What do Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives tell us about Flourishing Individualism?

 

This is a guest essay by Dr Theodore N. (Ted) Pauls.

Ted Pauls holds a Doctorate in Higher Education Administration and serves as a Professor of Business at Bethany College (Bethany, West Virginia). He has 32 years of college teaching experience including Bethany, Wheeling Jesuit University, and West Liberty University. He also currently serves as the President of the Brooke County Board of Education. Prior to entering academe, Ted served as a Marketing Director for a privately held corporation and as a stockbroker.

In my view, the topic of Ted’s essay is highly relevant to people who live in the liberal democracies. I often hear people claim that the priority given to personal freedom in those societies has caused them to become excessively individualistic. How can defenders of individual liberty respond to those who claim that excessive individualism has contributed to narcissistic behaviour, social isolation, and mental illness? We can’t deny that many individuals lack integrity in their dealings with others. We can’t deny that many individuals live lonely lives, lacking positive relationships with others. We can’t deny that many individuals seek to escape from reality and that some of them end up delusional.

However, we can explain that it is wrong to jump to the conclusion that the solution to those problems lies in further restricting opportunities for individual self-direction. We can explain that humans cannot fully flourish unless they have opportunities to exercise the practical wisdom and integrity required to direct their own lives in accordance with goals they choose and values they endorse. And we can also explain that the kind of individualism that we endorse is the flourishing individualism that Ted Pauls writes about in the following essay.

Ted writes:

 Flourishing individualism is a philosophical vision that places the rational, morally responsible individual at the center of ethics, politics, and human life. It is an ideal that affirms the dignity of the person, the objectivity of value, and the necessity of freedom—not merely as a constraint on power, but as the essential condition for human excellence. This article develops a theory of flourishing individualism by integrating key insights from three related and foundational works:

• Leonard Peikoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (1991),
• Edward W. Younkins’s Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism (2011), and
• Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen’s The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics (2016).

Each of these works contributes to a shared theme: the defense of individual flourishing as the core moral aim and the view that political society exists to enable, not direct, that flourishing. Peikoff articulates Ayn Rand’s Objectivist ethics and politics as a fully integrated philosophical system grounded in reason, egoism, and laissez-faire capitalism. Younkins seeks to synthesize Aristotelian virtue ethics, Austrian economics, and Objectivist principles to argue that human happiness and social cooperation are best achieved in a free society. Den Uyl and Rasmussen develop a metanormative liberalism in which the moral diversity of flourishing individuals is protected by political principles that are themselves ethically grounded but non-perfectionist in character.

The result of their combined perspectives is a powerful moral and political framework that answers the challenge of modern pluralism without surrendering the objectivity of value. It is a theory that preserves the ethical centrality of virtue and the reality of human goods while insisting on the primacy of liberty and individual responsibility. This article unfolds this framework in five parts: (1) the moral foundations of individual flourishing, (2) the structure of virtue and self-perfection, (3) the social context of flourishing, (4) the political principles that protect freedom, and (5) the philosophical implications of flourishing individualism for contemporary thought.

The Moral Foundations of Flourishing

At the heart of flourishing individualism is the idea that human life has an objective standard of value and that each individual must discover and pursue their own good through rational action. This view stands in opposition to both subjectivist relativism and collectivist moralities that subordinate the individual to external purposes.

Peikoff Explains Rand on Reason and on Life as the Standard of Value

Leonard Peikoff, in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand presents a moral framework that begins with the facts of human nature. This book is the first comprehensive statement of Rand’s philosophy. Peikoff discusses Rand’s views on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics. Rand’s philosophy asserts that existence exists independently of consciousness, that reason is the primary means of understanding the world and one’s place in it, and that individuals should act in pursuit of their own self-interest. Ayn Rand’s ethics, as he explains, holds that value is that which one acts to gain or keep, and that the fundamental alternative at the base of value is life versus death. Since human beings do not survive automatically, but by the use of reason, the standard of value is not mere survival, but rational flourishing—living as the kind of being one is.

This leads to a morality of rational egoism. The purpose of morality is not to sacrifice the self for others, nor others for the self, but to guide each individual in achieving their own happiness through the use of reason. Moral principles are principles of self-perfection, of the kind of character and action required to live a fully human life.

Objectivist ethics is thus neither altruistic nor hedonistic. It affirms the individual as an end in himself and views the pursuit of one’s own rational interests as both morally right and practically necessary. It calls for independence, integrity, productivity, and pride—virtues that are both personally fulfilling and socially beneficial.

Rand’s Objectivism holds that an individual’s choice to live is required for ethical obligations to exist. On the other hand, Younkins, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen all maintain that there is an ethical obligation to choose life because life is one’s natural end and good and therefore choiceworthy.

