Part III: How is political entrepreneurship similar to economic entrepreneurship?

 This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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As noted in the Preface, Don Lavoie held that entrepreneurship fundamentally consists of interpreting and influencing culture. From Lavoie’s perspective, “entrepreneurial acts are the readings of, and contributions to, different conversations”. He explains further:

“Most acts of entrepreneurship are not like an isolated individual finding things on beaches; they require effort of the imagination, skillful judgements of future costs and revenue possibilities, and an ability to read the significance of complex social situations” (Lavoie 2015, p.63).

It seems to me that political entrepreneurs listen to the discourse of potential supporters about existing policies to discover what they will be likely to find attractive. They use that information to innovate by producing new products and selling them persuasively. The new products are policy proposals. Success is measured, in the first instance, by whether proposed policy proposals are implemented.

Political entrepreneurs respond to public discourse, using it as a basis for policy innovation. However, their ideological agendas may not reflect a society’s underlying cultural values. In democracies, individuals may challenge entrenched interests by creating and participating in new political movements; under authoritarian regimes, such innovation is suppressed.

As I see it, Lavoie’s suggestion that entrepreneurs play an interpretive role in complex systems is applicable to all kinds of entrepreneurship. And Roger Koppl is correct to argue that “entrepreneurs are not a class of people distinct from other persons.” As Koppl says: “Entrepreneurship is an aspect of all human action. Entrepreneurship is a human universal” (Koppl 2006, pp.1-2).

Koppl built on the views of Israel Kirzner to propose a post-Kirznerian theory of entrepreneurial behavior. He suggested that alertness, discovery, and innovation are the key concepts required to understand what entrepreneurs do and what entrepreneurs are. Alertness refers to recognition of opportunities to revise plans and habits. Discovery is finding a profit opportunity, or some other opportunity to achieve a better outcome. Innovation occurs when the entrepreneur acts on the discovery that he or she has made (Koppl 2006, pp.6-7).

It is possible to identify different kinds of entrepreneurship with major contributors to the study of entrepreneurship. While Kirzner recognized the importance of discovery and innovation, he emphasized alertness to profit opportunities (Kirzner 1979). Joseph Schumpeter viewed the entrepreneur as an innovator who does new things, or does things in new ways (Schumpeter 1947).

Some political scientists have suggested a role for political entrepreneurs akin to the role played by Schumpeter’s innovators in the field of economics. Catherine De Vries and Sara Hobolt suggest that competition between political parties in European countries is like competition in economic markets. Long-standing dominant players have been challenged by disruptive new players. The central objective for both challengers and incumbents is the control of government and the delivery of public policies. Political entrepreneurs play a key role because a party that engages in successful political policy innovation can enjoy an effective monopoly on an issue and reap the consequent electoral benefits (De Vries and Hobolt 2020).

De Vries and Hobolt were writing about multi-party systems in which several political parties are competing for power. However, a similar form of competition occurs when an innovator challenges established leadership factions within a major political party by offering a product that is more appealing to a group of party members.

It often makes sense to view political and economic activities as belonging to separate realms. That perspective is helpful in considering the interactions between politics and business. Nevertheless, Richard Wagner makes an important point when he suggests that politics should be viewed as a peculiar form of business because it has many characteristics in common with business. Both attract investors to provide capital, entail competition, offer sources of livelihood for people, and are supported by administrative educational organisations. And both involve entrepreneurship, (Wagner 2016, p.11).

The next essay focuses on the peculiarities of politics as a form of business and discusses the incentives that political entrepreneurs are faced with in their efforts to attain power and introduce policy innovations.

References

De Vries, C.E. and S.B. Hobolt, “Challenger Parties and Populism”, LSE Public Policy Review 1, no.1 (2020), pp. 1–8.

Kirzner, Israel, Perception, Opportunity, and Profit, Studies in the Theory of Entrepreneurship (University of Chicago Press, 1979).

Koppl, Roger, “Entrepreneurial Behavior as a Human Universal” in Entrepreneurship: The Engine of Growth, ed. Maria Minniti (Praeger, 2007).

Lavoie, Don, “The discovery and interpretation of profit opportunities: culture and the Kirznerian entrepreneur”, in Culture and Economic Action, edited by Laura E Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (Edward Elgar, 2015).

Schumpeter, Joseph, “The Creative Response in Economic History”, The Journal of Economic History VII, no. 2 (1947), pp. 149-159.

Wagner, Richard E., Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).

What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing?

 

Preface to a Series of Essays

“Entrepreneurship necessarily takes place within culture, it is utterly shaped by culture, and it fundamentally consists in interpreting and influencing culture.”

-        Don Lavoie (Lavoie 2015, p. 50)

A few months ago, a kind person told me that “Freedom and Flourishing” had become more than just a blog. With that thought in mind, I have decided to try something new. I am proposing to present here a series of linked essays that can be read in much the same way as a journal article. Readers who wish to do so will be able to start at this Preface and read all the way through to the end, or alternatively, just read the essays that are of most interest to them. There will be links at the end of each essay to help readers to find their way to the next one and links at the beginning of each essay to help readers to find their way back to this Preface.

Some readers may notice that some of the material presented here has been published previously on this blog. The views presented in this series of essays have been more carefully considered but are still subject to revision.

As always, I welcome comments from readers.

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Some readers will come to this series with the prior belief that political entrepreneurship has a negative impact on freedom and flourishing. Those of us who believe that people tend to flourish most fully when governments refrain from interfering with their lives may hold that belief. We certainly have good reasons to be skeptical about the impact of political entrepreneurs on human flourishing.

