Part II: Can cultural values explain freedom levels?

 This essay is one of a series exploring the topic: What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing? The series commenced with a Preface which provides a synopsis of the series and explains why I think it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship.

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The aim of this essay is to consider the extent to which differences in economic and personal freedom in different countries can be attributed to differences in underlying cultural values rather than to other factors – most particularly, the influence of political entrepreneurship and the ideologies adopted by governments.

There are reasons to expect interactions between economic and personal freedom to be mediated by economic development, change in cultural values and democratization. As discussed in Part I, there are strong grounds to argue that changes in the rules of the game which expand economic freedom often enable countries to experience more rapid economic development. There is also evidence that economic development leads to greater demand for democratization and cultural values supporting personal freedom.

Research by Ronald Inglehart illustrates some steps in the process by which an increase in economic development may generate pressure for greater personal freedom. He writes:

“Economic development seems to bring gradual cultural changes that make mass publics increasingly likely to want democratic institutions and to be more supportive of them once they are in place. This transformation is not easy or automatic. Determined elites who control the army and police can resist pressure for democratization. But development tends to make mass publics more trusting and tolerant and leads them to place an increasingly high priority on autonomy and self-expression in all spheres of life, including politics, and it becomes difficult and costly to repress demands for political liberalization” (Inglehart 2000, p.95).

Figure 1 suggests the existence of a weak positive relationship between economic freedom and an index of facilitating values developed by the author. The index of facilitating values reflects the priority that people in different countries place on autonomy, and the extent of interpersonal trust in different countries. Autonomy was allocated 75% of the weight and trust was allocated 25%. The index was constructed using values data derived from the latest round of the World Values Survey. Economic freedom is measured using recent data from the Fraser Institute. This index reflects many different indicators relating to size of government, legal systems and property rights, sound money, freedom of international trade and regulation. Further information relating to construction of Figure 1 is available elsewhere on this blog.

Figure 2 suggests the existence of a strong positive relationship between emancipative values and personal freedom levels. The concept of emancipate values was developed by Christian Welzel to measure the beliefs that people hold about such matters as the importance of personal autonomy, respect for the choices people make in their personal lives, having a say in community decisions, and equality of opportunity (Welzel 2013). Welzel’s research, using data from the World Values Survey, suggests that as economic development has proceeded, larger numbers of people have tended to adopt emancipative values in an increasing number of societies. The personal freedom component of the Fraser Institute’s Human Freedom Index incorporates indicators of rule of law, security and safety, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom of association and civil society, freedom of expression and information, and relationship freedom (Vásquez et al. 2024). Further information relating to the construction of Figure 2 is also available elsewhere on this blog.

Economic freedom and personal freedom are strongly correlated (Vásquez et al. 2024, p.26). As discussed above, that can be partly explained by cultural intermediation. However, other processes may also be involved. For example, Milton Friedman suggested that economic freedom “promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other” (Friedman 1982, p.9).

The outlier data points in Figures 1 and 2 have been labelled to draw attention to countries that have substantially different economic and personal freedom ratings than might be predicted from their underlying cultural values.

The historical role played by individual political leaders in bringing about some of those outcomes is obvious to anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of the political history of some of the labelled countries, e.g. Venezuela, Argentina, Iran and China. However, those are all countries with economic and/or personal freedom ratings substantially lower than might be predicted by underlying cultural values. It is more difficult to identify the contributions individual political leaders with institutional outcomes in countries with greater freedom than might be predicted from underlying cultural values. For the jurisdictions where that is possible, e.g. Chile and Singapore (for economic freedom) and Taiwan and South Korea (for personal freedom) the political leaders who come to mind are not libertarians – they are authoritarian figures who held power several decades ago. 

Similar conclusions about the influence of political entrepreneurship are obtained by identifying countries which have experienced greatest change in economic and personal freedom since 2000. It is generally much easier to identify individual political entrepreneurs who have contributed to institutional outcomes in jurisdictions that have experienced the greatest contraction of freedom than in jurisdictions that have experienced the greatest expansion of freedom (Bates 2025).

It should not be surprising that it is easier to identify individual political leaders who have contributed to low or declining freedom ratings. Political leadership in the countries concerned is, by definition, authoritarian, or becoming increasingly authoritarian. When governments have relatively high regard for individual liberty, political entrepreneurship tends to be more subtle, and less focused on national leaders.

The ideas reflected in underlying cultures, as represented in Figures1 and 2, clearly account for only a portion of the ideas (including ideologies) which influence institutional change. And the power of ideas is not the only factor involved. Interest groups also seek to change the rules of the game in their favour.

The issue of whether interests dominate ideas, or vice versa, has been discussed in the past. (See, for example, Barry 1985.) It is important to emphasize, however, that there are no automatic mechanisms to translate ideas and interests into institutional changes. Political entrepreneurs play a crucial role in determining which ideas and interests have greatest impact on the rules of the game.

The following essay considers similarities between political and economic entrepreneurship.

References

Barry, Norman. "Ideas Versus Interests: The Classical Liberal Dilemma” in Hayek's Serfdom Revisited." Essays by economists, philosophers, and political scientists on The Road to Serfdom after 40 years (The Centre for Independent Studies, 1985).

Bates, Winton, (2025) Freedom and Flourishing: What role has political entrepreneurship played in changes in human freedom this century?

Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1982).

Inglehart, Ronald, “Culture and Democracy”, in Culture Matters, edited by Laurence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (Basic Books, 2000).

Vásquez, Ian, Matthew D. Mitchell, Ryan Murphy, and Guillermina Sutter, The Human Freedom Index 2024 (Cato and Fraser Institute, 2024).

