Do 19th Century principles of political economy explain British policies towards the Irish during the great famine?

This question has arisen from my reading of ‘The Great Famine’, by Ciarán Ó Murchadha. But I have an interest in the question for two additional reasons: I have some Irish ancestors who would have been affected by the great famine; and in the course of my work as an economist I have developed a great deal of respect for 19^th Century political economics.

I found Ó Muchadha’s book to be enlightening in explaining why a substantial proportion of the Irish population were heavily dependent on potatoes and highly vulnerable when crops were destroyed by a fungal disease in most of the years from 1845 to 1849. Prior to the famine, about one-third of the population was completely dependent on potatoes because no other crop could provide as much nutritional value from small plots of land. Over 600,000 households subsisted without tenure rights on small plots of land under the conacre system, which gave them access to land in exchange for their labour. A further 300, 000 cottier households had a more formal tenancy relationship which entailed working for set wages, which were offset against the rent for their plots. Many tenants on small holdings paid their rents in cash rather than by providing labour, but were also completely dependent on potatoes for subsistence. 

In the decades leading up to 1845, access to land for potato-growing was becoming more difficult, partly because of an increasing tendency for landowners to consolidate holdings for grazing purposes. In their struggle to obtain access to land it had apparently become common for poor people to offer more rent than they could possibly pay, in the hope that once possession was obtained it would be less bothersome for landlords to reduce rents than to initiate eviction proceedings. The transactions costs associated with evictions were often substantial. Tenants had a set of ‘tradition-sanctioned’ modes of proceeding under cover of darkness against people whom they believed to be perpetrators of injustice. 

Such secret society activity did not persist after 1847, however.  By that time, those who would have been likely to exact retribution for evictions were apparently ‘for the most part dead, in the workhouses, in prison or had departed overseas as emigrants or as transported felons’. The famine added impetus to the number of evictions, not just because many tenants were unable to pay rent, but also because landlords anticipated that their rates would rise dramatically to pay for relief under the Poor Law. Evictions would have substantially increased the death toll from the famine, but from a landlord’s perspective, consolidation of holdings was necessary in order to avoid bankruptcy.

The relief provided by voluntary contributions and the British government was not sufficient to prevent over a million deaths occurring during the famine period. The British Treasury spent about £8 million on famine relief in Ireland, much of which consisted of advances that were intended to be repaid. The government’s contribution was relatively small by comparison, for example, with the £69 million spent on the Crimean War of 1854-1856. The government could have done more to help the Irish without causing much hardship within Britain.

So, why didn’t the British government provide more help to the victims of the Irish famine? The explanation offered by the author is as follows:

‘Political economy … combined with ‘providentialist’ and ‘moralist’ views, provided the assumptions underlying the decision-making of the small London-based political elite whose views translated into legislation for Ireland, and none of whom ever witnessed its effects first hand’ (page 194).

However, that doesn’t line up well with what I know about the views of prominent 19^th Century political economists. For example, in discussing the limits of laissez faire in his book ‘Principles of Political Economy’, published in 1948, J S Mill wrote:

‘Apart from any metaphysical considerations respecting the foundation of morals or of the social union, it will be admitted to be right that human beings should help one another; and the more so, in proportion to the urgency of the need: and none needs help so urgently as one who is starving. The claim to help, therefore, created by destitution, is one of the strongest which can exist; and there is prima facie the amplest reason for making the relief of so extreme an exigency as certain to those who require it, as by any arrangements of society it can be made.’

Ciarán Ó Murchadha implies that his view is based on research by Peter Gray, which demonstrates

 ‘that the ideological framework was part of a wider set of beliefs shared across the British political spectrum, including the conviction that the Famine had been sent by providence, and that it furnished the British state with both the opportunity and the moral authority to reform Ireland thoroughly’.

A paper by Peter Gray has explained British policies towards the Irish in terms of

‘a readiness to attribute mass famine mortality in Ireland to the wilful immorality of the Irish, and to insist on the implementation of the penal mechanism of the poor law on all social classes’.

Immediately afterwards, Gray adds:

‘This, rather than any unthinking adherence to “laissez faire” is what informed the doctrine of “natural causes” in the latter stages of the Irish famine’ (IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 123).

It seems to me that British views relating to providence and morality might have been advanced by English people to avoid acknowledging that they did not feel much sympathy for starving people in Ireland. In his book, ‘Why Ireland Starved’ (1983) Joel Mokyr suggests:

‘It is not unreasonable to surmise that had anything like the famine occurred in England or Wales, the British government would have overcome its theoretical scruples and would have come to the rescue of the starving at a much larger scale. Ireland was not considered part of the British community. Had it been, its income per capita may not have been much higher, perhaps, but mass starvation due to a subsistence crisis would have been averted …’ (p 292).

Even though Britain and Ireland were part of a political union, there are strong historical reasons why many British and Irish people did not see each other as members of the same community. There is evidence that British political economists, including J S Mill, shared the prejudices against the Irish of many other British people. But the principles of political economy espoused by 19^th Century political economists did not require the British government to allow large numbers of people to die during the Irish famine. 

Is inequality of income distribution determined by social values?

There has been a spirited discussion in recent years about the effects of inequality of income distribution on the social fabric and the quality of life. As noted in an earlier post, it seems likely that inequality has some adverse effects on life satisfaction which are independent of the income levels of the individuals concerned. Stronger claims have been made by Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett in their book, ‘The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better’. These authors suggest that in association with lower social trust, a wide range of health and social problems are worse in societies in which inequality is higher. The evidence has been hotly contested - references to opposing contributions listed on a Wikipedia site.

It seems more likely that the correlation that has been observed between low income inequality and high social trust is the result of high social trust leading to a reduction in inequality, rather than a reduction in inequality leading to higher social trust. The big welfare states have been undeniably successful in reducing inequality of income redistribution. Andreas Bergh and Christian Bjornskov have provided evidence that historical levels of social trust may predict the current size of welfare states. High trust levels could be expected to help sustain big welfare states by limiting problems caused by free riding on welfare, by reducing the costs of regulation and monitoring, and by reducing tax evasion and revenue collection problems.

In this post I want to discuss evidence linking trust levels with the importance that people in different countries place on progress toward a more humane society and government action to reduce income inequality.