Nevertheless, if we are serious about promoting libertarian ideals, we cannot avoid considering the possibility that political entrepreneurship might have a role to play in getting us from where we are now - or where we seem to be heading - to a political and legal order that is more conducive to human flourishing.

In my view, it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship at this time because many voters in liberal democracies seem to have become increasingly dissatisfied with conventional centre-left and centre-right political leaders. Unfortunately, there seems to be increasing support in liberal democracies for leaders who propose rule changes which are likely to have detrimental impacts on prospects for freedom and flourishing. That support seems evident on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics.

In that context, it is particularly important to understand the contribution that political entrepreneurship has made to the problems that voters perceive, and the likely consequences of the alternative approaches to political entrepreneurship that are currently on offer.

The analytical approach adopted here has been influenced by entangled political economy as explained by Richard E. Wagner. According to that approach, both “polity and economy are arenas of practical action that operate in similar but not identical fashion” (Wagner 2016, p. 64).

Wagner’s approach recognizes the importance of individual action:

“The framework of entangled political economy accommodates recognition that societies change only through individual action inside those societies, and with those actions spreading within the society according to the receptivity of other members of that society to those changes” (Wagner 2016, p. 138).

As Chris Matthew Sciabarra has suggested, to understand institutional change we need to recognize interactions between personal, cultural and structural (political-economic) considerations. Sciabarra has discussed the nature of those interactions using a Tri-Level Model which builds on Ayn Rand’s conceptual framework (Sciabarra 2000, pp. 379-83). He emphasizes that although the personal, the cultural, and the structural can be analyzed separately, they can never be “reified as wholes unto themselves” (Sciabarra 2000, pp. 379-80).

I believe that the concept of political entrepreneurship is necessary to an understanding of institutional change for much the same reason that the concept of economic entrepreneurship is necessary to an understanding of technological change. The focus of the series is on how political entrepreneurship shapes the formal rules that govern economic and personal freedom across jurisdictions.

These essays draw heavily upon the insights of Don Lavoie in considering the nature of political entrepreneurship. In the passage quoted in the epigraph, Lavoie was writing about economic entrepreneurship. He argued that the “seeing of profit opportunities is a matter of cultural interpretation” (Lavoie 2015, p. 51). However, the idea that entrepreneurship consists in “interpreting and influencing culture” seems particularly relevant to political entrepreneurship.

What Lavoie means by culture is “the language in which past events are interpreted, future circumstances are anticipated, and plans of action are formulated.” (Lavoie 2015, p. 49).

He explains that he views culture as a discourse. In that context: “entrepreneurship is the achievement not so much of the isolated maverick who finds objective profits others overlooked as of the culturally embedded participant who picks up the gist of a conversation” (Lavoie 2015, p. 51).

Essays in this series will discuss the implications of significant differences that exist between political and economic entrepreneurship. In politics, voter choices are weakly linked to individual outcomes, decision-making often involves triadic relationships, and political marketing allows greater scope for deception. Moreover, political deal-making lacks a clear success metric comparable to profit in markets, and institutional incentives may attract opportunists rather than principled leaders.

I acknowledge, however, that many political entrepreneurs are motivated by a desire to achieve economic and social objectives that are widely supported in the communities they live in. They are confronted by information constraints. It is often impossible for a central authority to possess and process all the knowledge needed to achieve social and economic objectives without producing adverse, unintended consequences. As new policy initiatives are implemented to reduce those adverse consequences, economic freedom is often further reduced, and adverse economic and social impacts tend to multiply.

Political leaders seeking to restore economic freedom face challenges including entrenched interests and institutional path dependence. Changing formal rules is insufficient without corresponding changes in norms and incentives. I maintain that institutional reform is not solely about electing better leaders at a national level.

In advocating that the social sciences should pay more attention to the role of political entrepreneurship, I am certainly not attempting to promote a “great man theory” of institutional change. Political entrepreneurs rarely act alone, and their influence is constrained by a range of factors that are present to varying degrees in the societies in which they function.

Crucially, libertarian political entrepreneurs are unlikely to have a lasting impact on freedom and flourishing if their influence is confined to national politics. A national leader may play a pivotal role in sweeping away accumulated regulation but a culture supporting liberty and individual flourishing cannot be established and maintained unless many individuals undertake frequent acts of political entrepreneurship in their day-to-day interactions with others.

The structure of the series is as follows:

Part I provides a brief discussion of the links between freedom and flourishing to explain my reasons for focusing on institutions relating to economic and personal freedom. It also explains the meaning of institutions, institutional change, and political entrepreneurship.

Part II considers the extent to which differences in economic and personal freedom in different countries can be attributed to differences in underlying cultural values. It concludes that prevailing culture at a national level offers only a partial explanation of differences in economic and personal freedom levels. There is much left to be explained by other factors, particularly the influence of political entrepreneurship on the ideologies adopted by governments.

Part III discusses similarities between political and economic entrepreneurship.

Part IV discusses the incentives that political entrepreneurs are faced with in the context of the characteristics of politics that make it a peculiar business.  

Part V discusses the motives of political entrepreneurs and the impact of information constraints on pursuit of economic and social objectives.

Part VI considers the consequences of institutional path dependence, first in slowing the emergence of interest group politics and associated detrimental impacts on economic dynamism, and second in making it more difficult for reform-minded political entrepreneurs to restore economic freedom.

Part VII considers whether heroic political entrepreneurship has potential to promote freedom and flourishing. It urges that political entrepreneurship be perceived more broadly than in terms of government leadership.

Part VIII summarizes the series and concludes.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Chris Matthew Sciabarra for helpful comments on earlier drafts of some of the material presented in this series. The usual caveat applies. Please do not assume that Chris endorses the views presented here.