Welzel, Christian, Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

What impact does political entrepreneurship have on freedom and flourishing?

 

Preface to a Series of Essays

“Entrepreneurship necessarily takes place within culture, it is utterly shaped by culture, and it fundamentally consists in interpreting and influencing culture.”

-        Don Lavoie (Lavoie 2015, p. 50)

A few months ago, a kind person told me that “Freedom and Flourishing” had become more than just a blog. With that thought in mind, I have decided to try something new. I am proposing to present here a series of linked essays that can be read in much the same way as a journal article. Readers who wish to do so will be able to start at this Preface and read all the way through to the end, or alternatively, just read the essays that are of most interest to them. There will be links at the end of each essay to help readers to find their way to the next one and links at the beginning of each essay to help readers to find their way back to this Preface.

Some readers may notice that some of the material presented here has been published previously on this blog. The views presented in this series of essays have been more carefully considered but are still subject to revision.

As always, I welcome comments from readers.

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Some readers will come to this series with the prior belief that political entrepreneurship has a negative impact on freedom and flourishing. Those of us who believe that people tend to flourish most fully when governments refrain from interfering with their lives may hold that belief. We certainly have good reasons to be skeptical about the impact of political entrepreneurs on human flourishing.

Nevertheless, if we are serious about promoting libertarian ideals, we cannot avoid considering the possibility that political entrepreneurship might have a role to play in getting us from where we are now - or where we seem to be heading - to a political and legal order that is more conducive to human flourishing.

In my view, it is important to obtain a better understanding of political entrepreneurship at this time because many voters in liberal democracies seem to have become increasingly dissatisfied with conventional centre-left and centre-right political leaders. Unfortunately, there seems to be increasing support in liberal democracies for leaders who propose rule changes which are likely to have detrimental impacts on prospects for freedom and flourishing. That support seems evident on both the progressive and conservative sides of politics.

In that context, it is particularly important to understand the contribution that political entrepreneurship has made to the problems that voters perceive, and the likely consequences of the alternative approaches to political entrepreneurship that are currently on offer.

The analytical approach adopted here has been influenced by entangled political economy as explained by Richard E. Wagner. According to that approach, both “polity and economy are arenas of practical action that operate in similar but not identical fashion” (Wagner 2016, p. 64).

Wagner’s approach recognizes the importance of individual action:

“The framework of entangled political economy accommodates recognition that societies change only through individual action inside those societies, and with those actions spreading within the society according to the receptivity of other members of that society to those changes” (Wagner 2016, p. 138).

As Chris Matthew Sciabarra has suggested, to understand institutional change we need to recognize interactions between personal, cultural and structural (political-economic) considerations. Sciabarra has discussed the nature of those interactions using a Tri-Level Model which builds on Ayn Rand’s conceptual framework (Sciabarra 2000, pp. 379-83). He emphasizes that although the personal, the cultural, and the structural can be analyzed separately, they can never be “reified as wholes unto themselves” (Sciabarra 2000, pp. 379-80).

I believe that the concept of political entrepreneurship is necessary to an understanding of institutional change for much the same reason that the concept of economic entrepreneurship is necessary to an understanding of technological change. The focus of the series is on how political entrepreneurship shapes the formal rules that govern economic and personal freedom across jurisdictions.

These essays draw heavily upon the insights of Don Lavoie in considering the nature of political entrepreneurship. In the passage quoted in the epigraph, Lavoie was writing about economic entrepreneurship. He argued that the “seeing of profit opportunities is a matter of cultural interpretation” (Lavoie 2015, p. 51). However, the idea that entrepreneurship consists in “interpreting and influencing culture” seems particularly relevant to political entrepreneurship.

What Lavoie means by culture is “the language in which past events are interpreted, future circumstances are anticipated, and plans of action are formulated.” (Lavoie 2015, p. 49).

He explains that he views culture as a discourse. In that context: “entrepreneurship is the achievement not so much of the isolated maverick who finds objective profits others overlooked as of the culturally embedded participant who picks up the gist of a conversation” (Lavoie 2015, p. 51).

Essays in this series will discuss the implications of significant differences that exist between political and economic entrepreneurship. In politics, voter choices are weakly linked to individual outcomes, decision-making often involves triadic relationships, and political marketing allows greater scope for deception. Moreover, political deal-making lacks a clear success metric comparable to profit in markets, and institutional incentives may attract opportunists rather than principled leaders.

I acknowledge, however, that many political entrepreneurs are motivated by a desire to achieve economic and social objectives that are widely supported in the communities they live in. They are confronted by information constraints. It is often impossible for a central authority to possess and process all the knowledge needed to achieve social and economic objectives without producing adverse, unintended consequences. As new policy initiatives are implemented to reduce those adverse consequences, economic freedom is often further reduced, and adverse economic and social impacts tend to multiply.

Political leaders seeking to restore economic freedom face challenges including entrenched interests and institutional path dependence. Changing formal rules is insufficient without corresponding changes in norms and incentives. I maintain that institutional reform is not solely about electing better leaders at a national level.

In advocating that the social sciences should pay more attention to the role of political entrepreneurship, I am certainly not attempting to promote a “great man theory” of institutional change. Political entrepreneurs rarely act alone, and their influence is constrained by a range of factors that are present to varying degrees in the societies in which they function.

Crucially, libertarian political entrepreneurs are unlikely to have a lasting impact on freedom and flourishing if their influence is confined to national politics. A national leader may play a pivotal role in sweeping away accumulated regulation but a culture supporting liberty and individual flourishing cannot be established and maintained unless many individuals undertake frequent acts of political entrepreneurship in their day-to-day interactions with others.