   

The first step is to consider whether there is a link between social trust and high priority for progress towards a more humane society. The World Values Survey asks respondents to choose which goal is most important: a stable economy; progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society; ideas count more than money; and the fight against crime. Individuals who say that most people can be trusted are more likely to select a humane society and less likely to select the fight against crime as the most important objective. The percentages from the 2005-08 survey choosing progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society are plotted in Figure 1 below against levels of social trust for 53 countries.

Figure 1 suggests that in societies in which there are high levels of social trust, a higher proportion of the population tend to attach most importance to the humane society objective. The main exceptions are for low income countries (China, Vietnam and Indonesia) in which priorities could be expected to be different. France is also exceptional in having a relatively high attachment to the humane society objective despite relatively low levels of trust. This case is particularly interesting in terms of the direction of causation. There are some obvious historical reasons why French people could be expected to attach importance to the humane society objective (egality, fraternity etc.) despite relatively low social trust, but there does not seem to be any obvious reason why French people should have relatively low levels of trust if causation ran in the opposite direction.

The next step is to look at the link between the humane society objective and income inequality. Figure 2 shows the level of income inequality after taxes and transfers (as measure by the gini coefficient) plotted against the proportion of the population attaching most importance to the humane society objective for 21 OECD countries.

Figure 3 shows the link between the humane society objective and government involvement in income redistribution for the 21 OECD countries. The extent of income redistribution is measured as the ratio of the gini coefficient after taxes and transfers to the gini coefficient before taxes and transfers. The value of the variable would be 1.0 if there are no taxes and transfers which reduce income distribution. The ratio is shown in reverse order on the vertical axis. Countries with the greatest income redistribution appear at the top of the chart.

Figure 4 shows the link between the humane society objective and a measure of egalitarian sentiment from the World Values Survey. This measure is derived from responses to a question asking for a value from 1 to 10 to be assigned depending on whether views are closer to the proposition ‘Incomes should be made more equal’ (1) or ‘We need larger income differences as incentives’ (10). The percentages with ratings from 1 to 4 were used as a measure of egalitarian sentiment.

Figure 2 shows that disposable income (i.e. income distribution after tax and transfers) tends to be more equal in countries where a relatively high proportion of the population view the humane society objective as particularly important. Chile is an obvious exception.

Figure 3 shows that the extent of government income redistribution tends to be greatest in countries where support for the humane society objective is greatest. The extent of redistribution is lower than would be predicted on this basis in Chile, Mexico, Turkey and Korea, but these are all countries with relatively low average incomes by OECD standards.

Figure 4 shows that, as might be expected, egalitarian sentiment tends to be greatest in countries in countries in which there is greatest support for the humane society objective. However, comparing Figure 3 and Figure 4, it is apparent that high levels of redistribution are not always associated with strong egalitarian sentiment. For example, egalitarian sentiment seems to be particularly strong in Chile and Switzerland which have redistribution levels somewhat lower than might be predicted on the basis of support for the humane society objective. In the case of Sweden, redistribution is greater than might be predicted and egalitarian sentiment is lower than might be predicted.

The overall picture that emerges is consistent with the view that inequality of income distribution tends to reflect social values. People in high trust societies tend to have greatest support for moving toward a more humane society and greatest income redistribution, leading to relatively low income inequality. Although egalitarian sentiment tends to be greatest in countries where there is greatest support for moving towards a more humane society, it is stronger in some countries in which there has been little income distribution than in countries that have extensive redistribution. The experience of a big welfare state may dampen egalitarian sentiment.

How concerned should we be about trends in income distribution?

At the end of my last post I suggested that the evidence on changing income redistribution – in the OECDs recent publication ‘Divided We Stand’ - poses some serious questions to those of us who are inclined to argue that governments can create widespread opportunities by just getting out of the way. I stick by that, but I don’t see much that is of particular concern in trends in income distribution in OECD countries since the mid-1980s.

In his discussion of Wayne Swan’s recent ravings about income distribution, Henry Ergas agreed with Swan that it is possible to avoid a rising gap between income growth of those at the top of the income distribution and those at the bottom. He noted, however, that ‘the four countries that from the mid-1980s on, most conspicuously did so’ were ‘Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, usually known as the PIGS. In those countries, the bottom 10 percent’s incomes increased by about 1.7 percent more a year than those of the 10 percent at the top’.

I had missed this point when I first looked at the ‘Overview’ of ‘Divided We Stand’. When I looked at the relevant table, it seemed like a good idea to graph the data. The result is shown below.

The PIGS certainly stand out for their success in achieving relatively high rates of growth for those in the bottom 10% of the income distribution. As expected, the growth in average incomes of those at the bottom of the income distribution in the United States was substantially lower than for those at the top – but the same is also true of Sweden. This presumably reflects substantial economic reforms undertaken in Sweden since the mid-1980s.

The growth in incomes for those in the lowest 10% of the income distribution in Australia looks fairly good by comparison with most other countries, and the income growth that occurred is hopefully more likely to be sustained that for the PIGS.

The overall picture shown in the graph suggests a fairly loose relationship between the growth in incomes at the top and bottom of the income distribution. Is the relationship any closer between growth in incomes at the top and in the middle of the distribution?

The second graph suggests that there has been a fairly close relationship between growth in incomes at the top of the income distribution and those in the middle. Given all the talk about rising income inequality in the United States, I was surprised to see that the US does not stand out in terms of incomes at the top rising much more rapidly than those in the middle. What is all the fuss about? Are the researchers who view rising inequality in the US as something exceptional looking at more recent trends? Or are they jumping at shadows?

Postscript:

After some further reading, I am inclined to answer my questions as follows:

1.         Most of the fuss has been about increases in incomes of the top 1% in the US. The increase in share of the top 1% was relatively large by comparison with most other OECD countries. See Figure 12 of the ‘Overview’ of ‘Divided We Stand’.

2.        Growth in incomes of the top 1% has been highly volatile in the US. See Figure 2, of the Congressional Budget Office report: ‘Trendsin the Distribution of household Income Between 1979 and 2007’.