Younkins on Flourishing and Human Nature

Edward W. Younkins, in Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society, expands on this foundation by situating it within the broader tradition of Aristotelian eudaimonism. He argues that human beings have a nature with specific potentials and that morality consists in actualizing these potentials over the course of a lifetime. Flourishing (or eudaimonia) is an activity of the soul in accordance with reason and virtue.

Younkins draws on Aristotle, Rand, contemporary neo-Aristotelian philosophers, Austrian economists, and others to argue that flourishing is not reducible to pleasure, wealth, or external success. It is a state of integrated self-realization involving rationality, moral character, purposeful work, and meaningful relationships. It requires that individuals make choices consistent with their nature and long-term well-being.

Crucially, flourishing cannot be given or imposed—it must be chosen and achieved. This emphasis on agency echoes Objectivism’s moral individualism while adding a richer account of the variety and depth of human goods. The good life is not a fixed pattern but a dynamic process of self-perfection.

He also explains that Objectivist claims of value objectivity and claims of Austrian economists are compatible because that involve different levels of analysis. Rand’s sense of value-objectivity complements the Austrian sense of value-subjectivity because personal flourishing on an objective level transcends subjective value preferences.

Younkins’s book presents the essentials of a potential paradigm or conceptual framework for individual human flourishing in a free society. It is an attempt to forge an understanding from various disciplines and to integrate them into consistent, coherent, and systematic whole. His goal is to have a paradigm in which the views of reality, human nature, knowledge, values, action, and society make up an integrated whole. He recognizes that his potential framework will grow and evolve as scholars engage and extend its ideas.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen on Individualistic Perfectionism

Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen, in ThePerfectionist Turn, argue that ethical theory must return to a teleological and perfectionist framework that recognizes the centrality of human flourishing. Against dominant trends in analytic philosophy that treat ethics as a matter of rules, duties, or utility, they insist that the good life is the ultimate standard of evaluation.

Their contribution lies in developing a concept of “individualistic perfectionism”: the view that the good is self-perfection, but that this perfection takes diverse forms based on individual contexts, capacities, and choices. Flourishing is not a single ideal life but a framework in which many legitimate variations of the good life are possible.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen define human flourishing as objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed, and social. A person’s flourishing is desired because it is desirable and choice-worthy.

This view preserves the objectivity of morality while respecting the uniqueness of persons. It sees ethics as aspirational, not prohibitive—as a guide to excellence rather than a list of constraints. And it affirms the value of individual agency, creativity, and responsibility in moral development.

 Den Uyl and Rasmussen defend a template of responsibility, rather than a template of respect, as a framework within which to based one’s self-perfection. This agent-centered template recognizes the existential condition that each responsible and choosing individual must make a life for himself. Under this template self-direction and integrity are central to morality because personal responsibility for one’s life is primary.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen explain that political philosophy is unavoidably tethered to deeper, more foundational. and comprehensive perspectives and frameworks regarding reality, human nature, and ethics, Championing the tethered character of political philosophy, Den Uyl  and Rasmussen advocate individualistic perfectionism and the template of responsibility for a person’s self-perfection.

The Virtues of Flourishing: Self-Perfection in Practice

Flourishing individualism depends not only on abstract principles but on the cultivation of character. Virtue is the bridge between human nature and human flourishing: it is the habitual excellence of the soul in action.

All of these thinkers agree that virtues are not mere social conventions or rules of obedience but rational habits that support an individual’s life and happiness. While they differ in terminology and emphasis, they converge on a core set of traits that enable a flourishing life.

Objectivist Virtue Theory

Peikoff identifies seven cardinal virtues in Ayn Rand’s ethics: rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, and pride. Each of these is a rational requirement of life, rooted in the objective needs of human survival and flourishing.

• Rationality is the primary virtue: it is the commitment to reason as one’s only source of knowledge and guide to action.
• Independence follows from rationality: it is the reliance on one’s own judgment rather than on the beliefs or authority of others.
• Integrity is fidelity to one’s rational principles.
• Honesty is the refusal to fake reality.
• Justice is the principle of judging others objectively and giving them what they deserve.
• Productiveness is the creation of material values.
• Pride is moral ambitiousness—a commitment to achieving one’s moral worth.

These virtues are not sacrifices but achievements. They are the means by which an individual shapes a life worth living.

Younkins on Integrated Living

Younkins expands this list by emphasizing the integration of mind, body, and character. He argues that flourishing involves not just isolated traits but the harmonious development of the whole person. This includes intellectual virtues like wisdom and understanding, moral virtues like courage and benevolence, and practical virtues like industry and perseverance.

He also stresses the importance of purposeful work and the creation of value. Echoing Rand and the Austrians, Younkins sees economic activity not as a separate sphere but as an expression of human creativity and agency. Work is not a mere means to leisure; it is part of the good life.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen on the Diversity of Excellence

Den Uyl and Rasmussen agree that virtue is central but emphasize that virtue must be contextualized. Because flourishing is individualized, the specific content of virtue can vary with personal identity, role, and situation. What prudence or courage demands may differ between a soldier, a scholar, and an entrepreneur.