The structure of the series is as follows:

Part I provides a brief discussion of the links between freedom and flourishing to explain my reasons for focusing on institutions relating to economic and personal freedom. It also explains the meaning of institutions, institutional change, and political entrepreneurship.

Part II considers the extent to which differences in economic and personal freedom in different countries can be attributed to differences in underlying cultural values. It concludes that prevailing culture at a national level offers only a partial explanation of differences in economic and personal freedom levels. There is much left to be explained by other factors, particularly the influence of political entrepreneurship on the ideologies adopted by governments.

Part III discusses similarities between political and economic entrepreneurship.

Part IV discusses the incentives that political entrepreneurs are faced with in the context of the characteristics of politics that make it a peculiar business.  

Part V discusses the motives of political entrepreneurs and the impact of information constraints on pursuit of economic and social objectives.

Part VI considers the consequences of institutional path dependence, first in slowing the emergence of interest group politics and associated detrimental impacts on economic dynamism, and second in making it more difficult for reform-minded political entrepreneurs to restore economic freedom.

Part VII considers whether heroic political entrepreneurship has potential to promote freedom and flourishing. It urges that political entrepreneurship be perceived more broadly than in terms of government leadership.

Part VIII summarizes the series and concludes.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Chris Matthew Sciabarra for helpful comments on earlier drafts of some of the material presented in this series. The usual caveat applies. Please do not assume that Chris endorses the views presented here.

References

Lavoie, Don, “The discovery and interpretation of profit opportunities: culture and the Kirznerian entrepreneur”, in Culture and Economic Action, edited by Laura E Grube and Virgil Henry Storr (Edward Elgar, 2015).

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew, Total Freedom: Toward a Dialectical Libertarianism (Pennsylvania State University Press: 2000).

Wagner, Richard E., Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights from a Theory of Entangled Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016).

How can the study of human nature help us to reach normative conclusions in political philosophy?

When I read the sentence quoted in the epigraph above, the thought crossed my mind that Aristotle would have agreed with it. Aristotle based his philosophy on his observation of human nature. The reason why Aristotle came to mind will become apparent as you read the essay.

The quoted sentence written by Gerry Gaus is from the Preface of The Open Society and its Complexities (p.x). I have previously written about this book in an essay entitled: What does Gerry Gaus tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for political entrepreneurship?

I have three objectives in writing this essay:

• The first is to outline Gaus’s discussion of the social evolution of human nature and how that provides a basis for his normative conclusions about the desirability of an Open Society.
• The second is to consider what we need to know about human nature to reach normative conclusions about the desirability of an Open Society.
• The third is to consider whether Gaus’s approach helps us to defend the intuition that natural rights exist.

The evolution of human nature  

Gaus argues that human nature has been shaped by evolution, including cultural evolution. Humans are a norm-guided species. Social norms are predominantly a cultural phenomenon – a product of cultural evolution. The norms associated with different types of social order differentially encourage some aspects of human nature while discouraging others. Gaus suggests that “the truly outstanding feature of our evolved moral psychology is our ability to follow a wide variety of sharing and fairness norms in different circumstances and cultures”. (p.86)

Gaus suggests that the common view that publicly justified moral rules are a modern Western invention fails to appreciate that public justification has been a fundamental feature of moral life from the beginning:

“From the very beginning, human morality has relied on public justification: the rules of the group must be such that the members’ personal normative convictions and interests align with them.” (p.50)

Gaus is critical of the “tribal collectivist” view that humans “are simply, at bottom, natural egalitarian collectivists”. He begins his evolutionary story with conjectures about the complex social life of ancestral Pan – the posited common ancestor of humans, chimps and bonobos. Concern for personal autonomy may have its roots in a social life where individuals displayed a keen sense of self-interest in competition for alpha status, and in rebelling to avoid dominance.

Gaus acknowledges that Late Pleistocene (LPA) hunter-gather societies engaged in egalitarian meat-sharing. That was a means of reducing the variance in food intake, but it also reflects successful efforts by subordinates to control would-be bullies and upstarts. Under that interpretation, the egalitarian ethos of LPA societies was not inherently collectivist. LPA societies “appear characterized by a near-obsession with resisting the authority of would-be dominators”. LPA societies also exerted immense social pressure against innovators who sought to introduce new techniques to improve their own lot. This may have been an effective way to protect distributive shares.

People in LPA societies had a strong ethic of reciprocation – they engaged in the conditional cooperation that enables markets to function. Social support was more readily available to those who had a reputation for being willing to assist others.

Social norms developed in LPA societies as some moral rules became internalized because large majorities developed an emotional attachment to them and willingly complied with them. The exercise of self-control in conforming to social rules was a highly prized virtue in many small hunter groups.

About 17,000 years ago, there was a rise in inequality brought about by the development of forager clans, leading to creation of hierarchical states. The state’s organization gave it a decisive military advantage over more egalitarian groups. Grain-based monoculture may be the creation of hierarchical states rather than a cause of it.

Gaus presumably adopts F. A. Hayek’s view of the Open Society (or Great Society) as a society in which coercion of some by others has been reduced as far as possible and individuals are free to use their own knowledge for their own purposes. He argues that the morality of the Open Society scales up the norms of reciprocity and fairness while incorporating the ancient concern with autonomy and personal freedom: “the core rights of person and property become universal”. (p.133)

The recent emergence of WEIRD morality (the morality of Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democracies) may have occurred as a consequence of teachings of the Catholic Church opposed to incest, which was once defined so broadly that it led to the breakup of kin- and clan-based morality. Gaus notes Jonathan Haidt’s data (The Righteous Mind, 2012) indicating that the moral reasoning of WEIRD populations is largely focused on individuals and centres on the dimensions of liberty-oppression, care-harm, and fairness-cheating.  In contrast, most other moral systems, including those of conservatives in WEIRD societies give greater emphasis to loyalty-betrayal, authority-subversion, and sanctity-degradation.