References

Lavoie, Don, “The discovery and interpretation of profit opportunities: culture and the Kirznerian entrepreneur”, in Culture and Economic Action, edited by Laura E Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (Edward Elgar, 2015).

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew, Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism (Pennsylvania State University Press: 2000).

Wagner, Richard E., Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).

What does Gerald Gaus tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for political entrepreneurship?

 

This essay is the latest in a series that I have been writing about political entrepreneurship. It is the second that I have written on the implications of the knowledge problem for the plans of entrepreneurs who seek to improve economic and social outcomes. The first essay discussed Don Lavoie’s contribution to our understanding of the implications of the knowledge problem in that context.

The Complexities of the Open Society

This essay is based on my reading of Gerry Gaus’s final book, The Open Society and its Complexities. Gaus was a prolific author. This book, published in 2021, has been described by Chandran Kukathas as “his most ambitious work”. Gaus adopted an interdisciplinary approach to political philosophy and saw himself as being in “the truth business” rather than a proponent of any ideology. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the book that he valued the norms of liberty of the Open Society and detested authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

Like Don Lavoie, Gerry Gaus was strongly influenced by F. A. Hayek. In The Open Society, Gaus re-considers some of Hayek’s views in the light of developments over the last 20 years in theories of evolution and analyses of societies as complex systems. He focuses on the following three challenges based on his interpretation of Hayek’s views:

• First, do “our evolved moral sentiments constantly cause us to rebel against the Open Society and resort to a “tribal” moral outlook”?
• Second, given that “an evolved complex culture requires fidelity to … evolved norms, what type of justification” of the norms of the Open Society is open to us”?
• Third, has the Open Society “evolved beyond our governance”?

I will provide here just the briefest possible summary of Gaus’s responses to the first two questions.

First, humans “are certainly not inherently groupish creatures”. Humans are “fit for the Open Society”. However, they have not been optimized for it or any other social order, including tribal society.

Second, because the diversity of moral perspectives is fundamental to the moral life of the Open Society, the existence of increasingly diverse moral perspectives can enhance justification of the Open Society. The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality, entailing moral rules that lead toward extended cooperation rather than conflict and division. Public justifications of those moral rules must be as accommodating to diversity as possible. Effective governance requires widely justified norms and policies.

Knowledge required for governance

In this essay I focus on the Gaus’s view of the knowledge problem in his discussion of the question of whether the Open Society has evolved beyond “our” governance. He alludes to the knowledge problem when he observes that “we seek to devise policies to improve” the functioning of the Open Society. However, “we do not have the knowledge and competency to do so, hence we are constantly disappointed by the last round of interventions and we blame the last government for its failures and broken promises” (p. 13).

The passage quoted in the epigraph is from page 244, a point in the book where Gaus was summing up his argument. After noting that the passive population model often supposed that people would act against their own judgments, Gaus adds:

“Unfortunately, this view has been resurrected by those elites who continue to believe that the public is too ignorant to make its own decisions, and so should submit to “epistocracy,” or rule by those who know (aka, them). Not only, however, is such expertise essentially nonexistent in complex systems, but most actual agents in the Open Society are anything but passive materials to be guided by the elite: they are active, reflexive agents who make their own choices. When citizens do not endorse a policy, many will employ their resources to evade it.”

In considering whether the Open Society has evolved beyond our governance, Gaus introduces the concept of “self-governance”.  Self-governance is not the same as spontaneous self-organization, although Gaus suggests that the two concepts are not necessarily incompatible.

Self-governance requires that there be a “controller” who collects information at the system level and then uses that information to fuel a decision procedure that plays a role in guiding the systems behaviour.

Gaus refers to those aspiring to be controllers as governors. The roles that governors seek to perform may include the functions of political entrepreneurs. As I have discussed elsewhere, that function includes listening to the discourse of potential customers (supporters) to sense what they are likely to find attractive, and on that basis producing new products (policy proposals) and selling them persuasively.

Gaus considers three levels of governance – macro, meso, and micro- and three dimensions of governance – goal directed, strategic, and rules-focused. A goal-directed governor identifies preferred states and seeks to move society toward them. A strategic governor seeks to solve strategic dilemmas to assist citizens to secure outcomes they all want. A rules-focused governor seeks to structure some of the rules of self-organization.

Gaus’s analysis leads to the following conclusions:

• There is little prospect for a governor to successfully pursue macro-level goals in a complex society. For example, efforts to promote development in particular societies are often unsuccessful because institutions cannot readily be transferred from on society to another.
• Attempts to structure the “rules of the game” at a macro level are more promising. In cooperation with the self-organized normative framework of society a governor may effectively shape the rules of self-organization e.g. via civil rights legislation.
• Goal pursuit at the meso level is a dubious enterprise. Pursuit of environmental, economic and welfare-targeted variables is a hit-and-miss affair because our social world is a complex system. It is not linear and determinate, as is often assumed. Successful goal pursuit in a complex world is usually a matter of “muddling through” (sometimes described as learning-based governance).
• Polycentric governance studies show that a focus on problem-solving tends to facilitate effective governance when publics share pressing strategic dilemmas.
• There may be grounds for more optimism about the prospect for micro governance than governance at other levels.

In writing about micro governance, Gaus makes a favourable reference to the work of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Gaus justifies his optimism about micro governance as follows:

 “When changes come up from the more micro levels, not only are they apt to garner the moral endorsement of actual citizens, but the Open Society will possess a diversity of normative networks. Because what works today may be dysfunctional tomorrow, a diversity of approaches is always critical. This itself upsets the moralist, who believes she speaks for the truth about justice, and sees most deviations from her plan as shades of immorality. But many of the diverse publics will not take up her solutions—many citizens will see different problems and possibilities, and their normative beliefs will lead them to different solutions. (p. 240)

Summing up

In The Open Society and its Complexities, Gerry Gaus provided insights about the circumstances in which political entrepreneurs may be successful in pursuing goals.