They resist reducing virtue to rule-following or to a fixed ideal life. Instead, they see it as a dynamic and developmental concept: excellence in the use of practical reason to navigate the world in pursuit of self-perfection. This view aligns with Aristotle’s emphasis on phronesis (practical wisdom) as the master virtue guiding others.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen add practical wisdom (prudence) to the Objectivist list of virtues. They explain that reason is a self-directing activity and that practical wisdom is the excellent use of practical reason and the central integrating virtue of a flourishing life.

The Social Context of Flourishing

Flourishing is personal, but it is not solitary. Human beings are social by nature, and many goods—friendship, love, trade, knowledge—require the presence of others. The moral vision of flourishing individualism recognizes this fact without collapsing the individual into the collective.

The Role of Trade and Civil Society

Peikoff emphasizes that trade—both economic and spiritual—is the proper mode of human interaction. In a society of rational individuals, people deal with one another by mutual consent for mutual benefit. Force, fraud, and parasitism are morally and practically incompatible with a flourishing life.

Younkins adds that civil society—the network of voluntary institutions, markets, and communities—is the natural habitat for human flourishing. Drawing on Austrian economics, he shows how spontaneous order arises from the free choices of individuals pursuing their own goals. Markets are not chaotic or amoral but forms of cooperation that reflect human values.

Younkins explains that an entrepreneur attains wealth and his other objectives by providing people with goods and services that further flourishing on earth. He views entrepreneurs as specialists in prudence—the virtue of applying one’s talents to the goal of living well. In turn, Den Uyl and Rasmussen see a parallel between entrepreneurship and moral conduct. They discuss the creativity of human beings both in producing wealth and in building moral character, two enterprises that require alertness, insight, and evaluation and are parts of a flourishing life. They explain that both ethical wealth and economic wealth are a function of one’s actions taken to produce a good life.

Virtue and Community

While the state must not impose virtue, communities and relationships play an essential role in cultivating it. Younkins, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen all stress the importance of cultural norms, moral education, and social practices that support character development. Families, friendships, institutions of learning, and the arts all contribute to the conditions of flourishing.

But these institutions must be voluntary and diverse. The ethical pluralism of flourishing individualism requires a social order that permits experimentation, innovation, and personal growth.

Political Philosophy and the Framework for Flourishing

Ethics identifies the good life for the individual; political philosophy identifies the kind of social order that makes the pursuit of that life possible.

Peikoff, Rand, and Objectivism: Rights as Moral Principles

Peikoff and Rand emphasize that because human beings survive by reason, and because reason is a volitional faculty, freedom is the political condition required for moral agency. Rights are objective principles that protect the individual’s freedom to act.

The proper political system, therefore, is laissez-faire capitalism: a system that protects rights and bans the initiation of force. It is not morally neutral but grounded in the recognition that each individual has a moral right to live for their own sake.

Younkins: Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Civil Society

Younkins explains that the natural negative right to liberty is concerned with regulating conditions for human flourishing They are not directly concerned with promoting the attainment of flourishing. He agrees with Den Uyl and Rasmussen’s long held view that rights are metanormative principles that protect self-directedness, a universal requirement to all manifestations of human flourishing.

He also demonstrates that political freedom enables the emergence of complex, adaptive systems—markets, associations, cultural norms—that support flourishing. He draws on Austrian insights to argue that no central planner can substitute for the decentralized knowledge and creativity of individuals.

This view also entails limits on political authority. The state must be constrained by rule of law and dedicated to protecting liberty—not managing outcomes or mandating virtues.

Den Uyl and Rasmussen: The Metanormative Structure of Liberalism

Unlike Rand, Den Uyl and Rasmussen (as well as Younkins) distinguish between normative and metanormative principles. Ethics is normative: it guides individuals in living well. Politics is metanormative: it defines the conditions under which individuals can peacefully pursue diverse goods.

This leads to a perfectionist yet non-perfectionist liberalism: one that values flourishing and virtues but refrains from legislating them. The liberal order is justified not by neutrality but by its compatibility with ethical pluralism and moral agency.

Philosophical Implications and the Future of Flourishing Individualism

Flourishing individualism reconciles objectivity with freedom, pluralism with virtue, and individuality with community.

It offers:

• Objectivity without authoritarianism: Morality is real, but political authority is limited.
• Pluralism without relativism: There are many good lives, but not all lives are equally good.
• Agency in a world of systems: Individuals are not products of structures but shapers of their own destiny.
• A humanistic ideal: The individual is not a cog in the machine but a creator of values.

In a time of cultural fragmentation and political overreach, this philosophy offers a bold and humane alternative. It calls on us to build a society that respects liberty, cultivates virtue, and honors the rationality and free will of each person.