Gaus suggests:

“Extending core morality beyond kin-based networks may have been the critical development of WEIRD morality, but WEIRD morality too manifests a push toward expansion of the impartial network and pulling back by kin and ethnic markers and the power of social proximity. Human social life is defined by this constant tension between the push to wider moral relations and the pulling back of familiarity and social proximity. To describe human morality as either tribalistic or an ever-expanding circle is evocative but fundamentally distorting.” (p. 90)

Gaus goes on to suggest that although cultural evolution does not render humans unfit for the Open Society, they may well be unfit for Millean liberalism (and by implication, WEIRD morality). He argues that Millean progressivism “is a recipe for drastically reducing social learning (aka imitation), throwing us back on our cognitive capacities. That, however, is in turn a recipe for undermining ultra-social cooperation, and would probably make any significant system of social rules dysfunctional”. (p.102)

The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality, entailing moral rules that lead toward extended cooperation rather than conflict and division. Diversity of moral perspectives is fundamental to the moral life of the Open Society. Thus, the existence of increasingly diverse moral perspectives can enhance justification of the Open Society and public justifications of those moral rules must be as accommodating to diversity as possible. (pp. 164-167)

Gaus concludes:

 “a variety of different moral perspectives can, counterintuitively, enhance the ability of a society to secure public justification of shared moral rules. Each has his own opinion of the point and value of these rules, yet each can particulate in, and indeed enhance a social process that can generate a self-organized social morality.” (p. 167)

That description of an important characteristic of an Open Society seems to be as close as Gaus comes to reaching a normative conclusion about the desirability of an Open Society.

What do we need to know about human nature to reach normative conclusions supporting an Open Society?

I don’t think we need an evolutionary account of the shaping of human nature to reach normative conclusions supporting an Open Society. Gerry Gaus could have argued that humans have a variety of different moral perspectives by merely referring to evidence such as that presented by Jonathan Haidt. He didn’t need his interesting account of the evolution of human nature to make the point that moral rules can only secure “public justification” if they are as accommodating to diversity as possible.

That is not intended as a criticism. Gaus made clear that his primary intention in providing the evolutionary account was to counter the view (attributed to Hayek among others) that our evolved moral sentiments constantly cause us to rebel against the Open Society and resort to a “tribal” moral outlook.

Gaus’s discussion of the evolution of moral norms helped him to focus on some aspects of human nature that are relevant to assessment of politico-legal orders. However, it seems to me that Gaus overlooked other relevant aspects of human nature such as the importance to individual flourishing of the exercise of practical wisdom and self-direction. The relevance of those aspects might have been given more prominence if Gaus had considered some studies with an individualistic focus on virtues and values.

The study by Martin Seligman and Christopher Petersen of virtues that are ubiquitous and valued in every culture is relevant in this context. By reading the basic writings of all the major religious and philosophical traditions, the researchers found that six virtues were endorsed by “almost every single one” of these traditions: wisdom and knowledge, courage, love and humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. That list incorporates the ancient cardinal virtues of practical wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice and the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love. Seligman and Petersen identified 24 character strengths that they viewed as the routes by which the virtues can be achieved. One aim of the study was to assist people to identify their own character strengths. The study recognizes that individuals who have different character strengths have potential to flourish in different ways. (The study is described in Martin Seligman, Authentic Happiness, 2012, pp. 125-161.)

Another relevant approach is Shalom Schwartz’s theory of basic values. The findings of his surveys suggest that the value priorities in 82 countries exhibit a similar hierarchical order, despite substantial differences in the value priorities of individuals within those countries. The 10 basic values identified in that study were self-direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, security, power, achievement, hedonism, and stimulation. (See: Schwatz, S.H., 2012, ‘An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values’, Online Readings in Psychology and Culture.)

There are no doubt other empirical studies that identify the importance of practical wisdom and self-direction to individual flourishing.

However, as Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl (often referred to as the Dougs) have pointed out, “the character of human flourishing is not discovered solely by a scientific study of human nature. Considerations of the requirements and conditions for human volition and action, cultural and social practices, and commonsense observations are part of the process”. The Dougs add: “The point of entry for such reflection most often occurs when we examine our lives as a whole and wonder what they are for”. (Norms of Liberty, 2005, p.116).

The Dougs present a Neo-Aristotelian account of human flourishing in which the human good is explained to be objective, inclusive, individualized, agent-relative, self-directed and social. After providing that explanation, the authors conclude:

“Regardless of whether or not the forgoing outline of human flourishing meshes with Aristotle’s, it clear that human flourishing is, for our theory of individualistic perfectionism, something plural and complex, not monistic and simple. As we have noted, this view of human flourishing amounts to a version of moral pluralism because there are many goods that help to define human flourishing. Further, there is no single good or virtue that dominates all others and reduces them to mere instrumental values.” (p.143)

The Dougs do not refrain from declaring that human flourishing is good. Flourishing occurs when individuals actualize their natural potential to be good humans. (p.122)

The Dougs note that the individualized and agent-relative character of human flourishing poses the problem of how it can be possible for individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others. They explain that recognition of individual rights solves that problem because it enables individuals to flourish in different ways provided that they do not interfere with the rights of others. (pp. 76-96)

I hope that this brief outline of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl’s discussion of human flourishing provides sufficient evidence that their normative conclusions in political philosophy are based on their study of human nature.

Does Gaus’s evolutionary discussion help us to defend intuitions that natural rights exist?