Gaus was highly critical of the passive population model which assumes that people will follow policies dictated by governments rather than acting as self-governing agents. Such considerations made him highly skeptical about pursuit of goals at a macro level in a complex society.

He viewed pursuit of environmental, economic and welfare goals as problematic but acknowledged that some success may be achieved by “muddling through” i.e. adjusting policies in response to outcomes.

He was more optimistic about cooperative efforts to modify the “rules of the game” in which self-organization occurs. He also acknowledged that a focus on problem-solving tends to facilitate effective governance when people are confronted by pressing strategic dilemmas.

Gaus seems to have been most optimistic about micro-level governance that is able to garner the endorsement of “actual citizens”.

Addendum

Readers might also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.

What does Don Lavoie tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for the plans of political entrepreneurs?

One of the questions that I have been contemplating in recent months is whether the tariff policies of President Trump could be part of a coherent economic plan. Can his policies be rationalized in terms of revenue raising objectives, the optimum tariff argument, provision of appropriate incentives to manufacturing industries to meet defence or employment objectives, or the pursuit of foreign policy objectives? Is it possible that he is assigning policy instruments to objectives in a manner consistent with a rational plan?

The presumption underlying such questions is that it is preferable for political entrepreneurs to endeavor to ensure that their economic plans are coherent rather than unprincipled, unpredictable, and capricious. Although that may be a reasonable presumption, there is another other option that should be considered. Perhaps it is appropriate for political entrepreneurs to refrain from engaging in economic planning.

I was reminded of that while reading Don Lavoie’s book, National Economic Planning: What is Left?  Don Lavoie was an economics professor at George Mason University, where he taught from 1981 until his death in 2001. This book was originally published by the Cato Institute in 1985 and was reprinted by the Mercatus Center in 2016.

In this book Don Lavoie explains, among other things, that political entrepreneurs are confronted with a fundamental knowledge problem when they seek to plan economic activities, The epigraph quoted above (from page 181) encapsulates an important implication of the knowledge problem.

Lavoie’s explanation of the information problem begins with the insights of F. A. Hayek. The data that a planning agency would require to engage in rational economic planning resides in the separate minds of millions of people. The data exists only in a dispersed form that cannot be fully extracted by any single agent in society. The only way that knowledge can be used effectively is by relying on competitive struggles in a market system.  (p. 56)

The most obvious implication is that it is impossible for markets to be replaced by comprehensive economic planning. However, more modest attempts to steer the market towards particular outcomes also obstruct the source of knowledge which is essential to rational decision-making. (p. 56-7)

Lavoie points out that the only way we can know whether we are squandering resources by over- or underinvesting in microprocessors or steel, for example, is via “the messages contained in the relative profitability of rival firms in these industries”. He adds:

“But this is precisely the information we garble when we channel money toward one or another of the contenders. Deprived of its elimination process, the market would no longer be able to serve its function as a method for discovering better and eliminating worse production techniques. Without the necessity of responding to consumers’ wants or needs, businesses would never withdraw from unprofitable avenues of production.” (p.181)

Lavoie notes that advocates of industry policy disagree on the directions in which the market should be steered. For example, Felix Rohatyn wanted to funnel aid to sunset industries while Robert Reich wanted to funnel it to sunrise industries. He sums up:

“It is the main conclusion of the argument that I have called the knowledge problem … that there are no rational grounds on which Reich could ever convince Rohatyn or vice versa on such matters as are involved in economic change. As a result, such battles are sure to be fought with weapons other than carefully reasoned argument.” (p. 200-201)

Lavoie notes that Rohatyn and Reich both argued that it is the responsibility of a strong leader to coordinate the actions of the rest of us. (p.190) The coordination they had in mind seems to be more akin to the coordination that military leaders impose by giving orders to subordinates than the coordination among individuals that occurs voluntarily and spontaneously in a free market.

Lavoie argues that economic planning is inherently militaristic: “The practice of planning is nothing but the militarization of the economy”. In making that point he notes that the theory of economic planning was from its inception modeled after feudalistic and militaristic organizations. (p. 230)

Some would argue that a degree of militarization is a price worth paying, or even desirable, to achieve a range of national objectives. Indeed, the conventional theory of democracy seems to entail top-down direction. Prior to elections, political leaders tell voters about their plans for education, health, social security etc. and are expected to implement those plans after they are elected.  

I am not aware of anything that Lavoie wrote that discusses the legitimacy of the concept of national objectives and the question of whether planning (and militarization) may be necessary in the pursuit of social objectives. However, he provided a highly relevant discussion of the concept of democracy in a book chapter entitled, ‘Democracy, Markets, and the Legal Order: Notes on the Nature of Politics in a Radically Liberal Society’. (The book is: Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Eds.) Liberalism and the Economic Order, Cambridge University Press, 1993.)

In that chapter Lavoie notes that Western liberals tend to view democracy and markets “as in some sort of necessary tension with one another”. We tend to think that “taking democracy too far undermines markets and that taking markets too far undermines democracy”. He attributes that view to “liberalism’s gradual drift into compromises with conservatism and socialism”.

Lavoie argues that liberalism needs to reinterpret its notions of markets and democracy so that they are seen to be essentially complementary. Our economics needs to take account of the cultural underpinnings of markets and our politics “needs to move beyond the model of the exercise of some kind of unified, conscious democratic will and understand democratic processes as distributed throughout the political culture”. The force of public opinion is best perceived as the distributed influence of political discourses throughout society rather than as “a concentrated will”.