Together, these books by Peikoff, Younkins, and Den Uyl and Rasmussen provide essential  ideas for a robust framework for understanding flourishing individualism—a life of rational self-interest, virtue, and freedom.

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References

Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Douglas B. Rasmussen. The Perfectionist Turn: From Metanorms to Metaethics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016.

Peikoff, Leonard. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York: Dutton, 1991.

Younkins, Edward W. Flourishing and Happiness in a Free Society: Toward a Synthesis of Aristotelianism, Austrian Economics, and Ayn Rand’s Objectivism. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2011.

Did Hayek acknowledge the importance of individual self-direction in his vision of spontaneous order?

 

One of the reasons why Friedrich Hayek’s vision of spontaneous order is more attractive than collectivist alternatives is because it offers individuals greater opportunities for self-directed flourishing. However, the question arises of whether Hayek may have undermined the appeal of his vision by presenting a view of the limitations of human reason that leaves little room for individual self-direction.

In exploring this question, I sketch out the importance of self-direction to human flourishing, Hayek’s objections to constructivist rationalism, Hayek’s reverence for tradition and social evolution, Hayek’s attitude to free will, and the role of human agency in Hayek’s account of spontaneous order.

Importance of self-direction

 In helping make the case that “self-direction is the central necessary constituent or ingredient of human flourishing” Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen quote Aristotle and Henry Veatch, a leading neo-Aristotelian of the 20^th century. Veatch writes:

“Is it not evident that not only does a human being not attain his natural end by an automatic process of development and maturity after the manner of a plant or animal? In addition, no human being ever attains his natural end or perfection save by his own personal effort and exertion. No one other than the human individual – no agency of society, of family, of friends, or of whatever can make or determine or program an individual to be a good man, or program him to live the life that a human being ought to live. Instead, attaining one’s natural end as a human person is nothing if not a ‘do-it-yourself’ job.” (The Perfectionist Turn, 51-2)

The errors of constructivist rationalists

Chris Sciabarra makes an important point about Hayek’s anti-rationalistic beliefs:

“His enemy is not reason but the constructivists who have “historically again and again given birth to a revolt against reason”. (Total Freedom, 131)

Hayek observes that constructivist rationalists - enthusiasts for a deliberately planned society - tend to base their case on the synoptic delusion, “the fiction that all the relevant facts are known to some one mind, and that it is possible to construct from this knowledge of the particulars a desirable social order”. (LLL, v1, 14) Hayek argues that by over-estimating the powers of reason, constructivist rationalism has given birth to a revolt against the wisdom embodied in abstract rules, including rules of just conduct, which tell us what not to do. (LLL, V1, 31-34) The abstract rules protect individuals from arbitrary violence by others and enable them to try to build for themselves a protected domain with which nobody else is allowed to interfere and within which they can use their own knowledge for their own purposes. (LLL, V3, 163)

Hayek’s reverence for tradition and social evolution

In my view, Hayek sometimes went too far in downplaying the ability of humans to understand the significance of abstract rules. For example, in one instance he claimed that “submission to undesigned rules and conventions whose significance we largely do not understand, this reverence for the traditional, that the rationalistic mind finds so uncongenial, … is indispensable for the working of a free society”. (COL, 63) It seems to me that most people are capable of understanding the purposes served by rules of just conduct. It makes more sense to explain those purposes than to suggest that reverence for the traditional should be sufficient reason for compliance.

The emphasis which Hayek placed on group selection in the evolutionary process also downplays the potential role of reason. Hayek argues that rules of just conduct evolved because the groups which practiced them were more successful and displaced others. (LLL, V1, 18) James Buchanan pointed out that there is no reason to believe that group survival will always lead to a more beneficial state of affairs. Chris Sciabarra makes the same point, also noting that Hayek does not provide an objective standard by which to judge as desirable or undesirable the consequences of spontaneous orders. (Total Freedom, 131)

Buchanan suggests that Hayek’s skepticism about the ability of humans to rationally design social institutions, including constitutions, precludes any attempt at reform. In their excellent discussion of this point, Peter Boettke and Scott King suggest that the issue has been confused by conflating the question of the origin of institutions with questions relating to the development and improvement of institutions. They note that Hayek is open to attempts to improve spontaneous orders through small revisions in the overall rules. (I refer to the chapter entitled ‘Hayek and the Hayekians on the Political Order of a Free People’, in Hayek’s Tensions: Reexamining the Political Economy and Philosophy of F. A. Hayek, edited by Stefanie Haeffele, Solomon M. Stein, and Virgil Henry Storr.)