3.      The issue is whether the increase in the incomes of the top 1% is at the expense of the rest of the population. Various explanations have been given for the rapid increase in incomes at the very top of the distribution, but I don’t think a convincing case has been made that there has been systemic market failure. With the benefit of hindsight some remuneration experiments could be counted as failures, but it would be unreasonable to expect all market experiments to succeed. Failure of particular remuneration experiments doesn’t mean that the 99% would benefit from regulation of the remuneration of the 1%, or from higher taxation of the income of the 1%.  

Is Australia's 'fair go' ethos under threat?

In his recent essay about the rising influence of ‘vested interests’ in Australia, Wayne Swan, the treasurer, notes that we Australians ‘always prided ourselves on being a nation that’s more equal than most – a place where if you work hard, you can create a better life for yourself and your family’ (‘The Monthly’ March 2012). He argues that this ‘fair go’ ethic is ‘under threat’ from ‘the rising power of vested interests’. He was not referring to the union movement, which has exercised extraordinary influence under the Gillard government. He was referring to wealthy people who have campaigned in recent years against a new resource rent tax and carbon taxes.

 Swan claims:

‘A handful of vested interests that have pocketed a disproportionate share of the nation’s economic success now feel they have a right to shape Australia’s future to satisfy their own self interest’.

An editorial in the Australian Financial Review (AFR, 3-4 March) contrasted the tone of Wayne Swan’s essay with that of an essay by Bob Carr, former premier of New South Wales, which was published in the AFR on the preceding day. The AFR noted:

‘Mr Carr’s thoughtful musings on the crisis of democratic socialism and the need for Labor to embrace the reform era of the Hawke-Keating era stand in stark contrast to Mr Swan’s belligerent swipe against private enterprise’.

Carr’s comments about the reforms of the Hawke-Keating era are worth quoting:

‘The best bet for Australian Labor might be to embrace and not shy away from the bold economic reform of the Hawke-Keating era. British Labor will sound absolutely inauthentic if it repudiates Blairism. In a similar spirit, Australian Labor cannot walk away from its legacy and is entitled to define itself as the party of economic liberalism, open markets and rising living standards’.

Bob Carr’s article was written before he knew that he was about to become Australia’s foreign minister. Unfortunately, it is not likely that he will be able to continue to write sensibly about Labor politics while in his new position.

The AFR editorial went on to suggest that Swan ‘is wedded to an outdated ideology’ and to claim that ‘Mr Swan is arguably the most left-wing treasurer since Jim Cairns’. (Jim Cairns was federal treasurer for a brief period in the 1970s.)

I rarely read newspaper editorials, let alone quote them, but that one seemed to me to be exceptionally good. There are, however, a couple of points that I would like to add.

My first point is that it is particularly obnoxious for a government representative to criticize people for trying to defend their wealth against confiscatory taxation. There may be a strong case for governments (state rather than federal) to obtain a larger share of resource rents on behalf of citizens, but it was outrageous for the federal government to seek to do this by changing the rules applying to existing mining projects. When an investment has been made on the basis that governments will take a share of rents according to a particular set of rules it is extreme opportunism (if not theft) to announce a sudden change in the rules which enable the government to take a larger slice of rents. In my view the miners are entitled to argue that such behaviour is contrary to Australia’s ‘fair go’ ethos.

My second point is that the tone Wayne Swan has adopted is counter-productive if his aim is to promote serious consideration of the issues associated with changes in income distribution. Swan refers to the recent OECD publication, ‘Divided We Stand: Why Inequality KeepsRising’. This report suggests that income inequality is likely to rise in countries like Australia in the absence of ongoing government involvement in extensive income redistribution.

The evidence on changing income redistribution poses some serious questions to those of us who are inclined to argue that governments can create widespread opportunities by just getting out of the way. It also poses the serious question for advocates of redistribution of how they propose to build widespread community support for removal of disincentives in the tax-welfare system. In that regard, Wayne Swan’s performance could only be described as abysmal.

How does income inequality affect happiness?

Early yesterday the thought occurred to me that it might be a good idea to write something about the effects of inequality on happiness levels. I have been thinking that the judgements people make about inequality are more like judgements about the characteristics of a good society than judgements about the effects of inequality on aggregate happiness (whatever that means). I thought I would spend an hour or so bringing myself up to date with the literature and then another hour or so writing something - and the rest of the day in the garden. However, the process has taken longer than I thought it would (and this post might also take longer to read than some people might think appropriate).

The issues involved are fairly complex. There are at least three different aspects of the relationship between income inequality and happiness that might be relevant – the effects of relative income levels on happiness, the more general effects of income inequality on happiness and the effects of income inequality on happiness inequality.

How do relative income levels affect life satisfaction? As discussed here some time ago, this is not always about envy and status-seeking. The findings of a study by Guy Mayraz et al, based on German panel data, are consistent with the more conventional view that income comparisons tend to have negative effects on life satisfaction of people with relatively low incomes. However, some of the authors’ findings shed further light on the issues:

• ·         Life satisfaction of men is more affected by relative income than that of women.
• ·          Comparisons with friends and neighbours are less important than broader comparisons with the whole population.
• ·          Those who perceive income comparisons to be important tend to have lower life satisfaction.
• ·         The negative effect of relative income comparisons for those with below average incomes is balanced (from a Benthamite perspective) by the positive effect for those with above average income.

Does inequality have an effect on life satisfaction over and above the relative income effect? Studies which have attempted to answer this question have often reached different conclusions. A recent study by Paolo Verme, which seems to be technically superior to previous studies, has found that income inequality tends to have a significantly negative effect on life satisfaction, after controlling for relative income effects etc. The results seem to apply in western countries as well as non-western countries and to rich people as well as to poor people.

This raises the question of why income inequality might have these effects. One possibility is that people feel more comfortable in societies where opportunities are relatively equal. Another possibility is that they are more concerned about equality of outcomes. If so, it seems reasonable to suppose that they are concerned about income inequality because they think it results in happiness inequality.

Is there strong correlation between income inequality and happiness inequality? In a post a couple of years ago I suggested that there was not much evidence of correlation between income inequality and happiness inequality - on the basis of a paper by Jan Ott and some research of my own. Since there were not many countries included in these studies, it seemed like a good idea to produce the scatter diagram below showing measures of income and happiness dispersion for a larger number of countries. (I used World Bank and CIA data on the income/consumption gini and data on standard deviation of life satisfaction from Veenhoven’s latest IAH paper. Both series are based on information for various years during the last decade.)