In my book, Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing, I noted that, since ancient times, some philosophers have recognized that there is a foundation in human nature for intuitions about natural rights. I noted Haidt’s moral foundations theory and Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution but most of my discussion focused on Robert Nozick’s discussion of the evolution of norms and intuitions related to social cooperation for mutual benefit and the ethics of respect. (pp. 26-28) Nozick’s discussion is in his book, Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World, published in 2001.

Gaus’s discussion of cultural evolution overlaps considerably with Nozick’s, but there are differences of emphasis. As noted above, Gaus’s discussion emphasizes that public justification has always been a fundamental feature of moral life of humanity and that some moral rules become internalized as large majorities developed an emotional attachment to them. I think public justification is also implied in Nozick’s discussion of the merits of voluntary cooperation to mutual benefit because voluntary cooperation requires public justification.  (Nozick, p.259)

One difference of emphasis arises because of Nozick’s interest in the question of why conscious self-awareness was selected for in evolutionary processes. Nozick suggests that “if the function of conscious self-awareness was selected for because it makes us capable of ethical behaviour, then ethics, even the first layer of the ethics of respect, truly is what makes us human”. (p.300) Gaus is more interested in issues of public justification of norms and the question of “how we can live without oppression and subjugation in a complex and deeply divided world”.

I think Gaus’s evolutionary discussion is helpful to an understanding of why it is common for people to have intuitions that rules that restrain individual action require public justification to ensure that, as far as is possible, they are aligned with the personal normative convictions of community members.  Perhaps the intuition that people have a natural right to public justification of rules that restrain individual action is just as widespread and as strong as the intuition that individuals have a natural right to respect for their persons and property.

 Conclusions

This essay was prompted by my reading of Gerry Gaus’s book, The Open Society and its Complexities.

Gaus’s discussion of the evolution of human nature emphasizes the following points:

• Public justification of rules and concern for personal autonomy were a fundamental feature of moral life even before the evolution of modern humans.
• The evolved moral psychology of humans has allowed a wide variety of fairness norms to be followed in different circumstances and cultures.
• Human nature is neither fundamentally tribalistic nor is it characterized by an ever-expanding circle of moral relationships. There is constant tension between tendencies toward expansion of moral concerns and pulling back to familiarity and social proximity.
• The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality and diversity of moral perspectives.

Gaus argues that diversity can enhance the ability of a society to secure public justification of shared moral rules.

I think the points that Gaus emphasizes about human nature are helpful in considering the merits of an Open Society but I would have liked to have seen him give consideration to the relevance of other aspects of human nature such as the widespread view that exercise of practical wisdom is a virtue and the value that people place on self-direction. Consideration of practical wisdom and self-direction would have required consideration of studies with an individualistic focus as well as those that focus on social norms.

 It is possible to obtain insights about human nature from commonsense observations, introspection and reasoning, as well as from scientific research. On the basis of their observations and reasoning Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl were able to explain (in Norms of Liberty) that the human good is individualized, agent-relative and self-directed, as well as social. Their understanding of the nature of human good and individual flourishing provided a foundation for their normative conclusion that it is necessary for the politico-legal framework to recognize individual rights. Rights recognition makes it possible for individuals to flourish in different ways without the flourishing of some individuals or groups being given structural preference over that of others.

It is appropriate for conclusions about the rights of individuals to be based on the study of human nature rather than intuitions. Nevertheless, the intuition that humans have rights that should be respected is an important factor influencing individual behaviour. That influence could be expected to be stronger when people believe that individual rights are natural, in the sense of having a foundation in human nature. It seems to me that evolutionary theory supports that belief.

Gaus’s book left me thinking that the intuition that individuals have a natural right to public justification of the rules that restrain their actions may be as widespread and as strong as the intuition that they have a natural right to respect for their persons and property. More generally, it may be that humans tend to have strong intuitions that natural justice itself is a natural right.

Addendum

Readers might also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.

What does Gerald Gaus tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for political entrepreneurship?

 

This essay is the latest in a series that I have been writing about political entrepreneurship. It is the second that I have written on the implications of the knowledge problem for the plans of entrepreneurs who seek to improve economic and social outcomes. The first essay discussed Don Lavoie’s contribution to our understanding of the implications of the knowledge problem in that context.

The Complexities of the Open Society

This essay is based on my reading of Gerry Gaus’s final book, The Open Society and its Complexities. Gaus was a prolific author. This book, published in 2021, has been described by Chandran Kukathas as “his most ambitious work”. Gaus adopted an interdisciplinary approach to political philosophy and saw himself as being in “the truth business” rather than a proponent of any ideology. Nevertheless, it is obvious from the book that he valued the norms of liberty of the Open Society and detested authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

Like Don Lavoie, Gerry Gaus was strongly influenced by F. A. Hayek. In The Open Society, Gaus re-considers some of Hayek’s views in the light of developments over the last 20 years in theories of evolution and analyses of societies as complex systems. He focuses on the following three challenges based on his interpretation of Hayek’s views:

• First, do “our evolved moral sentiments constantly cause us to rebel against the Open Society and resort to a “tribal” moral outlook”?
• Second, given that “an evolved complex culture requires fidelity to … evolved norms, what type of justification” of the norms of the Open Society is open to us”?
• Third, has the Open Society “evolved beyond our governance”?

I will provide here just the briefest possible summary of Gaus’s responses to the first two questions.

First, humans “are certainly not inherently groupish creatures”. Humans are “fit for the Open Society”. However, they have not been optimized for it or any other social order, including tribal society.

Second, because the diversity of moral perspectives is fundamental to the moral life of the Open Society, the existence of increasingly diverse moral perspectives can enhance justification of the Open Society. The Open Society is characterized by self-organized social morality, entailing moral rules that lead toward extended cooperation rather than conflict and division. Public justifications of those moral rules must be as accommodating to diversity as possible. Effective governance requires widely justified norms and policies.