Lavoie suggests that what we should mean by democracy is a distinctive kind of openness in society rather than a theory about how to elect the personnel of government:

“Democracy is not a quality of the conscious will of a representative organization that has been legitimated by the public, but a quality of the discursive process of the distributed wills of the public itself.” (p.111).

It seems to me that those who see merit in Lavoie’s view of democracy have good reasons to be skeptical about the worth of top-down planning to achieve national objectives. Individuals have different priorities and objectives that deserve to be recognized. National plans cannot solve the knowledge problem entailed in giving appropriate recognition to individual differences. 

Addendum

Readers might also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.

Are declining economic growth rates likely to have undesirable impacts on social attitudes?

 

Research for an earlier essay on this blog led to the conclusion that declining economic growth rates in high income countries are likely to cause an increasing proportion of the population of those countries to feel that their standard of living is worse than that of their parents at a comparable age, and therefore to experience lower average life satisfaction. In this essay I extend that analysis to consider the social attitudes of people in the USA, Britain and Australia who feel worse off than their parents.

In the previous study I used data from the World ValuesSurvey to examine the relationship between the perceptions of respondents about their standard of living relative to their parents at a comparable age and economic growth in the countries in which they reside. That data was then linked to average life satisfaction.

The main findings were:

• Perceptions of standard of living relative to parents are positively related to past economic growth experience of the countries in which people live.
• In the high-income countries, low growth has a greater adverse impact on young peoples’ perceptions of their standard of living relative to parents than on the corresponding perceptions of old people.
• The perception of having a lower standard of living than parents at a comparable age has a substantial adverse impact on life satisfaction ratings.

These findings imply that lower economic growth rates would be likely to result in an increasing proportion of the population having lower living standards than their parents, and hence, lower average life satisfaction. The psychic costs of adjustment to lower economic growth would initially fall most heavily on young and middle-aged people.

Those findings raise questions about likely changes in social attitudes if economic growth prospects continue to decline in high-income countries, resulting in an increasing proportion of people who feel worse off than their parents were at a comparable age. This essay uses World Values Survey data to explore how some of the social attitudes of people who perceive themselves to have a lower standard of living that parents differ from those of the rest of the population.

I focus on three high-income countries – USA, Britain and Australia. The USA survey was undertaken in 2017, the British survey in 2022, and the Australian survey in 2018.

Figure 1 provides further evidence that people in the USA, Britain and Australia tend to have lower average life satisfaction if they perceive that their standard of living is lower than that of their parents.

 

Demographics

Figure 2 indicates that people who perceive themselves to be “worse off” than their parents tend to be concentrated in the 25-54 age groups.

 

Figure 3 suggests that the sex composition of those who feel “worse off” than their parents differs somewhat by age group in the countries considered, but I have no idea why. There appears to be a higher percentage of young women in that category in Australia, a higher percentage of women in the 30-49 age group in Britain and a higher percentage of older women in the United States.

 

Work and Success

Figure 4 indicates that those in the “worse off” category are less likely to agree that hard work brings a better life.

 

Attitude to Migrants and Migration

The only conclusion I can draw from Figures 5 and 6 is that Australians who feel “worse off” than their parents tend to have more negative attitudes toward migrants and immigration than those who feel better off or about the same.

 

Trust

Figure 7 suggests that a lower percentage in the "worse off" category say most people can be trusted.

Figure 8 suggests that a lower percentage of those in the "worse off" category have confidence in the justice system.

Priority given to Freedom

Figures 9 and 10 suggest that there is not much difference between the three groups in terms of priority given to freedom. Slightly fewer of those in the “worse off” category tend to give freedom higher priority than equality. Surprisingly, in Australia and Britain, slightly more of the people in that category tend to give freedom higher priority than security.

 

Government objectives

Figure 11 indicates that those in the “worse off” category are more inclined to want government to take more responsibility to ensure everyone is provided for. The percentages shown are for the top 3 ratings on a 10 point scale.

 

Figure 12 indicates that those in the “worse off” category are less inclined to give high priority to economic growth. Respondents were asked to select from a list which national aim should be given highest priority. Other items on the list include having strong defence forces and individuals having more say in decision making.

 

Politics

Figure 13 suggests that those in the “worse off” category are no more interested in politics than other people in the countries considered.

 

Figure 14 suggests that people in the “worse off” category are no more likely to consider that it is good to have a strong political leader.

 

Figure 15 suggests that people in the “worse off” category are no less likely to consider that democracy is important.

 

Figure 16 suggests that people in the “worse of” category are less likely to be satisfied with political system performance than are people in the other categories.

 

Figure 17 suggests that people in the “worse off” category are as strongly opposed to political violence as are people in the other categories.

 

Conclusions

The social attitudes of people who perceive their standard of living to be worse than that of their parents at a comparable age are similar in many respects to those of people who perceive their standard of living to be better or about the same as that of their parents.

However, there are some important differences. People who perceive their standard of living to be worse than that of their parents at a comparable age are more inclined to:

• Skepticism about hard work bringing a better life;
• Pessimism about trustworthiness of others and lack of confidence in the justice system;
• Collectivism in terms of responsibility for the wellbeing of citizens;
• Negativity about giving high priority to economic growth; and
• Dissatisfaction with political system performance.

That combination of attitudes seems likely to be self-perpetuating because it is likely to promote policy responses that will lead to lower economic growth and a further increase in the proportion of the population who perceive their standard of living to be worse than that of their parents. Adoption of more market-friendly economic policies to facilitate higher economic growth seems unlikely to occur before that course of action becomes more obviously necessary to avert major economic crises.   