Hayek’s attitude to free will

Discussions of Hayek’s attitude to free will often begins with his venture into theoretical psychology in The Sensory Order, published in 1952. When I read the ‘Philosophical Consequences’ chapter of that book, about 30 years ago, I gained the impression that Hayek was an advocate of free will. Hayek certainly rejects the idea that it is possible to explain why people hold particular views, at particular moments, from knowledge of their material circumstances. Immediately afterwards, in discussing free will more explicitly, Hayek asserts:

“To us human decisions must always appear as the result of the whole human personality – that means the whole of the persons mind – which, as we have seen, we cannot reduce to something else.” (See page 250 of “The Essence of Hayek”, 1984 by W. Glenn Campbell (Foreword), Kurt R. Leube (Editor), Chiaki Nishiyama (Editor).

Hayek based his argument against microphysical reductionism on the belief that the human brain can never fully explain its own operations. Paul Lewis has suggested that if Hayek had relied more fully on the ideas of organismic biologists he would have been able to develop an emergentist argument against microphysical reductionism, thus providing a stronger basis for use of concepts such as goals and purposes. (See Lewis’s chapter entitled ‘Tensions and Ambiguities in Hayek’s Social Theory’ in Hayek’s Tensions, cited above. Those who are interested in reading a philosophical emergentist argument for free will can find one in the The Metaphysics of Emergence, by Richard Campbell. I reviewed the book here.)

In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek offers a potted summary of the free will debate. He notes that the concept of universal determinism that dominated 19th century science seemed to eliminate the possibility of free will. He also notes that physicists have now abandoned universal determinism but doubts that this affects “the puzzle about the freedom of the will”. He then states:

“It appears that the assertion that the will is free has as little meaning as its denial and that the whole issue is a phantom problem, a dispute about words in which the contestants have not made clear what an affirmative or negative answer would imply.”

However, Hayek’s subsequent discussion of the conclusions generally drawn by determinists and voluntarists about their respective positions leaves little doubt about where he stands:

“The determinists usually argue that, because men’s actions are completely determined by natural causes, there can be no justification for holding them responsible or praising or blaming their actions. The voluntarists, on the other hand, contend that, because there exists in man some agent standing outside the chain of cause or effect, this agent is the bearer of responsibility and the legitimate object of praise and blame. Now there can be little doubt that, so far as these practical conclusions are concerned, the voluntarists are more nearly right, while the determinists are merely confused.” (COL, 72-73)

In discussing the difference between “inner freedom” and the absence of coercion, Hayek had already made clear his belief that it is possible for a person to be guided by “considered will”, “reason or lasting conviction, rather than by momentary impulse or circumstance”. He adds:

“If a person does not succeed in doing what, after sober reflection, he decides to do, if his intentions or strength desert him at the decisive moment and he fails to do what he somehow wishes to do, we may say that he is ‘unfree,’ the slave of his passions.” (COL, 15)

Later, Hayek asserts:

“The recognition that each person has his own scale of values which we ought to respect, even if we do not approve of it, is part of the conception of the value of the individual personality. (COL, 79)

The role of individual human agency

In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek wrote:

“Freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances force a choice upon us, and responsibility for the arrangement of our own life according to our own conscience, is the air in which alone moral sense grows and in which moral values are daily re-created in the free decision of the individual. Responsibility, not to a superior, but to one’s conscience, the awareness of a duty not exacted by compulsion, the necessity to decide which of the things one values are to be sacrificed to others, and to bear the consequences of one’s own decision, are the very essence of any morals which deserve the name.” (231-2)

That statement seems to me to be broadly consistent with the do-it-yourself job of being a good person, as described by Henry Veatch. However, some of the things that Hayek wrote later give a different impression. In The Constitution of Liberty, he advocated submission to rules and conventions, quoting David Hume’s assertion that “the rules of morality are not the conclusions of our reason”. (63) In Law, Legislation and Liberty, Hayek writes:

“Man is as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking one.”

Mario Rizzo has suggests (in a paper entitled, ‘F.A. Hayek and the Rationality of Individual Choice’) that Hayek’s mature views about rationality should be understood in terms of a general framework acknowledging that humans are both purposeful agents and rule-followers. In emphasizing the importance of rule-following behaviour, Hayek didn’t abandon individual rationality. Even at the purely individual level, leaving aside the need to coordinate plans with others, rule-following makes sense because we live in a world of uncertainty and because our minds have limited capacities to know and compute.

Hayek seems to have rarely considered individual agency apart from the spontaneous order. The following paragraph provides a good summary of his perspective:

“What makes men members of the same civilization and enables them to live and work together in peace is that in the pursuit of their individual ends the particular monetary impulses which impel their efforts towards concrete results are guided and restrained by the same abstract rules. If emotion and impulse tells them what they want, the conventional rules tell them how they will be able and be allowed to achieve it.”

Personal perspective

Did Friedrich Hayek undermine the appeal of his vision by presenting a view of the limitations of human reason that leaves little room for individual self-direction? In his efforts to counter constructivist rationalism, I think Hayek inadvertently understated the role of human reason in individual flourishing. However, if individuals have greater potential for self-directed flourishing than Hayek thought possible, that makes spontaneous order a more attractive option.