I can’t see any relationship between the variables in the chart, but statistical analysis suggests that a weak positive relationship might exist.  (The correlation between the variables is 0.13. The estimated coefficient relating inequality of happiness to inequality of income in a linear regression is positive, but the standard error is not much smaller than the estimate. The ‘t’ statistic is 1.38.)

The absence of a strong relationship between inequality of income and happiness at an international level is consistent with the observation of Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers that there has not been a close link between trends in happiness inequality and income inequality in the United States. It is also consistent with the findings of a paper by Leonardo Becchetti et al, based on panel data, that the increase in income inequality has not been one of the drivers of the increase in happiness inequality in Germany.

So, how did this information enlighten me on the question of whether the judgements people make about inequality are more like judgements about the characteristics of a good society than judgements about the effects of inequality on aggregate happiness? The effects of relative income on life satisfaction do not seem relevant to this question. The relationship between income inequality and individual happiness does seem relevant, but I suspect it has more to do with empathy with compatriots and a desire to alleviate suffering of people near the bottom of the income scale rather than a more general concern about distributional equity.

Happiness inequality also seems relevant. When Ruut Veenhoven argues that the quality of a society should be judged by the disparity of happiness among its citizens as well by average happiness levels, he is clearly making a judgement about the characteristics of a good society. The weakness of the relationship between income inequality and happiness inequality certainly suggests that caution is required in basing judgements about the relative quality of different societies on income distribution data. The question I am left with, however, is to what extent disparities of happiness can be attributed to government policies and societal institutions (the rules of the game) rather than individual and group behaviour. It seems to me that to the extent that we introduce distributional considerations into our consideration of the quality of different societies, we are on safer ground in basing our judgements on the distribution of opportunities that are offered, rather than on the distribution of happiness outcomes.

Why occupy Sydney?

‘So, you think I am in favour of occupying Wall Street, do you? What makes you think that?’

I knew it was Jim as soon as he spoke, but it took me a moment to work out where his voice was coming from. When Jim wants to have a discussion with you, he seems to appear from nowhere and just start asking questions. I suppose he thinks that gives him some kind of advantage. It doesn’t work! Everyone I know just ignores his opening questions and goes through the usual preliminaries of saying hello and asking after his health while they compose a response.

Jim had obviously read a brief comment on my last post in which I had speculated that he might be in favour of occupying Wall Street, but not Sydney. I reminded Jim about our previous discussions about banking and limited liability. In our previous discussion about banking Jim had suggested that it was a scam for banks to promise to repay deposits on demand even though they knew that they would be unable to meet that promise if all depositors asked for their money at the same time. In our discussion about limited liability, Jim had suggested that it was wrong to allow owners of banks to gamble with borrowed money, secure in the knowledge that if their gambles do not pay off then the most they stand to lose is the value of their shares. I also mentioned that when banks have been declared by governments to be ‘too big to fail’, bankers have a strong incentive to take abnormal risks because they know that they will be bailed out by governments if they make large losses. I ended by telling Jim that I could picture him in Wall Street carrying a placard saying ‘Bankers are Wankers!’.

Jim seemed satisfied with my explanation, but when I had finished he asked: ‘So, doesn’t all that apply to Australia as well as the US? Don’t you think I should be in favour of occupying Sydney, too?’

I tried to explain that prudential regulation seems to have worked reasonably well in Australia, so there doesn’t seem to be much to protest about in terms of the way the financial system is working in this country.

Jim’s response was quite robust and is not quotable verbatim. After deleting expletives I think the message he was giving me was that although I tell people that I am a libertarian, he thinks I am actually a neo-socialist because I am in favour of some prudential regulation of the finance sector. (Jim can call me a neo-socialist if he likes – it makes a change from being called a neo-liberal. My views on banking regulation are actually fairly close to those of Adam Smith, so I am in good company.) Jim ended his outburst by telling me that while I was entitled to my own views, I should refrain from misrepresenting his views.

‘Well, does that means you actually support the Occupy Sydney movement?’, I asked.

Jim didn’t respond for a long time. Eventually, he asked, ‘What are the Occupy Sydney people actually on about?’ I wasn’t sure, but I suggested that the main theme of the Occupy movement all over the world seemed to be the injustice of unequal distribution of wealth and power – particularly the idea that the top 1% of the population in many countries tend to benefit disproportionately from economic growth.

‘And who do you think is responsible for that?’ Jim said. ‘It is the 99% who are responsible for making the 1% wealthy. We make a few film stars fabulously wealthy by going to the movies that they star in. We make a few sporting heroes fabulously wealthy by watching the games they play and buying the products they endorse. The same system applies in the business world. The CEO of a successful company develops a reputation as a star performer just like film stars and sporting heroes. Successful companies are only successful because the 99% buy the goods they produce’.

‘So’, I said, ‘you don’t think there is anything to protest about?’

Jim said, ‘No, that’s not what I mean. The Occupy Movement should be protesting about celebrity culture and the vacuousness of consumerism. They should be poking fun at the idea that a good is worth buying just because it is popular and that entertainment is worth watching just because the performer is a star. They should be asking people whether they actually get pleasure by helping Kim Kardashian to become wealthier’.

I was left wondering why Jim was picking on Kim Kardashian. One possibility that crossed my mind is that she might have green hair. Jim doesn’t like green hair.

Will history judge Marx to have been right about the effects of technological progress on income distribution?

‘The instrument of labour, when it takes the form of a machine, immediately becomes a competitor of the workman himself. ... That portion of the working-class, thus by machinery rendered superfluous, i.e., no longer immediately necessary for the self-expansion of capital, either goes to the wall in the unequal contest of the old handicrafts and manufactures with machinery, or else floods all the more easily accessible branches of industry, swamps the labour-market, and sinks the price of labour-power below its value’ Karl Marx, Capital, 1887 (first English edition).

Since Marx wrote that, real wages have increased by massive amounts in industrialized countries. Authors of some books I have read recently suggest, however, that Marx’s predictions could end up being right in the end. Gregg Easterbrook warns that we should not take too much comfort from the fact that Marx’s predictions of gloom have not yet come true (‘Sonic Boom’, p 153; discussed here) and Jacques Attali suggests that tomorrows West will resemble today’s Africa (‘A brief history of the future’, discussed here).

