How could the great philosopher of human flourishing endorse slavery?

Aristotle (384-322 BCE) was the great philosopher of human flourishing. He argued that although health, wealth, honour, pleasure etc. may be sought for themselves, we choose them also for the sake of living well. Living well involves making use of the vital functions that make us human. Many of the vital functions of humans, including nutrition, reproduction and movement, are the same as those of other animals. However, humans also have the capacity to use reason to guide themselves and exercise appropriate moderation in their behaviour. Parents and fellow citizens may help us to acquire good habits, but we are individually responsible for exercising the practical wisdom that we require to flourish.

It would be reasonable to expect that a person who held such views would be opposed to slavery on the grounds that slaves can only use reason to guide their actions within the limits imposed by their owners. So, how could Aristotle endorse slavery?

Julia Annas explains in The Morality of Happiness that Aristotle saw slavery to be natural. His appeal to nature has two aspects. The first is his claim that slavery has a natural basis in differences between types of people. According to Aristotle, there are “natural slaves” whose “state is such that their function is the use of their body, and this is the best they can do”. On that basis he argues that “it is better for them to be ruled”. He also suggests that the benefits owners obtain from use of slaves “differs only a little” from those obtained from use of domesticated animals. Aristotle saw the relationship of subordination between owner and slave as an example of a general pattern, also encompassing the relations between men and women (p 152).

The second aspect of Aristotle’s appeal to nature was based on his observation that slavery was widespread and should therefore be considered natural.  (p 153).

Julia Annas suggests that Aristotle’s defence of slavery fails even in terms of his own view of what is natural. Aristotle distinguishes between natural behaviour, governed by internal sources of change, and forced behaviour, brought about by external factors that overrule the internal sources of change. Even if we were to accept Aristotle’s claim that some people are natural slaves, that cannot explain the functioning of actual slavery which is based on the use of force.  Again, Aristotle’s observation that slavery was a “near universal social institution” did not justify his inference that it is natural in the sense of not resting on force. Annas comments:

“The usual may be natural with plants and animals, but the complexity of human nature allows the usual to be something that is forcibly repressed, unjust and in every way frustrating to normal human capacities” (p 155).

How could Aristotle not see this? Perhaps he perceived that some people are natural slaves because he couldn’t imagine the slaves he knew as free citizens. Many of us have a somewhat similar problem today is assessing the potential of individuals to accept more responsibility than they have at present. There seems to be a common cognitive bias that leads us to identify people with their current roles. We don’t know what people are capable of until we see them in a different role.

Aristotle’s perception that it was natural to make slaves of defeated enemies can possibly be explained as the biased perception of a slave owner, but his loose definition of circumstances in which external force is involved left him scope to take a biased view. He was able to disregard the use of force at the heart of the system of conquest and slavery by identifying the whole system as a natural system.

Similarly, Aristotle’s loose definition of circumstances in which external force is involved enabled him to condemn the profit motive and the market economy. In this instance he identified the natural system as the primitive system of directly producing what meets one’s needs, and only using exchange as much as required to satisfy unmet needs and get rid of unusable surplus. That enabled him to identify the market economy as an external force that disrupted a natural system.

Aristotle’s view of what is natural would have been less prone to bias if it had been based on the natural rights of individuals, and hence the naturalness of mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation and exchange among individuals. That would have made it much more difficult for him to condone any use of force (coercion) that constrains individual flourishing.

However, we shouldn’t judge Aristotle too harshly for his wobbly views about what is natural. It is worth remembering, that a more coherent view of natural law didn’t prevent eminent philosophers who lived much later from also endorsing slavery. For example, Thomas Aquinas, who lived over 1500 years after Aristotle, also endorsed slavery despite holding the view that the first precept of the natural law is to do good and avoid evil.

A question worth exploring further is the extent to which Aristotle’s views on the potential for individual human flourishing played a role in the eventual recognition of the natural rights of individuals, via Aquinas’ endorsement of those views in his natural law theory of morality.

When can economists adopt a contractarian approach to provision of policy advice?

Cartoon by Peter Nicholson: from this site

Robert Sugden explains his use of the term ‘contractarian’ thus:

 “the most fundamental characteristic of this perspective is that a recommendation is addressed to a set of individuals, showing those individuals how they can coordinate their behaviour to achieve mutual benefit."

This post is prompted by my reading of his book, The Community of Advantage, reviewed on this blog a few weeks ago.  

Sugden’s adoption of a contractarian approach was inspired by the work of James Buchanan, in which social arrangements are assessed from the several viewpoints of individual members of society considered as potential parties to a social contract.

Contractarian reasoning implies a baseline of non-agreement from which benefit is measured. For agreement to occur, each party to a potential agreement must recognize that, for all the parties severally, agreement is more beneficial than the status quo.

Contractarian reasoning is readily applied in considering adoption of general rules. When individuals consider adoption of a general rule, a veil of uncertainty about future circumstances often makes it difficult for them to assess where their interests might lie. They become more likely to identify as an “average” citizen than a member of a narrow interest group.

Sugden contrasts the model of contractarian reasoning with two other approaches to normative economics, the model of the benevolent autocrat and the model of public reasoning. He suggests that each of these different approaches to provision of public policy advice, may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances.

When economists employ the benevolent autocrat model, they are providing executive decision-makers with their best judgements about what should be done. In stylized terms, Sugden suggests that they are implicitly saying: “If I were an impartially benevolent autocrat, this is what I would do”. In my experience, when economic advisors employed by governments are striving to be their best selves, they tailor their advice to the values and priorities of the governments they are serving. That doesn’t mean that bureaucrats should attempt to ‘second-guess’ political reactions in providing advice. As Roger Kerr pointed out, soon after leaving the New Zealand Treasury to become executive director of the New Zealand Business Roundtable, attempts to second-guess political reactions “can lead to a narrowing of policy options” and does less than justice to those politicians who are prepared “to tell the story like it is”. Roger explained:

“Economists of all people should be conscious that the performance of bureaucrats in trying to pick winners and losers in the policy-advice market is likely to be as unimpressive as in the industrial domain – and for much the same reasons, namely the lack of information and incentives. Perceived political constraints are not always immutable. They can be shifted by reasoned analysis and well-constructed strategies for policy change, developed by interaction between political managers and technical advisers” (Roger Kerr, ‘Ideas, interests, experience and the economic adviser’, World Economy, 10 (2) June 1987).