Knowledge required for governance

In this essay I focus on the Gaus’s view of the knowledge problem in his discussion of the question of whether the Open Society has evolved beyond “our” governance. He alludes to the knowledge problem when he observes that “we seek to devise policies to improve” the functioning of the Open Society. However, “we do not have the knowledge and competency to do so, hence we are constantly disappointed by the last round of interventions and we blame the last government for its failures and broken promises” (p. 13).

The passage quoted in the epigraph is from page 244, a point in the book where Gaus was summing up his argument. After noting that the passive population model often supposed that people would act against their own judgments, Gaus adds:

“Unfortunately, this view has been resurrected by those elites who continue to believe that the public is too ignorant to make its own decisions, and so should submit to “epistocracy,” or rule by those who know (aka, them). Not only, however, is such expertise essentially nonexistent in complex systems, but most actual agents in the Open Society are anything but passive materials to be guided by the elite: they are active, reflexive agents who make their own choices. When citizens do not endorse a policy, many will employ their resources to evade it.”

In considering whether the Open Society has evolved beyond our governance, Gaus introduces the concept of “self-governance”.  Self-governance is not the same as spontaneous self-organization, although Gaus suggests that the two concepts are not necessarily incompatible.

Self-governance requires that there be a “controller” who collects information at the system level and then uses that information to fuel a decision procedure that plays a role in guiding the systems behaviour.

Gaus refers to those aspiring to be controllers as governors. The roles that governors seek to perform may include the functions of political entrepreneurs. As I have discussed elsewhere, that function includes listening to the discourse of potential customers (supporters) to sense what they are likely to find attractive, and on that basis producing new products (policy proposals) and selling them persuasively.

Gaus considers three levels of governance – macro, meso, and micro- and three dimensions of governance – goal directed, strategic, and rules-focused. A goal-directed governor identifies preferred states and seeks to move society toward them. A strategic governor seeks to solve strategic dilemmas to assist citizens to secure outcomes they all want. A rules-focused governor seeks to structure some of the rules of self-organization.

Gaus’s analysis leads to the following conclusions:

• There is little prospect for a governor to successfully pursue macro-level goals in a complex society. For example, efforts to promote development in particular societies are often unsuccessful because institutions cannot readily be transferred from on society to another.
• Attempts to structure the “rules of the game” at a macro level are more promising. In cooperation with the self-organized normative framework of society a governor may effectively shape the rules of self-organization e.g. via civil rights legislation.
• Goal pursuit at the meso level is a dubious enterprise. Pursuit of environmental, economic and welfare-targeted variables is a hit-and-miss affair because our social world is a complex system. It is not linear and determinate, as is often assumed. Successful goal pursuit in a complex world is usually a matter of “muddling through” (sometimes described as learning-based governance).
• Polycentric governance studies show that a focus on problem-solving tends to facilitate effective governance when publics share pressing strategic dilemmas.
• There may be grounds for more optimism about the prospect for micro governance than governance at other levels.

In writing about micro governance, Gaus makes a favourable reference to the work of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Gaus justifies his optimism about micro governance as follows:

 “When changes come up from the more micro levels, not only are they apt to garner the moral endorsement of actual citizens, but the Open Society will possess a diversity of normative networks. Because what works today may be dysfunctional tomorrow, a diversity of approaches is always critical. This itself upsets the moralist, who believes she speaks for the truth about justice, and sees most deviations from her plan as shades of immorality. But many of the diverse publics will not take up her solutions—many citizens will see different problems and possibilities, and their normative beliefs will lead them to different solutions. (p. 240)

Summing up

In The Open Society and its Complexities, Gerry Gaus provided insights about the circumstances in which political entrepreneurs may be successful in pursuing goals.

Gaus was highly critical of the passive population model which assumes that people will follow policies dictated by governments rather than acting as self-governing agents. Such considerations made him highly skeptical about pursuit of goals at a macro level in a complex society.

He viewed pursuit of environmental, economic and welfare goals as problematic but acknowledged that some success may be achieved by “muddling through” i.e. adjusting policies in response to outcomes.

He was more optimistic about cooperative efforts to modify the “rules of the game” in which self-organization occurs. He also acknowledged that a focus on problem-solving tends to facilitate effective governance when people are confronted by pressing strategic dilemmas.

Gaus seems to have been most optimistic about micro-level governance that is able to garner the endorsement of “actual citizens”.

Addendum

Readers might also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.

What does Don Lavoie tell us about the implications of the knowledge problem for the plans of political entrepreneurs?

One of the questions that I have been contemplating in recent months is whether the tariff policies of President Trump could be part of a coherent economic plan. Can his policies be rationalized in terms of revenue raising objectives, the optimum tariff argument, provision of appropriate incentives to manufacturing industries to meet defence or employment objectives, or the pursuit of foreign policy objectives? Is it possible that he is assigning policy instruments to objectives in a manner consistent with a rational plan?

The presumption underlying such questions is that it is preferable for political entrepreneurs to endeavor to ensure that their economic plans are coherent rather than unprincipled, unpredictable, and capricious. Although that may be a reasonable presumption, there is another other option that should be considered. Perhaps it is appropriate for political entrepreneurs to refrain from engaging in economic planning.

I was reminded of that while reading Don Lavoie’s book, National Economic Planning: What is Left?  Don Lavoie was an economics professor at George Mason University, where he taught from 1981 until his death in 2001. This book was originally published by the Cato Institute in 1985 and was reprinted by the Mercatus Center in 2016.