In assessing Hayek’s views on the role of self-direction in individual flourishing it is important to recognize that advising individuals how best they could flourish was incidental to his main purpose. One way to illustrate that is by reference to my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing. I draw fairly extensively upon Hayek’s wisdom in the first part of that book in discussing topics such as the definition of liberty, rules of just conduct, transmission of ancient law to the modern world, and evolution of social norms.

I only mention Hayek’s contribution once in the chapter discussing the challenge of self-direction. His views are referred to in that context not to emphasize the difficulty of self-direction but to counter the view that we (humans) are prone systematically to make serious mistakes in the individualized pursuit of happiness. I draw attention to the fact that Hayek urged respect for social norms that embody the experience of generations in advocating a legal and social order consistent with pursuit of happiness by individuals. (150-1)

In retrospect, I could also possibly have drawn on Hayek to point out implications of the fact that reasoning is cognitively demanding. In pursuing our personal goals it often makes more to sense for us to choose rules (norms) to follow, based on our own previous experience and the experience of others, than to attempt to reason our way through life by treating every issue that arises as though nothing similar has ever previously been encountered in human history.  

Why do I consider myself to be a neo-Aristotelian classical liberal?

 

I pondered the above question as I read Fred D Miller’s book, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (published in 1995). Although some of Aristotle’s politics is challenging to classical liberals, Miller mounts a strong case that it is not anachronistic to attribute to Aristotle a concept of individual rights and support for a moderate degree of individualism.

Neo-Aristotelian classical liberals are not overly interested in defending Aristotle’s politics. They seek to have their own ideas assessed on their merits rather than in terms of the extent to which they agree with Aristotle's writings. Nevertheless, they have good reasons to label themselves as neo-Aristotelian – they draw inspiration from Aristotle.

Neo-Aristotelian classical liberals certainly appreciate Aristotle’s recognition of reality and his approach of attempting to understand the nature of the world in which we live. However, it is not necessary to be any kind of Aristotelian to follow Aristotle in that regard. In an earlier essay I argued that John Sellars had adopted an excessively broad view of what it means to be an Aristotelian by suggesting that all who join Aristotle in attempting to understand the nature of the world are Aristotelians. I argued that Aristotelians seek guidance from Aristotle’s ethics.

In my view it is Aristotle’s views on the nature of humans and individual flourishing that offer greatest inspiration for classical liberals. I think neo-Aristotelian classical liberals obtain inspiration from Aristotle mainly because they perceive him to have embraced an important role for individual self-direction. In what follows I draw upon Fred Miller’s book to explain why that is justified.

Aristotle’s account of individual flourishing

Aristotle identifies human flourishing with actualization of the potential of individuals. Miller suggests:

“Aristotle’s theory is perfectionist in the sense that it presupposes a theory of human nature and identifies the good with the fullest possible development of this nature.”

Aristotle identifies the good as “that for which everyone strives” but is not a perfectionist in the sense of insisting that anything short of perfection is unacceptable. For Aristotle, perfection provides an objective standard against which we can judge which of the things we might wish for are more choice-worthy. The good is both desirable and choice-worthy.

Aristotle maintains that rationality is the essential function of a human. He sees this function as stemming from the nature of human beings as a particular kind of organism. He argues that it is good for individuals to promote this function.

Miller notes Aristotle’s claims that virtuous acts must be chosen by the agent for their own sakes, that true self-love is embodied in persons who act according to their own judgement, and that the exercise of reason, in contrast to perception, is voluntary and up to the agent. He summarises:

“Those claims together seem to imply that rationality, virtue, and happiness are essentially free and voluntary”.

Miller also notes that Aristotle “relegated liberty to the status of a mere external good” and “prescribed frequent intrusions on individual freedom of choice in the pursuit of liberty”. However, he observes:

“None the less, it has been argued that Aristotle provided the theoretical basis for a more central role for self-directedness or autonomy”.

The references he cites of authors taking that position include some works by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl. With the benefit of advances in knowledge, it seems to me that the foundations for Aristotle’s views supporting individual self-direction are much stronger than the foundations for his views supporting slavery, a subordinate role for women, and a role for the state in moral development of adult citizens.  

Neo-Aristotelian classical liberalism

 In The Perfectionist Turn (2016) Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl write:

“Succinctly stated, human flourishing is understood by us to mean the exercise of one’s own practical wisdom.”

They argue that “human flourishing and the goods and virtues that constitute it” cannot “be adequately understood apart from the actualization of human nature”. They assert that “holding that human flourishing is the ultimate end and good for human beings is compatible with there being many diverse forms of human flourishing and with self-direction being vital to the very actuality of human flourishing”.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl state that they “seek to advance a neo-Aristotelian account of human flourishing”.