In attempting to think our way around this question an obvious place to start is with the effects of technological progress on the demand for labour. This approach makes sense if labour can be assumed to be more or less homogeneous, that aggregate capital stock can be measured appropriately, that most income from capital tends to accrue to people with high incomes and that technological change is the only factor influencing income distribution. I’m actually not sure that any of those assumptions stand up to scrutiny, but let us keep the discussion as simple as possible to begin with.

As Marx observed, new technology often involves capital-intensive processes displacing labour-intensive processes, e.g. the use of power looms to replace hand looms in the textile industry at the beginning of the industrial revolution and, more recently, increased use of robot technology in car manufacture replacing labour-intensive assembly lines. This kind of technological change tends to increase the ratio of capital to labour. However, introduction of new technology often occurs through the introduction of superior capital equipment that replaces existing capital (or more efficient sources of energy, financing innovations, business practices etc) without necessarily increasing the ratio of capital to labour. Most importantly, new technology makes possible an increase in national product, or real national income, and with increased demand for factors of production, including labour.

The net effect of those factors on future demand for labour will depend partly on whether, on balance, the new technology is a closer substitute for labour than for existing capital equipment (and other factors of production). Further development of electronics and robotics, in particular, can be expected to displace a lot more manual and mental labour, but my guess is that before too long new technology will largely involve superior robots replacing inferior robots, leaving demand for human labour relatively unaffected. There are some parts of the economy where new technology is unlikely to have much effect at all on the ratio of capital to labour, e.g. symphony orchestras. (William Baumol made the point in the 1960s that a symphony orchestra does not become more productive by playing faster.)

Another important influence on the future demand for labour will be whether average incomes are likely to result in a changing pattern of consumer spending toward more on labour-intensive or more capital-intensive goods and services. My guess is that ‘real’ experience (of foreign travel etc.) will trump ‘virtual’ experience and that people will prefer to interact with other humans rather than robots to obtain services such as restaurant meals.

So, I think there are limits to the extent that technological progress will result in substitution of capital for labour. When we take into account the fact that labour is not homogeneous, that investment in human capital and investment in physical capital can be substitutes or complements, and that people embody new technology in the skills they acquire it is not even obvious that it is particularly helpful to think in terms of aggregate categories such as labour and capital.

It is probably more meaningful to consider demand for particular categories of labour e.g. unskilled labour. Perhaps it is reasonable to predict that demand for unskilled labour will continue to shrink, but even that is problematic if we define ‘unskilled’ in terms of lack of formal qualifications and overlook the possibility that inter-personal skills - often acquired without formal training - will become increasingly important.

The idea that there is a class of people who obtain their income from selling their labour (workers) and another class of people who obtain their income from ownership of capital (the idle rich) seems likely to become increasingly irrelevant. As working people invest for their retirement they will be increasingly buying shares in the robots that will earn the income they previously earned for themselves.

Technological progress is not the only factor influencing income distribution. Factors affecting the supply of labour, e.g. immigration, could have effects on wage rates in some countries that are as important as the effect of technological progress. Then there are the effects of globalization both in providing international competition for labour-intensive industries and, increasingly, new sources of innovation and competition for technology-intensive sectors of industrialized countries.

Finally, the taxing and spending policies of governments modify the effects of technological progress on income redistribution. If Marx turns out to have been right about technological progress, it seems likely that governments in democratic countries will come under increasing pressure to intervene further in income distribution to ensure that all groups have an opportunity to benefit from the fruits of technological progress.

However, my personal view is that history will probably continue to judge Marx to have been largely wrong about the effects of technological progress on income distribution.
Winton Bates

How silly were J.S. Mill's views about income distribution?

J S Mill wrote: “The laws and conditions of the Production of wealth partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing optional or arbitrary in them. ... It is not so with the Distribution of wealth. That is a matter of human institution solely. The things once there, mankind, individually or collectively, can do with them as they like. They can place them at the disposal of whomsoever they please, and on whatever terms” (Principles of Political Economy, 1848, II,1.1).

In 1983, Friedrich Hayek commented that this view of J S Mill “is really an incredible stupidity, showing a complete unawareness of the crucial guide function of prices ...” Hayek explains: “We must face the truth that it is not the magnitude of a given aggregate product which allows us to decide what to do with it, but rather the other way around: that a process which tells us how to reward the several contributions to this product is also the indispensable source of information for the individuals, telling them where they can make the aggregate product as large as possible” (Conference paper published in Nishiyama and Leube, “The Essence of Hayek”, p 323). This must have been one of the most intemperate remarks that Hayek ever made about anyone.

One of the things I have learned from Richard Reeves book, “John Stuart Mill, Victorian Firebrand” is that Karl Marx was also unimpressed by Mill’s attempt to separate the laws of production and distribution. Marx viewed this as “a shallow syncretism” (Reeves, p 210). He thought Mill was attempting to reconcile irreconcilables.

How silly were Mill’s views about distribution? In order to answer this question I think we need to understand Mill’s views about property and inheritance.

I see a lot of merit in much of what Mill wrote about property. For example: “The institution of property, when limited to its essential elements, consists in the recognition, in each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have produced by their own exertions, or received either by gift or by fair agreement, without force or fraud, from those who produced it” (“Principles of Political Economy”, II, 2.2).

It is when Mill writes about “landed property” that I begin to see problems: “When the "sacredness of property" is talked of, it should always be remembered, that any such sacredness does not belong in the same degree to landed property. No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole species. Its appropriation is wholly a question of general expediency” (“Principles of Political Economy”, II,2.26). Given that land can be exchanged for other goods I don’t see how it is possible to argue that rights to ownership should not be recognized as the same for land as for other goods.

The problem that Mill had with “landed property” seems to be associated with the potential for a relatively small number of families to have a disproportionate amount of wealth and to exercise disproportionate political power. He was against the inheritance of “enormous fortunes which no one needs for any personal purpose but ostentation or improper power”. Richard Reeves points out that Mill was particularly concerned to distinguish between “earned” and “unearned” income. Mill viewed inheritances as “unearned” and argued that it would be socially beneficial to impose a limit on the amount any person could inherit.