The model of public reasoning provides a stylized view of politics as an arena for debate about the public good, where the participants strive to deploy impartial and reasoned argument. By contrast, in the real world, many participants in public debate on economic policy strive to deploy arguments to advance their own interests. Members of the economics profession who participate in such debates have potential to play an important role in ensuring that the merits and demerits of the arguments advanced are subjected to appropriate public scrutiny. That role has been made part of the public policy advisory process in Australia by being embodied in the public inquiry system of the Productivity Commission and its predecessor organisations.

My mention of the ‘economics profession’ brings to mind some provocative comments of Ludwig von Mises, an eminent Austrian economist, about professional economists:

“By virtue of their connection with definite parties and pressure groups, eager to acquire special privileges, they become one-sided. They shut their eyes to the remoter consequences of the policies they are advocating. With them nothing counts but the short-run concerns of the group they are serving. The ultimate aim of their efforts is to their clients prosper at the expense of other people. They are intent upon convincing themselves that the fate of mankind coincides with the short-run interests of their group. They try to sell this idea to the public …” (Human Action, fourth revised edition 1996, p 869).

I disagree with Mises description of such conduct as professional. It is unprofessional for economists to sell their souls to interest groups. It doesn’t matter how much knowledge of economics they might have, those who sell their souls are not behaving like members of an honourable profession.

Improving policy transparency

Some people with institutional expertise in public policy development have suggested that the advisory role of economists should be more akin to provision of information than normative advice. Bill Carmichael, a former chairman of the Industries Assistance Commission (a predecessor organisation to Australia’s Productivity Commission) argued for greater efforts to improve ‘policy transparency’ – to improve public understanding of the economic effects of policies that assist particular groups at the expense of the broader community. With reference to trade protection policies, he argued:

“Public availability of information about the effects, on national welfare, of responses which avert adjustment to economic change would improve domestic understanding and narrow the range of disagreement about what policy responses are appropriate. While it would not eliminate resistance to change by those who will be adversely affected, it would enable the grounds for such resistance to be weighed against the community-wide effects” (W B Carmichael, ‘National Interest and International Trade Negotiations’, The World Economy, 9 (4) December 1986).

Bill’s reference to ‘national welfare’ might raise tangential issues in the minds of some readers about the impossibility of aggregating, or averaging, the welfare of different individuals in a meaningful way, and the value judgements that are involved in using per capita GDP, or any other measure of income, as an indicator of welfare. In order to avoid getting bogged down in such issues, I interpret ‘national welfare’ as code for ‘the opportunities available, individually and collectively, to members of the community’.

When economists view their role as providing information publicly on the impact of policy change on opportunities available to various groups in a community, it seems to me that they are adopting something close to a contractarian approach to provision of policy advice. Such information enables the various groups affected to obtain a better understanding of how they are likely to be affected by policy change. Nevertheless, a public policy process of weighing the interests of those adversely affected by change against the interests of broader groups is likely to fall short of the ideal of a contractarian negotiation because the outcomes are unlikely to receive unanimous support. Unanimity is rarely possible since those adversely affected by change often have a strategic interest in withholding their support in the hope of obtaining a better outcome from the process. Perhaps the most that can be hoped for is that by the time policy decisions are made, the process will have persuaded those adversely affected by change that they are unlikely to benefit from lobbying to have the decisions reversed.

Compensation

Robert Sugden suggests that contractarian advisors have a better chance of achieving unanimous support for policy change if they give attention to compensation. When a policy proposal imposes significant harms on a group of individuals, the addition of compensation payments may have potential to make it mutually beneficial.  Unfortunately, Sugden doesn’t discuss the potential for those opposed to change to negotiate strategically in a context where policy outcomes are likely to be strongly influenced by the political muscle of narrow interest groups. When governments seek to negotiate compensation packages with powerful interest groups, they risk putting the rest of the community in a position somewhat akin to seeking to negotiate a settlement with an extortionist. The above cartoon relating to negotiations for deregulation of the Australian sugar industry illustrates the problem. After receiving substantial adjustment assistance to gain acceptance for deregulation about a decade ago, the industry has since been re-regulated.

Nevertheless, it is possible to cite instances where compensation payments do seem to have enabled better policy outcomes to be achieved in contractarian policy negotiations. In an article published a couple of years ago, reviewing literature on agricultural adjustment in Australia, Geoff Edwards, and I expressed the view that “economists advocating adjustment assistance during the 1970s helped shift the focus of agricultural policy in Australia away from price support and input subsidies, leading to greater acceptance of policies to facilitate adjustment rather than to impede it”.  We concluded that “adjustment assistance can sometimes enable less efficient and less equitable forms of assistance to be avoided” (Geoff Edwards and Winton Bates, ‘Antipodean agricultural and resource economics at 60: agricultural adjustment’, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 60, pp 573-589).

Conclusions

So, when can economists adopt a contractarian approach to provision of public policy advice? My experience leads me to think that a contractarian approach has been used effectively in considering changes in the ‘rules of the game’ relating to economic policy in some countries. During the 1980s and 90’s, some economists in Australia and New Zealand adopted important elements of a contractarian approach in successfully proposing trade liberalisation, privatisation of public enterprises, regulatory reforms and government spending restraint. The focus of analysis was the potential for changes in the ‘rules of the game’ to improve the opportunities generally available to community members. Reports were published with a view to obtaining broad community support for changes in the rules. Many influential opinion leaders were receptive to the view that the rules of the game needed to be changed in order to avert looming economic disaster.

For reasons expressed elsewhere on this blog (for example here and here) I think the democratic political processes of western countries have been corrupted so much over the last few decades that in the event of a future economic crisis it is unlikely to be possible to implement reforms to prevent emergence of widespread economic misery. I doubt whether use of a contractarian approach to policy advice will help much in this context, but such an approach is still more likely to be successful than the alternatives available. The best contractarian advice I can offer to individuals is to reduce your dependence on government as far as possible, and to seek out opportunities for mutually beneficial interactions that do not involve governments.

Over the next few decades, I expect that economists adopting a contractarian approach will play an increasingly important role in helping people to use new technology to negotiate mutually beneficial agreements to obtain what they want without government involvement. I will write more about that later.

Isn't it good to be able to get what you want by helping others to get what they want?

When I was at university studying neoclassical welfare economics - about half a century ago - the standard discussion of the benefits and limitations of free markets began with a demonstration that, under certain assumptions, individuals with stable and internally consistent preferences could maximize their utility through voluntary transactions. As I write, I have a picture in my mind of neat sets of indifference curves in an Edgeworth Box, rather than the gains from trade diagram shown above.