In this book Don Lavoie explains, among other things, that political entrepreneurs are confronted with a fundamental knowledge problem when they seek to plan economic activities, The epigraph quoted above (from page 181) encapsulates an important implication of the knowledge problem.

Lavoie’s explanation of the information problem begins with the insights of F. A. Hayek. The data that a planning agency would require to engage in rational economic planning resides in the separate minds of millions of people. The data exists only in a dispersed form that cannot be fully extracted by any single agent in society. The only way that knowledge can be used effectively is by relying on competitive struggles in a market system.  (p. 56)

The most obvious implication is that it is impossible for markets to be replaced by comprehensive economic planning. However, more modest attempts to steer the market towards particular outcomes also obstruct the source of knowledge which is essential to rational decision-making. (p. 56-7)

Lavoie points out that the only way we can know whether we are squandering resources by over- or underinvesting in microprocessors or steel, for example, is via “the messages contained in the relative profitability of rival firms in these industries”. He adds:

“But this is precisely the information we garble when we channel money toward one or another of the contenders. Deprived of its elimination process, the market would no longer be able to serve its function as a method for discovering better and eliminating worse production techniques. Without the necessity of responding to consumers’ wants or needs, businesses would never withdraw from unprofitable avenues of production.” (p.181)

Lavoie notes that advocates of industry policy disagree on the directions in which the market should be steered. For example, Felix Rohatyn wanted to funnel aid to sunset industries while Robert Reich wanted to funnel it to sunrise industries. He sums up:

“It is the main conclusion of the argument that I have called the knowledge problem … that there are no rational grounds on which Reich could ever convince Rohatyn or vice versa on such matters as are involved in economic change. As a result, such battles are sure to be fought with weapons other than carefully reasoned argument.” (p. 200-201)

Lavoie notes that Rohatyn and Reich both argued that it is the responsibility of a strong leader to coordinate the actions of the rest of us. (p.190) The coordination they had in mind seems to be more akin to the coordination that military leaders impose by giving orders to subordinates than the coordination among individuals that occurs voluntarily and spontaneously in a free market.

Lavoie argues that economic planning is inherently militaristic: “The practice of planning is nothing but the militarization of the economy”. In making that point he notes that the theory of economic planning was from its inception modeled after feudalistic and militaristic organizations. (p. 230)

Some would argue that a degree of militarization is a price worth paying, or even desirable, to achieve a range of national objectives. Indeed, the conventional theory of democracy seems to entail top-down direction. Prior to elections, political leaders tell voters about their plans for education, health, social security etc. and are expected to implement those plans after they are elected.  

I am not aware of anything that Lavoie wrote that discusses the legitimacy of the concept of national objectives and the question of whether planning (and militarization) may be necessary in the pursuit of social objectives. However, he provided a highly relevant discussion of the concept of democracy in a book chapter entitled, ‘Democracy, Markets, and the Legal Order: Notes on the Nature of Politics in a Radically Liberal Society’. (The book is: Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (Eds.) Liberalism and the Economic Order, Cambridge University Press, 1993.)

In that chapter Lavoie notes that Western liberals tend to view democracy and markets “as in some sort of necessary tension with one another”. We tend to think that “taking democracy too far undermines markets and that taking markets too far undermines democracy”. He attributes that view to “liberalism’s gradual drift into compromises with conservatism and socialism”.

Lavoie argues that liberalism needs to reinterpret its notions of markets and democracy so that they are seen to be essentially complementary. Our economics needs to take account of the cultural underpinnings of markets and our politics “needs to move beyond the model of the exercise of some kind of unified, conscious democratic will and understand democratic processes as distributed throughout the political culture”. The force of public opinion is best perceived as the distributed influence of political discourses throughout society rather than as “a concentrated will”.

Lavoie suggests that what we should mean by democracy is a distinctive kind of openness in society rather than a theory about how to elect the personnel of government:

“Democracy is not a quality of the conscious will of a representative organization that has been legitimated by the public, but a quality of the discursive process of the distributed wills of the public itself.” (p.111).

It seems to me that those who see merit in Lavoie’s view of democracy have good reasons to be skeptical about the worth of top-down planning to achieve national objectives. Individuals have different priorities and objectives that deserve to be recognized. National plans cannot solve the knowledge problem entailed in giving appropriate recognition to individual differences. 

Addendum

Readers might also be interested in a later series of essays on political entrepreneurship.

Is it too soon to be asking in what part of the world will the next golden age be located?

 

The question posed above occurred to me as I was reading the final pages of Johan Norberg’s latest book, Peak Human: What We Can Learn from the Rise and Fall of Golden Ages.

Johan Norberg is a senior fellow at the Cato institute. He is a historian of ideas and a prolific author. If Norberg has a fan club, I might qualify for honorary membership. I have written about some of his previous books on this blog (here and here) and have read others.

Norberg explains what he means by a golden age in these terms:

“A golden age is associated with a culture of optimism, which encourages people to explore new knowledge, experiment with new methods and technologies, and exchange the results with others. Its characteristics are cultural creativity, scientific discoveries, technological achievements and economic growth that stand out compared with what came before and after it, and compared with other contemporary cultures. Its result is a high average standard of living, which is usually the envy of others, often also of their heirs.”

The author suggests that the most important precondition for a golden age is “an absence of orthodoxies imposed form the top about what to believe, think and say, how to live and what to do.” He doesn’t present the golden ages he has identified in utopian terms. He acknowledges that countries concerned all practiced slavery, denied women basic rights and “took great delight in exterminating neighbouring populations”.

As implied in the epigraph, Norberg argues that civilizations decline when they lose cultural self-confidence. He suggests that episodes of creativity and growth are often terminated because of the perceived self-interest of people who fear change and feel threatened by it. Free speech is replaced by orthodoxies and free markets are replaced by increased economic controls. The fears of those seeking stability and predictability often become self-fulfilling.