What role has political entrepreneurship played in changes in human freedom this century?

 

For the purposes of this exercise, I have used the Human Freedom Index, published by Cato and the Fraser Institute, to identify which countries have experienced greatest change in human freedom this century.

In my view, this index provides the best available information on the state of liberty throughout the world. The latest publication in this series, The Human Freedom Index 2024, by Ian Vásquez, Matthew D. Mitchell, Ryan Murphy, and Guillermina Sutter Schneide, provides measures of personal and economic freedom in 2022 for jurisdictions covering 98% of the world’s population. The accompanying data set enables change in personal and economic freedom to be assessed for 157 countries over the period from 2000 to 2022.

This study is associated with my recent research efforts directed toward attempting to understand the role of political entrepreneurship in institutional change. The research reported here links most directly to some previous research which suggests that levels of personal and economic freedom in some countries have been more strongly influenced by political entrepreneurship than by underlying cultural values of the people.

The idea behind the current study is that if we can identify the countries that have experienced greatest change in economic and personal freedom and know a little about the recent political history of those countries, we will better placed to make judgements about the factors responsible for institutional change. The question I ask myself is whether changes in freedom can be attributed to the efforts of a political entrepreneur with an ideological mission, as opposed to other factors such as cultural change in the broader community, responses to economic crises, and external factors including advice of foreign governments and international agencies.

In this essay, I first consider the above graph which shows changes in personal and economic freedom this century for the full data set (157 countries) and then consider a second graph showing the same data for countries with above median human freedom in 2022.

Jurisdictions with greatest change in human freedom

The human freedom index reflects the combined impact of economic freedom and personal freedom. In the graph shown above, the 10 countries with greatest improvement in human freedom are labelled and identified with a green marker and the 10 countries with the greatest decline in human freedom are labelled and identified with a red marker.

An initial point worth noting about the graphs is the relatively small number of countries in the bottom right quadrant with an increase in personal freedom accompanied by a decline in economic freedom. That result is consistent with Milton Friedman’s observation that economic freedom “promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way allows the one to offset the other.” Hopefully, the people in counties in the top left quadrant, who have experienced substantial increases in economic freedom under oppressive governments, will subsequently be able to experience greater personal freedom as well.

It is not difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have made a major contribution to repression of liberty in jurisdictions that have experienced the greatest declines in human freedom since 2000. Peronism remained a dominant force in Argentinian politics in the first two decades on this century, even though Juan Peron died in 1974. The political landscape in Venezuela was dominated by Hugo Chavez and Nicholas Maduro, who have both pursued policies inimical to economic and personal freedom. In Venezuela, Daniel Ortega held the presidency for extended periods. Chad was subject to authoritarian rule by Idriss Deby Itno until his death in 2021. Iranian politics has been dominated by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei since 1989. Much of the decline in economic and personal freedom in Egypt has occurred since 2014, under the presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In Turkey, economic and personal freedom have also declined substantially since 2014, when Recep Erdogan came to power. The ruler of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, imposed substantial additional restrictions on personal freedom following the outbreak of civil war in 2011. Personal freedom in Hong Kong has been increasingly restricted since 2012 when Xi Jinping came to power in China. The decline in personal freedom in Bahrain since 2010 reflects the response of the government of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa to an upsurge of political opposition.

It is more difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have made a major contribution to expansion of liberty in jurisdictions that have experienced the greatest improvement in human freedom since 2000. That may partly reflect poor media coverage of good news stories in Africa. Substantial improvements in human freedom occurred in Liberia under the political leadership of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and in Gambia, under the leadership of Adama Barrow.

Some of the other countries that have experienced substantial improvements in human freedom have had governments that have tended to favour free markets consistently. Countries in that category include Lebanon, Armenia, Sierra-Leone and Colombia.

In some countries, including Timor-Leste, international agencies have played an important role in encouraging policies to strengthen government institutions and reduce corruption.

Many of the countries that have experienced substantial increases in human freedom have improved from a low base and still have human freedom levels well below the world average. Countries in that category include Angola, Lebanon, Laos and Sierra-Leone.

 Changes in freedom in relatively high freedom countries

 

When we focus on countries which currently have relatively high levels of freedom, a substantially different set of countries emerges as the 10 with largest declines or increases in economic freedom. Argentina is the only country with reduced human freedom which is common to both groups. Timor Leste and Armenia are the only countries with increased human freedom that are common to both groups.

Among countries with reduced human freedom, political entrepreneurs who have played a prominent role in implementing restrictive policies include Victor Orban in Hungary, Pravind Jugnauth in Mauritius, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Andrzej Duda in Poland.

The decline in human freedom in Guyana, Greece, France, UK, and USA seem to have occurred mainly via gradual slippage rather than deliberate policy. In addition, restrictions on freedom imposed in those countries during the coronavirus epidemic had not been fully removed in 2022.

It is difficult to identify political entrepreneurs who have played a prominent role in promoting economic and personal freedom in the countries with greatest increases in human freedom. However, Maia Sandu played a prominent role in Moldova. Bidzina Ivanishvili has played a prominent role in politics in Georgia since 2012, during a period of improvement in human freedom, but it is unlikely that his more recent political endeavours have had a positive influence on human freedom.

The countries with greatest increase in human freedom generally have policies which strongly favour free markets. The main exceptions seem to be the governments of Malawi and Timor Leste, which have been less supportive of economic freedom.

Conclusion

This essay has focused on countries that have experience substantial changes in human freedom over the period from 2000 to 2020 in an endeavour to assess the role of political entrepreneurship in those changes.