Of course, in the 1960s and 70s a great deal of attention was given to market failure stemming from violation of competitive market assumptions and the existence of externalities. Since then, research by behavioural economists has provided evidence that individuals’ preferences tend to be context-dependent, rather than stable and internally consistent. For example, as we all know, what we choose to buy may be influenced by the placement of items on supermarket shelves.

Just as evidence of market failure led many economists to advocate remedial government interventions, evidence that individuals’ preferences tend to be context-dependent has been used by some behavioural economists to argue for paternalistic interventions to nudge people to make better choices. Wise economists urge that consideration should also be given to government failure - the tendency for government intervention to make matters worse even when politicians intend to produce better outcomes.

Robert Sugden has shone light through the smog caused by the standard neoclassical assumptions about individual preferences in his recently published book, The Community of Advantage. Sugden dispenses with assumptions about individual preferences by substituting the principle of individual opportunity – the idea that individuals will choose to have more opportunities rather than less.

Sugden’s book has been praised by some eminent scholars working at the interface between economics, psychology and ethics. It is pleasing that Cass Sunstein, whose advocacy of paternalistic nudges is challenged in the book, describes it as “one of the very few most important explorations of liberty in the last half-century.

Sugden makes the powerful point that there is no basis for behavioural economists to interpret contraventions of the standard neoclassical assumptions as necessarily attributable to cognitive error or self-control problems. There is no known psychological foundation for human decision-making to be modelled as “a neoclassically rational inner agent, trapped inside and constrained by an outer psychological shell”.

Nevertheless, humans obviously make cognitive errors and experience self-control problems. Should economists wash their hands of those problems and leave them for psychologists to deal with? Sugden suggests that economists may be able to help by adopting a contractarian approach – addressing their recommendations to individuals - usually by showing them how they can coordinate their behaviour to achieve mutual benefit - rather than addressing recommendations to paternalistic governments. It is consistent with a contractarian approach for economists to point out the mistakes that individuals are liable to make and to suggest types of choice architecture (e.g. nudges) that they could use, if they wanted, to avoid making those mistakes.

One of the highlights of the book is the perception it offers of the workings of “the invisible hand” of the market. The invisible hand is sometimes portrayed as something that has to be mysterious since it is able to convert self-interest into community benefits. Sugden suggests that the invisible hand is far from mysterious when perceived in terms of the activities of profit-seeking traders looking for arbitrage opportunities. If some individuals are willing to sell something at a lower price than other individuals are willing to pay to buy it, traders can take advantage of the profit opportunities of that situation. From the perspective of the buyers and sellers the transaction helps realize an opportunity for mutual benefit, whether traders are involved or not.

As I see it, from an individual’s perspective the market provides expanded opportunities along the lines suggested in the gains from trade diagram shown above. A person who subsists without trading with others has little leisure time left after eking out a living. By participating in trade - earning a market income in this example - her consumption possibilities are expanded. She is able to get more of what she wants – more leisure and/or more other goods - by helping others to get what they want.

Opportunities for mutual benefit are not limited to market exchange. Mutual benefit is possible in many different types of cooperative interaction. Sugden provides an insightful analysis of team reasoning, contrasting a contractarian approach in which individual team members seek to achieve mutual benefit with the alternative of perceiving the team as a single entity and seeking to maximize the overall good of the team, as judged from some neutral viewpoint.

The author’s analysis of adherence to voluntary practices is also insightful. He notes that individuals realize mutual benefits directly by conforming to voluntary practices, e.g. tipping conventions, because regularities of behaviour provide salient benchmarks for expectations about one another in specific interactions. By conforming to the practice, they also sustain the expectations upon which it depends and help to maintain it as an institution.

In my view, the most important contribution of the book is its discussion of the ethics of intending mutual benefit. A long-standing and recurring theme of criticism of market exchange is that it involves extrinsic motivations that are not virtuous. That line of thinking implies, implausibly, that the intrinsic satisfaction that I obtain from blogging might evaporate if I were to obtain monetary rewards for my efforts. Sugden observes that when people participate in markets they can act with the intention of achieving mutual benefit, rather than personal benefit. He urges readers to adopt the following principle of mutual benefit:

“When participating with others in a voluntary interaction, and for as long as others’ behaviour in that interaction is consistent with this very principle, behave in such a way that the other participants are able to satisfy normal expectations about the consequences of the interaction for them."

The author explains that one of the merits of the principle of mutual benefit is that what it requires of us individually is independent of the motivations of the people with whom we interact. It is in our interests to seek mutual benefit in interactions with as many other people as possible. The principle never requires us to make judgements about another person’s intentions.

The Community of Advantage is the best book I have read about the economics of human flourishing. This brief review has provided only a glimpse of what it is about. Hopefully, it has whetted your appetite to read the book.

The book has raised several issues that I hope to be able to explore further on this blog:

• Is the principle of mutual benefit consistent with the primacy of personal responsibility as discussed by Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen in The Perfectionist Turn?
• When is it possible for economists who are engaged in provision of public policy advice to adopt a contractarian approach?
• Does the principle of mutual benefit mesh well with the views of Elinor Ostrom on management of common property resources, the views of Vincent Ostrom on politics, and the views of Max Borders about the prospects of a Social Singularity?

Is Steven Pinker too optimistic about the future of liberal democracy?

Steven Pinker’s aim in Enlightenment Now, The case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress, is “to restate the ideals of the Enlightenment in the language and concepts of the 21^st century” and to show that those ideals have worked to enhance human flourishing.

In response to one of Pinker’s earlier books I was prompted to consider whether Enlightenment humanism is the coherent world view that he claims it to be. In this book Pinker makes clear that he views “the ideals of the Enlightenment” to be synonymous with the open society and classical liberalism.  He argues that four themes tie the ideas of the Enlightenment together: an insistence on applying reason to understand our world; use of the methods of science; humanism, defined in terms of a focus on the happiness of individuals rather than the glory of tribes, races, nations or religions; and the hope for progress through political institutions that are conducive to human flourishing. Pinker regards liberal democracy as “an Enlightenment-inspired institution” and “a precious achievement”.

In my view Pinker succeeds admirably in showing that for the last two and a half centuries application of those Enlightenment ideals has enhanced individual human flourishing. Much of the book is devoted to evidence of the massive progress that has been made in the quality of life enjoyed by people on this planet over that period. I recommend this book and Max Roser’s Our World in Data web site (the source of much of Pinker’s data) to anyone who needs reminding that ‘the good old days’ were not so great.