Mill’s views about redistributive taxation were also influenced by his aversion to inherited wealth: “To tax the larger incomes at a higher percentage than the smaller is to lay a tax on industry and economy; to impose a penalty on people for having worked harder and saved more than their neighbours. It is not the fortunes which are earned, but those which are unearned, that it is for the public good to place under limitation. ...I conceive that inheritances and legacies, exceeding a certain amount, are highly proper subjects for taxation: and that the revenue from them should be as great as it can be made without giving rise to evasions ... such as it would be impossible adequately to check” (“Principles of Political Economy”, V, 2.14).

It seems to me that Mill’s claim that distribution of wealth should be viewed as entirely separate from production was silly – and contradicted by his own views about the adverse consequences of progressive taxation. Mill’s idea for an upper limit on the amount that anyone could inherit also seems extremely silly. I can see some wisdom in his views about taxation of inheritances, but even here it seems to me that he was fooling himself if he thought that inheritance taxes would impose no disincentives to working and saving. Despite all this silliness, however, Mill still had many sensible things to say about property rights and taxation.

Does our Nicole worsen income inequality in the United States?

In his recent paper, “Thinking clearly about economic inequality”, Will Wilkinson – a research fellow at the Cato Institute in the U.S. (and prominent blogger)- mentions some reasons why Nicole Kidman is wealthy. He states: “Nicole Kidman is fabulously wealthy because millions of individuals have chosen to see a movie with Nicole Kidman in it instead of a non-Kidman movie, or instead of going bowling”. He uses Nicole as an example to illustrate how the pattern of incomes “emerges from billions upon billions of individual choices and transactions” (p 14).

I think Wilkinson is making a good point. People often talk about income distribution as though government is actually distributing national income among the citizens - like a mother deciding how large a slice of a cake to give to each of her children. If we want the cake metaphor to reflect the real world, however, we have to accommodate the fact that mother doesn’t actually bake the cake, the children do. And distribution is the result of mutually beneficial process in which individuals earn cake by contributing to its production.

Wilkinson’s mention of Nicole Kidman is also relevant to a somewhat different point that he is making, although he doesn’t make the link specifically. Nicole Kidman has dual citizenship between the U.S. and Australia. If she is viewed as a U.S. citizen for the purposes of considering the distribution of income that makes the distribution of income in the U.S. look more unequal. If she is viewed as an Australian citizen that makes Australia’s income distribution look more unequal. Who cares?

The point is, of course, that there is something peculiar about viewing income inequality as a cause for concern at a national level, when this can change just because people move across national borders. When people talk about the effects of migration on income distribution in countries like the United States and Australia they are more likely to be thinking of the migrants who make income distribution less equal by occupying the lowest rungs of the economic ladder than those who make it less equal by occupying the highest rungs on the ladder. But the questions raised about the relevance of income distribution to well-being are the same in both cases.

Wilkinson makes the point: “If you focus only on the shifting pattern of incomes among legal residents within the statistics-keeping jurisdiction ... you can easily lose track of the real story of human welfare ...” (p 14). He comments as follows on the effects of the migration of unskilled migration on economic inequality in the U.S.: ‘If were to assume a natural and mundane moral perspective, from which all people involved are taken into account and assumed to have equal worth ... what we would see is a profound reduction in both poverty and economic inequality. If the question is “What happened to the people in this scenario?” then the answer is “The poorest people became considerably wealthier, narrowing the economic gap between them and the rest”.’ (p 15).

It seems to me that this reasoning is relevant to Australia as well as to the U.S. If we are interested in the well-being of people we should be interested in the opportunities that are available to them. When you look at it carefully the concept of income inequality doesn’t have much relevance to well-being.

How did changes in attitudes to inequality affect happiness in Poland?

This post continues my ruminations about the effect that beliefs about income inequality may have on the happiness of people who hold those beliefs. Previous posts can be found here.

In order to study this it would be nice to have a natural experiment in which the population of a country began with fairly positive beliefs about inequality and then changed those beliefs radically over a couple of years. In order to draw conclusions we would need survey information to document the change in beliefs that occurred, together with information on happiness levels, income inequality and per capita income levels.

It just so happens that such information is available for Poland. A study by Irena Grosfeld and Claudia Senik shows that a change in attitudes toward inequality, which occurred around 1997, was associated with a sharp decline in satisfaction with the current economic situation and some decline in satisfaction with personal living standards despite continued economic growth (‘The emerging aversion to inequality: evidence from Poland 1992-2005’, Discussion Paper 3484, IZA, 2008, here).

Around 1997 there was a sharp drop in the proportion of people agreeing with the statement that inequalities of income are necessary for economic progress and a rise in the proportion agreeing that inequalities of income are too large in Poland.

The statistical analysis actually suggests that income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) had a positive effect on satisfaction with the economic situation and satisfaction with personal living standards in the period from 1992 to 1996. The authors argue that inequality was initially interpreted as “an opening of new opportunities” following the fall of communism. It is somewhat easier to understand how this might occur in the light of the results of other research by Claudia Senik (discussed here) which suggests that in transition countries (Russia, Hungary, Poland and three Baltic countries) the life satisfaction of individuals tends to rise, rather than fall, when the income of their reference group -people with the same skills and occupation - increases. Her explanation is that in these countries people consider that their own future prospects to be better when the income of their professional peers rises.

Why did the change in attitudes toward inequality occur? Grosfeld and Senik suggest that “the turning point in tolerance for income inequality seems to come with the increasingly wide perception that the process that generates income distribution is itself unfair” (p17).

That suggests to me that a change occurred from a situation where the economic system was commonly viewed as a positive-sum game – potentially providing benefits to all participants - to one in which it was viewed as a zero-sum game – where the enrichment of some was perceived as being at the expense of others. Interestingly, the perception of an economy as a zero sum game can be an accurate perception when the distribution of income is influenced to a large extent by political favouritism.

All this leads me to wonder whether there is any survey evidence that people who perceive life as a positive sum game are generally happier that those who view it as a zero-sum game.

Can beliefs about inequality make people unhappy?

In recent posts I have been considering whether some of the findings by Arthur Brooks in “Gross National Happiness” apply to countries other than the United States (see: here, here and here). In this post I continue that theme and focus particularly on the effect of political beliefs on the extent to which people are made unhappy by income inequality.

