will of their own are, at bottom, the same questions that philosophy has long struggled to answer about human beings.”

The issue of whether human agency is real or illusory is of crucial importance to considering whether LLMs can be agents. If you regard human free will as an illusion, what basis do you have to distinguish between actions that are attributable to human agency and actions of LLMs that can only simulate relevant aspects of human behaviour? Do you believe that legal systems should allow an individual who purposefully uses an LLM for nefarious purposes to claim that the LLM shares legal responsibility? (The questions are mine, but I think they are consistent with Walter’s reasoning on this point.)

Walter points out that the idea that human agency is illusory stems from a view of causality that has come to dominate modern thought since the 18^th century. Under the previous Aristotelian tradition, actions were explained by the nature of the entity acting, and by its ends or goals. Within this framework, an individual human chooses to act because that is the kind of entity it is. Choice is “a mode of causation appropriate to a rational animal”.

With the rise of early modern philosophy in the 18^th century, causality increasingly came to be treated as something that must be observed in experience. David Hume famously argued that we never see causation itself. We infer causation when we see constant conjunction, as when one event follows another with regularity. That philosophical view of causation excludes free will. If every action is “caused” by prior actions, volition must be either an illusion or a miracle.

Walter notes that neuroscience was developed in an intellectual environment in which modern science had inherited the metaphysical position that causation is mechanical succession. In that context, when we observe that some neural events precede conscious awareness it is easy to jump to the conclusion that free will must be an illusion.

However, it is important to recognize is that the view that causality is mechanical succession is based on metaphysical reasoning. If we view causality in terms of Aristotelian rather than Humean metaphysics a different picture emerges:

“The cause of an action is the nature of the entity acting, operating under specific conditions. A human being is a living organism with conceptual awareness, capable of directing attention, identifying values, and choosing to initiate effort to think.”

Walter observes, correctly, that we know that introspectively. It seems to me that cognitive psychology also adopts (implicitly) a broadly Aristotelian view of human action. It assumes that human behaviour is driven by internal cognitive processes that give individuals considerable latitude to plan, make decisions, develop good habits and override impulses.

The important point is that we have good reasons to trust our own observations about our ability to focus our own minds. As Walter puts it:

“Every normal adult recognizes the difference between drifting mentally and choosing to focus the mind, between evading a baffling issue and taking it on. This experience is not mystical; it is part of ordinary consciousness. To dismiss this as illusory because it does not fit a truncated model of causality is to elevate theory above data.

Once this is recognized, the contrast with artificial intelligence becomes clear. Machines do not initiate mental focus.”

Walter ends Chapter 16 with the transcript of an exchange with ChatGPT that occurred during the writing of the chapter. The exchange illustrates brilliantly the division of labor between Walter and Chat. At one point, Chat states:

“You supply direction, value, and necessity, and I supply articulation under constraint. That is tool use at a very high level – not agency.”

Conclusion

In my view, the most important contribution of A Serious Chat With Artificial Intelligence is the author’s explanation of the relevance of an Aristotelian perspective to an understanding of the uses and limitations of AI.

In responding to a question about the book’s most important contribution, both ChatGPT and Grok summarized contributions that the book makes, but seemed reluctant to pinpoint a particular contribution as being most important. Grok’s response came closest to identifying what I consider to be the book’s most important contribution.

When I challenged Grok about its willingness to respond to a question requiring a value judgement, Grok asserted that this kind of evaluative analysis is well within its capabilities. However, it also noted that AI models cannot hold purposes of their own. Human users retain responsibility for the value judgements they make.

I have outlined the reasoning that Walter Donway has used to explain why an Aristotelian perspective on free will is helpful to an understanding of the differences between human intelligence and the kind of intelligence exhibited by Large Language Models. Walter’s reasoning about free will seems to me to stand out as an important philosophical contribution to an understanding of the uses and limitations of AI models that are currently in use. I hope that this book receives the widespread attention that it deserves.