Turning to the future, Pinker is more of a hopeful realist than an optimist. He recognises that “the darker sides of human nature – tribalism, authoritarianism and magical thinking – aided by the Second Law of Thermodynamics” have potential to push us back. In an early chapter he points out that in a world governed by entropy and evolution, the default state of humankind is characterized by disease, poverty and violence. A large and growing proportion of humanity have been able to escape from the default state through ongoing adherence to the norms and institutions fostered by the Enlightenment.

As I see it, the prospects for further progress in human flourishing in the liberal democracies will be strongly influenced the effectiveness of this form of government in delivering economic policies conducive to ongoing productivity growth. Productivity growth will obviously be required if people continue to aspire to have higher disposable incomes, but it will also be required to generate the additional taxation revenue needed to prevent public debt spiralling out of control. That is because spending on social welfare programs – particularly health care and retirement benefits - is likely to rise as the proportion of elderly people rises. Resort to higher tax rates would be likely to have adverse effects on incentives to work, save and invest, and thus reduce productivity growth.

Pinker notes that with stronger safety nets in place, the poverty rate for elderly people in the United States has plunged since the 1960s and is now below that for younger people. However, generous safety nets have a down-side. People in the liberal democracies face traumatic adjustments in the years ahead if governments are unable to meet public expectations of ongoing funding of existing programs at current levels.

Pinker recognizes low productivity growth and “authoritarian populism” as potential threats to human progress but does not draw out the links between these threats. Most of the populists that he is concerned about do not strike me as being particularly authoritarian, in the sense of enforcing strict obedience to authority. Nevertheless, they are stasists, seeking to undermine the Enlightenment values that have enabled technological progress and international trade to contribute massively to human flourishing since the beginning of the industrial revolution. Pinker’s discussion of the recent causes of low productivity growth is adequate, as far as it goes, but he fails to emphasize the potential for additional damage to be done by populist politicians seeking to capitalise on fears of the disruptive impacts of globalisation and technological progress.  

Pinker makes the important observation:

“A challenge for our era is how to foster an intellectual and political culture that is driven by reason rather than tribalism”.

He is scathing in his description of current electoral politics:

“Here the rules of the game are fiendishly designed to bring out the most irrational in people”.

In support of this assertion Pinker cites: the rational ignorance of voters; the bundling of disparate issues to appeal to a coalition of voters with geographic, racial, and ethnic constituencies; and media that “cover elections like horse races, and analyse issues by pitting ideological hacks against each other in screaming matches”. He notes:

“All these features steer people away from reasoned analysis and towards perfervid self-expression”.

Pinker’s suggests that for public discourse to become more rational, issues should be depoliticized as much as possible. His discussion of the ways in which issues become politicised and proposals for depoliticization of issues was covered in my last post on the benefits of listening to opposing viewpoints. His discussion ends by noting that the discovery of political tribalism as an “insidious form of irrationality” is “still fresh and largely unknown”. He appeals to readers:

“However long it takes, we must not let the existence of cognitive and emotional biases or the spasms of irrationality in the political arena to discourage us from the
Enlightenment ideal of relentlessly pursuing reason and truth”.

Pinker may not sound particularly optimistic about the future of liberal democracy, but he may well be too optimistic. Unfortunately, in addition to the irrationality he discusses, we are also confronted by widespread failure to adhere to the norms of self-reliance and reciprocity that underpin liberal democracy. As explained by James Buchanan (see this post for the reference) failure of the liberal order is becoming increasingly likely as a higher proportion of the population becomes dependent on government and voters increasingly seek to use the political process to obtain benefits at the expense of others.  

We seem to be heading toward what might be described as a democratic tragedy. As noted in an earlier post, when interest groups view the coercive power of the state as a common pool resource to be used for the benefits of their members, the adverse impact of tax and regulation on incentives for productive activity is likely to result in outcomes that will be detrimental for everyone. The incentives facing individual interest groups in that situation are similar to those facing users of common pool resources in the absence of norms of restraint.

Perhaps, as more people come to recognize that liberal democracy is confronted by deep problems, efforts will be made to reform political institutions to produce better outcomes. It is not obvious how that can be achieved, but we should not allow ignorance to prevent us from seeking solutions.

In my view Seven Pinker is on the right track in urging people to be hopeful:

“We will never have a perfect world, and it would be dangerous to seek one. But there is no limit to the betterments we can attain if we continue to apply knowledge to enhance human flourishing”.

Should trade policy be about "the art of the deal" or about facilitating economic growth?

"We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs.  Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength" - Donald Trump, Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 2017 

How should the Australian government respond to the potential for the crazy trade policies of President Trump to take the world into a new era of trade protectionism? Since Trump’s inauguration the depth of his commitment to trade protectionism has become clearer. In my view we should be prepared for the unravelling of much of the international trade liberalisation encouraged by the U.S. in the latter half of the 20^th Century.

If the Australian government continues with the current directions of international trade policy – viewing trade policy from an economic diplomacy perspective – there is a real risk that it will take ill-considered retaliatory action to foreign protectionism. Politicians who put their faith in trade diplomacy – the art of the export deal – think that they are pursuing the national interest when they make access to the Australian market contingent upon foreigners allowing our exporters to gain access to their markets. In terms of that mindset, if foreigners restrict access to their markets, it would appear logical for us to retaliate.

By contrast, political leaders who view trade policy as part of economic growth policy are more likely to keep in mind that the substantial trade liberalisation effort that Australia has made over the last 40 years has occurred unilaterally, rather than as part of any international deal. A growth policy perspective recognises the contribution that unilateral trade liberalisation has made to our prosperity.

The substantial trade liberalisation efforts made in Australia since the beginning of The Tariff Review, established in 1971, have all occurred for domestic reasons. Except for the 25 percent tariff cut of 1973, which was motivated primarily by macro-economic objectives, all of the reductions in industry assistance have occurred primarily to promote the micro-economic reform objective of providing incentives for greater productivity throughout the economy. That applies to reductions in non-tariff barriers, including reform of agricultural marketing arrangements, as well as reductions in reductions in tariff barriers.

As with other microeconomic reform policies, trade liberalisation efforts in Australia have not been pursued with equal enthusiasm by all governments. However, a sustained push toward trade liberalisation was initiated by Bob Hawke (then prime minister) and Paul Keating (treasurer) in May 1988 as part of a major package of microeconomic reform measures. In delivering the statement, Keating commented:

“The way forward for Australia is not to be closeted and sheltered, but to be open and dynamic, trading aggressively in the world. Only this kind of economy can provide the employment and rising living standards that Australians aspire to”.