Brooks observes that levels of happiness, beliefs about inequality and income mobility, and political allegiance tend to go together. Americans who think that income differences are too large (about half the population) are a lot less likely to believe that there is a great deal of upward mobility in the United States. Political liberals are a lot less likely than conservatives to believe that there is a lot of upward income mobility in America. Surveys also show that pessimists about income mobility are a lot less likely to be very happy than are optimists.

There is some evidence from published research relating to other countries that political views tend to influence the extent that inequality of income makes people unhappy. Research by Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch suggests that in Europe the poor and those on the left of the political spectrum tick down their happiness scores when inequality is high, but in the United States the happiness of the poor and those on the left is largely uncorrelated with inequality. Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch also report the results of a 36 country study based on the World Values Survey which suggests that low income has less of an adverse effects the happiness of low-income people if it is accompanied by a belief that poor people have a chance of escaping from poverty in the country in which they live. (See: Di Tella and MacCulloch in ‘Some uses of happiness data in economics’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 2006, p 42).

In earlier posts I have noted that in most countries the happiness of lower income people tends to be closely related to the happiness of middle and upper income people in the same countries (here) and that the gap in happiness between upper and lower income people is not related in any clear and obvious way to differences in the extent of income inequality among different countries (here). I now want to report on some research in which I have attempted to assess whether political views influence the proportion of lower income people who are satisfied with life.

The research involved use of multiple regression to explain the proportion of lower income people who are satisfied with life in terms of: the proportion of upper income people who are satisfied with life, self-positioning on the political spectrum; differences in self-positioning on the political spectrum between upper and lower income people; the proportion of the population who believe that it would be a good thing if there was less emphasis on money; differences between upper and lower income people in the proportions who believe that it would be a good thing if there was less emphasis on money; an indicator of religious service attendance and a measure of income inequality (gini index). (Data used in the study were for 66 countries for the year 2000 and have been sourced from “Human Beliefs and Values” by Ronald Inglehart et al.)

The results suggest that the most significant variables explaining the proportion of lower income people who are satisfied with life are:

• the proportion of upper income people who are satisfied with life (by far the most important);
• differences in self-positioning on the political spectrum between upper and lower income people;
• the proportion of the population who believe that it would be a good thing if there was less emphasis on money; and
• differences between upper and lower income people in the proportions who believe that it would be a good thing if there was less emphasis on money.
  
  

These results support the view that the impact that inequality has on the happiness of low income people is influenced by their political beliefs and their beliefs about the importance of money and material things.

(Research presented on this blog – as on any other blog - should be viewed with more caution than peer-reviewed research presented in academic journals. For quality assurance purposes I am prepared to make detailed results of research available to anyone who wants them and the data available to anyone who wants to replicate studies.)

What is the best predictor of the happiness of low-income earners?

The most obvious answer would be average income level. However, the probability of happiness can vary markedly among countries with similar income levels. This is apparent when we look at the extent to which average income levels in different countries influence the chances of happiness of those on lower, middle or upper incomes. For example, although lower income Australians have about the same probability of reporting that they are satisfied with life as might be expected on the basis of their income levels (70 percent), the probability of lower income Mexicans reporting that they are satisfied with life is about 34 percent greater than expected (75 rather than 41 percent) and the probability of lower income Japanese reporting that they are satisfied with life is about 21 percent lower than expected (46 rather than 67 percent). (These results were obtained by use of regression to fit an equation relating the probability of people on lower incomes being satisfied with life to per capita income level. Life satisfaction data was for 66 countries for 2000 and obtained from: : Ronald Inglehart et al, Human Beliefs and Values, Siglo XXI Editores, Mexico, 2004, A 170).

Some might suggest that measures of income inequality could be used to predict the happiness of low-income people. However, there is no clear evidence that happiness inequality is related to the extent of income inequality (see here).

It turns out that the happiness of those on higher incomes in individual countries is a good predictor or the happiness of low-income people in those countries. Lower income people tend to be less happy than those on higher incomes but the margin is fairly consistent across countries – if those on upper incomes are happy, those on lower incomes also tend to be happy. There are some exceptions. For example, data for 2000 indicates that lower-income Armenians were much more satisfied with life and low-income South Africans were much less satisfied with life than would be predicted on the basis of the happiness of those with higher incomes.

In general, however, a very large proportion of the variation in the probability of people on lower incomes claiming to be satisfied with life can be explained simply in terms of the proportions on middle incomes who claim that they are satisfied with life.

Are people desperate for security?

Richard Layard, an economist and member of the British House of Lords suggests that one of the “key facts about human nature” that emerges from happiness research is:
“People desperately want security – at work, in the family and in their neighbourhoods. They hate unemployment, family break-up and crime in the streets”(Happiness, Lessons from a new science, 2005, p7).
Layard goes on to ask: “So how can the community promote a way of life that is more secure?” The answer he provides is a defence of social security systems:
“It is precisely because people hate loss that we have a social safety net, and in Europe a welfare state. People want the security that these entities provide”.
Layard’s bottom line is: “if security is what most of us desperately want, it should be a major goal for society”(p168).

Layard seems to base his assertion that people desperately want security mainly on his interpretation of the results of research undertaken by Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist who was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics for his work on behavioural economics. Kahneman has found that most people have an aversion to loss, even when this involves relatively small sums of money. In one experiment Kahneman offers participants a bet on the toss of a coin:
“ they can either lose $10 or win $X. The factor by which X must exceed $10 provides an approximate measure of loss aversion. The median value in classroom demonstration is rarely far from $25 (‘Objective Happiness’, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwartz (eds.), Well-being, The foundations of Hedonic Psychology, 2003.

Layard infers from such demonstrations that losses hurt much more than an equal gain helps. However, Kahneman has cautioned against such an interpretation. He cites some experimental evidence in favour of an alternative interpretation, namely that loss aversion could represent “a deeply ingrained conservative tendency in decision-making”(p 18).

Layard also cites some studies involving analysis of survey results to determine how subjective well-being changes in response to income changes. The results of these studies support the view that losses hurt more than gains. However, such studies do not establish that people are desperate for security. (The studies are cited on Layard’s web site.)

If welfare states make a big contribution to happiness this could be expected to show up in international comparisons. In his review of happiness research, Will Wilkinson reviewed several studies which have examined the link between the size of the welfare state and the level of welfare within it. The conclusion he draws from that review is that:
“if the redistributive openhandedness of the state has any effect on happiness at all, it is a surprisingly small one. When slightly different econometric techniques using slightly different databases generate weak correlations in opposite directions, the correct lesson to draw is that the variable barely matters at all” (In pursuit of happiness research, p 19).