The Human Freedom Index, published by Cato and the Fraser Institute, has been used to identify countries with greatest changes in freedom levels. Information on the recent political history of those countries has then been used to assess whether the changes could be attributed to the influence of political entrepreneurs with an ideological mission.

The study first considered changes in freedom in the full data set of 157 countries and then at changes in freedom for countries with above median freedom levels.

My general conclusion is that, at least during the period considered, political entrepreneurship has played a larger role in bringing about substantial declines in human freedom than in bringing about substantial improvements in human freedom.

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship. In this post I have reproduced a list of pro-market reformers from William Easterly's book, Violent Saviours.

Where did Carl Schmitt go wrong in his critique of democracy?

 

I first became aware of Carl Schmitt about 30 years ago while reading Friedrich Hayek’s book, Law, Legislation and Liberty. At that stage I was left with the impression that while Schmitt still had influence among German legal philosophers, his views were mainly interest to people wondering how a respected academic could become a Nazi. Over the last year or so, however, I seem to be coming across increasing references to the relevance to contemporary politics of Schmitt’s views about friend-enemy distinctions and the autonomy of the political.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides the following biographical information about Schmitt:

“Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) was a conservative German legal, constitutional, and political theorist. Schmitt is often considered to be one of the most important critics of liberalism, parliamentary democracy, and liberal cosmopolitanism. But the value and significance of Schmitt’s work is subject to controversy, mainly due to his intellectual support for and active involvement with National Socialism.”

My reading of the full entry about Schmitt in the Stanford Encyclopedia (written by Lars Vinx) reinforced the impression I previously had that Schmitt’s political philosophy is inherently authoritarian. However, the conclusion that Peter C. Caldwell reached in his literature review is ambivalent:

“What Schmitt’s real message is remains disputed. Fifty years after the first reflections on his work began to appear, his interpreters still battle over whether he was primarily a brilliant lawyer and theorist of constitutional democracy or a gravedigger of democracy and apologist for authoritarianism; an intellectual adventurer and opportunist or a serious analyst of modernity; a conservative trying to save what could be saved of the European heritage or an antisemite and Nazi.”

(‘Controversies over Carl Schmitt: A Review of Recent Literature’, The Journal of Modern History 77, June 2025)

The focus of this essay has been determined largely by a couple of books that I have read recently. I focus on three aspects of Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy. First, I consider Adrian Vermeule’s synthesis of Catholic integralism and Carl Schmitt’s view that politics is war. Second, I consider the link between entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political. Finally, I reconsider Friedrich Hayek’s view of Carl Schmitt’s legal philosophy.

Vermeule’s synthesis of integralism and Schmittian illiberalism

My initial source for the discussion of integralism was Kevin Vallier’s book, All the Kingdom’s of the World (2023). I recently reviewed Vallier's book in an essay entitled, ‘Are integralists opposed to natural rights?’, but neglected to mention Vermeule’s affinity with the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt.

Vallier refers to Vermeule’s article, The Ark of Tradition, which is a review of Schmitt’s book, Roman Catholicism and Political Form. Vermeule writes:

“My suggestion, which is consistent with Schmitt’s vision, but goes beyond what he articulates, is that the Church serves as a kind of ark, whose vocation is to preserve the living tradition of the Verbum Dei amidst the universal deluge of economic-technical decadence, and the eventual self-undermining of the regime.”

He goes on to quote Schmitt:

“Should economic thinking succeed in realizing its utopian goal and in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society, the Church would remain the only agency of political thinking and political form. Then the Church would have a stupendous monopoly: its hierarchy would be nearer the political domination of the world than in the Middle Ages.”

My understanding of what Schmitt meant by “an absolutely unpolitical condition of human society”, is a condition in which people would no longer be interested in drawing “friend-enemy distinctions”. Schmitt claimed that life in a completely de-politicized world would be shallow, insignificant, and meaningless.

Such views seem to me to be mistaken and to have potential to cause a great deal of unnecessary misery. In fields of human endeavour such as business and sport, friendly rivalry obviously helps to make life meaningful for many people. However, friendly rivalry does not require friend-enemy distinctions. Opportunities for human flourishing are enhanced in societies where individuals tend to seek mutual benefit from voluntary (and friendly) interactions with other people, rather than seeking to benefit from the friend-enemy distinctions associated with coercive political processes.  

Lars Vinx notes: 

“Some interpreters have explained Schmitt’s hostility towards liberal de-politicization as being grounded in the view that a willingness to distinguish between friend and enemy is a theological duty.”  

That made me wonder, very briefly, whether a theologian could argue that it is necessary for Christians to be able to distinguish between friend and enemy in order to follow Jesus’s exhortation to love one’s enemies. Before wasting too much time, however, I reminded myself of Erasmus’s message about refraining from wars over theology, which seems to me to remain as relevant today as at the time of the Protestant Reformation. (If further explanation is required, please read something I wrote about Erasmus a few years ago.)

Autonomy of the political

In my recent essay entitled “How does entangled political economy help us to understand political entrepreneurship?”, I drew heavily on Richard E. Wagner’s book, Politics as a Peculiar Business,. However, that essay doesn’t discuss the link that Wagner draws between entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political.

The concept of autonomy of the political describes power relations and the behaviour of those who hold political power in society. The surface impression is that a small number of rulers dominate larger masses of citizens, but power is ever present in society and can be manifested in a variety of different ways. Wagner’s concept of entangled political economy “rests on the twin autonomies of the political and the economic in society, and the interaction between those autonomies being a source of turbulence within society.”   