In the light of the toxic political environment currently prevailing in Canberra it is worth remembering that those reforms were facilitated by support from the Liberal–National Party Opposition.

The trade liberalisation that was being undertaken in pursuit of microeconomic objectives was subsequently ­offered, and accepted, in Uruguay negotiations as our market-opening contribution to global trade reform. As the Tasman Transparency Group has noted, this approach enabled us to secure all the gains available from trade negotiations — the major gains in efficiency from reducing the barriers protecting our less competitive industries, as well as those available from access to external markets. That exercise should have provided the model for all subsequent international trade negotiations.

Unfortunately, the opportunity for further gains from the pursuit of microeconomic reforms has been missed in subsequent trade negotiations. Australia’s agenda in recent negotiations establishing a range of preferential trading agreements (PTAs) was simply a market access wish list. Following the conclusion of PTAs, governments have measured their success solely on the basis of whether the outcomes improved access to external markets.

The academic research that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is now sponsoring on “the effectiveness of economic diplomacy in contributing to Australia’s exports and inflow of foreign investment” does not seem to be directed at answering a comprehensible, policy-relevant question. Research being undertaken by the Productivity Commission on implications for Australia’s trade policy of possible international shifts towards a more protectionist stance seems more likely to provide a basis for sensible policy development.

Previous research on the consequences of PTAs suggests that there are no grounds for complacency that the economic benefits even exceed costs. For example, using an analytical framework developed by the Productivity Commission to assess our much-heralded trade agreement with the United States, Australian National University economist Shiro Armstrong found that the agreement was responsible for reducing — or ­diverting — $53.1 billion of trade with the rest of the world. He has suggested that “the data shows that … Australia and the United States … are worse off than they would have been without the agreement”. 

Recent Australian governments have at times acknowledged that trade policy should be part of a wider productivity promoting agenda. Nevertheless, the government seems to have been at a loss to know how to counter the argument that Australian governments should be seeking to provide a level playing field for domestic industries vis a vis subsidized foreign competitors. This argument has figured prominently in lobbying in some quarters for further government assistance by way of anti-dumping action and government procurement preferences. The government has been slow to point out that if we are to use a playing field analogy – and our interest is in promoting the wellbeing of Australians rather than conducting trade wars – the relevant basis for comparison is the relative assistance levels of different Australian industries. As a rule, if industries need assistance to compete internationally, they can’t be making efficient use of resources. 

If the Australian government is serious about its commitment to lift national productivity it should place trade policy in the Treasury department – the department with central responsibility for facilitating economic growth. This would add some much-needed economic discipline to the conduct of trade policy as we face a more difficult world trading environment. The last thing we need in this environment is a bureaucratic structure for trade policy that is biased toward mindless deal-making and retaliation

Does your constitution mandate free trade?

The Constitution of Australia, like that of the United States, mandates free trade – up to a point! Both constitutions mandate free trade between the states, and leave federal governments free to impose barriers to international trade to the extent that they wish.

It is debatable whether a constitutional requirement for free international trade would have made a huge difference to trade policy in either country. The requirements for free trade between the states have not guaranteed free trade between the states - judges have not always ruled against trade barriers imposed by states to protect local interests. Many judges seem to capable of being highly imaginative in their interpretation of concepts such as free trade.  

The relevant constitutional question is whether free trade is mandated by the real constitution - the set of dispositions that influence what most citizens will accept as legitimate actions by politicians and bureaucrats who make up the government. That depends ultimately on the views of individual citizens.

Why should your constitution mandate free trade?  I hope you share with me the belief that individuals have a natural right to engage freely in mutually beneficial transactions with one another, even though third parties may be disadvantaged. If so, you would probably consider it to be objectionable for a government to levy a discriminatory tax on the sales of the producer from whom you wish to purchase, in order to encourage you to purchase from a rival producer. You may well assert that you have a right to choose to buy from whatever source you wish, for whatever reasons you might have, free from any such third-party interference.

The logic of this argument does not cease to apply merely because buyers and sellers may be separated by national borders. National borders are artificial constructs that do not alter the natural right of individuals and firms to engage in mutually beneficial transactions. Donald Boudreaux has written persuasively on this topic: “International Trade Is Simply One Manifestation of Competition”.

Should an exception be made in situations where foreign governments subsidize their exports? No, if foreigners are sufficiently misguided to subsidize their exports there is no reason why domestic consumers should not benefit from any price reduction that this causes. In a market economy, if foreign subsidies result in an expansion of total imports, this can reasonably be expected to result in exchange rate and relative price adjustments to make exporting more profitable and bring about an expansion of exports. Production for the domestic market that is displaced by increased imports will be offset by increased export production.

Some economists still, no doubt, maintain that unilateral free trade is not optimal on grounds such as the optimal tariff argument, and the potential for the use of existing trade barriers as bargaining chips to obtain better access to foreign markets. Policy advisors who recommend departure from free trade to obtain such gains risk opening the way for much larger economic losses because they are dealing with fallible real-world governments, rather than the omniscient and benevolent governments assumed to exist in their economic models. In the real world of politics every departure from a simple rule opens up opportunities for interest groups to advance their interests at the expense of the broader community. 

However, there is one argument that makes it difficult for the real constitution to mandate free trade. With great reluctance, I am now willing to concede that it may be becoming more difficult for politicians to endorse free trade because many people are choosing to cast their votes for candidates who oppose it. Even though the gains from free trade vastly outweigh the losses, the uneven distribution of losses makes the outcomes of free trade seem unfair to many people. A substantial proportion of voters in many countries now seem to be saying that their disposition is to favour protection of existing jobs rather than the opportunities that free trade offers.

Over the longer term, the pursuit of policies to preserve existing jobs will, of course, be inimical to the specialization and technological progress which provide the basis for everyone’s future prosperity. Nevertheless, many voters and their representatives seem to be more concerned to preserve existing jobs than to promote future prosperity. Our democratic systems seem to be mutating from systems of social cooperation to promote the interests of everyone, to arenas for the “war of each against all” that Thomas Hobbes imagined as the only alternative to an all-powerful dictator “to keep them all in awe”. Are we powerless to prevent this war of each against all?

This poses the kind of constitutional dilemma discussed by one of the 20^th Century’s best economists, James M Buchanan, in The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, 1975. Buchanan wrote:

“If there exist potential structural changes in legal order which might command acceptance by all members of the society, the status quo represents a social dilemma in the strict game-theoretic terminology. Even if we consider ourselves far removed from the genuine Hobbesian jungle, where life is brutish and short, the status quo contains within it elements or features that are in principle equivalent. Life in the here and now may be more brutish than need be, and certainly more nasty. If after examination and analysis, no such potential for change exists, the legal-constitutional order that we observe must be judged to be Pareto optimal, despite the possible presence of discontent among specific members in the body politic”.