If people are desperate for security it is reasonable to expect that very few people would be satisfied with life as a whole if they felt insecure about their futures. I have examined the relationship between assessments of future security and life satisfaction using the Australian data base compiled by the Australian Centre on Quality of Life, at Deakin University, in constructing the Australian Unity Wellbeing Index.

The data set used relates to information collected in 2005 and is publicly available. For the sample as a whole, the percentages with ratings of satisfaction with life as a whole were distributed as follows: 18% (ratings 1-6); 49% (ratings of 7,8); and 33% (ratings of 9,10).

The data set also contains responses relating to seven aspects of personal life – health, personal relationships, safety, standard of living, achieving in life, community connectedness, and future security (all rated on a 10 point scale). Using this data I have calculated the percentage of people who have high satisfaction with life as a whole (ratings of 9 and 10) among those who have low ratings on particular aspects (ratings from one to six). These percentages can be used as indicators of the extent to which each aspect is necessary for a high level of satisfaction with life as a whole. For example, if no-one with a low rating on a particular aspect of life had high satisfaction with life as a whole, this would indicate that the aspect concerned was essential for high life satisfaction. At the other extreme, if the incidence of high life satisfaction within this category was the same as for the sample as whole (33%) this would suggest that the particular aspect had no influence on satisfaction with life as a whole.

The percentages with high satisfaction with life as a whole among those with low ratings on particular aspects is as follows (ranked in order of priority): personal relationships 10.8%, achieving in life 11.8%, standard of living 12.8%, future security 15.6%, health 15.9%, community connectedness 19.0% and safety 20.3%. The results suggest that future security is less essential to subjective well-being than is standard of living. (The relative unimportance of safety is difficult to understand, but is consistent with the results of other research using this data base. See: Robert Cummins et al, Australian Unity Wellbeing Index, Report 16.1, 2007, p 7.)

The results seem to me to help in understanding why international studies have not shown average well-being to be considerably higher in countries with large welfare states. The efforts of governments to provide greater security would tend to displace the efforts of individuals and possibly detract from their assessments of what they are achieving in life. In addition, since welfare spending must be paid for by citizens, any perceptions of improvement in security might be offset by perceptions of a lower standard of living with little net effect on satisfaction with life as a whole. After all, most citizens are quite capable of providing for their own future security without having to pay additional taxes to the government so that it can do it for them.

How should needy people be helped?

During their lifetimes the amounts that many people contribute in taxes and receive in benefits from the government are of broadly equal magnitude. In my view this churning is not benign, but in this piece I want to focus on poverty alleviation. How should help be given to those needy people who have not paid much tax in the past and who may never be in a position to make sufficient tax contributions to fully repay the cost of the welfare assistance they receive?

First we need to consider why taxpayers should be providing assistance to needy people. It can be argued that private charity would not be sufficient because of a free-rider problem. I am distressed by the existence of poverty and I gain a benefit if I see it alleviated – even if I make no voluntary contribution myself to the alleviation of poverty. This means that a case can be made for the government to compel me to make an appropriate contribution through taxation. Milton Friedman advanced this argument in the early 1960s (Capitalism and Freedom, 1962, p 190). The argument has recently been endorsed by Mark Harrison (The outcomes of income transfers’, New Zealand Business Roundtable, 2007).

One of the problems with this argument is the absence of any mechanism to identify free-riders. Welfare payments are funded from taxes that are imposed in accordance with more or less objective criteria that take no account of the fact that some taxpayers have conscientious objections to helping people they consider to be undeserving. That leaves us with a dilemma since we can hardly assume that the coercion involved in redistributive taxation has only trivial effects on the well-being of these conscientious objectors.

As I see it, the best way to begin to escape from this dilemma is to ensure that welfare assistance is consistent with human flourishing, so that the numbers dependent on it diminish over time. It is, perhaps, conceivable that if welfare assistance is sufficiently effective in alleviating poverty then at some time in the future the remaining problem could be small enough to be dealt with adequately through voluntary contributions.

A great deal has been written about the adverse effects of unconditional welfare assistance. (For recent discussions, see Mark Harrison’s paper cited above, pages 49-57 and Helen Hughes, Lands of Shame, The Centre for Independent Studies, May 2007, Chapter 7). The psychologist, Nathaniel Branden, has summed up the issues as follows:
“There are social philosophies and policies that encourage independence, and there are others that encourage dependence. The average person is not so autonomous that he or she will generate the appropriate attitudes in a culture that is rewarding the opposite” (A culture of accountability).

Although it is paternalistic to attach conditions to welfare assistance, in my view such conditions can be consistent with both freedom and human flourishing. They are consistent with freedom because people are free to reject offers of assistance if they don’t like the conditions attached to it. They can be consistent with flourishing because requiring needy people of working age to accept responsibility to help themselves can help them to achieve greater self-respect by becoming self-supporting.

Does income inequality lead to happiness inequality?

It seems reasonable to expect that the difference between the probability of happiness of people on upper incomes and those on lower incomes would depend on the degree of income inequality in the country in which they live.

This proposition can be tested simply by calculating the gap between the percentage of upper and lower income people who claim to be satisfied with life in each of a large number of countries and then ranking them by the gini coefficient (or some other measure of income inequality) and calculating gap averages for groups of countries. I have used data on percentages of lower, middle and upper income groups who are satisfied with life as a whole for 66 countries. The data was sourced from surveys conducted over the period 1999 - 2002 (see Ronald Inglehart et al, Human Beliefs and Values, Siglo XXI Editores, Mexico, 2004, A 170).

The results are shown below.




If income inequality causes happiness inequality we should expect to see lower average gaps between happiness of people on upper and lower income in countries with relatively low levels of income inequality. That is not what the chart shows.

Similar results have been found in a study by Jan Ott. In a study covering 64 countries this researcher found that inequality of income tends to go together with higher levels of happiness and more inequality of happiness. The correlations are not substantial, but the result challenges conventional wisdom. (See: ‘Level and inequality of happiness in nations’, Journal of Happiness Studies, 2005, p 408-9).