My views on human flourishing have been strongly influenced by Rasmussen and Den Uyl, as well as Aristotle. The following passage is from my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing:

“Wise and well-informed self-direction is integral to the process of human flourishing. The nature of humans is such that when individuals mature, they normally have potential to exercise the practical wisdom and integrity required to direct their own flourishing in accordance with goals they choose and values they endorse. Individuals cannot fully flourish if they are unable to exercise their potential for self-direction.”

The views presented in that passage were inspired by my reading of Aristotle.    

What makes a narrative good?

 

I asked myself the question posed above as I was reading Michèle Lamont’s book, Seeing Others, How to Redefine Worth in a Divided World. The passage quoted below seems central to Michèle Lamont’s book:

“The hegemony of the American dream manifests in the emphasis Americans put on neoliberal virtues of material success, self-reliance, individualism, entrepreneurialism, and competitiveness. These criteria of worth have gained more and more influence as “models of ideal selves,” and encourage many to internalize blame for the increasing precarity of their lives. This model can also lead people to seek out a scapegoat group to blame.” (p 31)

Those sentences seem to suggest that neoliberalism encourages people to either internalize blame for misfortune or to seek scapegoat groups to blame.

Internalizing blame

The author doesn’t explain why she believes neoliberalism can cause people to “internalize blame for the increasing precarity of their lives”, but she lists several references in the notes section which may support her claims. The one which seems likely to be most relevant is an article by Glen Adams, Sara Estrada-Villalta, Daniel Sullivan, and Hazel Rose Markus entitled ‘The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of Psychology’, Journal of Social Issues 75 (1), 2019.

Adams et al use the term ‘neoliberalism’ to refer to an economic and political movement that came to prominence in the late 1970s, advocating “deregulation of markets and free movement of capital with an emphasis on fluidity and globalization”. Such usage of ‘neoliberalism’ to refer to advocacy of free markets is now common, even though the term was once generally understood to refer to advocacy of left-leaning policies, e.g. a ‘social market economy’, rather than free markets. Like most advocates of free markets, I would prefer to be referred to as a classical liberal or libertarian, but I can usually assume that I am among good company when I am labelled as a neoliberal.

The authors argue that neoliberalism encourages “an entrepreneurial approach to self as an ongoing development project, an imperative for individual growth and personal fulfillment, and an emphasis on affect regulation”. I don’t object to that characterisation. It describes some aspects of the approach to human flourishing in Part III my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing.

However, the authors suggest that neoliberalism also supports psychological “responsibilization” - an ugly word for an ugly concept. The claim they make is that neoliberals advocate that individuals should not only accept personal responsibility for problems which it may be possible to ameliorate through behaviour change (such as obesity and substance abuse) but also to accept responsibility for misfortune more generally.

Neoliberals argue that free markets tend to reward individual effort, but that doesn’t mean that they believe that economic misfortune is always attributable to lack of individual effort. In fact, one of the characteristics of neoliberalism is recognition that social problems of poverty, unemployment etc. are often attributable to foolish government economic policies that are opposed to economic freedom.

I don’t know any neoliberal who would suggest that individuals should “internalize blame” for any disruption of their lives associated with innovation and competition. Neoliberals are more likely to suggest that people who lose jobs or other remuneration because of the disruptive impact of innovation and competition should view such setbacks as beyond their control. The potential for such setbacks is a price that previous generations have willingly paid to enable to enable their descendants to enjoy the benefits of economic growth. Deirdre McCloskey – a prominent classical liberal – has coined the term, ‘bourgeois deal’, to refer to the willingness of people to accept the potential for their lives to be disrupted by innovation and competition in exchange for ongoing expansion of economic opportunities. (See Bourgeois Equality.)

I doubt that many psychologists would suggest that their clients should “internalize” blame for all the bad things that happen to them. When psychologists suggest that individuals should take responsibility for their lives, I am sure that the vast majority would mean that individuals should focus on taking personal responsibility for problems that are within their locus of control.

Who is responsible for the scapegoat narrative?

It took me some time to work out why Michèle Lamont believes that neoliberalism encourages people to seek out scapegoat groups to blame for misfortune. Her reasoning evidently has more to do with her belief that Donald Trump is a neoliberal than with the beliefs of neoliberals.

On the page following the passage quoted above, Lamont writes: 

“From Ronald Reagan to Donald Trump, neoliberalism has come to be understood as a precondition for a successful society”.

I believe that free markets help societies to become and remain successful, but it is hard to understand how anyone could perceive Donald Trump to be an advocate of that view. While in office, Trump administered the final blow to the “neoliberal consensus” on international trade that characterised the post-Cold War period, and he currently favors further restrictions on international trade and international movement of labor.  