Buchanan was particularly concerned about ways to reform the rules of the political game to promote fiscal responsibility. That problem has worsened since the 1970s. The type of reforms he hinted at involved agreement by those who sense that they are vulnerable to having wealth expropriated via the political process to a mechanism for limited wealth transfer on condition that others agree to rules that overtly limit governmentally directed fiscal transfers.

I doubt whether rules to promote fiscal responsibility are feasible in the absence of a broad consensus concerning the role of government in distribution of the benefits from economic progress. Perhaps that is also a context in which the real constitution can mandate free trade. Current proposals being advanced in various quarters for guaranteed minimum incomes are relevant to this discussion. It seems to me, however, that proposals to ensure widespread opportunities for those displaced by import competition and technological change to improve their skills, and earn higher incomes, are probably more deserving of support. I might try to spell out reasons for that view in a later post. 

What policies will be pursued by the author of "The Art of the Deal"?

After reading Trump:The Art of the Deal it seems to me that the best way to start thinking about how to answer this question is to ask yourself what Mr Trump could do to further promote his own reputation as a political leader. His policy choices are likely to be determined largely by the potential they offer for the further self-promotion required to enable him to win a second term in office.

Some may wonder why I see a book written about 30 years ago as providing guidance about Mr Trump’s current priorities. Although his co-author, Tony Schwartz, claims that he actually wrote the book, it is clear that Donald Trump strongly endorses the ideology of The Art of the Deal and sees his experience in negotiating business deals as highly relevant to the presidency. In announcing his candidature, he said: “We need a leader that wrote ‘The Art of the Deal’.”

The Art of the Deal conveys the impression that the prime motivating force in Mr Trump’s life is self-promotion. The book is itself a promotional exercise designed to enhance his reputation as a person with the capability of doing deals under difficult circumstances. Trump is the hero, using publicity as a weapon to defeat incompetent and evil opponents. He emphasizes the importance of giving the media a good story. He even views critical stories as providing valuable publicity. Most tellingly, he acknowledges:

“The final key to the way I promote is bravado. I play to people’s fantasies. People may not think big themselves, but they can still get excited by those who do. That is why a little hyperbole never hurts”.

If you think that makes Mr Trump sound more like a politician than a business leader, consider the way in which he emphasizes that it is important “to deliver the goods”:

“You can’t con people, at least not for long. You can create excitement, you can do wonderful promotion and get all kinds of press, and you can throw in a little hyperbole. But if you don’t deliver the goods, people will eventually catch on”.

The quoted passage is followed immediately by reference to two former presidents, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, as examples of leaders who were good at promotion, but not so good at delivering the goods. This guy obviously thinks like a political leader, but it remains to be seen whether he will be as good as Ronald Reagan at delivering policy outcomes that are worth having.

The new president will recognize that to have any chance at re-election he will have to deliver some of the “goods” expected by the people who voted him into office. There will no doubt be a flurry of activity to take specific actions he has proposed for his first 100 days. Over the next few years there will probably be some real policy change e.g. cuts in corporate tax cuts, increased infrastructure spending and more restrictive immigration policies. In the foreign policy arena, application of the Trump doctrine of doing deals with the big players might end up favouring closer relations with China, as well as Russia, despite recent anti-Chinese rhetoric. That might make life more difficult for China’s neighbours, but is probably preferable to the alternative of deepening tensions between the U.S. and China. In many other policy areas, including trade policy, we are likely to see major re-branding exercises, with little actual policy change. Every policy deal will have Trump’s name written all over it – just like his real estate developments!

When I decided to read The Art of the Deal one of my objectives was to see to what extent he sees deals as involving winners and losers rather than mutually beneficial outcomes. There is some of both.  A substantial component of the “art” endorsed by Trump is actually an entrepreneurial function that will be recognizable to fans of Austrian economics. The entrepreneur sees an opportunity to make a profit that others have not seen, and then proceeds to use his negotiation and management skills in pursuit of that profit. If the entrepreneur succeeds, many others also benefit, including original owners of sites and the air space above them, financiers, contractors, building workers, and the people who own or rent space in the building. Everyone involved can be a winner.

The added complication in the entrepreneurial art practiced by Donald Trump is the prevalence of  government regulation impacting on the property development that he has been involved in. As I was reading The Art of the Deal I began to realize that Donald Trump and Tony Schwartz were writing about the entrepreneurial function in rent-seeking environments – the highly regulated property development market in New York and gambling industry in Atlantic City. For the benefit of readers not familiar with the concept, the idea of a rent-seeking society was developed by Gordon Tullock and Anne Krueger to describe societies where government regulations play a large role in determining the distribution of incomes, and substantial resources are expended by individuals and groups – rent-seekers - lobbying to have the coercive powers of government used to their advantage at the expense of others. The U.S. is not one of the first countries that comes to mind when I think of rent-seeking societies, but rent-seeking is rife in the industries where Donald Trump learned the art of the deal.

I am not the first to recognize that The Art of the Deal is about entrepreneurship in rent-seeking environments:  Adam Davidson made similar observations in an article in the New York Times Magazine in March 2016. However, I don’t think Davidson’s view of Donald Trump was entirely accurate. He suggested that Donald Trump “is not just a rent-seeker himself; his whole worldview is based on a rent-seeking vision of the economy, in which there’s a fixed amount of wealth that can only be redistributed, never grow”. The Art of the Deal portrays Trump’s real estate development activities as being about adding value to sites rather than just obtaining benefit at the expense of others. Even allowing for his hyperbole, Trump seems to see his role as that of a capitalist hero, like a character out of an Ayn Rand novel, who is using his skills in self-promotion and his legal team to fight the rent-seekers who are trying to obstruct economic development.

When he talks about public policy issues Mr Trump sometimes seems to allow his desire to present himself as a person with a kind heart to get in the way of clear thinking:

“Unlike most developers, I don’t advocate eliminating rent control. I just think there ought to be a means test for anyone living in a rent-controlled apartment”.

I wonder whether Trump really sees rent-control as a good way to provide economic assistance to poor people. A cynic might suggest that his support for means tested rent control was a rent-seeking ploy to further his own interests in evicting wealthy tenants from the rent-controlled premises that he wanted to re-develop.