 In my view, Norberg has done an excellent job in explaining why golden ages have emerged and disappeared at different times in different parts of the world.

However, I think there may be an omission in the author’s identification of golden ages. I will briefly discuss that before focusing on the question of whether the Anglosphere is in decline.

Identifying golden ages

Norberg discusses seven golden ages in his book. Since he doesn’t provide a summary timeline showing their duration, I asked ChatGPT to construct the following:

• Athens: 480–404 BC
• Rome: 27 BC–AD 180
• Abbasids: 750–950
• Song dynasty: 960–1279
• Renaissance Italy: 1490–1527
• Dutch Republic: 1609–1672
• Anglosphere: c. 1688 onward.

If that timeline is broadly correct, it suggests that the largest gap between golden ages occurred between the end of the golden age of Rome and the beginning of the golden age of the Abbasids. What was happening at that time? Although the golden age of Rome may have ended around 180, following the death of Marcus Aurelius, the decline and fall of the Roman empire took a few more centuries. The last emperor of the Western Roman empire was deposed in 476. Plato’s Academy in Athens apparently continued to function until 532, when the seven last philosophers left to seek refuge with the Persian king. Interest in Greek philosophy grew in Persia during the 6^th and 7^th centuries, partly because of the presence of scholars associated with schismatic Christian sects.

As I was pondering what was happening between 180 and 750, I began to wonder whether India’s golden age might have been worth discussing in this book. While visiting India last year I read William Dalrymple’s book, TheGolden Road: How Ancient India Transformed the World. As well as discussing India’s impact on religion and culture throughout much of Asia, Dalrymple. points out that over the period from about 250BC to AD 1200, India was an important centre of commerce and trade, and an innovator in fields such as astronomy and mathematics.

India was the source of the numerical system with 10 digits including zero, that we use today. Norberg mentions that important contribution, but Dalrymple discusses it at greater length.

Another fascinating topic discussed by Dalrymple is the close relationship between the merchant classes of early India and the Buddhist monastic movement. Dalrymple emphasizes the importance of trade between India and the Roman empire. He notes that as the Roman empire crumbled, India’s trade with Europe was replaced by expansion of its trade with south-east Asia.

Is the Anglosphere in decline?

The Anglosphere refers to those nations where the English language and cultural values are dominant. Few would dispute that over the last couple of centuries the Anglosphere, first led by Britain and then the United States, played a leading role among nations in demonstrating the benefits of liberal democracy, free markets, technological innovation, and free international trade. Life in the Anglosphere has been far from ideal even in respect of those criteria, but there can be no doubt that we have been living in an age of widespread prosperity that is without historical precedent. As Norberg points out, the whole world has benefited from the spread of golden-age conditions fostered by the Anglosphere, with global extreme poverty declining from 38 to 9 percent in just the period since 1990.

However, Norberg notes that “many ominous signs of decline are clearly present in our time”. He mentions the “hubristic overreach” of U.S. attempts to reshape the Middle East through military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the financial crash of 2008, and the growth of “crippling public debt”. He suggests that a series of crises, including the Covid pandemic, have fostered “a sense that the world is dangerous and that we need to protect ourselves from it”. He writes:

“Most worryingly, rich counties have experienced a major backlash against globalization and trade, and immigrants have become scapegoats, just as they were in so many other eras of decline, potentially shutting us out from our most potent source of constant revitalization.”

Norberg notes that both China and Russia “have recently taken a totalitarian turn and are working hard to devastate neighbours”. He suggests, nevertheless, that Russia and China will have a hard time trying to challenge the Anglosphere-led world order because it will be difficult for them to find reliable friends among advanced states. 

Unfortunately, in the short time since the book was written, the government of the United States has adopted an international stance that seems to be inconsistent with the continued existence of an Anglosphere-led world order. Countries that have long regarded themselves as allies of the U.S. are now forced to contemplate seriously how they can best protect their own interests if the U.S. pursues isolationist policies.

The book ends on a somewhat optimistic note. The author observes that there are roughly fifty prosperous, open societies around the world. If one of them fails, “that will not stop others from picking up the torch”. He adds:

“That prompts the question of where the next golden age will come from.”

After considering various possibilities, however, he suggests that “perhaps this is the wrong way to look at it because we now have a “truly global civilization” in which every literate person anywhere in the world can draw upon the accumulated knowledge of humanity and learn skills in any field. In that context, “no one country can hold a monopoly on the ideas that can make them prosper”.

I agree with the general thrust of that argument. The technology required for future golden ages is not deposited in a library that can be easily destroyed. However, the geographical location of societies that are open and prosperous is still an issue worth considering. It isn’t much consolation for citizens in the United States, Britain or Australia to know that their children and grandchildren may be able to draw upon the accumulated knowledge of humanity and learn skills in any field, if institutional change impinges adversely on their incentives to do such things. Opportunities for human flourishing depend on whether political entrepreneurs will restore and maintain sufficient economic freedom.

It is in that context that I ask: Is it too soon to be asking where the next golden age will be located?

I suggested an optimistic answer to that question in Chapter 6 of Freedom, Progress, and Human Flourishing. Looking beyond looming economic crises, I am still optimistic that the governments of most liberal democracies will eventually introduce institutional reforms to enable the drivers of progress to restore growth of opportunities.

Addendum

Readers may also be interested in a recent article by Johan Norberg, entitled “From Athens to Sparta: How Trumpism is Accelerating America’s Decline”, published in The Unpopulist:

https://www.theunpopulist.net/?utm_source=navbar&utm_medium=web .