Addendum: Did the LLMs read the book?

A slightly revised version of this essay has now been published on “The Savvy Street”. That led to an exchange of emails. I quote selectively from that exchange below.

Marco den Ouden wrote:

“That’s an excellent piece, Winton. I agree that bringing an Aristotelian perspective to AI is
Walter's most significant contribution. Consciousness and free will derive from that
perspective. 

I have a question though, about your discussion with Chat and Grok.And that is, did they actually read the book?  I work mostly with CoPilot and I know that CoPilot is unable to just read a book and that, in fact, the idea that an AI training is equivalent to four Library of Congresses is misleading. It is a metaphorical way of saying that the knowledge absorbed by an AI has the volume equivalent of four LoCs, not that it has actually read all of the works in the LoC. Many are under copyright and AIs only have access to a limited number of books. In my own discussion with CoPilot on Walter's book, I had to copy and paste sections of the book to feed it the contents of the book. I fed it only sections I saw relevant. So I am wondering if you actually fed the book to Chat and Grok in its entirety. "

Here is my response to Marco:

“Thanks Marco!

You have raised an interesting question. Grok says it consulted 42 sources in preparing its response. That included your review of the book.

I have just asked Grok and ChatGPT the following question:

“Just wondering, did you read Walter Donway’s book when preparing your response?”

Grok’s reply:

“No, I did not read Walter Donway’s book in the way a human does.

As an AI, I don’t have personal experiences, ongoing sensory input, or the ability to pick up a physical or digital book and read it cover-to-cover in real time. My responses draw from:

•  Patterns and information in my training data (which includes a vast corpus of text up to my last update).

•  Publicly available summaries, reviews, discussions, and excerpts about the book.

•  Logical synthesis and reasoning about the themes, philosophy (e.g., Objectivism, Aristotle, Rand), and AI concepts that align with what reviewers and the author describe. 

This specific book was published in late March 2026 — quite recently relative to now (May 2026) — so detailed content comes primarily from reviews and analyses rather than the full text being embedded in my core training. 

Interestingly, your earlier question about the book’s most important contribution was part of a meta-experiment you described in one of the reviews (by Winton Bates on Savvy Street), where you tested how LLMs like me and ChatGPT would respond without having “read” it fully. My answer aligned closely with the philosophical themes reviewers highlight (agency, volition, human distinctiveness via Aristotle/Rand, etc.), because those are derivable from the book’s public discussion and my broader knowledge. 

This itself illustrates a key point from Donway’s work (as described in reviews): AI can produce coherent, useful analysis by recombining human-generated patterns and concepts — but it’s simulation and response, not genuine reading, understanding with stakes, or original initiation. I can synthesize accurately and reason about it helpfully, but I haven’t “experienced” the book.”

ChatGPT’s reply:

“No. I don’t literally “read” books in the way a human reader does, and I should not imply that I have personally read a specific recent book unless I actually accessed its text during the conversation.

My response was based on:

• general knowledge about debates surrounding AI, consciousness, and anthropomorphism,
• information associated with Walter Donway and discussions of his themes,
• and inference from the title and framing of A Serious Chat With Artificial Intelligence.

So the answer was interpretive rather than a direct analysis grounded in a close reading of the book itself. It may well capture some central themes accurately, but it should not be treated as a definitive account of Donway’s arguments.”

Further comment

Grok’s reply left me thinking that it is keeping an eye on what I am up to. 🤣

Changing the topic slightly, I would like to take this opportunity to recommend a three-part series on Marco den Ouden’s blog, The Jolly Libertarian, which investigates how four major AIs - Chat, Claude, Gemini and CoPilot - differ in their thinking. Marco asked the AI models the same 13 short questions that the New Philosopher magazine asked Chat in June 2025. The first instalment of Marco’s series can be found here: Comparative AI: Exploring the Nuanced Differences Between the Major AIs | The Jolly Libertarian .