Adam Davidson might be close to the mark in suggesting that at an international level Donald Trump’s world view is governed by the idea that what one country gains another loses. Some passages in The Art of the Deal reflect that view. Trump claims that the Japanese “have become wealthier in large measure by screwing the United States with a self-serving trade policy that our political leaders have never been able to fully understand or counteract”. These days he expresses similar views about China.

 From an economic perspective, Donald Trump’s desire to put America’s interests first in trade policy would be desirable for Americans (as well as people elsewhere in the world) if only he knew where America’s interests lie. It is hard to believe that this builder of innovative modern buildings in New York thinks he can make America greater by transforming its manufacturing industry into a museum of mid 20^th century technology that can only survive sheltered behind high import barriers. If he sees America’s interests as providing widespread opportunities for Americans to enjoy greater prosperity, he should hire some competent economists to suggest what policies are most likely to contribute to that objective.

If Donald Trump believes his own rhetoric about asking lots of questions, keeping options open and thinking big, perhaps he could even end up as an advocate of unilateral free trade, rather than re-branded bilateral trade deals. In my view the odds are strongly against that, but it could happen! 

Postscript:

A couple of months later, I think I was excessively optimistic in suggesting that we are likely to see major re-branding exercises in trade policy with little actual policy change. There are two reasons for this. First, Trump’s most influential advisers strongly favour protectionism and will not be satisfied with the kind of re-branding that might satisfy the President. Second, as Barry Eichengreen has pointed out, Trump is likely to focus on trade policy because it is “the one set of economic policies a President can pursue without close congressional cooperation”.

It now looks as though the world might be about to enter a new era of trade protectionism. Some suggestions regarding appropriate Australian policy responses are in a later post.

Could the adoption of welfare states reduce vulnerabilities and build resilience in developing countries?

I was delighted when I first noticed that Human Development Report 2014 has looked at the question of how poor people in developing countries can be made less vulnerable and more resilient in the face of natural disasters, commodity price instability and other threats to their well-being. In turning its attention to vulnerability and resilience the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has recognized the progress that has occurred in reducing world poverty in recent decades.

However, I am appalled that the UNDP has adopted an approach that is likely to lead to lead to greater welfare dependency and increased government debt in developing countries, and inevitably make the poor people in those countries more vulnerable to extreme poverty when fiscal restraint has to be re-imposed. There is something very peculiar about the idea that people can become more resilient by being made dependent upon unsustainable government largesse. The UNDP seems to have an obsessive desire to encourage developing countries to adopt the most expensive kind of welfare system imaginable.

At this point you probably think that I must be exaggerating. If so, you are wrong! The report does not argue for provision of a targeted safety net to assist those most in need of help at time they most need that assistance. In fact, it rejects that approach explicitly in favour of universal provision of basic social services such as education and health care. The authors argue:

“Universal coverage of basic social services is not only imperative – it is also possible at an early stage of development. And recent evidence shows that it can be achieved in less than a decade” (p 85).

The authors recite the view that when social benefits are targeted, “the middle class and elites are less willing to fund them through taxes”.  They obviously see little merit in public policy transparency. They also over-estimate their ability to pull the wool over the eyes of middle and upper-income voters. Such voters have not been backward in shifting the burden of funding universal welfare back to low income earners via taxes on wages or goods and services (as in Scandinavian countries) or in shifting it forward to future generations through increases in public debt (as in many other high-income countries).

When the authors discuss policies to promote full employment they show some recognition that a somewhat different approach might be appropriate in developing countries. They recognize a need for policies to address the vulnerabilities of people engaged in traditional agricultural activities and informal sectors. For example, they mention the role of micro-credit schemes, improved small-scale technologies and support for farmer cooperatives.

I was hoping to see some innovative thinking about food security in the report, but I didn’t find any. The issue is mentioned in the discussion of agricultural trade liberalization, where it is in the “too hard” basket. There is recognition that “spikes in the prices of food and other commodities are adding to hunger and starvation for the poor and vulnerable”, without consideration of how this could be avoided. There is recognition that farmers in developing countries often have to compete with subsidized agricultural products from developed countries, again without providing any suggestions about how this could be avoided. And there is this peculiar recommendation: “Agricultural liberalization needs to be selective in targeting goods mainly exported by developing countries to avoid increasing prices of food staples of developing countries”. So much for free trade, or even fair trade!

Actually, apart from that example of absurdity, I found the section on trade in Chapter 5 of the report to be one of the more sensible parts of the report.

While I am in a positive frame of mind I should also mention that the report has some informative diagrams showing progress in reducing world poverty. For example, Figure 2.6 (page 41) shows that for most countries the poorest 40 percent of the population have enjoyed more rapid consumption than the population as a whole over the period 2005-10. However, when the authors wrote about that Figure, what they emphasized was that consumption for those at the poorest end of the distribution has been slower than for the population as a whole in some countries where inequality has been high or rising. The three countries they cite as examples are Malaysia, China and Uganda. That seems to me to be grossly unfair to China and Uganda; in those countries, growth in consumption at the poorest end of the distribution has been much the same as for the population as a whole.

It was almost inevitable that the UNDP would produce a disappointing report about how to reduce vulnerabilities and build resilience in developing countries. People who work for international agencies are always subject to the temptation to see themselves as architects of human development. It would be overly optimistic to expect anyone writing a report for the UNDP to show an understanding the bottom-up processes through which economic development has tended to lead to growth of emancipative values and progressively greater efforts to protect vulnerable people from misfortunes.

The authors of the report seem to have hopes that the approach they advocate will influence international debate about the post 2015 development agenda, which is to follow the Millennium Development Goals. In my view their report should be ignored. The approach the authors advocate is a recipe for a return to more widespread poverty and misery throughout the world.

Will we continue to allow economic development to provide better opportunities for people to have happy lives?

Some friends who have visited my blog have told me that they have had some difficulty in understanding the purpose of my recent series of posts related to emancipative values. This post is dedicated to those people.

Recent posts on my blog have been concerned with the future of human flourishing in wealthy countries. Is the future likely to bring greater and more widespread opportunities for people to live happy lives in wealthy countries?

 Before attempting to summarise my answer that question I need to show how economic development produced better opportunities.

My story begins a few centuries ago when it was normal for the vast majority of people in all parts of the world to be preoccupied with obtaining adequate food and shelter. The threat of famine was never far away, even though there were seasons when food was bountiful and some centuries when the pressure of population on food supplies was reduced in the aftermath of plagues.  For the most part, people lived in small communities isolated from the outside world. They often lived under the threat of being robbed by their own rulers as well as by people in neighbouring communities. It was common for people who did not share the religious beliefs of their rulers to be persecuted and to be deprived of property and even their lives. Violence was rife despite widespread religious observance.

