What impact does political entrepreneuriship have on freedom and flourishing? Further Reading

 Some suggestions for further reading have occurred to me since I published this series of essays on political entrepreneurship. I welcome suggestions for addition to this list.

To ensure that readers are familiar with the context, I will list the essays in the series before presenting suggestions for further reading.

What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing?

 Preface to a Series of Essays

Part I: How is human flourishing linked to liberty?

Part II: Can cultural values explain freedom levels?

Part III: How is political entrepreneurship similar to economic entrepreneurship?

Part IV: What incentives are political entrepreneurs faced with?

Part V: What information constraints confront political entrepreneurs?

Part VI: What are the consequences of path dependence?

Part VII: What kind of political entrepreneurship is required?

Part VIII: Summary and Conclusions

Further Reading Recommendations

Do free markets and democratic institutions lead inevitably to crony capitalism?

For an interesting discussion of reasons why that might be so, see:

Munger, Michael C., and Mario Villarreal-Diaz. 2019. “The Road to Crony Capitalism.” The Independent Review 23 (3): 331–44.

Munger and Villarreal-Diaz argue that successful capitalism creates institutions and incentives that make collusion between political power and economic power more “profitable,” in the sense of rewarding those who control that power. They suggest that cronyism and the tendency to demand redistributive state interventions should both be viewed as features of free-market capitalism.

For a thoughtful response, see:

Quintas, André and Boettke, Peter J. and Boettke, Peter J., Crony Capitalism, Populism, and Democracy (November 02, 2025). GMU Working Paper in Economics Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5696202 .

Quintas and Boettke agree that current democratic institutions breed cronyism. They suggest that in the current institutional setting there is no endogenous path out of cronyism. However, they argue that does not mean that democracy is inherently incompatible with capitalism. The authors outline an alternative vision for democracy drawing on the works of James Buchanan, F.A. Hayek, Vincent Ostrom, and Don Lavoie.

In another paper, Quintas and Boettke discuss the competing visions of cronyism of Randall Holcombe and Richard Wagner, both of whom argue that our current system is more accurately described as cronyism rather than capitalism. Holcombe views cronyism as an unintended but inevitable byproduct of capitalism, while Wagner envisages it as an inherent feature of all economic systems - a fundamental reality of political-economic entanglement. Quintas and Boettke lean toward the latter view. Once we recognize that cronyism existed long before the modern state, the relevant question is not whether capitalism creates cronyism but whether capitalism can escape cronyism’s grip. See:

Quintas, André and Boettke, Peter J. and Boettke, Peter J., Competing Visions of Cronyism within the Virginia School of Political Economy (April 27, 2025). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 25-16, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5280451 .

In Part VII: What kind of political entrepreneurship is required?, I referred to the chapter Vincent Geloso and Alex Tabarrok in the book, Can Democracy and Capitalism be Reconciled. Some other chapters in that book may also be relevant to consideration of political entrepreneurship e.g. William Galston’s chapter on the rise of the new right and Robert Lieberman’s chapter discussing the contemporary relevance of Polanyi’s views.

Issues relevant to political entrepreneurship are also discussed in several chapters of the recently published book, Liberal Emancipation, edited by Mikayla Novak. At this stage, I can only claim to have read the introductory chapter of that book.

What can we learn from the history of colonialism and development planning?

William Easterly has made important contributions. I have now read his latest book, Violent Saviours and have written about it in a post entitled: What was wrong with the Washington consensus?  The following passage quoted from the book lists some political entrepreneurs engaged in pro-market reforms:

 "In the end, many of the promarket reforms in the Rest were led or advocated by homegrown reformers, such as Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and Charles Soludo in Nigeria, Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais in Russia, Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland, Václav Klaus in Czechoslovakia, Simeon Djankov in Bulgaria, Hernando de Soto and Mario Vargas Llosa in Peru, a large number of Indian economists, and many other Latin American economists. Political leaders were often reformers themselves, like those in China and India, many other Asian countries, and many Latin American, Eastern European, and African countries."

What can we learn from Aristotle’s discussion of statecraft?

I have referred to Fred D. Miller’s book, Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics. Miller has recently published another book, Aristotelian Statecraft, which is near the top of my reading list.

John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies

Gus diZerega - a retired political scientist whose own work emphasizes the importance of liberal democracy as a social system - recommends John Kingdon’s book as “the most careful systematic study of political entrepreneurship”. An abstract of the book suggests that it attempts to answer the questions: How do subjects come to officials’ attention? How are the alternatives from which they choose generated? How is the governmental agenda set? Why does an idea’s time come when it does?

 Does tribalism corrupt politics even when one side is worse?

Dan Williams argues that it does in an excellent Substack article: "Tribalism Corrupts Politics (Even When One Side is Worse", Conspicuous Cognition (Dec 30, 2025). A link is here.

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As noted above, this post will be revised from time to time to add as further recommendations.