Wagner writes:

“For Schmitt, the autonomy of the political rested on exceptional circumstances and the friend–enemy distinction. Exceptional circumstances mean that a rule of law cannot be articulated that will cover every possible point of decision that might arise. The presence of exceptions is a point where the autonomy of the political enters into society. The friend–enemy distinction is a feature of the crooked timber of humanity that surely intensifies with increases in societal complexity and the hierarchical ordering in terms of status that comes in the wake of growing complexity.”

Schmitt argued that even if constitutional arrangements are crafted to support private ordering of societal interaction, the autonomy of the political will assert itself in the guise of exceptional circumstances. As the scale of the polity expands, consensual action tends to give way to factional action, wherein some factions gain at the expense of others. For example, whereas application of general rules and principles might require a few pages of tax codes, factional action to achieve concessions generates thousands of pages of tax codes.

To consider Schmitt’s proposed remedies for factional politics, I have looked beyond the references to Schmitt in Wagner’s book. My main source is the Stanford Encyclopedia entry written by Lars Vinx.

Schmitt’s views about the problems of democracy and the need for strong political leadership are similar to those of Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter (discussed in earlier essays, here and here). However, while Weber and Schumpeter defend liberty, Schmitt regards constitutionally guaranteed freedoms as concessions of the state to the individual.

Weber and Schumpeter emphasize the importance of constitutional procedures, but Schmitt’s view of constitutions seems ambivalent. Schmitt understands democracy as the self-rule of the people. He argues, however, that since the will of the people is not necessarily reflected in the majority view, representative government is not necessarily any more intimately connected with the principle of democracy than a dictatorship in the name of the people. 

Schmitt denies the possibility of changing the fundamental nature of an established constitution via use of rules contained within it. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility of suspending a constitution through a sovereign decision on the exception. He also acknowledges that a people, in a renewed exercise of their constituent power, might legitimately choose a non-liberal and non-parliamentarian form of democracy. 

Friedrich Hayek’s view

Hayek held similar views to Schmitt concerning the ability of the majority in a representative assembly with unlimited powers “to confine its activities to aims which all members of the majority desire, or even approve of”. The majority can only be kept together by “paying off each of the special groups by which it is composed”. (LLL, V3, 138)

In a footnote to that passage, Hayek suggested that in the 1920s “the weakness of the government of an omnipotent democracy was very clearly seen by the extraordinary German student of politics, Carl Schmitt.” However, Hayek added that “Schmitt regularly came down on what to me appears both morally and intellectually the wrong side.” (LLL, V3, 194-5)

The passage quoted in the epigraph at the top of this essay appears in Volume 1 of Law, Legislation and Liberty (p 71). It is immediately followed by the assertion that “long before Hitler came to power” Carl Schmitt “devoted all his formidable intellectual energies to a fight against liberalism in all its forms”. (Hayek’s perception that Schmitt was so clearly opposed to all forms of liberalism has been disputed. Some of Schmitt’s writings apparently give the impression that he was trying to save Europe’s liberal heritage.)

Later in the same paragraph, Hayek explains that Schmitt’s final formulation of his central belief about the law entailed “concrete order formation”. Schmitt posits that law is fundamentally a form of political and social organisation grounded in a community’s values, and that the state is the embodiment of the community’s legal order. Hayek argues that under that view of law, individuals are “made to serve concrete purposes”.

Hayek contrasts Schmitt’s view of law with his own view that law consists of “abstract rules which make possible the formation of a spontaneous order by the free action of individuals through limiting the range of their actions.”

While Schmitt saw the state as giving expression to the values of the dominant community group, Hayek saw law as consisting of rules of just conduct that have evolved to protect individual liberty.

Conclusions

Carl Schmitt is remembered as a prominent German legal and political theorist who became a Nazi. However, Schmitt’s political affiliations have not prevented frequent reference being made to views about friend-enemy distinctions and the autonomy of the political in contemporary discussions about political institutions.

This essay has focused on three aspects of Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy: Adrian Vermeule’s synthesis of Catholic integralism and Carl Schmitt’s view that politics is war; the link between Richard Wagner’s concept of entangled political economy and Carl Schmitt’s concept of the autonomy of the political; and Friedrich Hayek’s view of Carl Schmitt’s legal philosophy.

Schmitt argued that if economic liberalism succeeded in bringing about an absolutely unpolitical condition of society – a condition where people were no longer interested in making friend-enemy distinctions – the Catholic church would be able to dominate the world. He reasoned that that this religious organisation would dominate in those circumstances because it would be the only agency still engaged in political thinking. I am puzzled as to why he thought a religious organisation would be last to abandon the habit of making friend-enemy distinctions. It seems to me that criminal organisations would be likely to pose a greater obstacle to establishing an unpolitical utopia because friend-enemy distinctions are more intrinsic to their activities.

Schmitt presented a valid argument that constitutional arrangements crafted to support private ordering are prone to corruption by interest group politics. The autonomy of the political exerts itself as some groups argue for exceptions to general rules to obtain benefits at the expense of others.

Other political theorists have proposed stronger executive government as a remedy for problems that interest groups pose for the functioning of liberal democracies. However, Schmitt proposed more extreme remedies. For example, he suggested that under exceptional circumstances a government could make a “sovereign decision” to suspend a constitution.

Friedrich Hayek acknowledged that Schmitt had clearly seen the weakness of omnipotent democracy in the 1920s, but suggested that he “regularly came down on the wrong side” in proposing remedies.

Hayek argued that under Schmitt’s final formulation of his beliefs about the law, individuals are made to serve concrete purposes determined by the state. By contrast, Hayek viewed law in terms of abstract rules of just conduct that have evolved to protect individual liberty.

In my view Schmitt went wrong in his critique of democracy by seeking authoritarian remedies rather than changes in the rules of the game to address the specific problems that he identified.

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.