Everyone should be aware that the process of economic development began in earnest a couple of centuries ago with the industrial revolution in north-eastern Europe. Important technological innovations had previously occurred in various parts of the world, but this was the first time that technological advances led eventually to a sustained improvement in material living standards for large numbers of people.

A range of factors help to explain why the industrial revolution occurred when and where it did, but values and beliefs that became more approving of markets, experimentation, innovation and entrepreneurship were of crucial importance. Market exchange promoted more trustworthy behaviour, which reduced the cost of doing business and encouraged innovative investment activities. The new values and beliefs favoured greater economic freedom, including by removing regulatory barriers that had been protecting traditional patterns of production from competition. Firms were free to use new technology that enabled them to produce at lower cost and they were free to sell those goods to consumers.

Over the following couple of centuries, economic development provided greater economic opportunities to vast masses of people, first in Europe and then in many other parts of the world. As people satisfied their basic material needs to a greater extent they gave higher priority to such matters as having freedom to choose what kind of work to do, where to live and who to live with, having a say in community decisions and ensuring equal rights for women and members of ethnic minorities. That is what we mean by the growth of emancipative values.

So, will economic development continue to produce better opportunities for people to live happier lives in wealthy countries? There are several aspects to this question, but the one that concerns me most is that prevailing values in high income countries might take us further towards an ‘entitlement culture’ that will threaten economic freedom and further economic development.  

It is not hard to find evidence of the emergence of an entitlement culture in wealthy countries. Interest groups that might have had their origins in removal of discrimination or providing minimal opportunities to needy groups now often make a lot of noise in seeking additional entitlements for the people they represent. That tends to result in more government regulation of business, higher government spending and higher taxes i.e. a decline in economic freedom.

However, the results of my research provide some optimism that the entitlement culture can be prevented from taking over and bringing economic development to an end, along with the emancipation that has accompanied it. While economic freedom has fallen in some wealthy countries (e.g. US and Japan) it has risen in others (e.g. Sweden and Norway). There is evidence that the priority that people give to economic growth has risen in some wealthy countries in response to economic crises (e.g. Sweden) and that when this has occurred, economic freedom has tended to rise.

Most importantly, it is a mistake to think that there is some kind of battleground in society with people with high emancipative values on one side pushing for an entitlement culture and materialistic people on the other side pushing for higher economic growth. I could not find much evidence of a tendency for people with high emancipative values to give lower priority to economic growth – even after I went looking for it!

If you want more information on the  research that lies behind this post you will find relevant links in my last post. 

Would a 'Modest Member' please take an interest in anti-dumping regulation?

It was good to see the return of ‘The Modest Member’ column in the Australian Financial Review a couple of weeks ago. The original column was written by Bert Kelly, who used his wit and wisdom to good effect in promoting free trade, much to the discomfort of many people on both sides of politics. The latter-day modest members will make a worthwhile contribution if they display half the wit, wisdom and courage of Bert Kelly.

It is not yet clear whether the latter-day modest members will have the courage to emulate Bert Kelly. The series started with a column by Jamie Briggs on 7 February about lifting the dead hand of government i.e. reducing government spending. Today’s column by Kelly O’Dwyer is about the high cost of regulation. This is not a bad start, but it is hardly a test of moral character. So far Briggs and O’Dwyer have written the sort of stuff conservative politicians usually write when they are not in government.

A useful test of character for the modest members would be to attempt to emulate Bert Kelly by writing something sensible about Australia’s anti-dumping system. The modest members could usefully begin their consideration with an article by Bert, published in March 1972 and reprinted in ‘Economics Made Easy’, in which he explained that export prices that are lower than domestic prices are quite common in Australia and elsewhere. He noted that when we do it the practice is known as ‘marginal pricing’ rather than dumping. If the modest members take up this issue they might note that Austrade actually encourages prospective Australian exporters to use this practice.

If the modest members look carefully at the Productivity Commission’s recent report on anti-dumping duties they will see that the Commission found that none of the economic arguments that had been advanced in support of the anti-dumping system ‘provide any justification for Australia to retain an anti-dumping system’. In looking at this report and subsequent responses by the government and opposition, they might ponder whether or not the Commission will turn out to have been correct in its judgement that the anti-dumping system should be retained - on the grounds that it is unlikely to do much harm and may continue to be helpful in dealing with aspects of protectionist sentiment within industry and the community.

The modest members should ask themselves what Bert Kelly would have thought of proposals by their political colleagues to require foreign producers to prove their conduct hasn’t hurt Australian industry. They should also ask themselves what consequences are likely to follow from the government’s plans to ‘streamline’ the anti-dumping system. In particular, they should ponder the appropriateness of proposals of the International Trade Remedies Forum – the high sounding title the government has given to an unholy alliance of industry, unions and bureaucrats who benefit from the anti-dumping system – to enlist the Australian Bureau of Statistics to help complainants make a case for anti-dumping assistance.

One of the great strengths of Bert Kelly’s writing was his use of particular examples to illustrate the points he was making. In that regard, the modest members might find plenty to interest them in the current anti-dumping inquiry relating to aluminium wheels from China. In the light of recent discussions concerning further budgetary assistance to the car industry, they might ask themselves whether there is not some irony in a situation where Australian taxpayers could end up having to pay for the additional cost of imported inputs if this anti-dumping case is successful.  If they read the submission by Ford Australia they might wonder about the potential for a firm that is involved in protracted and acrimonious legal proceedings against another firm to initiate anti-dumping action as a tactic in a legal battle. If they read the submission by GM Holden, which argues against anti-dumping action because of its adverse effects on down-stream users, they might wonder whether the government was wise to reject the Productivity Commission’s recommendation that a public interest test should be included in the anti-dumping system. They might wonder why GM and its advisors think that line of argument might be influential.

It would not surprise me, however, if the latter-day modest members decide not to accept the challenge of writing about anti-dumping. Their political careers might be at risk if they start questioning the views of SophieMirabella the shadow minister for industry protection. As they tell themselves that discretion is the better part of valour they may take comfort from the fact that Bert Kelly pretended not to be without fear. Bert ended his anti-dumping article by telling readers that he didn’t ‘feel like chasing after the anti-dumping hare’ because ‘Mavis says I am in enough trouble already without getting mixed up with this kind of nonsense’.