Lamont’s claim that neoliberalism encourages people to seek out scapegoat groups to blame seems to rest on the behavior of Donald Trump. She observes that in 2015 former president Trump advanced a false narrative in which immigrants from Mexico were rapists and drug dealers. (pp 51-2). During the 2016 campaign Trump appealed to “America’s forgotten workers” by recognizing their plight and “by blaming globalization and immigration for it”. (p 70)

Lamont also suggests that Trump provided “an empowering narrative” for the working class “who are often perceived as “the losers of the system”. (p 165). Early in the book, she notes:

“Instead of depicting ‘everyday Americans’ as ‘deplorables’, as Hillary Clinton was perceived to do in the 2016 presidential campaign, her opponent Donald Trump affirmed their worth in his various electoral speeches, explaining their loss of social status as a result of globalization and immigration.” (p 8)

Lamont’s narrative

The title of Lamont’s book, “seeing others”, refers to “acknowledging people’s existence and positive worth, actively making them visible and valued, reducing their marginalization, and openly integrating them into a group”. (p 6) She suggests that having one’s sense of worth affirmed “is a universal need that is central to our identity as human beings and our quality of life”. (p 7) She urges that we “bridge boundaries with those who are different” via “ordinary universalism”, or “emphasizing similarities over differences”. (p 144)

I don’t object to those sentiments, and I doubt whether many other neoliberals would either. It is certainly appropriate to recognize that ordinary universalism can be “a vital counterweight” to “Nationalist populism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia” which “are on the rise in many countries”. (p 146) As an advocate of ordinary universalism, however, I think it is unfortunate that the author was not sufficiently “inclusive” to recognize that anti-Semitism also belongs on that list.  

I also object to the idea that “individualist approaches” to improving wellbeing “may harm more than they help, since they pull people’s attention away from more meaningful efforts”. (p 48) The author seems to be suggesting that excessive attention is given to approaches that help individuals to improve their assessments of their own worth. Instead, she urges:

“We need to ask ourselves hard questions about how we decide who matters and what we can do to create a more inclusive society.”

It seems to me that people who are lacking in regard for their own worth are unlikely to make a positive contribution to ensuring that the worth of others is appropriately recognized.

Much of the book is devoted to a discussion of how it is possible to change hearts and minds in order to reduce stigmatization of marginalized groups, and thus build a more inclusive society. That discussion is largely beyond the scope of this essay.

In Chapter 7, however, the author discusses the result of a survey of the attitudes of Gen Z students (aged 18 to 23). She seems a little perplexed that Gen Z tend to “embrace some neoliberal ideals – hard work and success” but is pleased that they “combine personal professional aspirations with the promotion of collective well-being”.

The author claims that apart from “the wealthiest of the wealthy” every other group “finds itself reeling from an onslaught of difficulties, disappointments, and anxieties, grasping for dignity and stability”. (p 47) That is implausible and seems at odds with her message about destigmatization of marginalized groups. However, it fits well with another theme of Lamont’s narrative.   

As already mentioned, Lamont suggests that Trump provided “an empowering narrative” for the working class. She suggests that the Democratic party should counter that with “messages of solidarity and dignity”:

“Redirecting working class anger toward the one percent is more likely to sustain fruitful alliances than driving wedges between diverse categories of workers who have so much in common.” (p 159)

Is Lamont’s narrative good?

It seems to me that appropriate criteria to consider whether a narrative is good include whether it encourages ethical behaviour and whether it is factually accurate.

Regarding ethical behaviour, Michèle Lamont seems to be seeking to “mobilize” good narratives when she suggests:

“We engineer our world together by mobilizing narratives that expand recognition of who is worthy.”

Leaving aside engineering, the message she is attempting to convey seems to be that narratives have a role in reinforcing the ethical intuition that we should respect other humans and behave with integrity toward them, irrespective of gender, sexual preference, race, nationality, religion, wealth, social status, political affiliations etc. I am not entirely convinced that she would include ideological opponents among those who are “worthy”, but she does acknowledge that “it is worth trying to understand even people we may strongly disagree with”. (p 159).   

On the question of factual accuracy, Lamont’s narrative, which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry with the wealthy one percent, seems to me to be just as questionable as Donald Trump’s narrative which suggests that the workers have reason to be angry about globalization and immigration. Neither of those narratives promotes an accurate understanding of economic reality.  

Conclusion

In this essay I have examined Michèle Lamont’s narrative that neoliberalism encourages people to either internalize blame for misfortune or to seek scapegoat groups to blame. My conclusion is that her claim that neoliberalism encourages people to internalize blame is baseless. Her claim about seeking to blame scapegoat groups seems to be based on the false belief that Donald Trump is a neoliberal.

Good narratives should encourage ethical behaviour and be factually accurate. One of Lamont’s objectives in this book seems to be to “mobilize” good narratives that reinforce the ethical intuition that we should behave with integrity toward all other humans. However, the factual accuracy of her narrative that workers have reason to be angry with the wealthy one percent is highly questionable. If accepted by governments that approach would encourage unethical redistributions of incomes and further dampen incentives that are essential to the ongoing growth of widespread economic opportunities.